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Summary: The thesis constitutes a study of a number of models of sovereignty as a 
means of gaining illumination on the nature of the use of sovereignty as an explanatory 
idea and the practices which it is used to represent. The models studied in detail are 
those of Augustinus Triumphus, who provided a pre-modern model of theocratically 
based global governance, and of Hobbes, Austin and Schmitt, who provided models 
of territorially based secular governance. In the analysis of these models, the features 
of sovereignty that will be explored are its symbolic character, its embeddedness, the 
role of routine in its operation and its potentiality for rupture. In relation to the last 
mentioned feature, which is particularly although not solely posed in Schmitt’s model of 
sovereignty, a grammar of normalities is developed in response to the relationship 
between norm and exception lying at the centre of his model. In examining these 
features, a philosophical framework will be developed, drawing on the writings of Ernst 
Cassirer, with particular reference to his ideas concerning the structure and role of 
symbols. Further theoretical refinements are made by supplementing the above 
framework with insights taken from Ludwig Wittgenstein, Anthony Giddens and 
Charles Taylor, and the idea of rupture is investigated more rigorously by exploring its 
relationship to that of routine. At this point, a model of popular sovereignty developed 
by Hans Lindahl and influenced by Cassirer is critically examined and a response is 
made to its inadequacies. In the conclusion, the notion of a secularised chain of being 
is introduced as a general underlying feature of the discourse of sovereignty. It will be 
suggested that despite the differences between the models, they all represent 
particular instances of an approach dependent on this notion, which has implications 
for the general nature of the discourse of sovereignty.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1. To engage in an extensive literature survey of the word ‘sovereign’ or 
‘sovereignty’ would result in a multi-volume work. It has been said that it is a term 
that has a long and troubled history.1 The reasons for this are several-fold. First it is a 
term that finds itself located across the boundaries o f a variety of disciplines, such as 
for example, those of law, both domestic and international, politics, international 
relations, philosophy, theology, sociology, history and economics. Various attempts 
have been made to classify it. For example Krasner claims to attribute four meanings 
to it. Domestic sovereignty, the domain with which the intellectual history of 
sovereignty has been most clearly associated, suggests the existence of a final and 
absolute authority possessed with supreme power over a territorially based political 
community. International legal sovereignty on the other hand is captured by the idea 
of state sovereignty and suggests that each state has legal competence to participate 
on an equal footing with other states in an international community dominated by the 
existence of such states.3 Interdependence sovereignty is a category introduced by 
Krasner to reflect the deepening of globalization and the varying abilities of states to 
effectively exercise control over movements which are trans-national in character 
including those of people, capital and pollutants. A loss of interdependence 
sovereignty does not in itself automatically lead to a loss of domestic sovereignty 
perceived as the existence of what is considered within the state to be the final and 
absolute political authority. However, it may well progressively weaken the position 
of that authority, as it increasingly comes to be seen as incapable of exercising 
effective control over certain entities within the state’s borders.4 The last category in 
Krasner’s taxonomy is that of Westphalian sovereignty which embraces the principles 
of territoriality and the exclusion of external actors ‘from domestic authority
1 Crawford, J 2006: 32.
2 He classifies sovereignty as domestic, international, interdependence and Westphalian sovereignty.
3 Steinberge, R.H 2004: 329.
4 Krasner, S.D 1999: 12-13. Clearly it can be said that interdependence sovereignty is undermined by 
the growth o f international phenomenon such as terrorism, climate change, the rise o f aids and the 
growing fuel and water crisis. See also Sassen, S 1996 for a useful exploration of the ways in which 
internal sovereignty is being undermined by global developments which cover economic globalisation 
and the development o f  international global governance through the organisations such as the World 
Trade Organisation, the increased movements o f populations and the emergence of an international 
human rights discourse reflected in a variety o f international human rights’ codes emanating in essence 
from the United Nations’ Universal Declaration o f Human Rights 1948.
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structures.’5 In other words domestic authorities are the sole arbiters of legitimate 
behaviour. Rees identifies six uses of the term ‘sovereignty’. Keohane
o
distinguishes between formal and ‘operational’ sovereignty. Steinberg, 
concentrating upon sovereignty from a non-domestic perspective, in effect highlights 
two approaches to sovereignty, namely from the perspective of international law, 
already mentioned above and from a behavioural perspective that seeks to evaluate 
the extent to which states in fact exercise the authority conferred by legal 
sovereignty.9 Reflecting on the plethora of ways in which sovereignty has been 
identified, it has been complicated further by the fact that the use of the term has 
shifted over time. Capturing this, the 1911 edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica 
concluded that ‘the literature of the subject is immense: every book on political 
science from the Republic of Plato has dealt with or touched on sovereignty.’10
2. One can see from the above that the different approaches mentioned intersect and 
are interdependent. Internal or domestic sovereignty which provides the internal 
coherence of a state is clearly profoundly linked to its external manifestation marked 
by the inter-relationship between states. However, the existence of a supreme 
authority internally will have little meaning without a degree of operational 
effectiveness associated with what Steinberg described as behavioural sovereignty.
Yet the seeming inter-dependence of internal with external sovereignty is not as 
simple as it first seems. The phenomenon of the failed state complicates the nature of 
this interdependence. In such states internal central governance is weak and 
significant swathes of the territory under their jurisdiction may in fact be beyond their 
operational control. Nevertheless from an international legal perspective such a state 
is accorded competence to engage in the international system ostensibly on an equal 
footing with other states.11 This complication is facilitated because a conceptual gap 
has opened up from the perspective of international law between a change of
5 Krasner, S.D 1999: 20.
6 Krasner, S.D 1999: 20.
7 Rees, W.J 1969: 209-240.
8 Keohane, R.O 1995: 177.
9 Steinberg explicitly refers to three views but the last concerns the extent to which sovereignty from a 
behavioural point of view is being undermined by a series of non-state actors and global developments 
(Steinberg, R.H 2004: 329-330).
10 Cited by Radon, J 2004:195 from http://1911encyclopeadia.Org/S/SO/SOVEREIGNTY.htm.
11 The formality o f state equality is not reflected in its reality. Not all states have the same rights in 
actuality although all states have the legal capacity to enjoy the rights they possess in legal settings 
(Simpson, G 2004: 44).
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government and a change of sovereignty.12 The requirements of state creation include 
the need for an effective government.13 There is a strong presumption for example 
that the state continues to exist with its rights and obligations even though there may 
have been revolutionary changes in government. Similarly a state is presumed to 
exist even where there is no effective government.14 Looking at this discrepancy from 
the perspective of an insurgent movement within the borders of a particular state, it 
may exercise sovereignty in an operational sense within the territory under its 
effective control but from the perspective of the central authority it will not possess 
legal sovereignty and will instead be an unlawful usurper. From an international 
perspective, the fact that operationally significant areas of a state’s territory are 
beyond the operational control of the central government will not automatically cause 
any change to the continued treatment of the territory as coming under the jurisdiction 
of one state and being represented by one government.15 If an insurgent movement 
ousts the existing regime, the fact of the change will not be regarded as lawful by the 
previous regime but its advent to power is unlikely to cause the state to cease to exist 
from an international perspective. As far as the position of government is concerned,
12 Until the middle o f the nineteenth century there was a close connection between concepts of state 
and government. However since then ‘a conceptual chasm’ has opened up between change of 
sovereignty and change o f government (Crawford, J 2006: 34). This gap needs to be treated with care 
as one can see from below that one o f the requirements for the creation o f a state is the existence o f a 
government.
13 The law relating to the existence o f states and international legal sovereignty is complex and has 
attached to it an enormous literature. However it is worth pointing out that there are two basic 
approaches to the question o f  whether a state exists, one being declaratory in nature and the other being 
constitutive in nature, the existence o f a state being dependent upon being recognised by other states. 
Recognition o f  course chimes with real politique. The principle o f effectiveness, the application of 
which is relevant to whether states are considered to exist, is expressed in the Montevideo Convention 
o f Rights and Duties of States 1933 and includes the requirement of a permanent population, a defined 
territory, government and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. See; Kelsen, H 1960; 
Brownlie, 1 2003; Fassbender, B 2003; Crawford, J 2006.
14 One can cite here most obviously Iraq where the government remains heavily dependent on external 
forces, particularly those of the United States to bolster its position and at least until recently, it was 
doubtful that the removal o f such forces would not have been accompanied fairly rapidly by the fall o f  
the government. The position in Afghanistan also has similarities as the central government’s writ o f  
control does not extend to significant swathes o f  the country.
15 States where such conditions have existed include Angola from 1975 to 1995, Cambodia from 1970 
to 1975, Nigeria from 1967 to 1970 and Eritrea and Ethiopia from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. 
The law relating to conditions for the creation o f states that involve insurgency is complex and will not 
be examined in detail. However it is worth noting that Article 2 paragraph 4 o f the Declaration of 
Principles o f International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in 
accordance with the Charter o f the United Nations provides that ‘Every State has the duty to refrain 
from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration o f the principle o f equal 
rights and self-determination o f their rights, to self-determination and freedom and independence’. 
Whether or not a territory will be characterised as a self-determination territory and the implications of  
such characterisation is a matter o f some complexity and need not be pursued here. See Crawford, J 
2006: 107-148.
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historically its recognition has been a unilateral act by each state and has been 
dominated by the effective control test. This chimes with Kelsen’s basic proposition 
that legitimacy derived from an existing legal order is the final analysis trumped by its 
effectiveness.16 This doctrine remains central to whether governments that had come 
to power unconstitutionally are recognised even though the practice of recognition has 
recently been weakened as a pivotal position defining the relationship between many 
states and newly emerging regimes. This reflects a re-emphasis on the fundamental 
point that the pivotal question to any government’s relationship with any other
1 7government is the recognition or not of the state to which the latter corresponds.
The idea of effectiveness which pervades both the recognition of states and of 
governments is however capable of being multifaceted, as indicated in criteria used to 
assess their existence, for example those contained in the Montevideo Convention of 
Rights and Duties of States 1933. These criteria are contestable in that all the criteria 
embodied in the declaration have an indeterminate quality.
3. The practice of sovereignty therefore appears to have both an internal and external 
dimension and at least from an operational point of view it is difficult to see how one 
can operate without the other.18 To put it in the language of Searle, it is part of the 
objective background against which its internal expression operates.19 To put it in the 
language of Taylor, for whom the idea of background as will be later explained more 
fully concerns the subjective awareness of individuals as they engage with the world, 
it is also capable of forming part of both the subjective background and foreground of 
individuals engaged in the practice of internal sovereignty.20 And it is internal 
sovereignty that will form the central concern of this thesis.
16 Kelsen, H 1999: 213. This reflects Jennings’s observation that ‘[a]ll revolutions are legal when they 
have succeeded and it is the success denoted by acquiescence which makes their constitutions law’ 
(Jennings, I 1959: 117-118).
17 The British Foreign Office makes this point in a policy statement in 1980. See 408 HL Debs cols 
1121-2; Crawford, J 2006: 151; Petersen, MJ 1996: 35,149,255.
18 Kant, for example, made it explicit that internal governance depends upon and is subordinated to the 
need to establish ‘a law governed external relationship with other states’ (Kant, I 1991: 47).
19 See Chapter 6 below at para 26 for an exploration o f the Searle’s idea o f the background as 
compared to Taylor’s.
20 See Chapter 6 at para 25 for an explanation o f Taylor, C’s idea of background and foreground.
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From Bodin to Schmitt
4. Sovereignty has been conceptualised in a multitude of ways not just in terms of its
9 Iorigins but also in terms if its location and qualities. Furthermore, irrespective of 
which author is engaged in formulating its character, one can see that its configuration 
is intimately linked in to a range of other concerns, including relevant metaphysical 
assumptions about the place of man in the cosmos, the nature of man, his propensities, 
his relationship with society, the role of individualism and historical laws in fuelling 
the development of society, the purpose of governance and the kinds of structure best 
fitted to give rise to those purposes.22 It is also inevitably affected by political events 
and other experiences that might have shaped the author’s perception of life. What
follows below is a brief sketch of the idea of sovereignty as it developed in Western
9 1thought to provide an initial sense of how the idea of sovereignty evolved. This is 
provided to allow the reader to place within some context the models of sovereignty 
which will, from the next chapter, be explored in greater depth and provides a brief 
overview of what is to come. While a chronological approach has been adopted 
below, it is as well to bear in mind that the development of sovereignty can be 
conceptualised as concerning a series of themes.
5. The idea of sovereignty in the sense of an institution that is decisive in terms of 
authority and/or power in the process of governance has been the subject matter of 
discussion since the times of Ancient Athens.24 One could say that models of 
governance always have to tackle this issue. In the early fourteenth century
21 In terms o f locations, one can identify monarchs for example as with Bodin, legislators as with Kant, 
the people as with Rousseau, the state as with a variety o f authors including Hegel. Furthermore, 
reacting against the claim that sovereignty rested with any individual, institution, population it has been 
located with ideals as for example in the case o f Constant with the idea o f justice (Merriam, C.E 1968: 
77).
22 This o f course means that to maximise one’s understanding o f sovereignty, as developed by a 
particular author, requires an appreciation o f other ideas proposed by that author. (Taylor, C 1985: 22). 
Hence when this thesis seeks to explore particular models of sovereignty, it will endeavour to lay out 
the author’s surrounding framework where considered relevant.
23 Despite the usual association o f the idea o f sovereignty with Western thought, the term has been used 
in non-Westem cultures. For example in the year 607 Prince Shotoku o f Japan sent a note to the Sui 
emperor o f  China that has been translated as saying, ‘[f]rom the sovereign o f the land o f the rising sun 
to the sovereign o f the land of the setting sun’ (Varley, H.P 1977: 15). For a study o f the sovereignty 
concept in Japan, see Tanaka, K 1965: 223-241.
24 An exploration o f the nature o f popular sovereignty in Ancient Athens is usefully explored in 
Ostwald, M 1986. See also Berent, M 2000.
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Augustinus Triumphus for example developed a theocratic model of governance
9 <centred around the decisive role of the pope in shaping it. Dante’s model of 
governance also seeks to elucidate a model of governance that possesses two poles of 
such decisiveness, namely emperor and pope. However, the great markers laid down 
in connection with the development of the idea of such sovereignty, and from which 
our current ideas of sovereignty are most closely related, can be located in those 
writings that emerged in the early modem period as the feudal era and its associated 
forms of governance were coming to a close and the territorially defined state was 
taking centre stage.26 In a sense, any writer concerned with the governance of states 
will inevitably, if  not explicitly, deal with the problems associated with sovereignty 
which pivot around the articulation of governmental power, its character, its limits 
and its justification. However, there are certain writers for whom the articulation and 
assertion of sovereignty was their central concern or at least a major concern.27 These 
include Bodin followed by the social contract theorists, namely Hobbes, Locke and 
Rousseau, for whom the contract is the mechanism through which there is a 
simultaneous socialisation and establishment of domination which takes the place of 
the hitherto dominance of teleological and theological justifications for society.28 
Sovereignty in Hobbes rests in effect with the monarch. For the latter two, 
sovereignty lies with the people whose will for Locke is expressed through a 
legislature while for Rousseau, no such representation can legitimately occur and
9 0sovereignty of the people is expressed directly through its general will. Kant 
differentiated between the idea of the social contract and its reality, pivoted his 
account around the idea of practical reason and explored further the idea of the state 
which emerged as a matter of necessity.30 For him, the sovereign expression of the 
united will of the people was to be found in ‘the ruling power’ vested with the
25 Wilks, M.J: 1963; Dante: 1996.
26 It should be pointed out that the idea of sovereignty was not unknown prior to this.
27 A useful, albeit dated survey o f a range o f models o f sovereignty, in which their nature and 
circumstances are explored, is the account o f Merriam, C.E 1968.
28 Useful texts which explore the nature and development o f the social contract include Gough, J. W 
1957; Riley, P 1982; Hampton, J 1985.
29 Rousseau, JJ 1993.
30 Kant expressly denies the historical existence o f the social contract and sees it more explicitly as a 
practical idea o f reason which requires man to leave the state o f nature and form civil society. One can 
look therefore at the practical idea o f reason as substituting for the explicit contract shorn o f the latter’s 
voluntarism in order to demonstrate the necessity for the national state. Contractarianism is 
hypothetical and actual consent is not involved (Kant, I 1991: 75; Riley, P 1982: 18;).
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31legislator. As with Rousseau and Hobbes, Kant’s sovereign is absolutist in nature, 
the sovereign of the state having only rights in relation to the subject and no
9^(coercive) duties. Moving to the nineteenth century, Hegel in his Philosophy o f 
Right, in an endeavour to identify the conditions necessary for humans to actualise 
freedom, located sovereignty as lying with the unity of the state with the 
constitutional monarch being the concrete expression of that unity.33
6. In England, in the nineteenth century, legal positivism developed in reaction to 
natural law theories. The two main exponents of this approach for our purposes were 
Bentham and Austin, both of whom developed a normative legal theory which 
embraced the idea of sovereignty. Bentham based his approach on utilitarianism, with 
its focus on the consequences of actions rather than prior reasoning.34 He rejected 
social contract theory as providing the foundation of society. Men submitted to 
authority, so it was claimed, because in doing so their interests were better served than 
a contrary behaviour. A political society as opposed to a natural one is one where 
people habitually obeyed a common superior, namely a sovereign body.35 The
31 Kant, I 1991: 138.
32 Kant, I 1991: 143. Following on from this, the constitution of any state ‘cannot contain any article 
which might make it possible for some power within the state to resist or hold in check the supreme 
executive in cases where he violates the constitutional law’ (Kant, I 1991: 144). Here the term 
‘supreme executive’ is a reference to the sovereign. When referring to the sovereign as absolutist in 
nature, this does not mean that Kant considered that there were no limitations upon his powers. 
However the breach o f such limitations, for example, the prohibition against establishing a hereditary 
nobility or owning land privately were in effect advisory only and breach o f them could not constitute 
an illegality.
33 Hegel, G.W.F 1967:para 279. Hegel’s idea o f  the state embodied the whole o f civilly and politically 
organized society not simply the government which for him was the ‘strictly political state’ (para 273, 
276). The location o f sovereignty in the state was a conclusion reached by a number o f authors using a 
variety o f  different operating assumptions and routes o f reasoning and involving a variety o f differing 
conceptions o f  the idea o f state. There were also differences over whether the state was synonymous 
with sovereignty or whether the latter was simply an attribute o f the former as for example suggested 
by Gerber. For him the state did not have ‘absolute power to will’ but was free in effect only to operate 
within the limits o f  the ends it pursued that in part would be defined by the constitutional principles of 
the state (Emmerson, R 1928: 51-66). See Merriam, C.E 1968: 85-129 for an overview o f the 
relationship between state and sovereignty and Emmerson, R 1928 for a detailed exploration o f the 
place o f ‘the state’ in the conceptualising o f  sovereignty within German jurisprudence. For a general 
discussion o f  the way that the ‘state ‘ idea has developed in Western political thought see Dyson, K 
1980; Skinner, Q 1978; Bartelson, J 2001; Bosanquet, B 2001; Skinner, Q 1989: 90-131.
34 Bentham coined the term utilitarian under the influence of Hume’s advocacy o f  ‘utility’ as the 
justifying ground o f both the social virtues and rules o f equity and justice. Hume had claimed that no 
principle o f  actions or habits were praiseworthy unless they gave rise to ‘happiness and welfare’ either 
o f the individual or society (Scarre, G 1996: 3). At its core, utilitarianism calibrated what was good by 
reference to what produced pleasure and avoided pain. Hence what was good for the community was 
calculated according to that which ‘produce[d] the greatest happiness for the greatest number’.
35 Bentham, J 1988: 40. This sovereign body consists o f an individual or ‘assemblage o f individuals of 
a known or certain description.’
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relationship between sovereign and subjects would be structured through the law 
emanating from the former.36 Austin’s position on sovereignty was similar to that of 
Bentham. Like Bentham, he rejected the idea of the social contract as forming the 
foundation of society and like him, utility was the founding principle of a political 
community. The idea of law for both is framed in terms of superiority and inferiority. 
Sovereignty’s relational aspect as suggested by the idea of habitual obedience in 
effect provided the limit point for the sovereign’s existence. Unlike Bentham, 
Austin’s sovereign is illimitable and indivisible in character while Bentham accepted 
the possibility of divided and partial sovereignty.37
7. Just as Bentham’s and Austin’s positivism was a reaction against the perceived 
inadequacies of natural law theories to identify and explain the fundamental nature of 
law, as for example espoused by Blackstone, Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty which 
emerged in the early twentieth century was developed at least in part, in counter­
position to Kelsen’s positivism in particular which had been associated with neo-
TO
Kantian thought. Through the latter, Kelsen sought to construct a ‘pure science’ of 
law from which sovereignty was excluded as a relevant category of analysis.
Schmitt’s re-centering of sovereignty arose out of his rejection of the machine-like 
quality of Kelsen’s hierarchy of norms reflecting Schmitt’s wider rejection of what he 
perceived to be the false distinction between is and ought, and his view that there had 
been a failure to appreciate the limits of rationality in the application of the law. 
Reflecting this, he considered that there had been a wrongful elimination of the 
personal element in the application of norms and following on from this, a failure by 
Kelsen and others to appreciate that legal orders rest on decisions and not norms.39 
Schmitt’s conception of sovereignty, captured by the evocative phrase that it is 
possessed by ‘who decides upon the exception’ proved highly controversial for a
36 ‘Habit’ and ‘utility’ sit uneasily together as an unreflective habit o f obedience might not accord with 
the interests o f the individual. See Ben-Dor 2000 for an exploration o f the normative quality o f law as 
conceptualised by Bentham.
37 There are a number o f differences between Bentham and Austin in relation to their conceptualising 
o f law which are not central to the exploration of sovereignty in this thesis which will concentrate, inter 
alia, upon Austin’s model o f sovereignty. See Freeman, M.D.A 2001: 203-207.
38 See Chapter 5 below for a fuller explanation. Kelsen’s concern was to study the character o f  law 
itself rather than its effects and substituted for the idea o f causation associated with the natural science, 
that o f imputation. In so doing, he adopted an analytical approach that chimed with the idea o f  
individual responsibility whereas causality connotes the idea o f determinism.
39 Schmitt, C 1988: 10. Yet o f course that then poses the question o f how the person or institution 
making such decisions is determined other than through some kind o f norm or practice.
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number of reasons.40 These included the profoundly anti-liberal democratic critique 
upon which it was predicated and Schmitt’s support for the Nazi project.41 The 
growth of interest in the ideas of Schmitt in the English speaking world were slow to 
develop for a variety of reasons not least because the translation of many of his works 
did not appear for some time and some have still not been undertaken.42 His ideas 
about liberalism and sovereignty received growing interest beginning at around the 
time of the failings and then demise of the Eastern Bloc and the subsequent energising 
of the globalisation process, both of which, against the backdrop of the passage of 
time from the Second World War, allowed for a growth in the re-examination of the 
basic structure and qualities of the liberal democratic project and the role of the 
state.43
And Beyond...
8. Schmitt’s ideas about sovereignty and particularly the state of exception found 
themselves being taken up later in the century most notably by Agamben who seeks to 
explore the state-citizen relationship and considered that the nature of sovereignty is 
central to understanding.44 Influencing Agamben are a range of thinkers including 
Benjamin and Foucault, with particularly the latter being reflected in his 
conceptualisation of society as a biopolitical body. However in contrast to Foucault 
who had marginalised judicial institutional models in his explanation of power, 
Agamben seeks to restore their centrality, by arguing that the ‘production of the 
biopolitical body, is the original production of sovereign power.’45 Sovereignty is
40 Schmitt, C 1988: 5.
41 Schmitt’s support for the seizure o f power by Hitler and his relationship with the Nazi regime is 
usefully explored in Balakrishnan, G 2000: 176-189.
42 A variety o f  reasons can be cited including the freshness o f the memory o f the Second World War 
and Schmitt’s disfavoured status because o f his association with the Nazi regime (Balakrishnan, G 
2000: 261).
43 Schmitt’s ideas particularly that o f the political had influence upon Arendt and Strauss with the 
latter’s writings playing an important role in the development o f the neo-conservative movement. See 
Norton, A 2004 for a useful discussion o f the influence o f Schmitt on the aforementioned.
44 It has also been taken up by Negri and Hardt in Empire. They seek to argue that due to globalisation, 
nation-state sovereignty has declined. However this does not mean the demise o f  sovereignty but its 
rescaling to the level o f the global where ultimately governance will be characterised by self-organising 
democracy by the newly formed constituent power, namely the multitude, in what has been 
characterised as post-modern republicanism ( Hardt and Negri, 2000; Passavant, P.A 2004). Empire 
does not form part o f  this thesis which is concerned with sovereignty as associated with the nation 
state.
45 Agamben, G 1998: 6. The ‘biopolitical body’ is a term derived from Foucault’s assertion that in 
modernity natural life is included in mechanisms and calculations o f state power. For Foucault,
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located ‘at the point of indistinction between constituting and constituted power’.46 
Agamben highlights a paradox associated with sovereignty, namely that a sovereign 
institution in whatever form it happens to take, is both inside and outside the law.47 
This manifests itself in the existence of the exception, created by the sovereign’s 
suspension of the law ushering in what Agamben refers to as ‘bare life’. This 
domain, which Agamben refers to as the sovereign sphere, is a sphere where the 
sovereign is ‘permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a 
sacrifice and sacred life, that is life that may be killed and not sacrificed’. Whereas 
for Hobbes, the state of nature is a pre-political state and the advent of sovereignty 
brings about the political, for Agamben conditions akin to the state of nature are 
profoundly political associated with the existence of the sovereign. Whereas for 
Hobbes a population was rescued from the state of nature by the existence of the 
sovereign, for Agamben, the advent of the sovereign plunges society into conditions 
associated with the state of nature which are expressed most starkly in the 
manifestation of the concentration camp.49 This amounts to a deeply pessimistic 
account of sovereignty. In contrast to Hobbes, Agamben considers that the conditions 
associated with the state of nature are a product of the political and of sovereignty, 
rather than the pre-political. The operation of sovereignty is the cause of these 
difficulties rather than the solution. As a result for Agamben ‘[u]ntil a completely 
new politics is at hand.. .every theory and every practice will remain imprisoned and
sovereignty, was characterised by the transcendence o f the sovereign and the relationship o f obedience 
o f subject to sovereign structured chiefly by law. Biopower, for Foucault, reflects the central concern 
and techniques used by modem government to manage and foster the growth and health o f the 
population under its jurisdiction and so brings life into the realm o f explicit calculation and makes 
knowledge/power an agent of transformation o f human life. Fundamental concerns about territory 
associated with sovereignty hence become replaced by fundamental concerns for the population 
associated with ‘govemability’ in whose era we are now situated. (Foucault, M 1991:102-103; 
Foucault, M 1980:143; Dreyfus, H and Rabinow, P 1982: 134). Hence for Foucault, sovereignty while 
it continues to operate as a feature o f governance, does not exhaust the latter’s activities. For 
Agamben, the production o f the biopolitical body involves the entry o f bare life (zoe) (which classical 
political theory considered to exist in the realm o f the private household only), into the sphere o f the 
polis-that is the politicisation o f bare life (Agamben, G 1998:6). Hannah Arendt makes an extensive 
study o f  the relationship between the private, social and the public, political domains (Arendt, H:
1958).
46 Agamben, G 1998:41.
47 This paradox is captured in Schmitt’s formulation used when endeavouring to describe the sovereign 
in the state o f exception as existing outside the law but nevertheless belonging to it (Schmitt, C 
1988/1922: 7).
48 Agamben, G 1998: 83.
49 For Agamben, the sovereign space where sovereign meets homo sacer, is the first properly political 
space’ (Agamben, G 1998: 84).
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immobile... ,5° To overcome this impasse, no mere reconsideration of the political is 
sufficient but the rethinking of Being itself is required.51
9. Just as Agamben presents a bleak picture of sovereignty’s potentiality, Loughlin 
presents a picture seemingly inspired by an understandable desire to locate it at the 
centre of the project of good governance.52 This is captured by his admission that 
sovereignty is absolute, though it incorporates certain intrinsic constraints which 
derive from what he considers to be the basic tenets of sovereignty. These express 
themselves through an institutional framework established for the purpose of 
maintaining and promoting the peace, security and welfare of citizens.’53 Yet the very 
idea of peace, security and welfare of citizens raises a multitude of possibilities that 
ultimately do not always fit in easily with the liberal democratic framework which is 
most obviously suggested by Loughlin’s approach to sovereignty. The Hitlerain 
project for example with a view to enhancing the welfare of its ‘citizens’ engaged in a 
large-scale house building programme aimed at the construction of six million units 
to be constructed at the rate of three hundred thousand a year, a rate of construction 
that casts in the shade current aspirations by the British government with regard to the 
facilitation of house construction to meet the current housing crisis.54 On the same 
theme, the United States of America, a liberal democracy has a health delivery system 
which effectively leaves some forty-five million citizens without any effective health 
care other than emergency coverage.55 At the same time, the idea of security and 
peace were matters that concerned Hitler just as they concern the United States or any 
other government. For Hitler, such security required war and expansion with a view to 
achieving peace upon what was perceived to be German terms, while for the United 
State, the ideas of security and peace also require measures to ensure that they are 
maintained on American terms by the imposition of Pax Americana through, inter
50 Agamben, G 1998: 11.
51 Agamben, G 1998: 59. For useful commentaries on Agamben’s sovereignty see Rasch, W 2004 ; 
89-102; Fitzpatrick, P 2005: 49-73; Hussain, M and Ptacek, M 2000.
52 Loughlin characterises sovereignty as an expression o f  official power emanating from ‘the nation’ 
residing between an institutionally created system o f government and its citizenry (Loughlin, M 2003: 
70).
53 Loughlin, M 2003a: 72-98; Loughlin, M 2003b: 55-86.
54 Overy, R 2004: 225.
55 San Fransiscan Chronicle October 11 2004.
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alia, the doctrine of pre-emption.56 More recently the phenomenon of ‘Guantanamo 
Bay’ has emerged which provides a modem day example of the state of exception in 
operation.57 The difficulty with Loughlin’s account of sovereignty is not so much the 
tenets he associates with its existence.58 These are facets which one would desire and 
seek to accommodate in any equitable political settlement. However the difficulty is 
that sovereignty as it has been historically conceptualised has frequently not 
possessed many of these qualities and neither have a significant number of political 
settlements which have bome an uncanny resemblance to the state of exception as 
proposed by Schmitt and developed by Agamben.59 This is apparent from the brief 
explorations above of Schmitt’s and Agamben’s models both of which are inter alia 
characterised by the extinguishment of rights, the suspension of law through law and 
the degradation of the boundary between public and private that remains possible. 
Indeed in accepting that the people or nation as the repository of the office of the 
sovereign, Loughlin opens up the possibility of a Schmittian outcome and the bleak 
conclusion posed by Agamben. Loughlin in his desire to construct an acceptable civic 
settlement which chimes with what he perceives to be the qualities of Western liberal 
democracy has sought to develop a narrative of sovereignty which seeks to avoid its 
bleaker and more disturbing potentialities. In so doing he has nothing to say about the 
phenomenon of the exception opened up by Schmitt. Loughlin’s sovereignty is that 
of normality whereas Schmitt’s and Agamben’s sovereignty is that of the exception.
Aspects o f Sovereignty
10. We thus arrive at the aspects of sovereignty that will feature in this thesis. These 
flow from the above discussion and concern pervasive features of the models briefly 
mentioned. Firstly, the idea of sovereignty is expressed through language as 
exhibited in the models referred to above. In fact one will see that the term is capable
56 As explicitly explored in Kagan, D, Schmitt, G and Donnelly, T (2000). This publication comes out 
o f  the Project for the New American Century and constituted a statement o f position by what was 
essentially a neo-conservative organisation. See Stelzer, I 2004. The doctrine o f pre-emption is clearly 
expressed by Rice, C 2004: 81-87. It has a number of precursors historically, in British foreign policy 
including Britain’s containment o f  Napoleon. See Gove, M 2004: 271-274.
57 Steyn, J characterised Guantanamo Bay as a ‘legal black hole’(Steyn, J 2003). For a detailed analysis 
o f the legal position o f the detainees at Guantanamo Bay see Duffy, H 2006.
58 These include that it is a facet o f  the modem state; a political relationship not derived from property 
relationships, that it is an expression o f public power; that public power is a product o f a political 
relationship; that public power is not private but official; that sovereignty is relational; that rights are a 
product of its expression; that it is not solely a matter o f positive law.
59 One only has to cite the Third Reich in Germany and the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia.
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of possessing different meanings and can be applied in a variety of different 
circumstances as elucidated by the models briefly referred to and to be explored more 
fully below. In exploring sovereignty, symbolic forms developed by Cassirer will be 
used to reveal the nature of sovereignty as a site of contested meaning. Secondly, that 
sovereignty’s existence is diachronic in nature. There is an expectation that the 
activities attributed to the institutions associated with sovereignty will have a 
repetitive quality. Thirdly that the diachronic existence of an institution and the social 
nature of its activities suggest that what characterises sovereignty is the relational. 
However it is posed in different ways. There is the relationship between the 
institutions to which central governmental decisions are attributed and the population 
or elements of it that are affected by such decision. There is perceived to be a 
relationship between such institutions and the source of their authority, commonly 
expressed in the idea of the ‘people’, ‘nation’ or more generically ‘constituent power.’ 
It will be suggested that the relational aspect of sovereignty to be fully understood has 
to be seen in symbolic terms.60 Moving on, fourthly, a further feature, linked to 
diachronicity and the repetitive and the relational character of sovereign activity is 
that concerned with habit posed by Austin, explored for example by Hart and 
McCormick and sociologically considered by Anthony Giddens.61 The sense of 
routine, expressed through the relational existing over time also points to the 
emdedded nature of sovereignty and this will emerge in the ensuing discussion. The 
relational also points to the potentiality of rapid change and ultimately rupture.
Structure
11. The structure of this thesis is primarily arranged around four models of 
sovereignty, the exploration of which will reveal the above themes, with particular 
reference to the routine associated with its operation, its embeddedness and the 
potential for rupture. These four models will be those of Augustinus Triumphus who 
constructed a pre-modem system of governance around the papal office which 
possesses a key attribute associated with modem sovereignty, namely supreme 
legislative power. The second model that will be explored in some detail is that of 
Hobbes. The next models will be that of Austin and Schmitt. In so doing, the themes
60 There is another relational aspect that will emerge in the discussion that follows and that is the 
relationship between instances o f activities and practices o f such activities.
61 Hart, H,L, A 1962; Giddens, A 1979 and Giddens, A 1984; and McCormick, N 2007.
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above mentioned will be explored. Observations made will be brought together 
particularly concerning embeddedness, routine, rupture and the symbolic with a view 
to revealing the pervasive features associated with the articulation of sovereignty and 
providing a framework, described as the ‘secularised chain of being’, within which 
the models of sovereignty under examination can be located.
12. The contents of the thesis can be divided into four parts covering thirteen 
chapters. The first part will provide a historical introduction to sovereignty going 
back to Athens and it will focus in particular on the above-mentioned models of 
sovereignty, providing a general introduction to each. This will be followed by a 
chapter providing a tentative theoretical approach which will be chiefly but not 
exclusively concerned with the writings of Cassirer. The third part will comprise a 
further set of chapters in which the four models will be revisited to and re-examined 
in the light of the theoretical insights provided by the tentative theoretical approach. 
The fourth part will open with a chapter, the contents of which are the outcome of the 
insights gained in the second reading of the sovereign models with particular 
reference to the Austin’s model, and will involve a further exploration of the nature of 
routine drawing out its relationship to rupture. This will then be followed by a 
chapter in which the pervasive themes explored in the previous chapters are brought 
together. These include the symbolic, transcendence, embeddedness and routine, 
which comprise the metaphysical fabric of sovereignty’s articulation which occurs 
within a framework described as the secularised chain of being. They will be applied 
by way of illustration to the Anglo-Irish conflict of 1919-1921. The concluding 
chapter will examine the place of the secularised chain of being in providing a 
referential framework for the seemingly divergent models of sovereignty explored 
within the main body of the thesis.
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PART 1 
Chapter 2: A Sketch of the Historical Process
1. Explanations of history frequently privilege one or a small number of features over 
others which are effectively excluded form the explanatory narrative or given 
marginal importance. Thus Christian historiography was based on the idea that 
Providence determined the change experienced by man as though historical 
development was an expression of a play written by God. 1 Medieval historiography 
had much in common with this approach The human agent’s role was to further the 
grand design of God’s plan and even when the agent believed he was working against
'y
the realization of these plans, he was unwittingly contributing to them. Renaissance 
history in reaction to what was perceived as a priori history in which overall pre­
ordained plan excluded the need for detailed factual research in the previous period, 
reintroduced the idea that held sway within the Greco-Roman period, that historical 
development was as a result of man’s self-willed actions and not a result of some 
divine plan. However unlike the Greco-Romans, man’s actions were not the product 
of his intellect but that of passion and impulse.3 Moving ahead, in reaction to the
Cartesian claim that historical inquiry had little value because unlike philosophy, 
history narrative was not trustworthy and fanciful, 4 Vico considered that history was 
capable of being scientifically studied as it like science was a product of the human 
mind and could be seen to be comprised of a cycle of development with distinct 
phases that repeated themselves albeit through different concrete manifestations and 
which were empowered by class struggle.5 Enlightenment historians tended to 
regard the fixed entity around which human history developed as the content of 
human nature.6 History’s movement for example, in the case of Kant, was subject to 
an unchangeable plan of nature which existed in parallel to the laws of nature and was 
characterised by progress whose outcome would be the development of human
1 Collingwood, R.G 1993, 50.
2 Collingwood, R.G 1993: 53.
3 Collingwood, R G, 1993: 57.
4 Collingwood, R.G 1993 59-60.
5 Adams, H.P 1935. The three repeated phases o f the cycle comprised “the age o f the gods”, the “age 
o f heroes” and “the age o f man”. He saw for example that there was a resemblance between the 
Homeric period o f Greek history and the European Middle Ages, both of which he classified as 
expressions o f the heroic age and hence history did not repeat itself but developed in a spiral rather 
than in a circular manner.
6 Collingwood, R.G 1993: 82.
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freedom. History’s movement was thus teleological in character leading to the full 
realisation of man’s abilities to reason, the application of which would realise such 
individual autonomy being acknowledged and respected.
2. Like Kant, and those before him, Hegel considered that history’s development was 
the expression of a plan, revealed by the idea that history moved towards the 
realisation of freedom but unlike his predecessors, this was not God’s plan or that of 
nature but that of the unfolding of human reason 8which guided human thought and 
consequential action.9 Human passion in the sense of self-interest drove this process 
forward and its ultimate destination was the realisation of this outcome in the form of 
man’s moral reason and autonomy. The development of reason was the development 
of human consciousness which itself was a process of thought. Such development was 
ultimately expressed through the emergence of the perfect state and hence the latter 
was the primary subject of history.10 Marx’s conception of history again held onto an 
overall plan. However, instead of privileging thought and its expression in the form of 
developing reason and the emergence of the state as the pervasive fabric of the 
historical process, Marx privileged economics and more particularly the development 
of productive forces and the modes of production through which such forces 
developed. History was characterised by changes in modes of production and 
growth of productive forces. The former were progressively undermined, ultimately 
giving way to new modes of production because they could no longer contain the 
ongoing growth of productive forces. Whereas for Hegel logic manifested by thought 
in the form of ideas came before such variables11 in the development of history, Marx 
privileged them over ideas, the former being the ultimate cause for the latter. Changes 
in the modes of production did not simply constitute the environment within which
t o
history took place but also constituted the source that defined its pattern.
7 Schneewind, J.B 1992, 332, Collingwood R.G 1993: 103.
8 Unlike Kant’s understanding of reason which is superhistorical and is realised through the 
overcoming o f ignorance and superstition, Hegel’s reason is not a fixed entity but develops in the very 
course o f  history itself through the collective actions o f man.
9 Kaufman, W 1966: 254-294.
10 Beiser, F 1993:289.
11 Collingwood, R.G 1993:124.
12 Collingwood, RG 1993: 124-5.
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3. More recently, reflections upon the nature of history, in addition to raising 
ontological issues about its nature, have also raised epistemological issues concerning 
its gathering which impact upon perceptions of the historical process. Toynbee 
considered that history was driven forward by the creation, existence and ultimate
1 3decay of civilizations. Collingwood, for example, considered that historical events 
have both an outside being the expression of the event while the inside comprises the 
rational thought behind the event. The idea of progress remains a valid, although not 
unproblematic descriptor, to assist in the illumination of the historical process.14 
Perceptions of historical events and the thought of those engaged in them however are 
not simply the outcome of historical data collected but require interpretation of that 
data which inevitably involves the historian in injecting his own experience into the 
process of developing historical thought. 15 In this way the historian re-enacts past 
experience. McNeill pays particular attention to the relationship between man and 
disease in exploring the historical process which he viewed as a spiral development 
with civilizations’ growth and decay being linked to the relationship between man and 
his biological environment.16
4. All these ideas 17 about the historical process whether they are idealistic in content, 
namely whether they tend to focus on the motivations and choices made as expressed 
by human action or concentrate on laws external to human will to explain historical 
development all hang on human decision and consequential action.18 And it is such 
decisions that form the fabric out of which sovereignty is constructed both 
conceptually and in terms of its actually perceived practice.
13 Collingwood, R.G 1993: 159-165; Toynbee, A 1947.
14 Collingwood, R.G 1993: 324-32.
15 Collingwood, R.G 1993: 302-4.
16 McNeil, W.H 1976.
17 The description o f the different conceptions o f histories mentioned are not exhaustive and have 
mainly concentrated on ontological issues concerning the nature o f the historical process.
18 Collingwood, R.G 1993: 302.
20/267
Supreme Binding Decisions
5. If one looks at various models of sovereignty, however they may differ, central to 
them all is the idea of an institution or institutions out of which emerges a flow of 
supreme decisions binding upon the communities over which such institutions have 
jurisdiction.19 The institution’s desired form varies ranging from that of an individual 
in the case of Hobbes and Schmitt, or a collective in the case of Locke or Austin, or 
the state in the case of Weber. Each model points to an institution or complex of 
institutions that are empowered to make supreme decisions which cannot be overruled 
by any other institution operating within the same functional and jurisdictional 
domain and in so doing maintain the separate identity and status of the political order 
of which they are part.20 The idea of the supreme decision is locatable within the 
historical development of human social organisation.
6. The creation of man is a social process and his development requires the existence 
of social order. The latter is the outcome of human interaction and therefore in order
i
to exist needs to be continually reproduced. This manifests itself in part through the 
habitualization of many activities through which decision making is facilitated by the 
narrowing of choice.22 Human activity therefore in large measure becomes repeated 
and predictable, giving rise ultimately to institutionalisation, through which human 
behaviour is controlled along preset pathways ensuring its predictability.23 
Underlying this there remains the potential for alternative behaviour which might be
19 The idea o f ‘binding’ suggests not just that they possess a normative quality that creates obligations 
o f compliance upon those to whom they are addressed but also that there is a perceived actuality of  
such compliance.
20 The term ‘functional and jurisdictional’ domain is used here to denote the possibility o f  functional 
separation between for example the legislature, executive and judicial and also to denote separation 
between jurisdictions most commonly but not exhaustively associated with the territorial state.
21 Berger, P and Luckmann, T: 1966: 70.
22 Berger, P and Luckmann, T: 1966: 71. This idea associated with routine will be explored later on in 
the thesis, triggered in part by Austin’s conception o f sovereignty which embraces the idea o f ‘habit’. 
See chapters 4 and 9 below.
23 Giddens within the context o f his idea o f  structuration considers that social systems manifest 
structure in the form of the reproduction o f social practices and therefore exhibit ‘structural properties’. 
The properties which comprise the more enduring features o f social life comprise institutions. These 
are made up o f features which are experienced by participants in the social system as having solidity in 
terms o f time and space (Giddens, A, 1984: 17,24.). This ties into Berger and Luckmann’s idea that 
institutions take on an objectified form when they are transmitted beyond those that created them and 
hence tend to appear to participants as unchangeable realities beyond the possibility o f  change by 
human action (Berger, P and Luckmann, T 1966: 76).
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disruptive and hence if necessary must be suppressed failing which institutions 
themselves might be undermined leading possibly to their replacement by alternative 
ones.24 Controlling mechanisms therefore exist which are designed to prevent such 
disruption and in essence comprise of rules, which may benefit some members of 
society as opposed to others, thus giving rise to the phenomenon of domination. 
Gellner suggests that domination in the sense of an impersonal and social 
stratification of power does not become apparent until the development of agrarian
9Ssociety. Structural disequilibrium arises in the sense that food surpluses now have 
to be distributed according to some set of predictable rules which define ownership of 
such surpluses and mechanisms for their distribution. Such rules are not self-evident 
or ultimately self-implementing and hence intertwined with their development lies 
the development of normative orders to ensure compliance.26 The motor for the 
development of stratification as an expression of domination appears frequently to 
have involved war, motivated by a range of factors, whereby one society’s wealth 
through violence was expropriated by another with the conquered population being
9 7turned into serfs or slaves.
7. According to Gellner, the ability to dominate is grounded in the possession of 
power, the latter manifesting itself by what he describes as ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ 
power. The former consists of the exercise of direct force and is comparatively rare. 
In fact the frequent use of such power suggests that the institution being attacked may 
be undergoing disintegration. Secondary power according to Gellner is exercised 
through the use of rules 29with the possibility of sanction which may itself involve the 
application of violence in the event of breach. However this idea of stratification 
and the institution of permanent authority arose slowly and incrementally. For 
considerable periods the authority was not permanent but may have only applied
24 Berger and Luckmann do not extensively address the issue o f  conflict. They are ‘society-centric’ in 
the sense that their penetrating comments on society take place within a framework where there is no 
other society which might compete and ultimately threaten the one under consideration. The society 
they examine is a paradigmatic one which is successful and ongoing. The way in which they construct 
social reality does not explore the existence o f conflict and its implications for the continuation o f that 
society.
25 Gellner, E 1990, 145.
26 Gellner, E 1990, 146.
27 Mann, M 1986: 53-4. An extensive analysis o f the motivations for violent conflict can be found in 
Gat, A 2006.
28 Berger, P and Luckmann, T give the example o f the frequent breach o f the incest taboo.
29 Rules o f course used in the narrower legal sense o f the word.
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i n
during times of war with little power outside war to issue and enforce commands. 
Once war ceased it was possible for the power an individual acquired during war to 
evaporate and it was frequently the case that leadership in war and peace was assumed 
by different people.31 One sees here the possibility of the emergence albeit on a 
temporary basis of a chain of a simple hierarchy whose integrity requires the making 
of what one might call the ‘final binding decision’. That is the decision against which 
there is no pre-determined and identifiable pathway which could lead to its 
overturning which would be socially recognised and accepted.
8. The idea of the supreme binding decision manifests itself in the development of 
city-states followed by empires particularly the Roman Empire which was arguably 
the first substantially territorialized form of governance which displayed unity and 
resistance to fragmentation that outstripped earlier empires. Hence here there was a 
comparatively stable hierarchy of governance at the apex of which lay the emperor 
whose decisions were regarded as supreme. The Emperor’s position as supreme
'y
ruler, in executive, legislative and judicial terms was regarded as unlimited. The 
demise of the Roman Empire resulted in the fragmentation of governance as 
expressed in the feudal period but the organisation of decision making remained a 
central issue around which cooperation, conflict and war continually developed and 
out of which the modem state system emerged.34 However one conceives the
30 Gledhill, J 2000: 28.
31 Gledhill, J 2000: 28. Clastres refers to attempts o f  chiefs to perpetuate their power by extending 
hostilities beyond what their communities thought were acceptable. Once past the point o f  
acceptability, virtually no one within the community was prepared to follow them (Clastres, 1977: 177- 
180).
32 By this is meant that domination for the first time was territorialized in that through economic and 
infra-structural integration, cultural and administrative integration of local elites, one could for the first 
time point meaningfully to territories ‘inside’ the empire which in contrast to those ‘outside’ the empire 
were pacified, economically integrated and protected from inward hostile incursion.
33 Nicholas, B: 1962: 12,18. This did not mean o f  course that in practice the Emperor’s writ was 
consistently applied throughout the Empire. Ultimately o f course the Empire fragmented and Rome 
was sacked and the emperor deposed in AD 410 (Davies, N  1997:213).
34 Different approaches have been adopted which prioritise different variables as being most 
determinant in the development o f statehood. Adopting Tilly’s framework one line o f  investigation is 
statist in character, including those that prioritise the internal as opposed to external international 
developments including the role o f warfare in the development o f the state as in the case o f McNeill, 
W.H 1982 and Bobbitt, P 2002. Other lines o f approach according to Tilly include the geopolitical 
approach which looks at the relationship between states as being the prime determinant o f  their 
development such as in the case of Rosenau, J.N. 1970. A third line o f approach is that which looks for 
an explanation o f  state- formation from changing modes o f production such as that o f Anderson, P:
1974 and the last general approach is similar to the economically orientated approach but taking 
greater cognisance o f  the position o f a given state within the world economy as a whole such as in 
Wallerstein, I. 1974-1988 (Tilly, C 1992: 6-16).
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development of this phenomenon, the location and character of political control 
remained central to the process of social change that Europe underwent. From the 
city states concentrated around the Mediterranean to the territorial states that initially 
emerged along the Atlantic,35 social conflict was geared to establishing and /or 
maintaining political control and the centre of that process was the ability of popes, 
emperors, kings, aristocracies and even democracies to define and dominate the social 
relationships that comprised the societies within which they were located. Such 
domination was most starkly tested by rulers’ abilities to raise monies from those 
populating their territories and armies to wage war in order to protect and extend their 
domains and interests.36 The existence of different sorts of interests with their 
concomitant rights, obligations and immunities frequently over overlapping territories 
all expressed shifting configurations of contingent cooperation which were 
expressions of the prevailing balances of power between different individuals and 
sectors of the population in what was frequently in essence a chronically conflictual 
situation.
9. The “drift” that was traced out by such conflict was one of progressive 
centralisation of governance. This initially expressed itself most clearly in the 
centralisation of the governance of the church. For example in the tenth and early 
eleventh century a centralised system of monastic governance emerged whereby all 
Cluniac monasteries were ruled by priors under the jurisdiction of the Abbot of 
Cluny.37 This came to serve as a model for the entire Roman Catholic Church and 
accompanied claims by popes such as Pope Leo IX of power over all bishops and
•3 o
clergy even those situated outside the empire. This process of centralisation 
ultimately led the clergy to be described as the first ‘translocal, transtribal,
iq t
transnational class in Europe to achieve political and legal unity.’ The Pope in 
effect became a universal legislator over the church, only limited by natural and 
positive divine law, that is law laid out in the bible.40 He was also a supreme judge
35 Tilly, C 1992: 189.
36 In reality Europe was politically dominated by regionally based kings and princes as opposed to the 
Roman or Holy Roman Emperors who proclaimed authority over such regions but who were reliant on 
such leaders for the raising o f  armies to protect the empire from inward incursion.
37 Berman, H 1983: 107.
38 Berman, H 1983: 94; Tierney, B 1988: 27.
39 Berman, H 1983: 108.
40 Le Bras, G 1926.
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and administrator and did not consider that his judicial authority was limited to 
spiritual matters or members of the church. His central role within the church however 
was not totally mirrored in his involvement in civil matters where his position was 
less clear.41
10. The centralisation process also expressed itself in the relationship between the 
Pope and Emperor most particularly in the Investiture Clashes where the former, 
notably Gregory V I1, attempted to claim jurisdiction over the latter claiming to have 
the power, inter alia, to depose emperors as temporal power was inferior to spiritual 
power.42 The conflict between pope and emperor resulted in a separation between 
the secular and spiritual realms both of which claimed to be universal and hence each 
was perceived to exist as a rival to the other. The result of this clash was 
contradictory. On the one hand as emperor and pope each supported local forces 
which opposed their rival, Germany and Italy underwent further fragmentation. 
However papal alliances with French kings, for example, facilitated the consolidation 
of the latters’ kingdom. 43
11. These moves towards centralisation however took place against a general 
backcloth of the feudal mode of governance that was characterised by a 
heterogeneous system of political authorities whose relations were shifting and 
ambiguous and where the jurisdictional limits of responsibilities could and did easily 
conflict. Territories were subject to overlapping and continually shifting rulerships.44 
These ranged from dynastic monarchies to religious foundations, commercial 
organisations, and the communal property of cities, towns and guilds.45 Hierarchies
41 With regard to civil matters his rule over some matters was absolute, while in respect o f others, he 
shared his rule with the secular authorities (Berman, H 1983: 99).
42 Tierney, B 1988: 56.
43 Spruyt, H 1994: 96. The papacy supported the build up o f  centralised kingdoms in territories 
surrounding the German Empire to provide a counter-weight to the latter. Ultimately however, the 
transterritorial jurisdiction o f the church and principle o f royal supremacy clashed resulting in a victory 
for the French kings.
44 Jackson, R 1999: 435 . This overlapping patchwork effect is graphically exemplified by the Count of  
Luxembourg, a prince o f the Holy Roman Empire and hence subject at least nominally to the emperor. 
At the same time, he held a money fief ( a pension) from the French King and was therefore subject to 
his jurisdiction. The result o f this uncoordinated network o f  relationships was the emergence o f  cross­
cutting obligations, for example John Toul, who was forced to attempt to balance rival obligations to 
four lords namely Lord John of Arcis, Lord Enguerran o f Coucy, the Count o f Champagne and the 
Count o f Grandpre with the latter two having equivalent status but precedence over the first two 
(Spruyt, H 1996: 39).
45 Jackson, R 1999: 435.
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were frequently diffuse and the relationship between superior and inferior interests 
within the context of such hierarchies did not always reflect the material balance of
46power.
12. Explanatory discourses for the emergence of a dominating system of sovereign 
state are various. Claims are made for example that the first signs of sovereignty 
associated with the modem state are prefigured in the centralisation of the Church 
referred to above. Early signs of what came to be known as the sovereign state have 
been located as occurring in the 11th century, following the fragmentation of the 
Carolingian Empire with the dynasty of Capetians in what is now central France and 
what had been the West Frankish part of the former empire. By the thirteenth century 
Spruyt claims that certain features of the sovereign state were detectable, for example 
the practice of a central administration, the production of revenue, a curtailment of 
church power within the King’s domain, the territorial demarcation of borders, the 
claim by King that he was the emperor in his own kingdom and the suppression of 
feudal rivals.47 What the Capetian example posed albeit hesitatingly and partially 
was the idea of the absolutist state, that is the idea according to Vierhaus that rule 
resided ‘in an undivided and unlimited authority of an individual, who as legislator 
was not bound by the laws, who was independent of all control, and who exercised 
sovereignty without consulting any groups or institutions except those created by
A O
himself.’ Explanations of the rise of the absolutist state, its fundamental qualities, 
the extent of its absoluteness together with that of its geographical spread, its 
relationship to the demise of feudalism and the rise of the modem nation state have 
been contested by various authors. 49 It is not the purpose of this work to engage with 
these debates, save to highlight the point that the idea of the absolutist state which 
suggests just that, namely that the king possessed unlimited political power, did not 
represent its actual practice. As Anderson has suggested, this kind of state was
46 For example, Henry II o f England held land in France as a duke and was obliged to pay homage to 
the French king Louis VII which he did, even though the latter was in military and political terms 
much weaker (Spruyt, H 1996: 39).
47 Spruyt, H 1996: 79. These features remained partially applied and were not embedded in a stable 
manner but were consistent with the rise o f  the absolutist state.
48 Vierhaus, R 1988: 113 cited in Teschke, B, 2003: 155.
49 These are usefully laid out by Teschke whose fundamental thesis in this regard is that within the 
literature o f International Relations there has been an over identification o f the modem state with the 
absolutist state and a misapprehension o f  the significance of the Treaties o f Westphalia in the rise of 
the modem state.
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‘exotic, hybrid, compositions whose surface “modernity” again and again betrays a 
subterranean archaism.’50 It contained features associated with both a fragmented 
feudal mode of governance and with those of the modem state-to-come. A 
comparatively centralised civilian bureaucracy in keeping with Weber’s rational legal 
administration existed side by side with the practice of treating the offices which it 
comprised as saleable pieces of property. Purchasers could then grant privileges in 
what amounted to a form of monetarised fiefdom.51 In relation to France, royal and 
non-royal political institutions competed with one another for domination although 
the former endeavoured to penetrate the latter by the placement of royal agents.
13. The absolutist state was therefore not absolutist in practice and although it 
contained sites of centralisation, these existed against a backcloth of contests between 
centres of power. This formation was therefore unresolved in its content and 
ultimately uncertain in its trajectory of development. Its existence emerged in a 
Europe characterised by military conflict and arguably its very development was 
borne out of the necessity to construct an efficient military response to repulse 
invaders and consolidate and enlarge political power. The emergence of the absolutist 
state was but the latest phase in an ongoing process where the issue of political power 
and authority was being negotiated peacefully or otherwise. The essence of that 
struggle which clearly continues is the scope of decision making, the identity of the 
decision maker, those who are affected by such decisions and the relationship 
between the different authorities which are empowered to make such decisions, that is 
to say the mapping of the hierarchical relationships between the decision made by 
such authorities. At bottom, one could say that one essential dynamic of the 
development of civilisation has been the drive by competing power centres to 
maximise the extent of their decision making abilities, in terms of scope and the 
extent to which they are complied with at the expense of their competitors. The 
structure of such power centres, the division of labour between them, the domains 
over which their decisions are applicable, and the extent to which such centres
50 Anderson, P 1974: 29.
51 Anderson, P 1974: 33.
52 Teschke, B 2003: 177-8.
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cooperate and co-ordinate their activities can be seen as moments in a dynamic and 
conflictual process which has continuously unfolded.53
14. Conflict has therefore been related to clashes between authorities that consider 
that they possess decision making powers over the same matters concerning the 
creation and maintenance of political control as described above. The successful 
imposition of decisions with binding force in the face of resistance by other 
authorities has denoted one of the essential elements associated with sovereignty, 
namely that of supremacy. Sovereignty requires that the decision of the authority 
claiming it will prevail in the event of a clash with other authorities. This requirement 
has been described as ‘ threshold concept.’54 However a single event will not mark 
the authority making the decision with the quality of supremacy associated with 
sovereignty. If there is no further event or if there are further events of the same kind 
which do not involve an authority’s decisions prevailing, then the quality of 
supremacy associated with sovereignty is less likely to be successfully claimed or 
sustained.
53 This process is characterised by manifestations o f rulership ranging from consent and cooperation 
through to those which express conflict and physical coercion, whether by law or ultimately by military 
confrontation. Theories which embrace conflict as the main or a significant element in the analysis o f  
the techniques required to maintain social stability are included in the writings for example of 
Machiavelli, N: 1988, Weber, M 1978, Habermas, J: 1976 and Gramsci A 1971..
54 Lee, S 1997: 245.
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Chapter 3: A Preliminary Sketch of Early Models of Sovereignty.
General Introduction
1. In this chapter I will seek to provide a detailed overview of two pre-modem and 
one early modem models of sovereignty. The pre-modem ones will comprise of 
those of Augustinus Triumphus and Dante while the early modem ones will include 
those of Bodin and Hobbes with an emphasis upon the latter. It should be pointed out 
that there will be a considerable development of a number of these models in the 
chapters following the development of a tentative theoretical approach platform.1 
The main purpose of these initial surveys is to provide a general overview of each 
model with a concentration upon appropriate primary and secondary literature.
2. Before doing this however, it is worthwhile providing a short account of early 
manifestations of ideas associated with sovereignty. These together with the material 
covered in the previous chapter will provide a contextual background for the models 
of sovereignty that will then discussed in detail together with others mentioned in 
summary form.
Early Stirrings o f the Ingredients o f the Idea o f Sovereignty
3. The rise of a number of components associated with absolutist sovereignty can be 
traced back to the Greek city-states. The Greeks were the first to distinguish between 
the laws of nature (physis) and the law of the community (nomos) and acknowledged 
that the latter were made by men.3 However they did not put the community or ruler 
above the nomoi and hence a conception of positive lawmaking had not yet been 
developed. 4 The Aristotelian idea of law rejected the notion of rulers or institutions
1 From this chapter, further explorations will be undertaken o f the models o f Augustinus Triumphus 
and Hobbes.
2 There is some dispute about whether these entities were states in the Weberian sense. See Berent, M 
2000 .
3 Popper, K 1966: 57-85.
4 Berent, M 2000: 11.
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being above the law. The community was placed under the law and indeed the latter 
would appear to have existed prior to the former. Thus for example Aristotle stated:
‘If a polis is a form of association, and if  this form of association is an association of 
citizens... it would seem to follow inevitably that when the constitution suffers a 
change in kind and becomes a different constitution, the polis will cease to be the 
same polis, and will change its identity.’ 5
He concludes:
‘It is obvious that the criterion to which we must chiefly look in determining the 
identity of the polis was the criterion of the constitution. The criterion of stock is 
irrelevant: whether the same group of persons inhabit a polis or a totally different 
group, we are free to call the same polis or a different polis in the light of the other 
and final criterion.’6
4. The construction and existence of the first city chronologically and logically 
follows the constitution. The nature and composition of the city was made to fit the 
constitution that is used in the wider sense of design.7 Consistent with this, was the 
observation that the Greeks had a static view of the law and were reluctant to change
o
it. The modem idea of law being made by legislatures and hence being able to be 
unmade by the same body had not yet emerged. Law had a fixity about it that was 
closely connected to the idea of law as habit. Law-inspired change was obeyed not so 
much from enforcement, the systematic means of which were lacking but as a result 
of change of habit.9 Rapid change of the law was perceived to be a threat to the 
‘general power of the law’ as a result of being a disruption to habit which could only 
change gradually suggesting that the power of law lay in its longevity and near­
permanency. 10 Consistent with this, it has been claimed that the Athenian assembly
5 Aristotle, Politics III 3 1276a35.
6 Aristotle, Politics III 3 1276b 10-14.
7 Berent, M 2000.
8 Sealey, R 1987: 52.
9 For example it was generally agreed that there was no proper police system and that centralised 
systems o f  coercion had not been developed. For example the ancient city-state army was generally a 
citizens militia which was constituted as an army only in response to external threat (Finley M.I 1983: 
18).
10 Aristotle, Politics II 8 1269a 20-3.
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was not a legislature in the modem sense.11 A change of law by the legislature in 
view of the lack of coercive state-based enforcement procedures could only be 
effective if reflective of the custom or consensus of the community.12 Enforcement 
was achieved by moral pressure by the populace upon those that broke the law. 
Consequently the assembly was limited to passing laws for which there was 
substantial agreement or homonoia in the populace.13 This would suggest that the 
ability of the assembly to impose its will was a limited one.
5. Sovereignty therefore in its modem sense, where it is fundamentally associated 
with the existence of an independently existing territorially-based state which 
possesses identifiable and separate centralised regulatory and enforcement 
mechanisms through which the community is regulated in accordance with a 
framework of law unlimited by natural law has not yet emerged. Ideas of absolute 
rule and the problems associated with it had however been raised for example in 
Antigone, the third of the Theban plays by Sophocles written in the 5th century BC. 
The play was set in Thebes following the banishment of its king, Oedipus. His two 
sons, Eteocles and Polynices, having come of age agreed to each rule Thebes in 
alternate years. Eteocles, at the end of his first year of rule, reneged on the agreement 
and refused to step down. As a result, war ensued between the brothers in which both 
were killed. Their uncle, Creon, the brother of their mother, Jocasta, assumed power. 
He ordered that Polynices, in contrast to Eteocles should not receive an honourable 
burial, justifying the difference in treatment between the brothers on the basis that 
while Eteocles’ engagement in military conflict was necessary to defend the city, it 
had been provoked by Polynices’ unwarranted attack. The penalty of death was to be 
applied to anybody that did not comply with that order. Antigone, the daughter of 
Oedipus, refused to obey it, feeling bound by the laws of Heaven to bury her brother. 
She unsuccessfully attempted to resolve this irreconcilable conflict by adhering to the 
requirement of honouring her brother and giving him an honourable burial in breach 
of Creon’s law. Creon was reluctant to implement the sentence as he was Antigone’s 
official guardian and she was engaged to his son. Despite this, he remained firm in his 
commitment to implement the punishment of death upon her.
11 Barker, E 1959:323-324.
12Ostwald,M 1986: 89-93.
13 Ober, J 1989: 297.
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6. He justified the necessity of punishment by stating tha t: ‘he who the state appoints 
must be obeyed to the smallest matter, be it right or wrong and he that rules his 
household, without a doubt, will make the wisest king, or for that matter the 
staunchest subject. ... There was no deadlier peril than disobedience, states were 
devoured by it, homes laid in ruins, armies defeated, victory turned to rout while 
simple obedience saves lives of hundreds of honest folks. Therefore I hold to the law 
and will never betray it.’14
7. This quote is consistent with the contention that rule by men ultimately cannot be 
bounded by higher law, a position historically associated with Plato and ultimately 
with Hobbes.15 Also present was the notion of limitless power possessed by such a 
ruler which was expressed as positive law freed from the constraints of natural law 
and justified by the requirement of obedience to achieve social stability. Again the 
idea of social stability and obedience to law formed a central tenet of Hobbes’ 
justification of sovereignty. But through Antigone was exhibited the tension created 
between the simultaneous and conflicting demands of natural and positive law. 
Obedience to both at the same time was impossible, presenting an intractable 
existential problem from which there was no obvious escape. This dilemma was 
present within Greek society although the clear separation of natural from positive 
law had not yet occurred and a hierarchical structure of law had yet to clearly emerge 
in which positive law was not bound either by natural law or largely freed from it.16
8. The dilemma between the rule by law espoused, for example, by Aristotle and rule 
by men advocated by Plato is a theme that of course runs through debates about legal 
authority to this day. For Aristotle, the rule of law was legitimised on the basis of rule 
by consent for the public good. He stressed that it was more proper that the law 
should govern than any citizen and that the persons who hold power should "be 
appointed as guardians of the laws and as their servants.17 He goes on, ‘ ... he who 
asks law to rule was asking God and intelligence and no others to rule; while he who
14 Sophocles 1947.
15 The relationship between Hobbes’ sovereign and natural law is commented upon below and in 
chapter 8.
16 Ostwald 1986; Berent, M 2000.
17 Aristotle (1992) 1287a.
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asks for the rule of a human being was importing a wild beast too; for desire was like 
a wild beast and anger perverts rulers and the very best of men... ’.18 Thus rule by 
men could amount in the extreme to tyranny since such rulers would rule according to 
their own personal interests not necessarily in the interests of the community.19 Right 
in such circumstances could become equated with the ruler, the stronger party. This 
had previously appeared albeit transparently in a debate about whether justice was 
equated with strength. It was conceded by Thrasymachus in his debate with Socrates 
in the Republic that rulers were capable of making mistakes about what was in their 
interest. When doing so, according to Thrasymachus, they were not acting as rulers 
and therefore as rulers they made no mistakes.20 This artificial position immediately 
raised the question as to by whom and by what values the interests of those 
considered to be rulers would be determined. Such standards were potentially beyond 
the ruler's control and hence suggested the placing of value-based limits upon the 
ruler's capacity to govern that were universally recognised as such. This position was 
in contrast to that of Cleitophon who considered that justice was equated with what 
the stronger party believed to be in his own interests. The two positions were an 
expression yet again of the seemingly intractable problem of whether in the 
articulation of order, laws rule through men or men through laws.
9. Plato's Republic was arguably the first theoretical attempt to distinguish ‘state’ 
from "society" and it has been argued that he introduced a principle of sovereignty 
that had similarities with the Hobbesian model.21 At first sight it might appear that 
the philosopher-rulers were in a sovereign position to rule without external limits. 
However as part of the city, they were not in a position to change the constitution 
which was laid down by Glaucon and Socrates. Sovereignty therefore did not exist in
the sense of a distinct, supreme and governmental body with unlimited law-making
00powers, forming part of the community over which it ruled. There was no room for 
amendment and therefore the philosopher-rulers had no opportunity to alter the 
settlement that had been bequeathed them. The position of the philosopher-rulers was 
justified through a foundation myth that provided a seemingly external source of
18 Aristotle (1992) 1287a.
19 Aristotle 1992: 1295al-1295a24.
20 Plato 1955 340a-341 c (p. 18-21).
21 Crossman 1959.
22 M.B. Foster in Berent, M 2000.
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legitimation that appeared to be independent of the political configuration which 
spawned it. The central feature of this myth whose aim was to deceive the population 
over which the philosopher rulers govern was that God created the three strata of 
society, namely the Rulers, the Auxiliaries and the farmers and other workers.23 This 
foundation myth after two generations or so was expected by Plato to be accepted by 
the population as truth, thus providing them with reasons to adhere to such social 
arrangements that characterised Plato's utopia, whose purpose was the creation of a 
just society.
10. Sovereignty as a matter of practice therefore did not occur within the city states 
of Greece although the emergence of law of the community was an important pre­
condition for the later development of sovereignty. However another pre-condition 
namely a distinct separation between government and population had not yet 
occurred.24
11. Regarding the development of the Roman Empire, the emergence and 
development of the office of princeps became increasingly associated with traits 
associated with monarchical absolutism 25 as evidence by the general principle that 
the prince was above the law and Ulpian was able to lay down in the third century as a 
legal doctrine that ‘what has pleased the prince has the force of law’.26 The 
significance of his position developed through him becoming differentiated and 
superior in respect of other magistrates with whom he initially shared power, by way 
of combining his office with other offices and extending his authority into a system of 
supreme rule over the growing territory under Rome’s domination. The symbol of 
majesty began to play an increasing role in the depiction of the emperor as supreme 
ruler as divine in character.27 Emperor worship gained increased centrality over the 
worship of traditional deities and this was accompanied by the rise of monotheistic 
movements. The idea of a supreme god displaced a multiplicity of gods as the
23 Plato 1955, 415 a-c. This myth was to be distinguished with the Hellenistic conception o f God or 
The One as Plato described it. The idea o f a god in the myth which could combine "perfect right with 
awesome power" may have added to its potency.
24 Hinsley, F.H 1986: 29.
25 Buijs, G 2003: 241.
26 Hinsley, F.H 1986: 43. ‘Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem’
27 Buijs,G 2003: 241.
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central focus for worship with the other deities becoming considered to be the
ORmanifestations of the former.
12. The emergence of the idea of the unitary transcendent god was an important 
conceptual development which was to be reflected in the unitary and transcendent 
quality of sovereignty. The monotheistic religious practice most relevant to this 
process was that constituted by Christianity. This reflected the emergence of the idea 
of a universally applicable transcendent god, which itself had in part grown out of the 
idea associate with the Jewish religion, of a supreme god which was separated from 
the cosmic order ,29 but whose primary concerns were considered to relate to the 
circumstances of the ‘chosen people’ in the form of the Israelites. The localism of 
the Jewish idea of God was replaced by the universality of the Christian variant with 
its transcendent quality associated with the latter’s idea of God being increasingly 
emphasised. This was achieved by a number of developments: God’s abstract quality 
and God’s continuing separation from the cosmos and his role as the creator of 
universe ex nihilo.30 Under Greco-Roman influences, the idea of God increasingly
31included His universality and unknowability reflecting the unknowability of the One 
together with Him being considered to be unchanging and of limitless power.32 The 
idea was also intermittently expressed in early Christianity that the creation of the 
Universe was an expression of God’s free will which suggested that the universe was
33inherently fragile and was utterly dependent upon God for its continued existence.
The existence of Jesus was considered to be demonstration of the alienation and
28 Brent, Allen 1999: 251-109 in Buijs,G 2003: 242.
29 Non-identification with the cosmic order was in contrast to the Greco-Roman idea o f God being 
immanent within it.
30 This had been confirmed by the Council o f Nicaea and was clearly inconsistent with the Platonic 
view o f the relation o f the One to the universe and also in fact went beyond the claims made in Genesis 
which had implied that the universe was created by God out of a primordial chaos and not out o f  
nothing which was a new claim. The idea o f chaos which is relevant to a narrative associated with 
sovereignty’s creation is explored in chapter 8 below below. A useful general summary o f the 
qualities associated with the Christian idea o f God can be found in Ferguson. E 1998: 470-475.
31 This unknowability and associated transcendence was captured by the claim o f Athenagorous that 
God was impassable, incomprehensible, infinite, uncreated and eternal (Ferguson, E 1998:471).
32 For example Justin in the second century expressly denied that God had feet, fingers, hands or a soul 
as he was not a composite being and that he did not exist in space at all.
33 This idea was an intermittent one particularly in early Christianity and competed with another that 
was more akin to that within the Greco-Roman conception o f God whereby the universe’s creation was 
the result o f the overflowing o f ‘the One’ most clearly expressed in the writings o f Plotinus (Lovejoy, 
A 1964: 62). The idea o f the universe created by God’s free will ultimately gave rise to a sense o f  
fragility later expressing itself, for example, in Hobbes’ assertion that civilised society was utterly 
dependant upon the continuing existence and effectiveness of a sovereign described by him, inter alia, 
as a ‘Mortal God’. See below.
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distance of man from God but also of the possibility of the former being united with 
the latter. The construction of Jesus’s image could be seen to reflect the idea of the 
logos developed within the Graeco-Roman tradition but moving beyond that in its 
personified manifestation.34
13. To summarise at this point if we conceptualise sovereignty as before as 
comprising the qualities of unification, agency, voluntarism embracing the idea of 
free will, supremacy and lastly external limitation one can see in the above 
developments some although not all these qualities emerging in the development of 
the idea of God. Unification of many gods into one is central to this development. 
Voluntarism emerges albeit uncertainly in the idea of the universe being the product 
of the Creator’s free will. The God’s supremacy associated with this voluntarism is 
manifested in the increasing demarcation of God’s existence from that of the physical 
world through the mechanism of transcendence accompanied by the requirement of 
closure whereby there is no higher authority. This in turn emphasises the separation 
that is central to the idea of sovereignty between the body considered to possess it and 
the rest of the community over which governance takes place. The consequences of 
the operation of free will were to become more accentuated with the development of 
nominalist thinking with Scotus and Occam with regards to the centrality of free will 
in the construction of social relationships including those of governance as most 
classically seen with Hobbes’ model of sovereignty which is centred around a clash of 
wills. External limitations as expressed through the social practice of territorial 
limitations associated with internal governance were also to develop with the break­
up of the Roman Empire. However at this stage it is worthwhile undertaking a 
preliminary examination of a proposed model of pre-modem governance that
34 Ferguson, E 1998: 687-691.. The 'Word' otherwise known as the Logos has had a variety o f  
meanings attributed to it and has been equated with God and/or with divine status. Logos has both 
Hellenic and Judaic roots which renders it particularly problematic to identify. It has been considered 
to pre-exist creation and operate as the intermediary between God and the created universe 
participating in that creative process. It has been equated particularly in the Hellenic tradition with 
reason or rational principle as manifested in the universe being arranged according to natural or divine 
law. The ‘Word’ has also been equated with Christ who has been considered to be its personified 
manifestation.
35 For purposes o f modem popular sovereignty, agency is possessed by government which rales in the 
name o f the people.
36 Buijs provides a useful summary o f the relevant ingredients o f norminalism as it developed in the 
medieval period and its implications for conceptualising governance. More will be said below about 
the implications o f  nominalism for the development o f sovereignty. See Buijs, G 2003: 229-260.
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possesses the key ingredients of unification, supremacy with associated closure and 
voluntarism.
Augustinus Triumphus
14. Perhaps the most powerful formulation of sovereignty prefiguring Hobbes by 
more than three hundred years was that of a cleric, Augustinus Triumphus, an ardent 
advocate of absolute papal power. Together with others, he developed his ideas within 
the context of the clash between church and empire over whether secular rulers or the
"xnpope had supremacy over matters of temporal governance. The sovereignty he 
ascribed to the pope essentially amounted to a set of propositions logically deducted 
from a god who was universal, all embracing, transcending time and space without 
limit whose earthly manifestation came in the form of Christ and whose existence to 
humans was explained by the trinity.
15. The pope’s earthly sovereignty was at least in terms of its claim absolute in terms 
of power, territorial scope and temporal duration. It existed in perpetuity and 
ultimately was justified by the assertion that the pope was Christ’s vicar and was in 
fact a human manifestation of God. The sovereignty expressed by the pope was 
therefore a human manifestation of God’s cosmic sovereignty. To accept restrictions 
upon the pope’s powers was to tolerate limitations upon God’s powers, which within 
a monotheistic paradigm was impossible. The pope’s will was God’s will and it 
manifested itself in the form of positive law that was the earthly expression of divine 
law. As there could be no conflict between the two, given the unity between pope and 
God, such laws were right and had to be obeyed by man not primarily because of their
i o
contents but because they were an expression of God’s will. Authorship of these 
commands therefore was the trigger for mandatory obedience underpinned by the 
assertion that the pope’s pronouncements had the quality of divine law itself. His 
was the only channel through which divine law could become known on earth and 
given this, the pope was not subject to any higher earthly authority. All law could be 
amended and changed by him and he was the sole judge of what could be regarded as
37 The specific struggle which gave rise to his major work Summa de potestate ecclesiastica concerned 
that between Pope John X X I1 and Louis o f Bavaria.
38 There was one important exception to this that is explored below.
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an illegal act. As he was God’s manifestation on earth, there was nothing to prevent 
him from changing the law in order to safeguard his own position, reflecting 
Triumphus’ position that “ the law cannot be greater than the legislator.39 For 
Triumphus and others who subscribed to the idea of a universal papal emperor, the 
pope’s power was the power to do anything- Papa omnia potest.40
16. The corollary of an authority with absolute power was that individuals could 
assert no rights against the pope for to do so would be to assert rights against God.
The fundamental duty of all individuals was to obey the pope. This amounted to an 
absolute ethical norm. The justification for the pope’s autonomy of will combined 
with the individual’s absolute duty to obey, derived from the claim that ultimately as 
Christ’s vicar, it was only he who could guarantee the preservation of society and 
ensure the salvation of its members. Disobedience to a papal order in effect amounted 
to heresy, a rejection of God and an acceptance of anti-papal idolatry. Claims that the 
pope could in his pronouncements fall foul of divine law were countered by that of 
papal infallibility which was a logical and necessary extension of papal sovereignty.41
17. The priorities of political power under this arrangement were subsumed by the 
requirement of spiritual salvation. This reflected the Augustinian proposition that 
secular government was the product of sin and the Fall of Man and in so far as it 
existed, it would have to be exercised in accordance with the requirements of the 
spiritual domain. Fallen Man, within this medieval construct, was characterised by 
sin and therefore, to quote a modem phrase was one-dimensional.42 His redemption 
could only occur by way of spiritual salvation for which he was totally reliant upon 
God and his earthly manifestation namely the pope. His physical presence was 
counterposed by a constitutional absence. Constitutionally, he was nothing, as the 
pope was under no obligation to take any notice of or respond to the demands of his 
sinful nature apart from those required by divine law of which the pope was the sole 
source. The community in which he lived, the Ecclesia 43 was in essence a vehicle to
39 Quoted in Wilks, M.J, 1963: 173.
40 Wilks, M.J, 1963: 169.
41 The relationship between papal sovereignty and infallibility was a highly problematic one perhaps 
explaining Augustinus Triumphus’ vagueness as to the nature o f the latter.
42 Herbert Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man.
43 It was referred to by Augustinus Triumphus as the Ecclesia whose core lay in the realm o f the divine 
but which also had an earthly presence and therefore existed in both the spiritual and temporal planes
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enable him to become incorporated into the divine being and obtain eternal life. It 
was therefore utterly dependent upon papal will for its construction. As stated by 
Augustinus Triumphus, it was through the pope ‘that we live, move and have our 
beings as good citizens.’44 There was thus considered to be a total identification 
between the pope’s will and that of the community, regarded as the congregation of 
the faithful. The pope therefore embodied the community which could have no other 
manifestation than that expressed by papal w ill45 The two became merged into one 
reflecting the spiritual project of incorporating all members of the community into the 
body of the divine.46 Juridically, reflecting the influence of Roman law, the 
community in its corporate nature, as embodied by the pope, was regarded as a 
corporation sole.47 All the community’s powers were possessed by the pope himself 
and no other. Papal legislation was that of the community which had no separate 
existence from him. Papal governance, even if practically carried out by others, was 
done so through his body of which they were considered to be part.48 The source of 
his power was the divine traced through St Peter and Christ. Fallen Man’s 
requirements had no expression separate from those of the community which itself 
had no separate existence apart from that of the divine as manifested by the pope who 
was regarded as a human god.49
18. Here one can see the manifestation of a sovereignty that does not depend for its 
legitimacy on an ascending origin of political authority in contrast to that of Hobbes 
and those who followed him. It is a totalising sovereignty in which Man has no 
independent secular presence. His existence has not yet been recognised as 
legitimately involving different realms of activity generating independently existing
simultaneously. In this sense, it reflected the existential character o f Jesus as both divine and human 
and was perceived to comprise the mystical body o f Christ. The purpose o f the earthly element of this 
society was to enable its members to come into contact with true reality and hence to attain supreme 
good, to be incorporated into the divine being and obtain eternal life. The task o f rulership which was 
considered to be embodied in the person o f  the pope was to translate the requirements o f the divine into 
positive law.
44 Augustinus Triumphus, Summa xxxvi, 6, p.217 cited in Wilks, M.J 1963: 37.
45 The identification of the ruler with the ruled is the basis o f the modem theory o f the state.
46 1 Corinthians, 12: 13-28.
47 Wilks, M.J 1963: 32.
48 Wilks, M.J 1963.
49 The idea o f a human god has a certain resonance with the Hobbes’ description o f sovereignty as a 
‘mortal God’. The pope as the earthly manifestation o f God is considered to be divine and therefore 
immortal. The temporally finite presence o f his body is therefore overcome by considering that all 
popes, including both predecessors and successors, amount to a continuous earthly presence o f the 
divine in perpetuity.
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secular norms in the economic, political and moral domains and therefore his 
presence bears no similarity to citizenship in its modem sense. All earthly activity is 
subordinated to the all-embracing requirements of spiritual salvation. His one­
dimensional state and the negation of his individuality in its own right are paralleled 
by a pervasive sovereignty which depends for its existence on the claim that God’s 
presence is absolute. Whereas the Old Testament God made his earthly presence felt, 
in the eyes of his believers, through episodic interventions,50 Triumphus' idea of God 
has developed to include a continuous human presence in the form of the pope. The 
whole of society is regarded as being subservient to God's requirements and earthly 
governance is constructed accordingly. Within Triumphus' model, the idea of God has 
reached its zenith in the sense that the temporal is completely absorbed by the needs 
of the spiritual. The fabric of Triumphus' powerful model of sovereignty is built 
around these assertions.
19. Yet at the same time there is an ambiguity about the pope's presence. The 
maintenance of papal sovereignty necessitates that he alone can experience 
authoritative revelation. His claim to be the human manifestation of God rests in part 
upon a monopoly of such access. Yet his ambiguity of form has the potential for 
undermining his claim to be the earthly manifestation of God. His claim to be a 
manifestation of God or the vicar of Christ rests in essence upon faith supported by 
scriptural interpretation and deductive logic from some of the tenets of faith, namely 
the existence of God, his all powerful nature and his resultant ability to transcend 
physical existence whilst at the same time having the ability to assume any physical 
forms he so chooses. The pope’s claim to be something other than what is 
constituted by his physical presence is not supported by the physical senses. The only 
aspect of his presence that is so supported is his physical mortality which equates with 
that of any other individual over which it is claimed he is entitled to rule in an 
absolute manner. This dual claim namely to exist simultaneously in the domain of the 
spiritual and physical is at one and the same time the strength and the potential 
weakness of Triumphus’ model. If his two manifestations are perceived to be 
detached from one another then the whole construct is fatally undermined. The most 
obvious point at which this unravelling process can begin to occur is in the perceived
50 For example, the divine initiation o f covenants such as those between God and Noah (Gen.vi. 18; ix 
9-17) God and Abraham. (Gen. xvii).
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relationship between positive and divine law. For Triumphus the pope simply declares 
and executes already-existing higher or divine law.51 Positive law therefore 
ultimately has no independent existence from that of divine law which is a logical 
outcome of the pope's position as the human form of God. However if  it is perceived 
that the two manifestation of law are not synonymous then the very identity of the 
pope with God is put under potentially fatal strain. These are matters which will be 
further explored below upon the completion of preliminary explorations of other 
models of sovereignty and the development of an explanatory framework through 
which an investigation will take place.
Dante
20. What we see above in the model of sovereignty presented, is an attempt at 
closure, by way of the identification of the occupant of the papal office with God and 
by the occupant being supreme in terms of governance. Closure in terms of exclusion 
of states was not part of this model because in its own terms, the sovereign body’s 
reach was global.52 However the idea of universal governance was also posed by
r i
Dante whose model also raises the issue of sovereignty and its character. As with 
Augustinus Triumphus, this model is developed before the emergence of the 
territorially limited state as being the dominant mode of governance within Western 
Europe. It too is heavily dependent upon the existence of a ubiquitous god. It was 
influenced by a Christianised version of Aristotelian thought developed by Aquinas in 
the thirteenth century. It too was formulated in response to the ongoing jurisdictional 
disputes between pope and emperor from the eleventh to the fourteenth century.54 It 
was based upon the idea of a universal ruler, dependent upon a universal god which 
was the causative agent of earthly society and sought its legitimacy by claiming to be 
an expression of God's will.55 One ruler of mankind was perceived to mirror the 
belief that there was one ruler of the cosmos and thus since heaven was guided by a
51 Wilks, M 1963: 155.
52 Wilks, M 1963:419.
53 Dante specifically claims that the emperor’s jurisdiction is only bounded by the ocean which, in the 
period that Dante was writing, covered the known world.
54 See Tierney, B 1988 for a useful account o f  these conflicts.
55 This account o f Dante’s view o f monarchy is based on Monarchy translated and edited by Shaw, P 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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single God, mankind in an ideal state was to be guided by a single ruler.56 Drawing 
upon Aristotelian thought, the ideal state, characterised by unity, was the root of what 
was good in contrast to plurality which was considered to be the root of evil.57 As 
God’s will always corresponded to what was best, a universal emperor who could 
ensure such unity was in accordance with God’s will.58 Such arguments based on 
abstract principle were confirmed by historical fact. For example, it was considered 
that Christ's perfect existence was mirrored by a perfect system of unified governance 
at the time of Christ's birth under Augustus, the emperor of the unified Roman 
Empire.
21. In contrast to Triumphus, Dante concluded that temporal jurisdiction was vested 
in a world emperor not in the pope. This was again achieved by a series of arguments 
based upon reason derived from abstract principle, scriptural interpretation and 
claimed historical fact. Underlying them was the idea reflecting Aristotelian 
influences that man had two natures, respectively corresponding to his soul and body. 
In relation to the former he was considered to be incorruptible,while, with respect to 
the latter he was considered to be corruptible. Reflecting this duality, Man was 
considered to have two goals, namely that of temporal happiness, that is a moral and 
ethical goal and happiness in the eternal life, that is to say an ecclesiastical-spiritual 
goal.59 Man therefore for Dante was no longer one dimensional in character and 
earthly governance reflected this assumption. There was both a temporal and spiritual 
aspect of Man that ran in parallel with each other. Whilst temporal jurisdiction was 
vested in the emperor, spiritual matters lay with the pope. This division of governance 
was also considered to be consistent with scriptural interpretation and in effect 
amounted to a divine separation of powers.60 The hierocratic structure associated 
with Triumphus’ model in which the temporal was subordinated to and effectively 
absorbed by the spiritual was replaced by a bifurcated hierarchy in which God was 
located at its pinnacle below which there were two hierarchies seemingly of equal 
status.61 One represented the spiritual and the other the temporal and they were 
headed respectively by the emperor and the pope. In effect Dante appropriated the
56 Dante, 1996: 12.
57 Dante, 1996: 26.
58 Dante, 1996: 25.
59 Dante, 1996: 92-93.
60 For example Luke xxii: 38.
61 There was an unresolved uncertainty about the position. See below.
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language of spiritual governance for the purposes of temporal governance through 
what has been described as an humana civilitas which paralleled the spiritually 
anchored Ecclesia, constituting the mystical body of the human race, the head of 
which was the emperor with the task of realising Man’s earthly purpose of obtaining
ff)happiness, that is through the re-establishment of a terrestrial paradise. However 
this heterogeneous structure together with Dante’s methodology set up a series of 
seemingly unresolved difficulties.
22. For Dante as for Aquinas, reason became a tool through the use of Aristotelian 
teleology to discover the nature of truth which included God’s will. This approach 
both justified and defined the nature of temporal sovereignty itself and the limits 
associated with it. Hence these limits were independent of it and defined its nature 
and its capacity for action. Reason thus remained an independent judge of the validity 
of the emperor’s actions. This was reinforced by the absence of any claim by Dante 
that the emperor was God thus exposing the potential for the actions of the former to 
conflict with the perceived will of the latter. The ontological differentiation between 
God on the one hand and the emperor and pope on the other was an inevitable 
outcome of the separation of earthly governance into the two domains of the temporal 
and spiritual. A lack of such differentiation would have suggested such a limitation 
upon God’s powers, a logical impossibility given the all-powerful nature of God as 
reflected in Aquinas’ writings.63
23. The limits of the emperor’s powers manifested themselves for example by 
Dante’s assertion that the division of the empire would be against God’s will and 
therefore invalid as ‘nobody has the right to do things because of an office he holds 
which are in conflict with that office, otherwise one and the same thing would oppose 
itself in its own nature, which is impossible: but to divide the empire is in conflict 
with the office bestowed on the emperor, since his task is to hold mankind in 
obedience to a single will.. .therefore the emperor is not allowed to divide the 
empire.’64 The consequence of this was that any emperor who endeavoured to do so 
would have been carrying out an invalid act of no effect as was claimed by Dante in
62 Kantorowicz, E.H 1997: 468.
63 A useful summary o f the conceptualising o f  God by Aquinas is to be found in Davies, B: 1992.
64 Dante, 1996: 81.
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relation to the alleged gift by Emperor Constantine of Rome to the pope. This transfer 
in Dante’s view destroyed the indivisible unity of the world and led the Church on a 
path of territorial acquisition.65 Another limitation suggested by Dante consistent 
with the principle of equity formulated by Aristotle was that there should be a 
jurisdictional differentiation within the temporal domain itself.66 The different 
characteristics of different localities meant that each locality should have been 
allowed to formulate laws according to its own particular circumstances. However 
this was only permissible to the extent that they did not conflict with laws that 
concerned matters that were common to all men and which were the exclusive 
concern of the universal emperor.67 Here an incipient federal arrangement was being 
suggested and the implication was that were the emperor to automatically veto any 
such legislation without justification, he could have been acting in breach of God’s 
will and in that event his action as expressed in law would not have been valid.68 The 
examples could be multiplied.
24. These limits were consistent with the definition of the universal emperor itself 
which Dante regarded as, ‘a single sovereign authority set over all others in time, that 
is to say over all authorities which operate in those things and those which are 
measured by time.’69 Reference to ‘time’ clearly referred to temporal authorities in 
contrast to spiritual ones which were unbounded by time. It was reinforced by the 
Aristotelian idea that social institutions existed for the sake of the citizen and not visa-
70versa. Reflecting this, Dante proclaimed that the emperor was appointed for the 
sake of an already existing jurisdiction, namely that of the empire, ‘for it is clear that 
the emperor precisely as emperor cannot change it, because he derives from it the fact 
that he is what he is.’71 This again points to certain limits placed upon the emperor's 
powers, the breach of which could run foul of God’s divine plan. The first limitation 
connected with the emperor’s duty to maintain a unified empire has the quality of
65 Dante, 1996: 80 note 1.
66 Ethics, 5, 10-1137a; 31-1138a.
67 Dante, 1996: 24-5.
68 It could be argued that the requirement o f maintaining the unity o f the empire was an overriding one, 
given its status as part o f God’s divine plan and therefore would take precedence over those 
underpinning local legislation. Hence where such legislation was considered to undermine the empire’s 
unity, an emperor could be justified in vetoing it.
69 Dante, 1996: 4.
70 Shaw, P 1996: xiv.
71 Dante, 1996: 82.
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eternal law about it as formulated by Aquinas.72 The second comprising the principle
I'Xof equity, that of natural law and the third, that is its application, that of human law. 
On this basis it would be only the third kind of law that was within the gift of the 
secular powers to change since the first two were immutable expressions of the 
rational will of God.74 The emperor's function was to lead men to their human goal of 
temporal happiness by relying on philosophical teachings whilst the pope's task in 
reliance upon theological teachings was to lead men to divine salvation.75 The laws 
made and executed by the emperor had to be aimed at promoting the common good 
otherwise they could not be regarded as laws.
25. The other major limitation concerned the relationship itself between the temporal 
and spiritual aspects of governance. The perceived differences between the purpose 
of the emperor and pope in general terms defined their respective domains but the 
precise location of the boundary between the two was left unclear by Dante. God was 
at the summit of the bifurcated hierarchical structure. Its branches corresponded to the 
distinct domains of the temporal and spiritual with their respective heads, namely the 
pope and emperor and their jurisdictionally equivalent status.76 Within the temporal 
domain, conflict between local rulers of equal status required a supreme judge at the 
pinnacle of that branch of the hierarchy which for Dante had to be the universal
7 7emperor. However, Dante did not address the potential problem of conflict between 
pope and universal emperor. The lacuna was consistent with the idea referred to by 
Aquinas that positive law, that is human law could only derive its coercive force from 
the ruler’s power and hence the latter could not coerce himself.78 As there was no 
superior earthly judge to that of pope and emperor, there could not be any earthly 
mechanism by which conflict could be settled.
26. However it also seemed that Dante was reluctantly cognisant of the above 
difficulty. On the one hand he appears to have accorded the two, equal status, within
72 Aquinas, T “ The Summa o f Theology” Qu. 91 and 93 in Sigmund P, 1988: 46,48.
73 Aquinas T, “ The Summa of Theology Qu 95 in Sigmund P, 1988: 53. Aquinas formulated the three 
categories o f law used here.
74 Aquinas T, “ The Summa of Theology Qu. 97.3 in Sigmund P, 1988: 53.
75 Davis, C.T, 1993: 68.
76 Dante, 1996: 86.
77 Dante, 1996: 14.
78 Aquinas T, “ The Summa of Theology Qu. 96.5 Sigmund P, 1988: 55.
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the terms of his hierarchy. On the other, at the end of Monarchy he made the 
intriguing statement that, c[t]he Roman Prince is in some sense subject to the Roman 
Pontiff, since his earthly happiness is in some sense ordered towards immortal
7Qhappiness.’ Does this suggest as Aquinas did, that papal intervention was justified 
where temporal governance amounted to a direct threat to the salvation of mens’ 
souls? 80 The implications of this comment would appear to fundamentally 
undermine the bifurcated hierarchy of governance constructed by Dante since it 
would suggest that there was not equivalence between the supreme representatives of 
the spiritual and temporal spheres. The autonomy of the secular sphere would appear 
to be limited and in fact to be subordinate to that of the spiritual sphere. The 
seemingly unresolved jurisdictional relationship between the pope and emperor was 
provided with a solution which in effect placed the spiritual above the temporal in the 
event that the pope considered that laws passed by the emperor amounted to a 
spiritual threat. Dante appeared to be suggesting that the pope had a monopoly of 
interpretative and decision-making power in relation to which of such temporal laws 
would constitute such a threat. On this basis, the pope, in the name of the spiritual, 
possessed a veto power over all temporal laws and hence to dominate the temporal as 
well as spiritual domains with the ultimate possibility posed of the former being 
absorbed into the latter. This comprised an outcome that was fundamentally 
incompatible with the basic normative requirements of Dante’s model, namely the 
requirement for two separate independent co-equal domains corresponding to the 
spiritual and temporal.
27. Any emperor wishing to contest papal rulings on such matters and who wished to 
proclaim equivalence with the pope could find himself in conflict on three levels. 
Firstly there would be the issue of the proclaimed equivalence itself given the 
ambiguity of Dante's constitutional prescription. Secondly and independently there 
could be a clash over the interpretation of the laws under examination. Thirdly even if 
there was acceptance over their meaning, there might be clash over whether such laws 
could in fact amount to a threat to man's salvation. The difficulty for the emperor 
would be that a concession in this regard could amount to him accepting that the 
secular reasons motivating the laws would be displaced by supposed spiritual ones
79 Dante, 1996: 94.
80 Sigmund, P, 1988: xxii.
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overruling them. Effectively therefore, he would be accepting that the character of the 
temporal domain was to be determined by spiritually determined limitations which 
were beyond his jurisdiction. The secular domain would be entirely contingent on the 
reaches of the spiritual one since a decision by the pope not to proclaim that a 
temporal law threatened man's redemption would be as significant as the exercise of 
any veto power over such a law. At a more abstract level, the difficulty with the 
bifuracated configuration was that it gave rise effectively to two normative orders, the 
secular and the spiritual ones. A clash between them could not be easily resolved 
since there was no provision of an earth-bound superior order that embraced them 
both.81 Hence, ultimately conflict could only be fully resolved by one order being 
subsumed by the other and for the equivalence between the two to be extinguished.
In that event, Dante's system would 'collapse' into one with similarities to that of 
Augustinus Triumphus in that there would be only one global chain of command 
which was spiritually orientated with the emergence of a hierocratic order with one 
chain of command which was spiritually orientated.82
28. As a result of the weaker claims for temporal sovereignty in Dante's model, it 
could suffer instability leading to its alteration or destruction. Firstly, in the name of 
purported spiritual domain, the pope could potentially absorb powers associated with 
the governance of temporal matters. This might not have amounted to an illegitimate 
action by the pope because of Dante's acceptance of the ultimate superiority of the 
spiritual over the temporal domains. Thus, hidden within Dante's model was the 
possibility of another model of sovereignty by implication, in which papal authority 
was rendered supreme both in the temporal and spiritual domain. This was suggested 
by a critic of Dante, namely Guido Vemani. He considered that the world emperor 
proposed by Dante was none other than the emperor of Christ and the emperor was in 
fact the pope.83 Secondly there were the normative limitations attached to the powers 
of the emperor, the breach of which, leaving aide any papal intervention, could have
81 Dante by leaving the relationship between emperor and pope unresolved in this way therefore did not 
meet the requirements that he himself considered essential for effective governance, namely the 
avoidance o f conflict between its institutions through the provision o f a supreme decision-maker (in his 
case in the form o f  emperor) who would resolve such conflicts and hence secure closure and an 
effective system o f decision-making and administration.
82 Augustinus Triumphus was completely explicit about the inferiority o f temporal rulers such as kings 
to spiritual ones such as bishops (Wilks, M. J, 1959: 337).
83 Wilks, M.J, 1959:417.
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set up a crisis as to the legitimacy of his actions and resultant dispute. Whereas in 
the first model, the claim was that the will of God was unfailingly expressed through 
its earthly manifestation, the pope, in the second there was room for the emperor's 
will to conflict with that of God's and hence to be rendered illegitimate and 
ineffectual.85
29. Both Augustinus Triumphus and Dante were writing at times when governance 
was very different to now. The state had yet to become the dominant unit of 
governance around which rules of international law were constructed. Instead the 
organisation of governance across Europe was characterised by a plethora of 
arrangements whereby the European region was not divided up into exclusive 
sovereignties, but was covered by overlapping and shifting lordships within a 
framework of shifting rights and obligations so that sub-continental governance was 
neither completely supreme or independent. The configuration of territory subject to 
a given ruler was not normally continuous in character but more resembled the 
arrangement of an archipelago. The central political idea was that of Respublica 
Christiana, a loosely formed empire through which governance was split into a 
spiritual and a temporal domain with the former headed by the pope and the latter 
headed by an emperor. Religious governance was based on a universitas , that is a 
hierarchical organisation with the occupant of the papal office at its summit 
legitimated through being perceived as compliant with the requirement of the great 
chain of being which was geared towards the overall purpose of Christian redemption
8 f tand salvation. The period of this empire was characterised by jurisdictional and 
territorial dispute between three centres of power namely that of the papal office, that 
of the emperor and that of the emerging regional monarchies. One can see in the
84 Papal intervention itself could set up a crisis o f legitimation when judged against the requirements of  
Dante's model of governance, in the sense o f being perceived to amount to a straying into the temporal 
sphere reserved for the emperor. On the other hand, the pope's intervention could be seen as protecting 
the spiritual domain from being undermined by temporal encroachment by the emperor in which case 
the hidden model o f sovereignty implicated in Dante's stated model could legitimately emerge.
85 Below a further examination o f the model o f Augustinus Triumphus will reveal that in fact there is 
an arrangement which in effect bears significant similarity to that o f Dante. It is constructed in a way 
that endeavours not to disturb the discourse o f  supremacy that Augustinus Triumphus attaches to the 
spiritual domain as embodied by the pope. It will also be seen that just as Dante’s model fails by 
reference to its own purpose o f being based upon two separate independent co-equal domains 
corresponding to the spiritual and temporal, Triumphus’ model also ultimately fails to adhere to the 
hierocratic logic based on papal supremacy around which it is substantially structured.
86 Various sources were consulted in the construction o f this material. These include: Jackson, R 1999, 
Wilks, M.J 1963, Morrall, J 1980, Tierney, B 1988, Oakely, F 1988, Bums, J.H 1988.
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writings of both Augustinus Triumphus and Dante, expressions of this conflict since 
each represents a different position on the spectrum between that which did not 
recognise a separate domain of secular governance as manifested by Triumphus and 
that which considered independent secular governance to be legitimate and in the 
middle, solutions to governance based on the ideas of Aquinas which recognised a 
largely independent secular domain but ultimately subject to religious control. Dante 
at first sight fitted into the radical secular wing of this debate by advocating a 
completely separate and independent domain of secular governance and therefore 
appeared to go beyond Aquinas in this regard by advocating two parallel paradises in
effect. However on closer inspection, this separation was not as complete as first
88appeared. It potentially led to what was in effect a variant of the great chain of 
being which characterised the Christian mode of governance with its supreme 
governor at the head of a multi-layered system of governance. It was through the 
complete detachment of the secular from the spiritual and ultimately the latter being 
subordinated to the former, together with the predication of governance upon 
territorially limited but contiguous domains and the development of governance upon 
the will of the governor, as expressed through positive law unfettered by natural law, 
that provided the basis for the emergence of models of modem sovereignty. Early 
examples, leaving aside Hobbes, include the models of Bodin and Machiavelli, both 
of whom based their models on systems of centralised governance that were 
territorially limited where it was considered that supreme power should be located in 
one location. Both models reflected a long and ongoing process of social 
development producing the weakening of feudalism, the growth of territorially based 
states that were increasingly secular in character and the re-working of the Corpus 
Juris, leading to a re-conceptualising of the content of law amongst legal scholars 
which produced a body of law that was more responsive to the realities of the human 
condition as manifested regionally.89 Brief coverage will now be given to Bodin’s 
model with the aim of exploring the central characteristics of his model of sovereignty 
most particularly his claim that sovereignty required its holder to be supreme over a
87 Kantorowicz, E.H 1997: 469.
88 This is a point that is not developed by Kantorowicz who considers that Dante had broken with 
Aquinas in this regard. My argument is essentially that while the great thrust o f Dante’s Monarchia 
does fit in with such a conclusion, there remains a thread o f attachment to the spiritual domain in a 
manner that provided for the continuing domination o f the temporal by the spiritual thus bringing him 
back inside the framework provided by Aquinas.
89 This is usefully explored in Franklin. See Franklin, J.H 1963.
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territorially limited population. This will be followed by a detailed introduction on 
Hobbes’ model and will conclude with a brief word on Machiavelli.
Bodin
30. In the case of Bodin, one sees a definition of sovereignty as ‘the absolute and 
perpetual power of a commonwealth.’90 He conceptualised it as not being limited 
‘either in power, or in function, or in length of time.’91 Its location depended upon the 
arrangements of governance. It was capable of being located within a single 
individual or group of individuals who if possessing it would not be subject to law, 
save for natural and divine law.92 The most effective form of governance was 
however considered by Bodin to be that of monarchy. However sovereignty would 
not be possessed if such power had been allotted for a specific period of time by ‘the 
people’ or by them through consent, whether by commission, nomination or 
delegation or generally by law,94 since for Bodin, in such circumstances sovereignty 
remained with the donor of the power, namely the people.95 For a person to become 
sovereign, the people must have been stripped absolutely of power which could occur 
for example by unconditional gift and was consistent with the laws of succession 
based on hereditary principles. It could also occur by a ruler imposing himself upon a 
people by force, even though in such circumstances the individual would be described
90 Bodin, J 1992: 1.
91 Bodin, J 1992: 3.
92 Bodin, J 192: 11, 13. Although the sovereign was not bound to keep laws made previously by his 
predecessors by virtue o f them being laws, he might be bound by them by virtue o f being subject to 
‘just and reasonable’ contracts which the public good require him to keep (Bodin, J 1992: 14).
93 Bodin, J 1962: VI, 4, 715 as cited in Holmes S: 1995: 104. In effect, the purpose o f his model was to 
justify absolute monarchy and centralised government in response to the central problem of his time, 
namely religious civil wars in Europe that also afflicted France from the 1560s. Consistent with this, 
he objected to arrangements where sovereignty was divided between ruler and people and an axiomatic 
property o f sovereignty was that it had to be undivided.
94 Bodin, J 1992: 7. Agency which is central to the modem idea of sovereignty, for Bodin was 
incompatible with it since it suggests the power o f the person claiming to be sovereign is derived from 
elsewhere.
95 Bodin, J 1992: 4. In these circumstances the donnee o f such powers would be nothing more than 
trustees o f  it (Bodin, J 1992:4). In this sense, the arrangement would be similar to Locke’s desired form 
o f  governance whereby a legislature held power as trustees for the people. Thus Bodin cites the 
example o f  the Cnidians who annually granted power to sixty citizens called amnemones who were 
wrongly regarded as sovereign and in Bodin’s view were not so since they were obliged to return such 
power at the end o f the year. So for Bodin, sovereignty remained with the people and only its exercise 
was handed over to the amnemones who at best could be called sovereign magistrates ‘but not 
sovereigns pure and simple’ (Bodin, J 1992: 4-5).
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as a tyrant.96 Sovereignty was conceptualised as being imposed upon a population 
located in a specific territory and amongst the (absolute) powers associated with it
0 7was that of law-making which was regarded as the first ‘mark’ of sovereignty. It 
embraced all other powers associated with sovereignty, including but not limited to 
the declaring of war and peace, the hearing of appeals at last instance, the 
appointment and the removal of officials, the imposing of taxes and the granting of 
pardons.98 Reflecting the sovereign’s freedom from the law, the latter was perceived 
as a command emanating from the sovereign and generally his predecessors and 
affecting all his subjects.99 What we see here referring back to qualities associated 
with sovereignty is that it concerns centralised governance, that the sovereign is 
supreme in terms of the legal order which he creates, that he is not bound by the laws 
he makes by virtue of them being laws, that there is a degree of closure because of the 
supremacy of the sovereign, that sovereignty is over a specific territory with a specific 
population and hence by implication involves exclusion of other populations. 
Underpinning this, certain qualities associated with sovereignty remain beyond his 
power to alter, namely, laws that ‘concern the state and its basic form,’100 that is to 
say they concerned the continuity and circumstances of the crown itself.101 These 
included the laws of succession which ensured a successor and the law against the 
alienation of the territory and resources of the commonwealth thus ensuring the
96 Bodin, J 1992: 6. 120.
97 Bodin, J 1992: 56-58. The idea o f the first mark o f sovereignty embracing all the others suggests 
that Bodin did not appreciate the difference between legislative and executive functions o f government 
and is clearly consistent with his requirement that sovereignty was indivisible. Franklin J.H discusses 
this point and considers that Bodin was incorrect to claim that this was a requirement o f sovereignty. 
(Franklin, J.H 1991: 302-305).
98 Bodin, J 58-59 which contains a full list o f what are regarded as the ‘true’ prerogatives o f the 
sovereign. These prerogatives are consistent with the power associated with Bodin’s sovereign being 
public in nature, that is to say power that is qualitatively differentiated from private power as 
emphasised by Aristotle in his observation that ‘it is an error to suppose, as some do, that the role o f  the 
statesman .. .o f a statesman, o f a king, o f a household manger and o f a master o f slaves are the same on 
the ground that they differ not in kind but only in point o f numbers o f persons’ (Aristotle, 1962:54). 
Bodin is quite explicit about the public nature o f a sovereign’s powers in contrast to the power o f the 
heads of households, guilds and corporations which he considered to be private in nature. He states 
‘[a]ll power to command another is either public or private. The public power resides in the sovereign 
who makes the law, or in the person o f magistrates who bend beneath the law and command other 
magistrates or private persons.’ (Bodin, J quoted in Franklin, J.H 1963: 71).
99 Bodin, J 1992: 51. This gives rise to a comparatively narrow domain o f exemption from the law as it 
does not include other categories o f law which constitute higher law.
100 Such laws included the laws o f succession and another forbidding the territorial alienation o f the 
kingdom by consent. This latter in particular underpins the territorially limited nature o f  Bodin’s 
sovereignty.
101 Franklin, J.H 1973: 70.
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continuation of the latter.102 To pass such laws would negate his sovereignty and 
hence such restrictions were regarded as part of God’s fundamental laws.103 The 
other kind of higher law the sovereign was considered to be subject to were those that 
mainly concerned with the protection of the rights of the sovereign’s subjects. 
Reflecting this, the sovereign remained bound by God’s and natural law, although 
there was no higher immanent authority that the population could appeal to in order to 
ensure that the sovereign did not breach such laws or punish or even depose him when 
he did, since to have such a body would remove sovereignty from the person in whom 
it was vested.104 This difficulty was not satisfactorily resolved by Bodin as he 
claimed that the duty of subjects to obey the sovereign arose out of the laws of God 
and this applied even where the laws created by the sovereign were in breach of the 
laws of nature and yet elsewhere he claimed that it was the duty of magistrates and of 
all the people to disobey since the need to respect the laws of nature ‘ought to be to 
all subjects greater and more precious than the wealth, the life, the honour of all the 
princes of the world.’105
31. Bodin’s sovereignty continues to possess, albeit in weaker form, a feature of pre­
modem sovereignty, namely that its legitimacy is descending in form from God from 
whom Bodin’s sovereignty appears at least at first site to retain its agency. Reflecting 
this, are the continuing restraints upon sovereignty albeit with uncertain consequences
102 Bodin, J 1992: 18. Here one can see a separation between the incumbent o f the crown and the office 
itself, given that the restrictions as to the alienability o f sovereignty can be, as Skinner has suggested, 
attached to ‘sovereignty’ rather than the sovereign itself, which although not alluded to by Skinner at 
this point is consistent with the above separation (Skinner, Q 1978b: 294).
103 Bodin, J 1992: 18. The expectation would be that the magistrates would correct this law once the 
offending sovereign was dead and that in the meantime they would not acknowledge them. There still 
remains a difficulty here in that in the absence o f  an uprising to reverse the measure, by the time it is 
altered, it may well be too late in practical terms to reverse the wrong created. Where for example, he 
has given away part o f his kingdom, one would end up with a position whereby, as with a diminution 
or alteration o f the territorial reach o f the jurisdiction o f the UK Parliament, any legislation to reverse 
such a position by subsequence parliaments would be valid but very probably ineffective. Returning to 
Bodin, the fact that such decisions would not be binding upon subsequent monarchs or their 
magistrates further undermines the legitimacy o f such measures and if  anything may encourage 
resistance to them prior to the offending sovereign’s death most particularly by his successor who 
would be affected by such measures. See Franklin J.H 1973: 74.
104 Bodin also considers that the sovereign is bound by what in effect could be regarded as jus gentium 
or international law, as he states that the sovereign is bound also by ‘various human laws that are 
common to all people.’ (Bodin, J 1992:10). Example o f natural laws which bind the sovereign include 
the prohibitions o f  acting dishonestly and o f stealing, and of being obliged to honour contracts he has 
entered into with his subjects, o f only removing another’s property against his consent by just and 
reasonable cause and o f being liable to judgment in respect o f debts owed by him to his subjects 
(Bodin, J 1992: 39-42).
105 Bodin, J 324 1962 quoted in Skinner, Q 1978b: 295.
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of higher law, which reflect a continuing attachment to medieval constitutionalism. In 
this sense, the idea of a transcendent God which provides the conceptual space for 
independent secular governance is clearly present. However as Buijs has put it, the 
idea of the sovereign’s accountability to God, that is the ‘“ Christian qualification’”106 
has not yet been completely removed, preventing a complete rupture of earthly 
governance from requirements associated with that of religion. Closure which is 
central to the idea of sovereignty’s supremacy has not been unambiguously achieved 
in a metaphysical sense although from the point of view of external territory, it has 
occurred.108 From the point of view of the political community there is an ambiguity 
as clearly the sovereign is separated from community over which he rules by virtue of 
his role and powers including that of being free from the commands of law he issues 
but as he himself is subject to certain natural laws as is the rest of the population, it is 
arguable that complete separation has not occurred in this domain.109 Paradoxically 
as Holmes suggests the limitations imposed upon the sovereign could be said to 
strengthen his legitimacy and hence his power in the eyes of the population and help 
forge an identity between sovereign and community,110 not least because breach of 
higher law by the sovereign will according to Bodin cause him to be guilty of 
treasonous conduct against God.111
106 Buijs, G 2003: 247.
107 The fundamental project which the Six Books o f the Commonwealth aims to achieve is a systematic 
study of the legislation and law o f  all peoples and the development o f a system o f laws which reflects 
the best unearthed by this comparative study.
108 The territorially defined nature o f Bodin’s model is reflected by the entitlement of magistrates upon 
a king’s death not to acknowledge any decree of his that goes against the ‘royal laws on which the 
sovereign majesty is founded and supported.’ This would include decrees that include ‘usurpation o f  
the commonwealth’s domain’ (Bodin, J 1992:18).
109 For example he was obliged to honour his contracts with his subjects and foreigners (Bodin, J 1992: 
35.) Given the ambiguity concerning closure in relation to the political community, this leads to the 
conclusion that the attempt by Buijs to identify closure as expressing itself in three respects overlooks 
the interlinking between them.
110 Holmes, S 1995:100-133. This comes across clearly for instance where Bodin states ‘that to have 
absolute power is not to be subject to any law at all, no prince o f this world will be sovereign since 
every earthly prince is subject to the laws o f God and o f nature and to various human laws that are 
common to all peoples’ (Bodin, J 1992:10). This reflects more widely his conviction that good 
governance, geared towards ensuring social peace is most likely to achieve that if  there ‘is an 
adaptation o f the state to the nature o f the citizens’ (Bodin, J quoted in Franklin, J.H 1963: 78). 
Reflecting this and indicative o f the way that Bodin’s scheme o f governance was fundamentally 
secularised was his view that the sovereign must be prepared to tolerate religious diversity within his 
kingdom where to suppress it could lead to the destruction o f  the state (Bodin, J quoted in Holmes, S 
1995: 125).
111 Bodin, J 1992: 13.
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32. The idea of the continual, that is to say a perpetual sovereign office explicitly 
comes to the fore in Bodin’s model. The idea of the uncommanded commander as 
regards territorially based positive law emerges although in the case of Bodin, such 
laws are not yet completely set free from the requirements of higher law. The idea 
of political power which Hobbes goes on to develop in a systematic way is implicit in 
Bodin’s model in the idea of the sovereign being perpetual and hence possessing a 
potentiality which is realised through law. The sovereign while undivided and hence 
in functional terms capable of engaging in all three modes of governmental power, 
namely judicial, legislative and executive now, in Hobbes’ model revolves more 
around its legislative role than its judicial one. The sovereign as yet is not explicitly 
conceptualised in impersonal terms, a development which again emerges more clearly 
in Hobbes’ writings.
Hobbes
33. Moving onto Hobbes, his work has been described thus:
‘ ... a philosophical progression which would start with natural bodies and the most 
fundamental principles of the natural sciences, move on to man and an account of his 
sense perception, language, reasoning, psychological nature, and morality and
i I
conclude with an account of civil society or the “body politic”.’
34. The account concerned with his political philosophy and sovereignty is to be 
found largely in three works, namely De Corpore Politico in the Elements o f  Law, De 
Cive, and Leviathan.113 In summary, the location of Hobbes’ political philosophy is 
situated at the end of a logical progression and is largely based on an understanding of 
human psychology which he sought to underpin by an analysis of the laws of matter. 
What Hobbes therefore attempted to do was to provide a political philosophy which 
was one albeit important piece in a larger jigsaw puzzle endeavouring to explain 
man’s existential condition by reference to scientific laws and assertions that in 
Hobbes’ opinion were immutable. There is a vast literature relating to all aspects of
112 Gaskin, J 1994, xvii.
1131 have cited them in the order in which they were completed, although On the Citizen otherwise 
known as De Cive was published before The Elements o f  Law.
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Hobbes’ work and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to engage with much of it. 
What is intended here is to concentrate on his understanding of the structure of 
sovereignty and its limits, and in the process to evaluate the relationship between the 
spiritual and temporal in his model.
35. In contrast to the Aristotelian approach, christianised and reinvigorated by 
Aquinas, Hobbes considered that man was not a political animal114 and was not bom 
fit for society.115 The reason for this was that man in his natural state was not inclined 
to live in a co-operative manner or behave in a way that was consistent with the 
common good.116 This arose out of his perception of man as a creature driven by 
inconstant desires and fears, many of them were not innate but the product of
I I 1  1 i oexperience, which were multifarious in character, and varying from man to 
man.119 These formed the basis for conflict since Hobbes perceives power as being:
4 the eminence of the Faculties of Body or Mind ...[which] are means and Instruments 
to acquire more: as Riches, Reputation, Friends, and the secrete working of God,
1 9 0which men call Good Luck.’
36. Implicit within this definition was the idea that life was ‘a zero-sum game’ in 
which one man’s loss was another's gain and which was made explicit in the Elements 
o f Law}21 Pre-civil society which he described as the state of nature 122 was
114 As described by Aristotle, Politics 1,2, 1253a7.
115 Aristotle, Politics'.l.l, 1253a3.
116 In contrast to the vision o f man proposed by Aquinas who was created in God's own image: 
Aquinas, Qu.XClll: Pegis, 1997: 885. Aquinas alludes to the inequality between the image as 
constituted by Man and God and thus the former's imperfections can stand in the way o f man living in 
accordance with the common good and in accordance with God's divine plan. However he does not 
rule out the possibility o f man naturally being able to live in accordance with such a plan since ‘the will 
o f  a man who sees God in his essence o f necessity adheres to God... ’ Qu. LXXXll.a 2 (Pegis, 1997: 
779). Hobbes on the other hand in effect closes off this possibility for man in his natural state.
117 Hobbes, T 1968:120.
118 For example the desires to be rich, to enhance one’s reputation and to have friends which he 
encapsulates in the desire for ‘felicity’ which he defines as the 'Continuall [sic] successe [sic]in 
obtaining those things which man from time to time desireth’ (Hobbes, T 1968: 32).
119 Hobbes, T 1998:32.
120 Hobbes, T 1968: 150.
121 Hobbes, T 1994: 48.
122 This term to denote pre-civil society was used by other theorists for example the Thomists such as 
Molina and Suarez as suggested by Skinner, Q 1978b: 156-7. There is some controversy over the 
ontological status o f the state o f nature. Gaskin for example asserts that it is a hypothetical model o f  
what existence would be like if  society was never formed or if  it broke down (Gaskin, J.C.A 1994: 
xxx). Tuck and Silverthome on the other hand whilst not discounting that it might be ‘a thought
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characterised by conflict rather than harmony.123 The desires and fears listed by 
Hobbes were an expression of man’s self-interest and he was innovatory in asserting 
that man, in the state of nature, was motivated overwhelmingly by self interest as 
expressed through them. At rock bottom these desires were all a manifestation of 
man's overriding need to survive.124 His actions were therefore determined by that 
end within an environment of finite resources and possibilities, where it was 
impossible for everyone to satisfy all desires. Conflict was intensified by all men 
having been borne with an equality of potential ability and expectation that they were 
able to fulfil their desires.125 The result was a condition in which war between 
individuals prevailed since they were disposed towards violence to resolve their 
conflicts.126 Life in the state of nature was characterised by Hobbes as poor, nasty, 
brutish and short.127
37. From these seemingly chaotic circumstances and his conclusion that the desire for 
self-preservation was universally present amongst men, he concluded that men were 
justified in taking all necessary measures to defend themselves in their quest for 
survival. As a result, he elevated that universal desire into a universal right. Thus he 
stated:
‘It is not therefore absurd nor reprehensible, nor contrary to right reason, if one makes 
every effort to defend his body and limbs from death and to preserve them. And what
198is not done contrary to right reason, is done justly and o f Right]
experiment’ (implying that Hobbes did not necessarily think that such a condition was possible) 
considered that it was possible that Hobbes thought it to have been a state o f affairs witnessed in North 
America amongst Indian tribes (Tuck, R and Silverthome, M 1998: xxv-xxvi). MacPherson makes the 
point that the qualities that Hobbes attached to man were those perceived within political society which 
suggests together with Gaskin's approach that the 'state o f nature' might have been used as a polemical 
device to point out the consequences o f the fall o f government at a time o f acute political instability in 
England ( Macpherson, C.B 1968:37)
123 Again this was not a unique characterisation. For example in a sermon preached in 1621 Robert 
Bolton stressed the horrors of life without government which would include,' murder, adulteries, 
incests, rapes, robberies, peijuries, witchcrafts, blasphemies' (quoted in Sommerville, J 1992: 38 from 
Bolton, Robert, Two Sermons preached at Northampton (STC 3256)).
124 Hobbes, T 1998: 1.1-1.10. Hobbes never explains the basis upon which he asserts its universal 
applicability (Tuck, R and Silverthome, M 1998:xxiv).
125 Hobbes, 1968: 183-4.
126 Hobbes, 1968:186; Hobbes 1998:29; Hobbes, T 1994: 80.
127 Hobbes, 1998:186; Hobbes, T 1994.
128 Hobbes, 1998: 27.
56/267
Developing this idea he asserted:
‘THE RIGHT OF NATURE which writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty 
each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his 
own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently of doing any thing, 
which by his own Judgement, and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means 
thereunto.’129
38. This right of self- preservation for Hobbes was inalienable and formed the 
bedrock upon which political society could be created. Seemingly in conformity with 
the idea of natural laws, Hobbes constructed a set of these which he considered would 
ensure survival if implemented. These laws, predicated upon the right of self- 
preservation, he defined as:
‘a Precept, or general Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do,
th a t, which is destructive of his life, or taketh way the means of preserving the same;
110and to omit that which he thinketh it may be best preserved.’
39. In effect he constructed a hierarchy of such laws for he indicated that there was a 
fundamental law of nature which required ‘That every man ought to endeavour to
1 -j |
seek Peace... ’. However in recognition of man’s fundamental right to self- 
preservation, he qualified it by stating that ‘.. .and when he cannot obtain it, that he 
seek and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre.’132
40. Hobbes then formulated a number of laws that reflected the core principle of 
endeavouring to seek peace involving each individual giving up his right to govern 
himself if others would do the same,133 keeping his covenants,134 not being a judge in 
one’s own cause135 and a number of others.136 The difficulty about exercising such
129 Hobbes, T 1968
130 Hobbes, T 1968
131 Hobbes, T 1968
132 Hobbes, T 1968
133 Hobbes, T 1968
134 Hobbes, T 1968
135 Hobbes, T 1968
189.
189.
190. 
190. 
190. 
201 . 
213.
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laws in the state of nature was that there was no central authority to interpret or 
enforce them and nor were there any objective criteria determining what each man 
was entitled to do to preserve himself In the absence of such an authority which was 
the fundamental characteristic of the state of nature, as the quote above suggests, each 
individual was entitled to judge what was required to satisfy his perceived desires. In 
effect subjective judgements possessed by each individual determined their actions 
and hence their individual relationships with other individuals. Drawing out the 
implications of this state of affairs, Hobbes considered that each man ‘has the right to 
all things.’137 To impose limits on what man could do to satisfy his desires in the 
state of nature would in effect, undermine his ability to realise his fundamental right 
to survive.
41. Far from condemning such behaviour in the state of nature, by the construction of 
the right to self-preservation, he appeared to justify it. In doing so, he heightened
what was a radical conflict between the nature of man and the natural condition of
mankind.138 A fundamental paradox can be inferred from this. Man, given his nature, 
might have been better off on his own in the sense that his basic survival might have 
been more assured, but he was more likely to be impoverished. To overcome the latter 
required the company of other men but the price he had to pay to obtain the benefits 
possibly available in such circumstances constituted by the state of nature, 
undermined his ability to survive. The conditions he needed to maximise his 
prospects of basic survival, namely isolation, were not achievable whilst those that did 
apply, minimised such prospects and were inescapable.
42. The solution for Hobbes lay in the creation of a central authority, namely a 
sovereign, through the formation of a social contract between all adult individuals in 
the state of nature. The motivation propelling people to enter into such a contract was 
that of self-interest, namely the fear of death.139 The escape from such an eventuality 
under the influence of such fear was seen to be an agreement in which each individual 
suspended his judgement and will in favour of that of a sovereign whose single will
136 In each o f the three major sources o f his works, that is Elements o f Law, On the Citizen and 
Leviathan there is a slightly different list but with a large degree of overlap. Those mentioned are also 
to be found in On the Citizen, Chapter 11 and 111 and in The Elements o f Law Chapters XVI and X V I1.
137 Hobbes, T 1998: 28; Hobbes, T 1968: 189,354.
138 Oakeshott, M at p. xxxv in Hobbes, T 1957.
139 Hobbes, T 1968: 192.
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replaced that of the many.140 Henceforth, the multitude of opinions, wills and actions 
were to be replaced by that of one will which had a complete 141 monopoly over what 
was required to ensure the preservation of all within a ‘commonwealth’. In substance, 
the commonwealth equated to a territorially defined political society- that is a nation 
state.142 Within this arrangement, separate individual wills formerly within the state 
o f nature, ceased in a public sense to be, and were replaced by the one will which 
Hobbes regarded as being absolute.143 This he defined as the authority to 
do’...whatever it [the commonwealth] chooses- make laws, judge disputes, inflict 
penalties, and make use of everyone's strength and wealth at its own discretion -and 
may do all this by right... ’.144
43. There thus appeared at first sight to be no limit upon the authority that such a 
sovereign possessed. The unchallengeable individual judgements possessed by the 
many in the state of nature were replaced by what appeared to be the unchallengeable 
judgement (and actions) of the sovereign as to what was required to govern civil 
society.145
The Nature o f Obligation
44. What was the place of God within this construct? To investigate that requires an 
examination of the nature of the obligation to obey the sovereign under which each 
individual was placed following the agreement to set up civil society and also a brief 
exploration of Hobbes’ eschatology. Much has been written on the nature of the 
obligation towards the sovereign. As has been said elsewhere there are a number of 
ways of explaining the basis of the obligation.146
140 Hobbes, T 1998:72.
141 This will be qualified below.
142 As will be seen below Hobbes assumes the existence o f nation states.
143 Hobbes, T 1998: 82.
144 Hobbes, T 1998: 82. Note here that by implication an equation is made between the commonwealth 
and the sovereign again suggesting the absence o f the population in a public or constitutional sense. 
Hobbes’ paradigm about sovereignty also does not specifically indicate that it must comprise a 
monarchy since although he considered that monarchy is the most effective form o f government {On 
the Citizen, chapter X), he did not discount the possibility o f  other forms o f governance.
145 The multiplicity o f infallible wills is replaced by a single infallible will o f the sovereign who in this 
sense resembles the papal sovereign authority constructed by Augustinus Triumphus.
146 For example, one based on egoistic psychology as espoused by Watkins, J.W.N 1965; Taylor, A.E 
1965; Warrender, H 1957.
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45. In this respect, two fundamental approaches to the nature of obligation have 
emerged.147 The first position claims that Hobbes’ theory of obligation was 
essentially based on man's psychology and that his prescriptions for how they ought to 
behave as formulated in his laws of nature were based on his idea that men behave in 
accordance with what they perceive to be to their advantage. Hobbes’ laws of nature 
therefore were a set of formulations shaping the relationships between individuals 
which if followed would maximise the probability of survival. Flowing from this,
• • f 45?political authority as expressed by the sovereign was based on individuals' wants. 
Fundamentally, an individual's preparedness to obey the sovereign rested on his 
calculation that it was more advantageous for him to obey than not.149 Hobbes’ claim 
that the laws of nature were the commands of God within this approach in essence 
amounted to an overlay crafted onto the main psychologically-based theory of 
political authority to attract the religious zealots of the day to "buy into" the idea of 
complying with the commands of a sovereign. The second approach was that 
embodied in what has become known as the Taylor-Warrender thesis.150 In this, 
Taylor and Warrander separated Hobbes’ ethical doctrine from his psychologically- 
based approach with which they considered there was no necessary logical 
connection, and tied it into what was perceived to be Hobbes’ theism. Taylor 
considered that the duty to obey the sovereign could not simply be located at the door 
of the covenant entered into by each individual in the state of nature to obey the 
sovereign. Rather, by imputation, there had to be an antecedent moral obligation to 
obey natural law because they were the commands of God, one natural law being that 
men were to obey the covenants made by them.151 Taylor considered that Hobbes’ 
political philosophy could stand without recourse to his ‘egoistic philosophy’.152
147 There have been a range o f approaches but they can be reduced two fundamental positions and it is 
these that will be briefly explored.
148 Watkins for example characterises Hobbes’ laws o f nature as ‘doctor's orders’ whose sanctions are 
not moral but based on individuals' self interests (Watkins, J.W.N 1965:76).
149 As exemplified by Hobbes who justified the necessity for a coercive power to ‘compell men to 
perform equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror o f some punishment greater than 
the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant... ’ (Hobbes, T 1968: 202).
150 There are differences between the approaches o f Taylor and Warrender but that described above is 
what is common to them both and characterises the second position.
151 Hobbes, T 1968: 201; Hobbes, T 1998: 43; Taylor, A.E 1938 reprinted in Lively, J and Reeve, A 
1989: 24.
152 Taylor, A.E 1938 reprinted in Lively, J and Reeve, A 1989: 27.
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46. Warrender considered that running through Hobbes’ theory was an uneasy 
dualism consisting of two systems, one based on motivation and another based on 
obligation.153 Warrender located the lack of ‘fit’ to the fact that he considered the 
fundamental law of nature was to ‘seek peace’ rather than to ‘preserve thyself. He 
further considered the former had more of a social and less of a self-regarding appeal 
than the latter 154 and was concerned not so much with self-survival but with the 
conservation of society.155 In support, he observed that Hobbes had noted that the 
laws of nature "are contrary to our ‘naturall Passions.’156 Watkins in countering this 
observation has correctly pointed out, when Hobbes made that statement he did not 
mean that the laws of nature were contrary to all our passions but only to those that
i en
disposed us to ‘partiality, pride, revenge and the like.’ The laws of nature however 
were predicated upon one overriding desire, that was to avoid ‘most of all that terrible
1 S8enemy of nature, death from who we expect... the loss of all power.’
47. Therefore although not explicitly raised by Watkins, in effect, Hobbes appeared 
to construct a hierarchy of desires just as he had constructed a hierarchy of natural 
laws. Hobbes’ account of natural laws was predicated upon his perception of man's 
natural right and in this sense Hobbes was inverting the relationship supported by 
many natural law theorists that had preceded him that natural rights were derived 
from natural laws.159 His perception of natural laws was bom out of the observation 
of man's nature and a deductive process centred on his conception of the state of 
nature, that itself was part of his explanation of the cause of civil society. His 
perception of self-preservation and its implications therefore were not based on man 
in isolation but on man in the company of others in pre-civil society.160 There was 
therefore no fundamental schism between the right of self-preservation and the laws 
of nature.
153 Warrender, H 1957: 213.
154 Warrender, H 1957: 218.
155 Warrender, H supports this line o f argument by observing correctly that Hobbes accepted that the 
laws o f  nature were against human passions.
156 Hobbes, T 1968: 223.
157 Hobbes, T 1968: 223; Watkins, J.W.N 1965: 91.
158 Hobbes, T 1994: 79; Watkins, J.W.N 1965: 116.
159 Shapiro, I 1986:42.
160 Since Hobbes conceptualised man's natural state to be the state o f nature, his conception of 
individual man could not in effect be stripped o f the effects o f that natural state.
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48. What this does point to however is that there was no necessary hierarchy of 
systems implicit within Hobbes’ thought. The theistically based model was not 
necessarily simply an adjunct to the egoistically-based model. At the very least there 
was an intertwining of the two. The means by which the laws of nature were 
constructed was based on what Hobbes perceived man was rather than on what he 
ought to be. This desire for unity was implied at the very beginning of the Elements 
of Law when he stated that the laws of nature have ‘hitherto been built on thin air.’161 
By this he meant that until then, laws of nature whose contents had been chronically 
contested were based on a process of reasoning which excluded rather than embraced 
man's passions and hence denied man's reality. Furthermore, it is doubtful that 
Hobbes perceived his system to include two distinct systems. The study of the human 
mind was not a separate discipline in the seventeenth century and therefore the 
assertion that he was exploiting two systems which he perceived to be separated could 
well amount to an example of transporting back in time modem day categories which 
did not exist at the time.162 In effect, Hobbes was developing one system of thought, 
albeit with elements which could later be perceived to be distinctly separate.163
Hobbes ’ Eschatology
49. At this point one can see that the place of God in Hobbes’ construct of 
sovereignty is less obvious than is the case in the writings of Dante and Augustinus 
Triumphus. These two models were based on a descending chain of authority in 
which God manifested Himself in the sovereign body or bestowed authority directly 
upon it. Whereas with Hobbes, the chain of authority was ascending in character since 
it emanated from a social contract, the parties to which were individuals in the state of 
nature. While God's role was prominent, it was no longer direct. The immediate 
reason for the sovereign's authority was the agreement that created the obligation and
161 Hobbes, T 1994:19.
162 The philosophical exploration o f  human cognition and desires was beginning to develop with the 
writings o f Descartes and Hobbes in De Corpore ( part o f The Elements o f Law) but to say that at that 
time the conclusions that sprung therefrom were perceived by Hobbes as comprising a separate 
knowledge system was to overstate the point.
163 Watkins himself argues against the existence o f more than one system but at the same time in effect 
suggests that there was a ‘theological top layer’(Watkins, J.W.N 1965: 95). This also seems a 
problematic formulation since it enables the vertical boundaries between systems to reinsert themselves 
albeit horizontally.
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not God's commands in the form of natural law.164 However Hobbes throughout his 
major works did spend a great deal of time in drawing out the relationship between 
God and his ideas about political authority. The outcome was a ‘hollowed out’ 
version of God. This was a result of Hobbes’ materialist ontology and nominalist 
epistemology that reduced the spiritual to a matter of private concern and elevated 
temporal government to the only form of government that was consistent with his 
perception of God and the only form of government that was possible.
50. Hobbes was a materialist and rejected matter-spirit dualism and has been 
described as an advocate of one- world realism.165 This was expressed with clarity in 
Leviathan where he stated:
‘... the Universe, that is the whole mass of things that are, is Corporeal, that is to say, 
Body: and hath the dimensions of Magnitude, namely Length, Breadth and Depth: 
also every part of the Body, is likewise Body, and hath the like dimensions; and 
consequently every part of the Universe, is Body; and that which is not Body, is no 
part of the Universe; And because the Universe is All, that which is no part of it is 
Nothing; and consequently no where] 166
51. Consistently with this, he asserted that incorporeal substances were a logical
1 A 7nonsense. Having closed off the possibility of God being of such substances, 
Hobbes either needed to assert that no God existed or its existence was material in 
character or had a character which could not be defined according to human reason.
A universe without a God was an unlikely proposition because it could only mean that 
either it was self-created or in fact never commenced at all. Hobbes rejected both 
these possibilities on the basis that the character of material existence was defined by
1 AScause and effect. He philosophically deduced that there was a God on the basis that 
there needed to be a ‘first cause of all causes’169 and in this sense followed in the 
Aristotelian tradition. However, philosophically, he could only ascertain the 
existence and not the qualities that God possessed, since any reasoning of qualities
164 ‘The right to rule arises from agreement’ (Hobbes, T 1998: 173).
165 Gaskin, J.C.A: 1994: xxv.
166 Hobbes, T: 1968: 689.
167 Hobbes, T 1968:429.
168 Pacchi, A 1988 in Roger, G.A.J and Ryan, A 1988: 175.
169 Hobbes, T 1994: 64; Hobbes, T 1968: 167.
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would lead to an anthropocentric construct in which man would attach to God human 
conceptions of space and time.170 Hobbes’ claim that God existed was therefore 
matched by his assertion that He was unknowable and incomprehensible 171 since 
natural reason could not stretch to that which was not material save to affirm 
existence. Even this assertion, however, had its difficulty, since for Hobbes, 
knowledge arrived at through philosophical deduction could only be conditional, that
• 179is conjectural and not absolute. This philosophical uncertainty could only be 
remedied by an alternative means of ascertaining the truth, namely through the use of 
faith upon which the validity of the scriptures as the word of God rested.173
52. Hobbes proceeded to construct a theology that in effect was based around God’s 
simultaneous presence and absence. As a result of philosophical deduction it was 
present as the first mover but unknowable and non-existent in the sense of being 
definable in terms of time and space. From the point of view of sacred history174 as 
manifested in the Bible, the kingdom of God in line with his materialistic approach 
was considered to have always had a material rather than a spiritual expression.175 
Hobbes through his interpretation of the scriptures provided a precedent for the model 
of sovereignty that he was seeking to justify.176 It manifested itself in the idea of God
170 Pacchi, A 1988 Roger, G.A.J and Ryan, A 1988: 175; Antiwhite, 13.6, p. 198. Hobbes thus rejects 
descriptions of God as being "eternal" since such epithets do not capture his essence which is beyond 
reason (Hobbes, T 1968: 403).
171 Hobbes, T 1994: 65; Hobbes, T 1994: 192.
172 Hobbes, T 1968: 131; EW I, p. 531 reproduced in Watkins, J.W.N 1965: 70. This o f course sets up a 
tension since to assert that reason can lead to the conclusion that God exists but yet is inconceivable 
puts His existence into doubt.
173 Hobbes, 1968: 614; Pocock, J.G.A 1960: 163.
174 Hobbes was distrustful o f history as a valid form o f inquiry to ascertain past events and to predict 
future ones as he considered historians to be more motivated by their desires to advance ‘their own 
ends than o f truth, and o f the goods o f others’ (Hobbes, T 1995:40-41). He also considered it to be 
based on experience from which reliable predictions could not be drawn since ‘experience concludeth 
nothing universally’ (Hobbes, T 1994: 33). .Given this defect and given that history does not fit into 
what has been described as Hobbes’ unhistorical and synchronically based philosophy (Pocock, J.G.A. 
1960) in which materially based cause and effect ascertained through reason rather than experience is 
the key determinator, the epistemological validity o f the scriptures as accurate indicators o f the past 
and reliable predictors o f  the future could only be derived from faith.
175 Although not stated by Hobbes, to assume that the first mover was the same entity as that which 
gave rise to the Kingdom o f  God must have involved the operation o f faith since philosophically there 
was no inevitability that they were one and the same. The material expression o f the kingdom o f  God 
was simply that and could not embrace the totality o f God which was unknowable.
176 It is not being suggested here that Hobbes’ interpretation o f the scriptures was necessarily motivated 
by his desire to achieve this outcome. The purpose o f Hobbes’ writings on the nature o f God and 
religion and the relationship to his own beliefs have given rise to considerable controversy and are 
discussed in a number o f works for example, Lange, F History o f  Materialism Vol 1, Boston, 1881) 
Martinich, A.P The Two Gods o f  Leviathan, (CUP: 1992); Warrender, H The Political Philosophy o f  
Hobbes, (Clarendon Press: 1957); Hood, F.C The Divine Politics o f  Hobbes (OUPT964) and Cooke,
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who exerted concrete worldly sovereignty through the agency of Abraham and then 
Moses in a temporally and not spiritually based kingdom. Hobbes describes it as a 
commonwealth - that is a civil kingdom with God as king and Moses as his viceroy 
ruling over the Israelites who were the chosen people.177
53. This model had a profoundly archetypal quality in three other respects that were 
central to the legitimacy of the model of sovereignty he constructed. Firstly Moses's 
authority as God's earthly representative did not derive directly from God but was 
grounded upon ‘the consent of the people’ whereby the latter agreed to obey the 
former in what amounted to a social contract.178 Secondly, in his explanation of the 
transmission of God's laws to his chosen people, the Israelites, Hobbes concluded 
from the bible that Moses had a complete monopoly of access to God. The latter's 
‘presence’ manifested itself in the form of commands which were relayed by Moses,
i  nQ
their only legitimate purveyor and interpreter. This fitted with Hobbes’ contention
that God was ontologically unknowable and aside from personal revelation was
knowable only through humanly recognisable expressions of His will in the form of
such laws. Thirdly, Hobbes concluded that sovereigns historically were able to set the
boundaries of what was permissible regarding the interpretation of the scriptures and
1 80the formulation of religion. In effect therefore, religion and prophecy in an earthly 
sense were dependent upon the sovereign's role and it is upon this basis that Hobbes 
explained the authority of the Church and the pope as being derived from the 
sovereign himself.181
54. Moses therefore whilst not described by Hobbes as a ‘Mortall God’in effect 
occupied this position since he was the heavenly God's counterpart on earth and his
P.D Reassessing the Bible in Leviathan (Rowman: 1996). These characterise Hobbes variously as a 
sincere theist, tepid theist, a crafty manipulator o f religion and as being duplicitous. The point however 
is that for my purposes, what is relevant is not the extent to which Hobbes genuinely held the positions 
he espoused about religion but the extent to which his writings on religion support his theory o f  
sovereignty.
177 Hobbes, T 1968:446.
178 Hobbes, T 1968: 502.
179 Hobbes, T 1968: 504. His legitimacy having derived from his emergence as a result o f  the social 
contract.
180 Hobbes, T 1968: 504-5.
181 For example in Chapter 42 o f Leviathan (Hobbes, T: 1968).
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claims about the substance of God's commands were unchallengeable.182 He and his 
successors were according to Hobbes, sovereigns under God whilst the kingdom of 
God lasted which, according to Hobbes, was from the time that the people of Israel 
committed themselves to the ten commandments delivered by Moses to the election of
1 Ol
Saul. Hobbes’ scriptural interpretations thus far strengthened the legitimacy of his 
model of sovereignty which was initially set up through philosophical reason, by
1 R d.providing layers of historical and theological consistency. However at this point, 
Hobbes had not completely eliminated the threat of resistance to what he perceived to 
be the sovereign's absolute nature, emanating particularly from the Church resting
IOC
upon the assertion that the spiritual domain was dominant over the temporal. The 
notion of the spiritual as a separate domain with an independent source of authority 
had to be destroyed.
1 R A55. The existence and threat of a separate spiritual domain over which a church 
could seek sole jurisdiction and therefore potentially compete with the secular 
sovereign for the loyalty of the commonwealth's subjects depended upon an existence 
in parallel with temporally based earthly society. For Hobbes this was impossible 
since nothing, leaving aside the fact of the first-mover, existed beyond the physical 
that was inherently rooted in time and space.187 This included the existence of the 
Kingdom of God whose space and time-bound existence was confirmed in the bible 
as alluded to above. For Hobbes, although the Kingdom of God had existed in the 
past, it did not currently do so and would not return until Christ's second coming 
which lay indeterminately in the future.188 Thus, the claim of the catholic priest to be 
able to act as gatekeeper to an existing non-material Kingdom of God and that the 
Catholic Church was part of that kingdom was unsupportable. So too was the 
contention put forward by certain protestant sects that the Kingdom of God was a
182 ‘Mortall God’ is the phrase used by Hobbes to describe the sovereign and denotes the latter's 
infallibility (Hobbes, T 1968:227).
183 Hobbes, T 1968: 448. The kingdom would be restored with the restoration of Christ (Hobbes, T 
1968: 448).
184 Looking at Leviathan, the ahistorical and philosophical basis o f sovereignty is provided in the first 
half o f the work whilst its scriptural basis is found in the second half that also elaborates upon Hobbes’ 
eschatology which itself is important for the coherence o f the model.
185 The rejection of any law other than that of the sovereign gave rise to charges that Hobbes had 
destroyed religion for example in BramhaH's The Catching o f  Leviathan.
186 That is the Kingdom o f God.
187 Pocock, J.G.A 1960: 175; Hobbes, T 1968: 689.
188 Hobbes, T 1968: 448, 598.
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presently existing entity.189 Hence the claim of the Catholic Church and certain 
protestant sects to be able to usurp temporal sovereign authority had no religious basis 
in Hobbes’ view.
56. Contending for current purposes that the essence of existence was a materially 
based and therefore time-bound, Hobbes endeavoured through the above means to 
bring the content of religion into the secular domain and in so doing in effect to cause 
the temporal to absorb the spiritual. The sovereign legitimately subordinated the 
function of prophecy to his own secular requirements in the name of religion that was 
shown to be temporally bound.190 In contrast to the tension lying at the centre of 
Dante’s model between the spiritual and the temporal, the sovereign was in the 
position to define the ‘temporal’ and the ‘spiritual’.191
189 For example the Presbyterians.
190 Johnston, D 1986.
191 Hobbes, T 1998: 216.
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Chapter 4: An Introduction to Austin
Background
1. The territoriality of the models of governance expressed by Machiavelli, Bodin 
and Hobbes, was consistent with the emerging idea of the consolidated state, itself an 
outcome of the triumph of the temporal over the spiritual with regard to earthly 
governance and the resultant recognition of the need for an autonomous civil authority 
to regulate the affairs of communities which had secular existences.1 Empirically this 
is reflected most clearly but not solely in the comparatively centralised kingdoms of 
Britain and France followed by the emergence of other continental European States 
facilitated by the Treaty of Westphalia. Having said that, Europe was characterised 
by turmoil throughout this period until the settlement reached at the Congress of 
Vienna. This occurred following the thwarting of Napoleon’s ambition to create a 
French Empire within the heart of Europe. It involved the creation of a confederation 
of thirty-nine German states and a complex adjustment of borders involving, inter 
alia, the absorption of Norway by Sweden, Lithuania, Eastern Poland and Finland by 
Russia and half of Saxony by Prussia.2
2. The Hobbesian approach to law which manifests itself, inter alia as the commands 
of a sovereign released from restraints of natural or higher law expressed itself in the 
secular and positivist accounts of law developed in particular by Bentham and Austin. 
Unlike Hobbes’ approach, that of Austin did not seek its authority in a founding social 
contract which he regarded logically incoherent and historically unfounded.3 Like 
Hobbes, the existence of sovereignty was not limited to a particular institutional form 
and its existence was predicated upon the existence of an independent political society 
concentrated within a distinct and contiguoust area of territory over which the 
sovereign held sway reflecting a dominant perception that the state was the ideal
1 Skinner 1989: 107. Early expressions o f  the idea of the state are found in the writings o f thinkers 
concerned with the Italian cities o f the 15th and 16th centuries such as Guicciardini in his Discorso 
which was concerned with the Italian city o f Medici and Machiavelli in his Discorsi published in 1531. 
Early references in English political thought to the idea o f the state can be seen in the writings of 
Thomas Starkey in the 16th century.
2 Davies, N  1997: 762.
3 Austin, J 1832: 253-258.
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method of political organisation and had become the dominant method through which 
communities were structured.4 Also like Hobbes, Austin considered that sovereignty 
was undivided and illimitable and in this sense he departed from Bentham who 
accepted that sovereignty was capable of being divided and limited in power.5
3. In Hobbes, one had seen the detachment of law from morality as defined by natural 
law. Natural law had been "demoted" to a set of moral axioms, 6one of which formed 
the pre-legal basis for the nature and necessity of illimitable sovereignty, whose 
purpose was the realisation of one such moral axiom, namely the limitless right of 
man to preserve himself.7 For Austin, the justification for sovereignty and law which 
emanated from it was to be found in utility. This comprised a principle most 
particularly associated with Bentham,8 through which government and its policies, 
realised by law, could be justified, guided and evaluated. The essence of this principle 
was that any action of government should be approved to the extent that it promotes 
the happiness of the community.9 The degree of happiness achieved by any such 
action could be assessed by measuring the extent to which it induced pain or pleasure. 
The sanctions associated with rules including law necessary to enforce government 
action against the misguided resistance of wayward individuals could also be assessed 
by reference to pain and pleasure. 10 Thus part of the task for any legislator as far as 
Bentham was concerned was to understand the impact of such pleasures or pain in 
order to construct punishments which would ensure obedience to the law. This 
required the making of detailed calculations on how they would affect individuals in 
the community.11
4 However the state had not yet become the dominant system o f political organisation globally. Nor 
had nation and state during this period harmonised with one another within much o f Europe (Van 
Creveld,M 1999:199).
5 Bentham, J 1970: 18; Freeman, M.D.A, 2001:203.
6 Although unlike Hobbes, Austin considered that divine law were laws properly so called. (Austin, J 
1863 : 38).
7 Hobbes, T 1968:189.
8 The concept o f utility filling the gap left by natural law was first alluded to by Hume (Freeman, 
M.D.A 2006). That concept is captured by Hume’s claim that the ‘ great end o f human industry, is the 
attainment o f happiness.’ (Hume, D 1985:148). Mill from whom philosophical utilitarianism is 
commonly considered to emanate defined it as ‘[t]he creed which accepts as the foundation o f  morals. 
Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse o f happiness. By happiness is intended 
pleasure, and the absence o f pain; by unhappiness, pain and privation o f pleasure’ (Mill. J 1861: 210).
Bentham, J 1970:chps 1 and 2.
10 Morison, W.L 1982: 40.
11 Morison, W.L 1982:40.
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4. Austin whilst accepting the principle of utility as the guiding justification of the 
governing process did not in his major works on jurisprudence adopt the details of 
Bentham's evaluative system on pain and pleasure nor supply one of his own although 
he provided an extensive defence of the principle of utility.12 He explained and 
justified the principle of utility thus:
‘ God designs the happiness of all his sentient creatures. Some human actions forward 
that benevolent purpose, or their tendency are beneficent or useful. Other human 
actions are adverse to that purpose, or their tendencies are mischievous or pernicious. 
The former, as promoting God has enjoined. The latter, as opposed to his purpose 
God has forbidden. He has given us the faculty of observing; of remembering; of 
reasoning: and, by duly applying those faculties, we may collect the tendencies of our 
actions. Knowing the tendencies of our actions and knowing his benevolent purpose, 
we know his tacit commands.’13
‘In so far as the laws of God are clearly and indisputably revealed, we are bound to 
guide our conduct by the plain meaning of their terms. In so far as they are not 
revealed, we must resort to another guide: namely the probable effect of our conduct 
on that general happiness or good which is the object of Divine Lawgiver in all his 
laws and commandments.’14
5. The glimpses of utility captured in Hobbes’ idea that the rationale of sovereignty is 
the realisation of individuals' right to self preservation, further developed by Hume,15 
has thus been expanded to ensure the realisation of happiness or good. However like 
Hobbes, a justification for his founding principle of government, namely utility, lay 
in an identification being made between it and the will of God. Whilst Hobbes 
identified the will of God with the will of the sovereign, the principles of utility were 
not inherently identical to sovereign will. Hobbes accepted the inevitability of 
individuals exercising resistance where they considered that the sovereign imperilled 
their lives and that this could lead to his downfall. However this observation was not
12 Austin, J 1863:Lectures 11 and 111.
13 Austin, J 1863:41.
14 Austin, J 1863:45.
15 Hume, D 1985.
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explicitly developed and in terms of emphasis remained peripheral to his overall 
scheme of governance, not least because for Hobbes, the population over which a 
sovereign ruled was not collectively capable of having an existence that was separate 
from that of the sovereign himself and hence was not capable of having interests that 
could clash with those of the sovereign.16 Austin went further than Hobbes and 
considered that it would be just to take up arms against the enemies of utility
1 7including a sovereign who departed from its requirements and to overthrow him.
Hence he was a supporter of the French Revolution and the overthrow of the 
1 8monarch. However as with Hobbes, this was very much a last resort. In contrast to 
the radical Benthamites who considered that social progress would inevitably be 
accompanied by intense political and class conflict, Austin now considered that utility 
required that wherever possible government should promote harmony and 
reconciliation in order to avoid conflict.19
6. Whilst the emphasis of Bentham's interest was upon an analysis of law with a view
to exploiting it to achieve reform by the construction of an ideal code, Austin was far
20more interested in building a systematic analysis of existing laws and legal systems. 
Much of his writings therefore comprised a pursuit of what Bentham classified as 
expository jurisprudence in contrast to a censorial jurisprudence which concerned law
71 •as it ought to be and which tied in with Bentham's reforming project. However it 
cannot be said that his view of law and its application took place in a political 
vacuum. Austin initially identified with Benthamite radicalism but all this was to 
change upon his return from Germany where he spent a year preparing his lectures, 
for when he took up his post as Professor of Jurisprudence and the Law of Nations at 
the University of London in 1828.22 Whereas before he had been an advocate of 
democracy in order to empower the people at the expense of the aristocracy, he now 
considered that the mass of the population because of lack of education were not able
16 The potentiality o f  the right to resist within Hobbes’ theory will be further explored in the next 
chapter on Hobbes.
17 Austin, J 1824.
18 Austin was a great admirer o f Hobbes’ work on sovereignty and its influence upon his work is plain 
to see. However he was critical in two major respects, firstly in his use o f the social contract as a 
justification for sovereignty and secondly that he "inculcates too absolutely the religious obligation o f  
obedience to present or established government." (Austin, J 1863: 230).
19 Hamburger, L and J, 1985: 43.
20 Morison, W.L 1982:41.
21 Morison, W.L, 1982:42.
22 Hamburger, L and J 1985: 33.
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to make the choices necessary to give rise to good government. This required rule by 
an intellectual elite since it was best able to legislate upon the basis of ethical choices
9  7derived from the requirements of utility. Acceptance by the mass of the population
to the voice of reason as expressed by this elite was central to this process whereas the 
call by the radical Benthamites for an extension of democracy was not.24 Reflecting 
this distrust, he considered that the autocratic Prussian monarchy was more capable 
than its partially representative counterpart in England of engaging in good and
9  <enlightened government. The acceptance by the population of the governmental 
prescriptions of the intellectual elite required them to be subjected to a system of 
universal education through which they could gain a modicum of insight into the
9  f \scientific principles and consequential conclusions expressed by the elite.
7. Austin accepted that the method of social organisation most likely to achieve 
utility was market capitalism, the workings of which had been explored and 
enunciated by Ricardo and James Mill. This was for example reflected in his view 
that utility demanded the institution of private property and its protection from 
unauthorised interference failing which the ends of government and law would be 
defeated.27 His perception of the best way of achieving this was for the state to be 
centralised, that is constructed around a single legal order with a stable moral 
framework that would be best equipped to defend the institution of private property 
and thus to successfully resist any socialist threat.28 Property ownership had to be 
defended from the vagaries of the working classes that in Austin's view were prone 
not accept the sanctity nor the inequality that such a society would inevitably bring 
upon them.29
8. Austin’s concentration upon jurisprudence was consistent with an orientation 
which saw the elimination of prejudices through the inculcation of reason, including
23 Hamburger, L and J 1985: 35.
24 Austin's lack o f faith in the extension o f democracy as a requirement for improved government led to 
him not campaigning for the enactment o f  the first Reform Bill although he did not go as far as 
rejecting it (Hamburger, L and J 1985: 45).
25 Morison, W.L 1982: 122-132; Mill, J.S 1873:96 quoted at length in Dicey, A.V, 1905: 161-164.
26 Austin, J 1832: 68-69.
27 Austin, J 1832, 85.
28 Morison, W.L, 1982: 123; 85 The Edinburgh Review  221; Cotterrell, R 1989:77.
29 Austin, J 1863: 64-68. The solution to the problem o f working class hostility to the private 
ownership o f  property lay for Austin in their mass education whereby they would come to ‘reason’ that 
is to see and identify with the worth o f such property and its attainment.
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that relating to the centrality and operation of legal systems, inter alia, through 
education, rather than political conflict as the key to progress. It was the outcome of 
the belief that reform could be reduced to a technical scientific process led by experts 
whose conclusions would ultimately enjoy universal acceptance because of their self- 
evident truth. The underlying purpose of Austin's enterprise was to demarcate the area 
of concern for jurisprudential study that for him was characterised by the existence of 
positive law within independent political society. For Austin, positive law was an 
expression of earthly will and thus had to have an author to create it. Within what he 
referred to as an independent political society characterised by a legal hierarchy, the 
logical pre-condition for the existence of such law was the existence of an ultimate 
will from which all law ultimately emanates.30
Austin fs Sovereignty
9. For Austin, any centralised society is constructed around a legal hierarchy with a 
sovereign entity at its summit. Sovereignty is possessed by an identifiable institution 
to which the bulk of the population of a politically independent community habitually 
obeys and which must not be habitually obedient to any other institution.31 
Sovereignty expresses its will through commands which Austin classified as including 
but not limited to positive law.32 Unlike Bentham, he considered that a centralised 
society required an undivided and illimitable sovereign, without which there would be 
a risk of anarchy. Reflecting this and again unlike Bentham, he added the 
requirement that the sovereign must not habitually render obedience to anyone else.
A sovereign subject to limitation for Austin was an unsupportable contradiction. 
Moreover the idea of constitutional limits upon the exercise of sovereign power held 
no useful purpose as they were unenforceable 34and were in fact an obstacle to the 
exercise of sovereign power in accordance with scientific principles. There is an 
empirical feel to this definition. It is not at first sight what ought to be but what
30 Austin, J 1832: 165.
31 Austin, J 1832: 172-173.
32 Austin, J 1832: 25, 117.
33 Austin, J 1832: 172-173, Bentham, J 1970: 37-8.
34 If limits could be imposed upon the legislative power o f the sovereign, the institution vested with 
these powers would cease to be sovereign. Constitutional limitations for Austin were expressions o f  
positive morality and were not part o f law.
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empirically exists in Austin's view in any legal system. This definition and the way 
that it is treated by Austin is highly problematic for a number of reasons.
10. There is a considerable literature on the methodology that Austin employed in 
constructing what he regarded as universally present in any legal system of developed 
societies. Was his analysis the outcome of a rationalistic inquiry commencing with a 
number of a priori postulates from which deductions were made to ascertain the 
nature of law as logic required rather than as actuality existed ?35 Alternatively was it 
the outcome of an empirical inquiry in which a series of generalisations were 
abstracted by way of inductive logic from facts observed by Austin to exist in 
particular legal systems? The span of opinion on this is considerable and ranges from 
Stone's view that Austin's inquiry was essentially a deductive one embracing 
scholastic logic and therefore rationalistic in nature, although flawed, to that of 
Morison, Hart and Grey 36who considered that the enterprise was empirical in nature 
although again flawed in approach and/or outcome. The difficulty with such 
evaluations at the risk of stating the obvious is that one is reliant upon the published 
version of any particular piece of work which may exclude completely or partially, 
particularly with regard to empirical investigations, the data upon which the 
abstractions are based. It is also the case that methodologically it is not the case that 
'rational' inquiry is not common to both approaches if one takes the term to embrace 
logical precision, consistency, coherence, and a commitment to relentlessly pursue an 
argument.37 In this looser sense, what is different is the way that logic is employed 
and the stages at which it is employed. In relation to classical rationalist inquiry 
regarded philosophically as such, deductive logic is employed which moves from 
general a priori principles to particular conclusions whose truth is guaranteed by the
-7 O
fact that they follow necessarily from those principles. Typically, in relation to 
empirical investigation, one moves from the particular in the form of experience to the 
general through inductive logic to formulate general propositions from which through 
deductive logic, particular conclusions are reached which can then be measured
35 A logical dream world (Morison,W.L. 1958: 218).
36 Gray, J.C, 1909: 92; Hart, H.L.A 1954; Morison, W.L. 1958; Stone, J 1968.
37 Cottingham, J 1984: 3.
38 Cottingham, J 1984: 141.
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against experience to test their validity and hence the validity of the generalisations 
which are abstracted from the initial observations.39
11. The difficulty can be that it is not necessarily entirely clear as to whether the 
method in any inquiry consists of one approach as opposed to the other. Besides a 
lack of published data which can cause uncertainty there is the structure and language 
of the inquiry as presented in the published work. Even if the language of the 
publication under investigation embraces comments that appear to be references to the 
empirical world, this does not inevitably mean that they are the outcome of an 
empirical investigation. They could be formulated as generalisations seemingly from 
empirical investigation when in fact they are a priori principles more consistent with 
a rationalistic inquiry. Furthermore the level of abstraction reached following an 
empirical inquiry, may be so high as to put in doubt its relationship with the 
particulars from which it was inferred. It is also possible that the methodology 
employed is confused so that it becomes a matter of evaluative judgement as to 
whether the inquiry is essentially rationalist or empirical in nature. What makes this 
more difficult is that inevitably even in relation to rationalistic inquiry in the strict 
sense of the term, the nature and content of the a priori principles are likely to some 
extent to reflect the experience and knowledge of the enquirer and therefore cannot be 
completely divorced from the empirical domain.
12. Reflecting the last comment, it has been said that Austin used an a priori method 
but built his ‘a priori concept’ out of an ‘actual system of law’.40 If Austin's inquiry is 
rationalistic in nature then it may not correspond to any given legal system but will 
tend to express the inner truths of given legal systems, the unreliable and contingent 
empirical expressions being pale reflections of such truths. Alternatively the 
rationalistic model might be used as a filter with which to select empirical features 
which conform to the model in order to claim that concrete empirical reality 
corresponds to the outcome of the deductive logic of the rationalistic inquiry.41 On
39 The idea that the movement from the particular to the general inevitably involves a logical process 
was challenged by Popper who considered this ‘leap’ to be the result o f  a number o f different processes 
which may defy logic. For him the resultant generalisation cannot be shown to be true no matter how 
many times it is verified by particular instances.
40 Dias R.W and Hughes, G.B 1957: 375,376.
41 That is to say a tautology is created out o f an exercise where ‘reality’ is ‘bent’ to conform with the 
theoretical model. It has to be said that even in empirical inquiries, this process of selection can occur
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the other hand if it is empirical in nature then the expectation will be that the model 
produced will correspond to existing legal systems, although perhaps to varying 
degrees. This will obviously apply to any element within the constructed model 
including that of sovereignty. Austin's own intentions appear to have been that of 
conducting an empirical inquiry as suggested by various of his comments.
Thus for example he states:
‘Seeing that a true theory is a compendium of particular truths , it is necessarily true as 
applied to particular cases. The terms of the theory are general and abstract, or the 
particular truths which the theory implies would not be abbreviated or condensed.
But, unless it be true of particulars, and, therefore, true in practice, it has no truth at 
all. .. .They say that a truth in theory is not truth in practice. They mean that a false 
theory is not a true one...,42
13. Morison points out that Bentham who greatly influenced Austin clearly indicated 
that the existence of a sovereign was a political fact and not simply a legal postulate 
which is indicated by Bentham claim that there is commonly in states ‘some person or 
body of persons exercising this supreme power’ which he termed as ‘the Sovereign’.43 
Mill also in his system of logic asserts that theoretical conclusions can only emerge as 
a result of empirical investigation. However Austin's empirical claims sit uneasily 
with his method of presentation which takes on the appearance at times of a scholastic 
inquiry. This is perhaps amplified by modem day expectations of what an empirical 
inquiry should comprise. There is no clear separation of Austin's observations as to 
what is found in particular legal arrangements from which general propositions can be 
formulated which can then be tested against other particular examples of legal 
systems. Instead emphasis is given to general propositions. So for example in lecture 
one there is an immediate attempt at defining in general terms of what law comprises. 
It rapidly becomes apparent however that Austin’s conclusions on this and how it
at the stage o f  abstraction in order to fit a pre-conceived model. Hence in part Popper's claim that any 
theory can never be completely verified by empirical observation, the other problem being that 
generalising from different sets o f particulars can never rule out the possibility that there may exist an 
unexamined set o f particulars which does not correspond with the generalised abstraction comprising 
the theory under investigation.
42 Austin, J 1832: 51.
43 Bentham, J 1970: 18; Morison, W.L 1982: 42-43.
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breaks down into separate categories would probably not have been arrived at other 
than under the influence of empirical observation although the nature of such 
observations is frequently not made clear.
14. Similarly in relation to sovereignty, Austin commences with a definition of 
sovereignty which is then elaborated upon. At this point, it could be argued that 
Austin's inquiry is consistent with an a priori rationalistic approach rather than an 
empirical one. However the lecture in which sovereignty is explored also contains 
empirical observations from France, Mexico, Great Britain, Turkey, United State of 
America, Prussia, Bavaria and the German and Swiss Confederations, ancient Greece 
and Italy.44 In his reference to Hobbes he does not consider that the role of a social 
contract has any validity.45 This conclusion appears to be one based on an 
interpretation of Hobbes’ texts fed by his positivist position as to the non-existence of 
natural rights upon which the social contract was claimed to be based. If one accepts 
that that the conclusion is the outcome of empirical observations, one cannot help 
concluding that these were selected to fit a priori propositions This points to the 
inevitability that no empirical enquiry can be free of a prior assumptions and the need 
to view the claim as to the commitment to empirical enquiry made by Austin. 
Bentham and Mill in such a light even if it appears to depart from their subjective 
intentions. What appears difficult to argue against was that Austin intended that his 
inquiry should be empirical in character and that his concept of sovereignty should be 
applicable to actually existing legal systems.
15. His definition of sovereignty gives rise to a number of problems. For example, 
what does ‘bulk’ or ‘habitual’ mean? Austin does point to the difficulties of 
ascertaining whether in a given instance, the bulk 46 of the individuals of an 
independent society behave in manner that amounts to their habitual obedience to a 
given superior.47 However, whilst acknowledging their lack of precision, he does not
44 Austin, J 1832: 167,175,185, 192-194, 209,211. If anything the range o f systems he comments upon 
is perhaps too wide and superficial and he might have benefited from concentrating in depth on fewer 
ones. This is again perhaps a sign o f  the discrepancy between his commitment to empirical inquiry and 
the adoption o f appropriate methods to achieve it.
45 Austin, J 1832:230.
46 The word "bulk" also suffers from the same difficulty.
47 Austin, J 1932: 172-174. His admission that ‘the positive mark o f sovereignty and independent 
political society is ...a fallible test’ if  anything attests to Austin's concern that his inquiry is empirically
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explicitly seek to provide more refined definitions and thus the application of these 
terms to given empirical instances is not simply problematic from an evidential point 
of view, that is from an empirical perspective, but also from the standpoint of having 
clear criteria by which to judge given empirical circumstances.48
16. His conclusion as to the location of sovereignty in the United Kingdom was that 
it was to be found between parliamentary elections with the monarch, peers and 
member of the House of Commons 49 At the point of parliamentary elections, the 
delegated share 50of sovereign power, namely that of the House of Commons reverted 
back to the electorate and thus at this point sovereignty lies with the electorate 
together with the monarch and peers.51 This of course departs from Diceyan thinking 
that legal sovereignty lies with the Monarch in Parliament while political sovereignty, 
or at least a predominate part of it lies with the electorate.52 This discrepancy has 
been explained in various ways. For example by the claim that Austin's sovereignty
53was not legal in character but a pre-legal notion namely that it is the "logical 
correlate of assumed factual obedience."54 or the "legitimate ultimate locus of political 
authority" which for Manning lies in a collectivity at whose instigation the 
constitution subsists.55 Dicey also criticises Austin’s formulation claiming that he 
has confused the location of legal with political sovereignty. Dicey’s formulations 
about the relationship between the electorate and sovereignty are not entirely clear. 
Within the space of a few lines he firstly states pointing to the confusion Austin 
expresses through his failure to distinguish between legal and political sovereign, that 
‘[i]t is, however, .. .true that in a political sense, the electors are the most important 
part of, we may even say actually, the sovereign power, since their will is under the 
present constitution sure to obtain ultimate obedience.’ A few lines further down
relevant and not as Stone alleges that it suggests that objectively Austin's concern was to create a 
logically coherent deductively-led legal model which had no particular connection to empirical reality.
48 What percentage o f  instances must the bulk o f a community obey the commands o f the superior for 
the latter to be designated a sovereign? Must the threshold be 50 per cent or more and over what period 
o f time?
49 Austin, J 1832:192-3.
50 The idea o f delegation appears to be synonymous with representation and is described by Austin as 
binding the members o f  the House of Commons generally and vaguely ‘ to abstain from such exercise 
o f the delegated sovereign powers as would tend to defeat the purposes for which they are elected or 
appointed’ (Austin, J 1832: 194).
51 Austin, J 1832: 192-3.
52 Dicey, A.V 1915:3.
53 Manning, C.A.W 1933: 192,202 cited in Cotterrell, R 1989: 70.
54 Manning, C.A.W 1933: 192,202 cited in Cotterrell,R 1989: 70.
55 Manning, C.A.W 1933: 192, cited in Cotterrell, R 1989: 70.
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again commenting on Austin he states, ‘[t]he electors are part of and the predominant 
part of the politically sovereign power.’ In both comments the place of the electorate 
is not entirely resolved. It is suggested that this lack of resolution expresses a tension 
that is the product of the inter-play of two approaches to the location of political 
sovereignty. One approach might be regarded as causatively structured whereby the 
location of political sovereignty is placed where it is perceived the originating will or 
wills are located that give rise to society and its institutions. In addition one might be 
seeing a normative argument at play based on a political metaphysic whereby the 
electorate are perceived as being the unitary source of political will in a symbolic 
sense, thus excluding the other elements mentioned, as will be explored below when 
considering the writings of Cassirer on symbolism.
17. Regarding for the moment the above comments about the possible symbolic role 
of the electorate as an expression of a legitimating narrative, legitimacy is a concept 
with a normative character or set of characters and it is not inevitable that the actual 
source of obedience coincides with where it ought to be, according to a given 
framework of legitimacy.56 The location of the sovereign, characterised by being 
the object of habitual obedience by the bulk of the community, whether it is 
ascertained at election time or between elections appears to be located by reference to 
pre-existing constitutionally important legal rules rather than empirical 
investigation.57 These laws define such institutions as parliament and the electorate. 
There is a tautological assumption that the ultimate source of habitual obedience is 
where it ought to be. Austin adopts the same approach to the location of sovereignty 
in the United States of America again assuming that the ultimate source of the 
habitual obedience of the population is where its constitution in his view suggests it to 
be. In this case he claims that sovereignty "be inferred" from the amendment 
procedure contained in the fifth article of the constitution as residing in the states'
c o
governments as forming one aggregate body [sic]. In Austin’s commitment to
56 This appears to suffer from the fundamental fallacy to derive what ‘is’ from simply from what 
‘ought’ to be ( Freeman, MDA, 1994:12-13).
57 Reflecting this difficulty, Dicey asserts that Austin's conclusions as to the location of sovereignty 
was a deduction from the position o f the British parliament and that it was a ‘generalization drawn in 
the main from English law.’ (Dicey, A.V 1915: 26-27).
58 Austin, J 1832: 210. So he does not consider, with regard to the federal arrangement in the United 
States that the president and congress is sovereign but is ‘merely the subject matter of the united states’ 
government.’ (Austin, J 1832: 209). Sovereignty is located in the states’ governments forming one 
aggregate body, meaning by a state’s government not its ordinary legislature, but the body of its
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conceptualise sovereignty through what in his mind comprises an empirically 
orientated enquiry, he is guided by the requirements of establishing a chain of 
causation with regard to the production of law, as applied to each constitutional 
settlement he seeks to investigate so that he can discover the ‘first cause’ of such 
production. The substance of the chain is in effect determined by what he perceives to 
be the normative requirements of the system under examination.
18. For Austin, sovereignty lies with a determinate source (or sources )ffom whom or 
which all positive law in his view are attributed although it may not be directly 
involved in producing such law as can be seen in his analysis, described above, of the 
location of sovereignty in Britain and the United States.59 It is these which the bulk of 
a given society must habitually obey if the body or bodies in question are to qualify as 
sovereign. It is the fact of habitual obedience rather than the causes of habitual 
obedience that is important. The word ‘habitual’ suggests repetition, in this case 
repetitive obedience. It also suggests that obedience occurs through unthinking 
compliance60 which has an automatic quality to it. If obedience occurs only because 
of a sovereign's commands, is it necessarily habitual obedience even if it is repetitive 
if the motivation for obedience is the avoidance of punishment? 61 Therefore one's 
view of the meaning of the word "habitual" will impact upon the extent to which such 
obedience occurs. If it simply suggests repetition then one is not concerned with 
internal motivation but simply with external compliance. However even here there 
are difficulties. In the absence of an empirical inquiry which seeks to question
ordinary citizens which appoint its legislative body and which, union apart, is properly sovereign 
therein’ (Austin, J 1832: 209-210). He then goes onto suggest if  for each state there was an ‘immediate 
chief then sovereignty in the United States would lie with an aggregate o f all these individuals as a 
‘collective whole’ suggesting, although not explicitly spelt out, that as a consequence sovereignty lies 
with the collective whole o f the citizenry that determine the composition o f each state legislature. He 
bases these conclusions on his reading o f the Article V o f the American constitution which concerns 
the procedures for amendment.
59 Austin's definition o f  sovereignty refers to that determinate and superior entity to which habitual 
obedience by the bulk o f a given society is expressed. The definition does not specifically refer to law 
as being the expression o f  the sovereign's will which gives rise to such obedience but it is clear from 
his assertion that positive law is a ‘direct or circuitous command’ o f a sovereign, that this is what in 
substance is meant (Austin, J 1832: 116, 118). Such law comprises commands o f a general character 
which trigger sanctions in the event o f non-compliance (Austin, J 1832: 24-29).
60 Hart raises this point. See Hart, H.L.A 1962: 51.
61 This raises the problem o f the fluctuation o f motivation both between individuals and also in relation 
to each individual's motivation over time.
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members of the population on their extent of obedience and reasons for it, 62 how 
would one measure whether habitual obedience is achieved by the bulk of a society? 
The external sign of such obedience at first sight might be considered to be that civil 
society is stable and thus there appear to be no significant moves to disrupt or 
overthrow the sovereign body. But even if that appeared to be the case by external 
observation over a period of time, could that automatically lead to the conclusion that 
habitual obedience by the bulk of the population is manifested? Arguably not, as it 
might be that in certain respects, there is not habitual obedience even though overall 
the claim is accepted that society is a stable one.63 For example, there might be 
widespread theft or traffic crimes or white-collar fraud. Would such activity be 
incompatible with habitual obedience by the bulk of the population to the sovereign’s 
commands? Attempts to illuminate upon the meaning of habitual obedience by 
equating it with stability in society creates its own uncertainties which go to highlight 
further the problem with the idea of habitual obedience as being a defining criterion 
by which the location of sovereignty is ascertained. The idea of habitual obedience 
providing the basis of the existence of sovereignty however while empirically highly 
problematic to verify does point to a profound observation of Austin and that is that 
ultimately the conformity of a population with the laws that are produced in its name 
whether by a sovereign or otherwise cannot ultimately be explained by the claim that 
it is the laws themselves that dictate that they are followed or indeed that behaviour 
consistent with them necessarily is a product of consciously following them.
19. Such practice becomes particularly apparent in relation to discussions about the 
extent if any to which a sovereign is bound by its own laws. From Austin’s point of 
view logically a determinate sovereign body which is the source of all positive law 
cannot be bound by it. On this basis, if the sovereign were legally bound by it then he 
would be in a state of subjection to a higher sovereign which opens the way towards 
contemplating an infinite hierarchy of sovereigns which is an impossibility. Hence
62 This would be highly problematic in any event. Quite apart from the issue o f representative 
sampling, there would inevitably be an under-reporting o f disobedience as suggested by the problem o f  
under-reporting in criminal surveys.
63 This raises the issue as to who is doing the accepting. A government is more likely to argue that 
society is stable than an opposition and it might be that parts of population disagree with both. So there 
are issues about the nature o f interpretative communities, how they express themselves and the extent 
o f consensus. This o f course raises issues as to the nature o f representation since such communities 
express themselves through de jure  or de facto  representation.
81/267
Austin's characterisation of rules, which in form constitute laws and that seem to be 
applicable to sovereigns, are in reality only a form of positive morality as against the 
sovereign.64 At any given juncture, the existing sovereign can change such laws, 
although to do this it would have to comply with what Hart has defined as secondary 
rules of the legal system.65 These include those that are constitutive of sovereignty 
itself by for example regulating how succession is to proceed and also those which 
define those expressions of sovereignty that amount to its commands which the bulk 
of the population habitually obey.66 This logical inference which he supports with 
empirical evidence 67 only however illuminates one aspect of the relationship between 
sovereignty and law. What Austin does not consider is the impact upon this 
conclusion of the continuation of sovereignty within a diachronically existing society.
20. Assuming for the moment that sovereignty is vested in one single individual, a 
pre-condition for the maintenance of a stable society is the orderly transfer of 
sovereign power from one sovereign to its successors so that damaging contests for
/ o
power can be avoided at these points in time. Austin himself recognised this 
requirement.69 Laws therefore have to be in place which define when such transfer 
takes place and to whom. It is true that whilst a particular person occupies the office 
of sovereignty, he or she is not bound by such rules. However that does not mean that 
the sovereign within Austin's formulation is liberated from the law. Yes it is true that 
logically the sovereign from an Austinian perspective is not bound to obey his own 
laws. Yet from the perspective of the practice of sovereignty, the refusal by a
64 Austin, J 1832: 212-213.
65 For Hart the lack o f an appreciation o f the rules o f recognition, change and adjudication as central to 
any modem legal system was one criticism he made o f the way Austin characterised legal systems. See 
Hart 1961.
66 These latter constitutive mles are equivalent to the rules o f recognition that Hart considered to be 
central to any functioning state legal system.
67 For example Austin explores the possibility of the British Parliament departing from a fundamental 
condition o f the union between Scotland and Wales contained in Article XXV of the Union with 
Scotland Act 1706 whereby the governance o f the church in Scotland was not to be altered and 
considers presciently that Parliament is capable o f altering this provision. This has in fact occurred for 
example by the British Parliament altering the terms o f the aforementioned Article by the enactment o f  
the Universities (Scotland) Act 1853 abolishing the requirement that university professors must 
subscribe to the Confession o f Faith. The Union o f Ireland Act 1800 required the churches o f England 
and Ireland to be united into one church named the United Church o f England and Ireland which was to 
remain in "full force for ever". In fact the Irish Church Act 1869 separated the two churches despite 
this clause and the validity o f the latter Act's terms were upheld in E xp Canon Selwyn (1872) 36 JP Jo 
54;Munro,C 1999: 138-139.
68 For Austin as for Hobbes, as indicated in the former's definition, sovereignty need not be limited to a 
single individual but can be vested in a group o f individuals or institutions (Austin, J 1832: 165, 192).
69 Austin, J 1832: 134.
82/267
sovereign to obey its own laws while not being illegal might well cause a rupture in 
the relationship between him and his subjects as manifested by the emergent lack of 
habitual obedience by a bulk of the population within the sovereign’s jurisdiction as
7 0  • •they perceive his actions to be illegitimate as a result of their legality. This points to 
the self-evident observation made by Bentham that habitual obedience is conditional 
in character and points back to the relational quality of sovereignty.71 The existence 
of habitual obedience therefore in the manner posed by Austin, even with the 
difficulties of establishing it, is likely to be affected by the extent to which a sovereign 
complies with his own or his predecessors laws and significant breach may but will 
not inevitably lead to governmental crisis. Indeed, it is not inconceivable that 
departure by the sovereign from existing laws might actually ensure habitual 
obedience whereas compliance might undermine such obedience for example in 
circumstances that amount to a national crisis for example in the event of a hostile 
invasion. This of course points to the possibility of the state of exception around 
which Schmitt constructed his idea of sovereignty and to whose model we will now 
turn.
70 In essence the sovereign’s behaviour in this circumstance does not comply with the prevailing 
practice and expectation of the population. This indicates the deeper point that a system of formal law 
is grounded in everyday practices (Tully, J 2007: 321).
71 ‘... the obedience o f the governed is susceptible o f every modification o f which human conduct is 
susceptible: and the rules which mark it out, o f every diversity which can be clearly described by word’ 
(Bentham, J 1970: 69).
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CHAPTER 5: An Introduction to Schmitt
1. Schmitt’s conception of sovereignty is boldly stated in the opening line of Political 
Theology as ‘he who decides on the exception’.1 Immediately several observations 
can be made. Firstly there appears to be an ambiguity lying at the heart o f the 
definition. Is the person who decides upon the exception recognised as the sovereign 
prior to the decision or is it the decision itself that gives the person making it the 
status of sovereign? In the first case the sovereign is identifiable whilst in the second 
he is not prior to the decision. The first is more consistent with the commissarial 
dictator as exemplified by the Reich President in the Weimar Republic. The latter is 
consistent with classical sovereignty which seemingly 3 exists outside the legal order, 
although not disconnected from it and whose decision creates law and ultimately 
order. Secondly it concentrates upon the exception and not the norm. The classical 
definition of sovereignty namely that sovereignty is the ‘highest legally independent 
underived power’4 appears not to fully capture the essence of sovereignty and yet as 
we shall see Schmitt oddly is incapable of escaping from it. There is a sense of the 
episodic about his definition. It is as though it is normally undetectable in terms of 
external manifestation and suddenly bursts forward at some point ‘to declare the 
exception.’5 Its manifestation has the feel of the miraculous and indeed Schmitt 
makes reference to the exception as ‘analogous to the miracle’6 in jurisprudence.
2. Four elements of work which are crucial to an appreciation of his idea of 
sovereignty will be concentrated upon. These will comprise firstly his analysis of the
n
historical development of (European) Man’s Weltunschauung that is to say the way 
he has constructed the world around him, secondly the decisionism that is located at 
the heart of any legal system, thirdly Schmitt’s idea of the political and finally his idea 
of democracy. These features will be considered and will provide the basis for an
1 Schmitt, C 1985: 5.
2 Dyzenhaus, D: 1997: 43.
3 In the next chapter I will argue that a sovereign cannot exist outside the legal order.
4 Schmitt, C 1985: 17.
5 Schmitt, C 1985: 5.
6 Schmitt, C 1985:36.
7 Schmitt lays out his ideas on this matter in the context o f an impending threat of the Russians upon 
the Weimar Republic whom he considers have ‘seen through our great words and institutions’ and 
whose vitality ‘is strong enough to seize our knowledge and technology as weapons.’ (Schmitt,C 1993: 
130).
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exploration of his idea of sovereignty which will take place in the third part of the 
thesis following the construction of a tentative theoretical approach with which to 
illuminate the nature of sovereignty.
3. For Schmitt, historically the dynamic of western history has been fuelled by a 
continuous search for neutral or central spheres free of conflict around which society 
could be peacefully organised. The operative domain of the sixteenth century was 
theology which was replaced by that of metaphysics in the seventeenth century, itself 
replaced by humanitarian concerns in the eighteenth followed by economics in the
o
nineteenth century to be replaced by technology in the twentieth century. Reflecting 
this latest shift Schmitt states:
‘ In almost every discussion one can observe the extent to which the methodology of 
the natural technical sciences dominates contemporary thinking. For example God of 
traditional theological evidence- the God that governs the world as the king governs 
the state- subconsciously is made the motor of impelling the cosmic machine. The 
chimera of modem big-city dwellers is filled to the last atom with technological and 
industrial conceptions, which are projected into cosmological and mathematical 
mythology, the world becomes a giant dynamo... ’
4. Implicit within this quote one can detect two features associated with Schmitt’s 
view of modernity, namely innovation for innovation’s sake, an existential wandering 
which is accompanied by a rejection of descending authority and tradition, and a 
sense that pre-modem civilisation involved a wholeness and unity since lost.9 Even 
the idea of God is itself turned into an entity which serves to explain and justify the 
domination of technology. The seemingly limitless possibilities of the production 
process is brought out starkly by Schmitt when he characterises it as ‘[a] marvellously 
rational mechanism [that] serves one or another demand always with the same 
earnestness and precision, be it for a silk blouse or poison gas or anything 
whatsoever.’10 The underlying irrationality of it emerges in Schmitt’s contrasting the 
production process itself, that is technology which he describes as being ‘dead’ with
8 McCormick, J.P 1997: 98.
9 Nehamas, A 1996a: 224.
10 Schmitt, C 1996a: 14-15.
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technicity nwhich is ‘alive’ and embracing a belief ‘of an activist metaphysics, the
belief in limitless power and domination of man over nature even human nature
...[which] can be called fantastic and satanic but not simply dead, spiritless or
1 0mechanized soulessness.’
5. The rise of technicity, the idea of a life-world seemingly without a subject has its 
equivalent in jurisprudence, as far as Schmitt was concerned, in the construction of a 
hierarchy of norms most fully expressed in the idea of Kelsen which for Schmitt is a 
manifestation of the uncritical importation of the laws of science, that is to say the 
laws of cause and effect into the realm of human social relations. The net result is 
that the reality of man is distorted by the worship of the rational at the expense of the 
irrational that is expunged. The judge in Schmitt’s interpretation of Kelsen’s schema 
is reduced to an automaton whose expression of the law does not register as anything 
other than a confirmation of the impersonal norm over which he has no control in 
shaping. Just as the judge is reduced to nothing more than a cog in the machine so the 
state itself becomes nothing more than the machine itself, that is to say it is nothing 
more than a collection of norms.13 This is reflected in his statement that ‘[a]t the 
foundation of his identification of state and legal order rests a metaphysics that 
identifies the lawfulness of nature and normative lawfulness. The pattern of thinking 
is characteristic of the natural sciences. It is based on the rejection of all 
‘arbitrariness’ and attempts to banish from the realm of the human mind every 
exception.’14 Schmitt’s conception of the legal process refuses to countenance the 
extinction of the personal element which cannot be explained by the norm or 
necessarily any other identifiable rational processes which occur independently of the 
judge’s personal will. Thus he claims that ‘every concrete juristic decision contains a 
moment of indifference from the perspective of the content, because the juristic 
deduction is not traceable in the last detail to its premises and because the
11 It is worth noting here the difference in meaning that Schmitt places on technology that is Technik 
with technicity, that is Technizitat.
12 Schmitt, C “ The Age o f  Neutralizations and Depoliticisations (1929) Matthias Konzett and J.P 
McCormick, Telos 96 (suumer 1993) from McCormick, J.P 1997: 44.
13 Emerson consideres that Kelsen is insistent that his norm-based structure requires that ‘the concept 
o f will in any psychological sense must be banned from the philosophy o f law as forming part o f the 
juristically indifferent land o f metajurisprudence... .The legal person is not the real person but a legal 
construction for the purpose o f attribution. This procedure leads Kelsen to absorb the State wholly into 
the formalism o f the law.’ Emerson, R 1928: 169-170.
14 Schmitt, C 1985:41.
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circumstances that require a decision remains an independently determining 
moment.’15 What is seen here is the idea of the decision albeit at a micro-level which 
cannot be explained by any existing external structure of reasoning which is 
independent of the decision maker. It is thus an expression of decisionism, the idea 
that decisions even at this micro-level have an underived quality which means that 
law-making cannot be reduced to a set of machine-like impersonal norms which 
Kelsen allegedly claims it to be.
6. The irreducible personal element for Schmitt renders the state’s production of 
norms meaningless without being brought to life as law through judicial decisions. 
The substance of judicial decision without which norms would have no practical 
meaning or impact legally are dependent on the fact of the decision for their 
realization or more disturbingly their non-realization. The decision is everything and 
decisions which are anti-normative in content are capable of having the force of law 
in any legal system. To simply reduce the existence of law to the form of norms and 
not to be alive to the way they are expressed actually renders one blind to the 
possibility of the law being deformed and ultimately becoming a tool for coercion. 
For Schmitt, Kelsen wrongly attempted to exclude the operation of personal will at 
the point where mediation occurs between norm and decision. It furthermore takes no 
account of the most explicit part of the law making activity, namely the legislative 
process itself which through the operation of quantitative majoritarian democracy 
leading to temporary opportunistic alliances results in the production of insincerely 
founded norms. 16 The excessive legal formalism of Kelsen’s normative account of 
law with its artificial separation of politics and sociology from jurisprudence renders 
an account which is both completely incapable of capturing the reality of the legal
1 7process and empty of any moral content.
15 Schmitt, C 1985: 30. In similar vein he claims that the ‘constitutive, specific element o f a decision is, 
from the perspective o f the content o f the underlying norm, new and alien. Looked at normatively the 
decision emanates from nothingness’ (Schmitt, C 1985: 31-2). It would be interesting to speculate how 
Schmitt would have received the idea o f Dworkin’s Herculean judge. Schmitt’s horror at the rise of the 
machine as the point o f departure for the analysis o f  law and other social relationships would doubtless 
have been reinforced as Dworkin endeavoured to close and seal the gap, which for Schmitt the legal 
positivists had threatened to do, but behind an anti- positivist rhetoric as expressed in L aw ’s Empire.
16 McCormick, J.P 1997: 216. This mirrors Rousseau’s aversion to factionalism which he regarded as 
being destructive o f  social unity that for him was by the institutionalisation o f the general will 
(Rousseau, JJ 1993).
17 Schmitt, C 1985: 18-22; Schwab, G 1989: 48.
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7. The idea of the exception lying at the centre of Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty 
can be seen to be embedded in his analysis of the transition from norm to concrete 
decision. Here the point at which a decision can be made cannot be completely 
accounted for by reference to the norms that are alleged to guide it. The decision is 
therefore surrounded by relevant norms although they ultimately do not fully 
determine it. Magnifying the scale of observation to that of the state, rather than 
consisting of simply a machine which can be explained exclusively by reference to 
such norms, for Schmitt, it also embraces the personal in the form of lawmaking and 
administration as concretely manifested by the decisions of judges, legislators and 
other state officials. The idea of state as machine seemingly simply comprising norms 
to the final degree is the product for Schmitt of the triumph of the enlightenment 
which rejected “the exception in every form”.18 The idea of law became equated with 
statute and that of statute with the state.19 This idea of the law state, that is the 
Rechtsstaat, also suited its main advocate the liberal bourgeoisie who ‘wanted a god 
[although] its god could not become active; it wanted a monarch but it had to be 
powerless; it demanded freedom and equality but limited voting rights to the 
propertied classes.’20 The law of the state however for Schmitt did not exhaust its
7 1existence since preceding law is authority or commands from above. Kelsen’s
reductionism excluded the idea of will falling outside the norms of the state and 
ultimately being their source not only in his analysis of the legal process but in his 
commitment to the suppression of the original underived earthly will namely that of
79sovereignty. For Kelsen in contrast to Schmitt ‘sovereignty can only be the quality 
of a normative order as an authority that is the source of rights and obligations.’ 23
8. As a result, Schmitt considered that the objectivity that Kelsen claimed for himself 
‘amounted to no more than avoiding everything personalistic and tracing the legal 
order back to the impersonal validity of the impersonal norm.’24 More widely as a 
critique of positivism as up until then it had expressed itself, he considered that its
18 Schmitt, C 1985: 37.
19 Schmitt, C 2004: 18.
20 Schmitt, C 1985: 59.
21 Schmitt, C 2004: 18.
22 Kelsen considers that the ‘concept o f sovereignty must be radically repressed’ (Kelsen 1920: 120 as 
quoted in MacCormick J.P 1997: 214).
23 Kelsen, H 1945: 255.
24 Schmitt, C 1985: 29.
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supporters failed to understand that legal decision-making was ultimately personal in 
character and ultimately such decisions could not be derived from the positive legal 
norm that is to be applied.25 In essence therefore, Schmitt transferred such an 
approach from the domain of daily judicial decision making in which the personalism 
manifested by the judge to the macro level, that is to say to the level of constitutions, 
states and the general system of law. At this level, Schmitt considers that Kelsen seeks 
to claim the purity of law, in the name of scientific objectivity, separating normative 
jurisprudence from its sociological variant and politics- an orientation which enables 
him to remove the personal from the fabric of the state conceptualising it as nothing 
more than a collection of norms. The validity of such norms is not determined by 
their contents but by their perceived relationship with ‘higher’ norms and ultimately 
tracing their validity back to a basic norm which in Kelsian terms is the product of 
presupposition and hence in that sense is a fiction.26 This arises out of the product of 
the will of a decision-maker, most obviously a constitutional majority which gives 
rise to the first constitution upon which a given legal system ultimately derives its 
authority. Hence for Schmitt, the personal, despite Kelsen’s claim to the contrary had
• • 27not been removed but arguably suppressed or perhaps more accurately distanciated. 
Any legal system is ultimately predicated upon a personal decision which cannot be 
derived from any existing normative system and the content of any normative system 
is ultimately dependent on changing majorities increasing the possibility of endless 
change from a substantive perspective. Flowing from an explanatory framework 
which seeks to explain the law and its application simply by reference to systems of 
norms, sovereignty is in terms of its human manifestation, suppressed and replaced by 
what has been described as an hypothetical device namely the basic norm whose 
function is to make sense of already existing normative frameworks in an act of what 
Derrida would consider to be a form of fabulous retrospectivity, which provides
25 Schmitt, C: 1985: 30.
26 As specifically stated by Kelsen in his explanation o f  the basic norm (Kelsen, H 1986: 117).
27 This emerges when Kelsen seeks to respond to the question o f how a particular constitution comes 
into being. He considers that it is the product o f an amendment o f a previous constitution and is in fact 
the ‘grandchild’ o f the historically first constitution which gives rise to the basic norm (Kelsen, H 
1986: 114). This emphasises continuity rather than rupture by attributing the creation o f  two 
constitutions to their predecessors, thus suppressing the personal character o f the amendment process 
that cannot be ultimately explained by the amendment provisions, and distanciates the rupture to an 
historically first constitution which is ‘two generations’ away from the existing constitution and 
suppresses the decisionism occurring outside any existing legal normative structure by the explanatory 
devise o f the basic norm fiction.
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foundation and avoids indefinite regress.28 In contrast, the idea of sovereignty 
remained central to Schmitt’s thinking, a centrality that emerged with the rise of 
modernity characterised by the removal of the end-telos and the need to negotiate and 
more importantly respond effectively to the unforeseen emergency in respect of which 
an existing normative system could be fundamentally undermined because to function 
required the existence of a normal situation. It was the potentiality of the exception 
with its negation of normality that for Schmitt pointed to the existential need for a 
sovereign who was able to determine the existence of such exceptional circumstances 
and had the authority to suspend the existing system of norms to the extent needed to 
deal with such circumstances and which could ultimately result in the negation of 
existing formal constitutional arrangements in order to preserve what fundamentally 
united the collective against its enemy. It was the circumstances of such conflict that 
for Schmitt lay at the heart of human existence and which in the final analysis 
necessitated and legitimated the state structured around the sovereign. The state was 
the central institutional expression of a people’s political existence and it was their 
political existence that most fully expressed their existential being.
9. Schmitt claimed that at its core the idea of the state preceded the law. In turn, the 
state presupposed the political and the political was expressed by conflict between 
friend and enemy through which a people’s homogeneity and identity would be
7 0forged. The idea of the political as being the centrally existentially defining concept 
began to emerge in some of his earlier writings 30 but was explicitly explored in 
Concept o f the Political. Like Hobbes whose writings influenced Schmitt 
considerably, his ideas developed against the background of political and social 
instability. Both men considered that Man was inherently dangerous, that conflict 
was Man’s natural condition and that to ensure stability and order required 
authoritarian solutions predicated upon a strong state.31
10. The implications of this were profound for Schmitt. The idea of the peoples’ 
homogeneity expressed in the form of the state rested upon that of exclusion of “the
28 Derrida, J, 1986.
29 Schmitt, C 1996c.
30 For example in 1996a and 1988.
31 In the case of Schmitt, his ideas develops against the background o f the Weimar’s republic’s 
instability.
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other” as a result of the playing out of what he termed as ‘the political’. This for 
Schmitt was a transcendent existential category upon which the state rested. Contrary 
to the idea of the social contract which ultimately was based upon the ontological 
supremacy of the individual, Schmitt’s idea of the political was based upon the 
supremacy of the collective, that is the friend/enemy distinction around which peoples 
coalesced as units of governance in opposition to other peoples.33 Hence his opening 
statement in the Concept o f the Political that ‘[t]he concept of the state presupposes 
the concept of the political.’34 The reason for the state’s creation was not a matter of 
indifference as in Kelsen’s jurisprudence. However it was not necessarily the 
individual’s desire to survive or a collective desire to have the benefits of some form 
of distributive justice 35 which required the coercive power of the state, or a rejection 
of the role of a given state as operating to secure the privileged position of the 
capitalist in his exploitative relationship with the working classes to name three 
examples that might necessarily be the reason for the creation of people and its 
resultant state. It was not that such qualities or purposes might not form the focus 
for social conflict. It was that for Schmitt, the political denoted a condition which took 
on its clearest expression when the intensity of conflict between people, irrespective 
of what had concretely triggered it, had reached its most intense expression in which 
the issue of who was friend or enemy was acutely posed.37 It was the point at which
'IQ
there was an existential threat to one’s way of life. The possibility for peaceful 
resolution was past and violent conflict involving a life and death struggle between 
friend and enemy occurred in the form of military conflict. War for Schmitt was the
-IQ
‘existential negation of the enemy’ and the most extreme expression of enmity. The 
friend/enemy distinction which was increasingly posed the more intense conflict 
became was not for Schmitt a normative claim40 but an existential one which
32 As in Schmitt’s The Concept o f the Political.
33 It has to be said however that there is an individualistic trace embedded in his explanation o f  the 
friend/enemy antithesis. See below.
34 Schmitt, C 1985: 19. He thus reverses the relationship between the state and the political, that is to 
say, he rejects the argument that political conceptions derive from the state (Kennedy, E 1998: 99).
35 As Kant would explain the reason for the need for a state ( Guyer, P 1992:4-5 and 351-3).
36 Dyson, K 1980: 104.
37 ‘The political is the most intense and extreme antagonism, and every concrete antagonism becomes 
that much more political the closer it approaches the most extreme point, that o f the ffiend-enemy 
grouping’ (Schmitt, C 1996c: 29).
38 Schmitt, C 1996c: 49.
39 Schmitt, C, 1996c: 33.
40 This was profoundly challenged by Strauss in his illuminating analysis o f The Concept o f the 
Political. See Strauss, L 1996: 83-107.
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explained the condition of violent conflict which was frequently exhibited in 
humankind’s history.41 While Schmitt therefore did not claim that social conflict 
could only be solved by war, he did consider that the political and ultimately politics 
rested on the ever-present possibility of war breaking out. The possibility of violent 
conflict therefore always lurks in the background and ‘it is the leading presupposition 
which determines in a characteristic way human action and thinking and thereby a 
specifically political behaviour.’42
11. At the heart of the idea of the political there is at least at surface level a 
contentless form and circularity,43 the only defining point, leaving aside the 
particularities of any given conflict, being its intensity within the public domain.44 
The political and its associated friend/enemy relationship did not possess identifiable 
social substance in the form of conflict for example over race or culture or economics. 
No identifiable category such as the aforementioned exhausted the meaning of this 
transcendent concept and the intensity associated with it could potentially attach to 
any such category or combination of categories and hence potentially to no 
identifiable category at all. As Schmitt stated ‘[o]nly the actual participants can 
correctly recognise, understand, and judge the concrete situation and settle the 
extreme case of conflict.’45 There was therefore a sense in which the moment of 
eruption of intense conflict could defy prediction and also a sense in which the 
concrete circumstances leading to such an eruption could defy easy classification. As 
Schmitt stated ‘the morally evil, aesthetically ugly or economically damaging need 
not necessarily be the enemy [whereas] the morally good, aesthetically beautiful and 
economically profitable need not necessarily become the friend in the specifically 
political sense of the word.’46
41 Schmitt, 1996c: 33. Schmitt claims that ‘the definition of the political... neither favours war nor 
militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism.’
42 Schmitt, 1996c: 34. The idea o f  the possibility o f a violent clash between friend and enemy erupting 
as conflict intensifies has also been characterised as expressing an ‘ever-lurking potential’ 
(Bockenforde, E.W, 1998: 40).
43 What is intensely felt by the collective is political and what is political is intensely felt. If the social 
existence o f  the collective is embraced in a Hobbesian sense by one individual who has a sovereign 
function, then the political becomes individually determined. This is a logic that is played out in 
Schmitt’s thoughts given his attitude to democracy and representation.
44 Schmitt specifically makes the point that the enemy is public in nature and only exists when ‘at least 
potentially, one fighting collectivity o f people confronts a similar collectivity’ (Schmitt, C 1996c:28).
45 Schmitt, C 1996c: 27.
46 Schmitt, C 1996c: 27.
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12. There is thus at the heart of the political an underived quality and hence the point 
at which the exception applies, that is to say this point cannot be deduced from some 
pre-existing normative framework.47 This means that there is no limit to the grounds 
used by a collective to arrive at the conclusions regarding who is the potential enemy 
and at what point a threat to its existence is posed by that ‘enemy’. There is 
seemingly no privileged position from which to judge the legitimacy of a collective’s 
decision. No overarching external configuration of values or principles, whether 
they be economic, moral, aesthetic or religious can be relied upon. This does not 
mean to say however that Schmitt was claiming that no arguments of this kind might 
arise in the process of the conflict, but that each such conflict will generate its own 
concrete configuration of disputation and there is no inherent limit as to what these 
might be. The logical outcome of this lack of substantive specificity is that it is not 
impossible, however improbable, for one nation to declare an intense hatred of 
another such that physical conflict erupts for no apparent reason or for reasons that 
might be regarded as truly bizarre.49 Just as the reasons for the identity of an enemy 
are not constrained by any overarching normative limits, so too is the point at which 
antagonisms reach the threshold at which violent conflict ensues. In terms of 
conduct, there is no privileging of peaceful politics conducted within normative 
frameworks over violent conflict. Furthermore there is no privileging of one type of 
violent conflict over another so that there is no inherent reason why defensive war 
should be preferred over offensive ones in order to safeguard oneself from the 
apparent enemy 50and thus ‘no first strike’ doctrines have no privileged position over 
pre-emptive ones.51
13. Having said that, there appears to be no explicit normative constraints as to the 
circumstances in which conflict might arise. There are nevertheless a set of
47 The advent o f war, the most intense expression o f the political, ‘has no normative meaning but an 
existential meaning only, particularly in a real combat situation with a real enemy’ (Schmitt, C 
1996c:49).
48 See below for a qualification on this point.
49 For example, to cite the war that occurred between El Salvador and Honduras ostensibly over a 
football match in 1969 although its roots were economic and nationalist in character. See 
http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/sierra/soccer1969.htm. accessed on 1st August 2007.
50 Howse, R 1998: 66. Schmitt’s formulation that violent conflict should only be justified if  there is an 
existential threat to one’s way o f life is sufficiently vague to justify an adventure to safeguard oil 
supplies- a reason which some commentators have suggested lies at the heart o f invasion o f Iraq in 
2003.
51 This is graphically illustrated by the defence policy o f the United State’s government which is 
committed to the pre-emptive strike doctrine.
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assumptions upon which Schmitt operates in his development of the political. He 
operates on the basis that the operating political community comprises of ‘a
7^pluriverse’ of states rather than a global state or other kinds of formations. He 
considers that the waging of war in the name of universal categories such as 
‘humanity’ will lead to particularly intense conflict manifesting the most extreme 
inhumanity as the enemy is not even considered to be human.53 He goes on to assert 
that the concept of humanity excludes the concept of the enemy ‘because the enemy 
does not cease to be a human being.’ 54 The outcome of a war fought in the name of a 
universal category such as ‘humanity’ therefore is not the removal of ‘a particularly 
intensive political meaning’55 but of the friend/enemy distinction central to Schmitt’s 
idea of the political.56 On the one hand, any reason appears to be valid by mere fact of 
its existence reflecting the existential character of the friend/enemy distinction and 
Schmitt’s endeavour with it to move beyond the universal categories of good and evil. 
On the other hand, the potentially endless panorama of existential possibilities 
propelling the conflict between and separation of friend from enemy appears to 
exclude universal categories because of existential specific nature of collectivities in 
Schmitt’s pluriverse of such entities.57
14. The state for Schmitt amounted to a socio-political phenomenon that expressed 
the existence of a unified people whose manifestation was the product of the
52 Schmitt, C 1996c: 53. Schmitt accepted that the idea o f statehood as the primary unit o f international 
social organisation was not valid for all time but was historically specific (Schmitt, C 2003: 126).
53 Schmitt,C 1996c: 54. In footnote 23 discussing the justification for war he ironically declares that 
‘[m]aybe one day it will be enough if  a people were unable to pay their debts.’
54 Schmitt, C 1996c: 54.
55 Schmitt, C 1996c: 54.
56 The tendency towards treating certain groupings as excluded from humanity and hence subject to 
annihilation clearly troubles Schmitt. It is all the more paradoxical that he found himself, in the light o f  
his conclusion that the Weimar Republic was incapable o f avoiding its own self-destruction because o f  
its degenerate liberal democratic character and of supporting a regime which went on to undertake a 
technologically sophisticated and efficient extermination o f much o f the European Jewish population 
whose humanity was clearly denied. Again the idea of Schmitt’s seeming opposition to the exclusion 
o f a people’s membership o f humanity suggests an underlying moral framework at work in this 
attitude.
57 Howse claims that what Schmitt does is to ‘turn pacifism against the natural law just war tradition in 
order to remove any moral constraint from the conduct o f war’ and ‘how little his approach is non 
bellicose’(1998:66). This might be overstated since it can be argued that Schmitt is not saying that 
there should be no moral constraints but rather that given the fundamental nature o f the political and 
the friend/enemy category, the reality is that such moral constraints will not be effective. Paradoxically 
it could be argued that precisely because o f the ever present possibility o f the emergence o f the friend 
enemy distinction and o f war, that this encourages states to be more careful and circumspect in the way 
they behave towards others in order to lower the risk of war.
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separation of friend from enemy.58 Its existence was therefore fundamentally based on 
the continuing exclusion of non-homogeneous elements who were the enemy or had 
the capacity to become so. Within the state itself, social relationships were predicated 
upon this continuing unity that bound people together on the basis of some sense of 
compelling solidarity forged in conflict whether it was for example based on religion, 
culture or economics. It was a pacified unity 59 where differences in so far as they 
existed were managed by the institutions of the state in such a way as to avoid the 
eruption of conflict which if allowed could result in civil war. This in turn could lead 
to the destruction of that unity, the reconfiguration of the population, the 
reorganisation of statehood involving the destruction of the existing state reflecting 
the emergence of alternative collectivities. While the interior of the state constituted a 
domain where the likelihood of clearly demarcated friend enemy polarity was 
normally remote, the possibility remained. The same could not be said for the 
relationship between states where there existed a substantially greater risk of the 
intensity of conflict erupting into a violent struggle between friend and enemy which 
were clearly defined in the process, that is to say the playing out of the political on an 
international scale.
15. The friend enemy distinction suggests a particular mode of existence in which the 
survival of the collective was valued above individual existence. It appears to be 
profoundly anti-individualist in character. The collective’s will while having a 
similarity to Rousseau’s general will does not countenance the idea of the social 
contract as an explanatory and legitimating narrative. For Schmitt any such contract 
was individualist in nature and was capable of undermining the collective will that 
was predicated on its collective unity supported by its exclusion of heterogeneous 
elements. Democracy could only operate meaningfully within such a unity since only 
within this context could it operate in a way that did not negate the collective’s ability 
to identify the enemy and thus ultimately to protect itself.60 Individualism cut across a 
governance primarily based around the centrality of obedience most profoundly
58 Schmitt endeavoured to capture the idea o f the sovereign state by characterising it within the context 
o f the political as ‘the specific entity o f the people’ and in the final analysis it is the ‘ultimate authority’ 
(Schmitt, C 1996c: 19-20).
59 ‘The endeavour o f a normal state consists above all in assuring total peace within the state and its 
territory’ (Schmitt C, 1996c: 46).
60 Schmitt, C 1988: 14; Rousseau, 1973.
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expressed in a preparedness to sacrifice one’s life to protect friend and destroy enemy 
and an ordered society which are in line with his authoritarian perspective.
16. Therefore the prospect of the liberal state being able to determine who is friend 
and who is enemy is unacceptably problematic for Schmitt although the need for such 
determination remains. ‘The negation of the political which is inherent in every 
consistent individualism leads necessarily to political distrust toward all conceivable 
political forces and forms of state and government.’ 61 Ultimately, the destruction of 
the enemy, a violent process ‘must demand the sacrifice of life’62 and such a demand 
is fundamentally incompatible with individualism. A strong state, necessary to 
confront the enemy, is incompatible with liberal freedoms which are the product of a 
limited state. The enemy therefore is a public one and here Schmitt draws on the 
distinction made by Plato who distinguishes between public and private enemy. ‘An 
enemy he states only exists when “one fighting collectivity of people confronts
fk 'Xanother a similar collectivity.’ The decision to determine whether an enemy exists 
and hence the steps necessary to protect the collectivity leads to Schmitt’s exploration 
of dictatorship and sovereignty.
17. Schmitt’s conception of democracy therefore was not as one would imagine a 
liberal state. The pre-condition for mass democracy was homogeneity. 64 Reflecting 
what Schmitt saw to be the interpenetration of state and people arising out of the 
development of mass democracy, an intervening organisation in the form of 
parliament-based representation through discussion was incapable of realizing the 
expression of the peoples’ will.65 The ideal solution 66 for Schmitt to the continuing
61 Schmitt, C 1996c: 70.
62 Schmitt, C 1996c: 71.
63 Schmitt, C 1996c: 28.
64 Schmitt, C 1988: 15.
65 Schmitt, C 1988: 15.
66 Schmitt’s attitude to parliamentary democracy displays the tension between the idealist and 
pragmatic elements of his writing. At the beginning o f Parliamentary Democracy he states in the 
preface to the second edition that ‘the parliamentary enterprise today is the lesser evil, that it will 
continue to be preferable to Bolshevism and dictatorship... that it would have unforeseeable 
consequences if it were discarded’ (Schmitt, 1988:2). On the other hand, he characterises liberalism 
‘as a consistent comprehensive system’ that embraces the idea that truth is the outcome of ‘eternal 
competition o f opinions’ and that in contrast to the truth, discussion means ‘renouncing a definite 
result’ (Schmitt, 1988:35). In a similar vein, he considers that parliament is against the will o f the 
people.. .an institution based on discussion by independent representatives has no autonomous 
justification for its existence. (Schmitt, C 1988:15). If anything, McCormick’s claim that Schmitt was
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prospect of government by discussion however was not a return to some form of 
representation more in keeping with a medieval configuration as expressed by the 
Catholic Church 67 but executive- led direct democracy achieved through the agency
/TO
of plebiscites or acclamation. For Schmitt, this alone within the context of the crisis 
of the Weimar republic, is capable of meeting the challenge posed by the creation of 
the total state. Democracy involving a direct relationship between the governed and 
the governing lies at the heart of this proposition. Real democracy is one where 
‘dictatorship and Caesaristic methods not only can produce the acclamation of the 
people but can also be a direct expression of democratic substance and power.’69 
The crises of the liberal state in fact for Schmitt amounted to a subversion of 
democracy at the hands of liberalism since the liberal and democratic elements were 
counter-posed to one another. Democracy needed to be rescued from ‘from its 
concealment by liberal elements.’70 Secret ballots, a central mechanism for the 
indication of political will, within the liberal mode of democracy needed to be 
replaced by the ‘original democratic phenomenon’ of acclamation through the 
‘accepting or the rejecting shouts of the assembled crowd.’71 ,72 Democracy was for 
Schmitt, expressing his allegiance to Rousseau’s idea, about ensuring the identity of 
the governed and governing. 73 It did not require, and indeed ideally should have 
excluded revocable consent and representative institutions, since these amounted to
inconsistent in his attitude towards parliament underplays the reality o f his position which was 
contemptuous o f it within liberal democracy.
67 Schmitt has considerable sympathy for forms o f governance wherein authority is derived from above 
as with the Catholic Church itself. Legitimate representation is predicated upon personalised authority 
as expressed in the following: ‘ ...the idea o f representation is so completely governed by conceptions 
of personal authority that the representative as well as the person represented must maintain a personal 
dignity- it is not a materialist concept. To represent in an eminent sense can only be done by a person, 
that is not simply a ‘deputy, but an authoritative person or an idea which if  represented, also becomes 
personified’ (Schmitt, C 1996a: 21).
68 Schmitt, C 1988: 16. The anti-democratic character from a representative liberal perspective o f  
plebiscitary democracy is suggested by Weber’s characterisation o f it as a ‘variant o f charismatic 
authority, which hides behind a legitimacy that is formally derived from the will o f the governed. The 
leader (demagogue) rules by virtue o f the devotion and trust which his political followers have in him 
personally.’ Modem examples (as opposed to ancient ones) that Weber provided include the 
dictatorship o f Cromwell, the leaders o f the French Revolution and the First and Second French 
Empires (Weber, M 1978: 268).
69 Schmitt, C 1988: 17.
70 Schmitt, C 1927-8: 202 quoted in Jacobson A.J and Schlink, B 2000: 385.
71 Schmitt, C 1927: 34 quoted in Jacobson A.J and Schlink, B 2000: 385.
72 This in effect might be thought as a form o f governance which in substance is akin to a form o f  
descending authority (rather than the ascending variety associated with genuine democracy) which if  
anything reduces the people to a manipulated plaything used to legitimate the will o f an exclusive 
political elite as suggested by Preuss, U 1987: 109.
73 Schmitt, C 1988: 14.
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qualities that could easily be distorted by heterogeneous political parties and interest 
groups who undermined the unity upon which, in Schmitt’s view, meaningful 
democracy was based. Voting more generally appeared to have the potential to disrupt 
this unity or falsely claim its existence since he considered that it should only permit a 
latent and presupposed agreement and consensus to become evident.74
18. This concern about the way in which participatory procedures can be distorted is 
consistent with his views on the dispensation of the involvement of the electorate 
altogether. In his analysis of the law making provisions available in the Weimar 
Constitution he provided a remarkably positive account of government by decree in 
states of emergency declared under Article 48 of the Constitution. He posed its 
necessity as in part being the outcome of the fundamental contradiction between the 
first part of the constitution which concentrated upon the functional and value neutral 
matters detailing the institutions of government and their jurisdictions and the second
nc
part which provides protection to certain substantive individually based rights. The 
difficulty with the first part was that because of its value neutral orientation, there was 
nothing to prevent the constitution being amended out of existence using the 
procedures in Article 76.76 The implication here is that this very value neutrality, 
within the context of party politics would render the state incapable of identifying 
threats externally or internally that might profoundly undermine it. The difficulty 
with the second part was that the privileging of such individual rights and hence, in 
his view of minorities, negated democracy itself and was capable of destroying the 
first part of the constitution.77 Schmitt’s preferred plebiscitary democracy could not 
overcome this contradiction whereas emergency governance under Article 48 could
no
substantially do so in that various articles protecting civil rights could be suspended.
74 Schmitt, C 2004: 28. This ties into his general comments about the nature of representation described 
above.
75 Such as freedom o f movement (art 111), freedom o f speech (art 118), inviolability o f home (art
115), marriage (art 119) and peaceful assembly ( art 123). Schmitt considered that the contradiction 
was so profound between the two that one part or the other should be repealed since rather significantly 
‘the constitution is a unity’ (Schmitt, C 2004: 47). The significance here is that this very much reflects 
the idea o f the people as a pre-constitutional unity emerging out o f the exclusion or separation o f  
enemy from friend.
76 Schmitt, C 2004: 48-49.
77 Schmitt, C 2004: 41.
78 Article 48(2) allows suspension o f Arts 114,15, 117, 118, 123,124, and 154 which concern the rights 
to liberty, the inviolability o f the home, privacy, freedom of speech, peaceful assembly, the right to 
form societies and the right to inheritance. There was considerable controversy over the latitude o f Art
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Therefore for Schmitt, the Reichpresident’s emergency powers were superior to 
ordinary law making in that it could not set basic rights aside and er ‘the extraordinary 
lawmaker can, by contrast, do both and apart from everything else, thereby already 
surpasses the ordinary legislature and is superior to it in a novel way.’79 Such 
superiority was strengthened further as under the emergency powers of Article 48, the 
Reich President could issue decrees which effectively overrode provisions in the first 
part of the constitution which otherwise could only be altered by constitutional
OA
amendment in accordance with the provisions of Article 76. This of course meant 
that the powers of the Reich President under Article 48 also surpassed those available 
to him and the electorate in plebiscitary decisions.
19. The ambiguity latent within Rousseau’s writing between the existence of the anti- 
individualistic general will and the individually based social contract upon which it is 
based is for Schmitt firmly resolved in favour of the collective. However he went past 
this point with his embrace of the advantages of the powers in Article 48 to open the 
door to permanent rule under these provisions. If anything, his position in terms of 
the shape of these powers was Hobbesian as he proclaimed that for the extraordinary 
lawmaker, referring to the Reich President’s article 48 powers, the distinction 
between statute and statutory application, legislative and executive, was neither 
legally or factually an obstacle. The extraordinary lawmaker combined both in his 
person.”81 Furthermore ‘he can directly issue an order that would “in itself’ constitute 
a police ruling that could be understood as stemming from legal norms governing 
police action, thereby evading the administrative law instruments established to 
provide legal recourse against the police.’82 Here, one sees a figure who combined 
the unified executive and legislative role of a Leviathan-like figure and who 
represented for Schmitt the embodiment of the Machtstaat, the executive state which, 
in contrast to the Rechtsstaat coalescing around it, possesses the ability to tell friend 
from enemy whether manifesting itself internally or externally.
48(2) with Schmitt arguing that it did not limit the Reichpresident’s suspensory powers to the above 
articles.
79 Schmitt, C 2004: 73-74.
80 This includes the requirement that two-thirds o f the members o f the Reichstag are present and two- 
thirds of them vote in favour o f the constitutional amendment.
81 Schmitt,C 2004: 71.
82 Schmitt C 2004: 71.
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Conclusions
20. For Schmitt, the key question in political philosophy in the age of modernity is 
that without a transcendent God, who would take his place ‘as the highest and most
O'*
certain reality and thus serve as a point of legitimacy in human reality?’ Was it to be 
the community or history? For Schmitt, the answer was the community as opposed to 
history. At the heart of that reality was human existence and at the heart of that was 
death or at least the possibility of struggle that could lead to it. How was this the case? 
At the centre of the human condition is the political for Schmitt. The political in its 
starkest form involves a clash between friend and enemy in the form of life and death 
struggle that war gives rise to. In essence it is the possibility of that struggle that 
infuses man with his human quality and the denial of the possibility of that struggle 
that leads to an existential death. It is the clash or potential clashes between 
collectives that provide for Schmitt the basic social existence of man, an existence 
that is reminiscent of Hobbes’ state of nature but is depicted at collective rather than 
an individual level. Furthermore, arguably, whereas for Hobbes that task is to escape 
the state of nature through the creation of the sovereign, for Schmitt such an escape is 
illusory and indeed given his evaluation of the existential requirements of being
o c
human, it is undesired. What was the source of this illusion which opens the way to 
the erroneous belief that the friend/enemy antithesis can be avoided through, inter 
alia, the adoption of universal categories such as ‘humanity’ which paradoxically can 
lead to wars that are far more inhumane than those fought around causes that are 
specific to specific collectivities and which therefore do not seek to deny to the 
opposing side its membership of humanity? For Schmitt, the cause for such 
developments was, influenced by Weber, explained primarily through the rise of 
technology and the cultural blindness it provokes as exhibited by the spirit of 
technicity that co-exists with it. That spirit considers that all problems can be solved 
through technology’s use, that is to say it gives rise to the religion of endless technical 
progress.86 Technology appears to be neutral and thus capable of serving everyone in
83 Schmitt, C 1996b: 103.
84 Therefore Schmitt distinguished himself from Hegelian inspired notions o f historical determinism.
85 The contrast between Hobbes’ state o f nature and Schmitt’s equivalent as captured by the friend 
enemy antithesis is usefully explored by Strauss (Strauss, L 1996).
86 Schmitt, C 1993:139. The relationship between Schmitt’s writings and those o f others including 
Weber are explored in McCormick, J.P 1997. The character o f economic-technical thinking is caught
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a world in which a process of depoliticisation dominates as manifested by the belief in 
the possibility of creating permanent peace and understanding.
21. The illusory possibility that the necessity of such struggle could be avoided 
paralysed the European elite who for Schmitt were central in what he perceived to be 
a life and death struggle that in all probability had to be undertaken with the Russian 
communist state.87 Here for Schmitt, the economic-technical thinking at the heart of 
the Communist project in effect was harnessed by the collectivity of the Russian 
soviet state so that the ‘anti-religion of technicity has been put into practice on
OQ
Russian soil’ and posed a grave threat. This association of the Russian soviet state 
with the Anti-Christ points in substance to the depiction of the struggle between 
friend and enemy, but in religious terms. The spiritlessness of technicity was pitted 
against the institution of the Catholic Church which Schmitt considered to be the 
paradigmatic institution that historically prevented man from losing himself 
spiritually. The difficulty was however that the Catholic Church, had for Schmitt, as 
a complexio oppositorum, that is to say a complex of opposites, become an institution 
that was capable of embracing incompatible movements and ideas and hence avoiding
89antithesis. It had come to undermine the unity of the state rather than strengthen it. 
Hence the place for the political which was constructed by Schmitt to take account of 
the age of modernity and the predominant forms of governance associated with it but 
as a rejoinder to the rise of technicity. It became central to the capacity of the 
institution which had emerged out of the ashes of the empire of the church, namely 
the state, from which the capacity to engage in such struggle had been undermined 
through the rise of technicity. However in the church as Slade has argued in terms of 
its representational character was the template for the form of governance that could 
potentially explicitly engage in the political.90 The church had derived its authority
by Schmitt’s claim that ‘ a completely irrational consumption conforms to a totally rationalised 
production’ (Schmitt, C 1996a: 14).
87 This is sharply depicted in the opening words of Schmitt in ‘The Age o f Neutralisations and 
Depoliticisations’ where he states that ‘[w]e in Central Europe live under the eyes of the Russian’ 
(Schmitt, C 1993: 130).
88 Schmitt, C 1993:131.
89 Schmitt, C 1996a: 7.
90 Francis Slade provides a useful exploration of the influence o f Catholicism upon Schmitt’s 
conception of the political. She is careful to point out that the church was the paradigm for his 
conceptualisation o f representation within the domain o f the political since ‘the political power of 
Catholicism rests ...on her absolute realization of authority’ in contrast to economic thinking that 
knows nothing o f representation (Schmitt, C 1996a: 17-18; Slade, F 115-117). However it was not a
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from the sacrifice at the centre of the religious narrative to which it was committed 
and had developed into a centralised hierarchically constructed collective with 
authority-based leadership which had once been prepared to engage and direct life and 
death struggle associated in substance with the political.
22. The centralisation associated with church governance now had to be generally 
transposed to the secular domain within the context of the inevitability of an acute 
struggle most probably with the Russians which could not be predicted or ultimately 
catered for by any normative structure. Its necessity was further reinforced by what 
he considered to be the profound contradiction at the heart of the liberal democratic 
order between liberalism and democracy whereby there was at best an uneasy 
compromise between the two which expressed itself in a crisis of legitimacy featuring 
different groups each clustered around differing conceptions of private interest 
endlessly fighting for dominance in the name of the overall interests of the volk?x 
As a result the capacity of the state to decisively identify and protect itself from 
hostile forces was fundamentally weakened. Decisive decision-making could only be 
achieved by the sovereign decision in the name of the people whose will would be 
expressed by acclaim. Ultimately the clearest expression of such decision making in 
the face of acute crisis was the declaration of the state of exception which constituted 
the uniquely held capacity of sovereignty which would in effect cause the suspension
Q 9of the existing constitution in order to save it. There lay the sovereign’s legitimacy.
23. The idea however of the exception and the relation of norm to it requires further 
investigation as it will be my contention that to fully understand it requires the 
construction of what I will describe as a grammar of normalities. However before 
that can occur, a theoretical model has to be developed through which Schmitt’s
paradigm for rule in the civil domain as regards its commitment in the political order to the primacy of  
the common good which according to Catholic teaching was defined as ‘ the harmonious development 
and natural perfection o f man’ according to the Pope Pius XII in the Encyclical Letter on the Function 
o f  the Sate in the Modern World quoted in Slade, F 1996: 121). The character o f representation as 
expressed in the Catholic Church however does not sit easily with the idea o f decisions made by the 
Weimarian president validated by plebiscitary democracy, which for Weber rested on charismatic 
authority (Weber, M 1978:268). Nor does it sit easily with the idea o f sovereign dictatorship which 
might well also rest on such authority.
91 Dyzenhaus, David 1996: 135.
92 Schmitt’s idea o f sovereignty was therefore deeply embedded in what he perceived to be the 
international practice of states captured by his phrase ‘pluriverse of states’.
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model of sovereignty and other models, namely those of Triumphus, Hobbes and 
Austin will be discussed.
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PART 2
CHAPTER 6: A Tentative Theoretical Approach 
Introduction
1. The purpose of this chapter will be to tentatively outline a theoretical approach 
whose elements will then to be used to re-examine the models of sovereignty already 
covered. Out of this exercise of re-examination, further refinements will be made to 
the approach and the elements of which it comprises will be brought together and 
used to illuminate sovereignty’s articulation.
2. For the purpose of analysing the models of sovereignty discussed in previous 
chapters, one of course has to resort to a further model or models with which to make 
sense of them.1 This could for example involve models that concentrate upon man’s 
psychic condition, with a view to explaining the models of sovereignty in the light of 
such needs. It could involve models that seek to root sovereignty in the theocratic 
categories that dominated metaphysical understanding prior to the advent of 
modernity and the enlightenment. One could consider that sovereignty should really 
be explained by reference to theories that seek to explain the nature and development 
of social power by reference to economic development and resultant inequality as 
exemplified by Marx, or by reference to the nature of the development of political 
leadership as an expression of the rationalization of society as explored by Weber or 
by use of the functionalist approach, developed by Durkheim and exemplified by 
Parsons or through structuralist approaches as originally developed by Saussaure and 
expounded in the writings of Foucault, Poulantzas, Levi Strauss and Lacan.2 The 
reality of course is that the relationship both within and between ‘schools’ of theorists 
is complex and contingent upon the criteria applied to determine the configuration of 
such schools. In any event social analysis is probably enriched by not keeping to one 
particular theorist, with the aim of producing a tension and contradiction- free 
account.
1 Underlying this o f course is the inescapable necessity o f the engagement in the process o f ‘world- 
making’ as exploited by Goodman which rests on the proposition that reality cannot be simply 
perceived but must also be conceived (Goodman, N 1978: 6).
2 See Weber’s ‘Types o f Legitimate Domination’ in Weber, M 1978.
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3. All models of sovereignty so far discussed at the risk of sounding trite, centrally 
involve the domain of language. The centrality of language to the construction of 
sovereignty is most obviously captured by Walker’s rather unwieldy definition of 
sovereignty which refers to discursive forms. Beaulac in her paper on Bodin’s 
approach to sovereignty remarks on the role of reality-creation that the word 
‘sovereignty’ possesses, reflecting the more general proposition that words both 
represent and create such reality in the human mind.4 The creative character of the 
word’ sovereign’ or ‘sovereignty’ is reflected in work of authors such as Wemer and 
W ilde5 and Walker6 who consider sovereignty to be a speech act drawing on the 
work of Searle.7 Searle himself while not specifically mentioning sovereignty 
devotes a book to the construction of social reality and claims in essence that 
language, more specifically, performative utterances are central to the creation of 
what he describes as institutional facts.8 More specifically it is the symbolic feature 
of language that in his view is essential for the constitution of institutional facts of 
which a sovereign would be but one.9 To begin to further understand the nature of 
sovereignty and the variation of arrangements associated with it, some of which are 
illuminated in the models so far covered, it is to this symbolic feature of language 
which I will now turn.
4. Searle’s reference to the symbolic content of language is captured by his 
observation that words are capable of representing something beyond themselves.10 
Institutional facts for Searle are partly constituted by language because they contain 
some symbolic element in the form o f ‘words, symbols or other conventional devices 
that mean something or express something or represent or symbolise something
3 Walker considers that sovereignty can be defined as the discursive form  in which a claim concerning 
the existence and character o f  supreme ordering power fo r a particular polity is expressed, which 
supreme ordering power purports to establish and sustain the identity and status o f the particular 
polity qua polity and to provide a continuing source and vehicle o f  ultimate authority fo r the juridical 
order o f that polity. ’ (Walker, N 2003:7).
4 Beaulac, S 2003: 24.
5 Wemer, W and De Wilde J.H 2001: 287.
6 Walker, N 2003: 7.
7 Searle, J 1969.
8 Searle, J 1995 More will be said below about how Searle’s idea o f  institutional facts is relevant to the 
study o f sovereignty in this thesis.
9 Searle J 1995: 60 The theory o f ‘institutional facts’ within legal philosophy has been developed by 
MacCormick, D and Weiberger, O (1986).
10 Searle, J 1995: 60-1.
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beyond themselves ‘in a way that is publicly understandable. ’11 One can immediately 
see the validity of this observation when considering the models just discussed. So 
for example Hobbes’ sovereign is capable of being constituted by an individual whose 
presence is not simply captured by his biological manifestation but by additional 
qualities he is considered to possess which separate him from the rest of the 
community over which he is said to be sovereign. In that sense Searle’s observation 
is encapsulated with regard to sovereignty in the idea that the kings possess two 
bodies. 12 The physical body that is common to both man and king has attributed to it 
the qualities associated with two subjectivities,13 one of which in the case of the 
sovereign is given priority over the other which as a result is suppressed.14 If that is 
the case for men, one immediately has to ask whether the symbolic character of 
language is not more pervasive than is suggested by Searle and that perhaps that it is 
that pervasiveness that needs to be interrogated a little more if one is to grasp hold of 
the role that language plays in the construction of sovereignty.
5. At the level of sociological method one might immediately consider the 
approaches of symbolic interactionalists commencing with Mead and more latterly 
those of Erving Goffman who focussed on symbolic interchange in the process of 
personal interaction.15 At a philosophical level the symbol as a site of the generation 
of meaning, particularly but not exclusively, through linguistic processes, has been 
touched upon and explored by a diverse range of thinkers. The idea of the symbol, as 
being central to the construction of meaning, has its roots in Kantian philosophy and 
its concerns with the processes of cognition. It emerges as a central feature in the 
writings of Cassirer, a neo-Kantian who sought to expand Kant’s critique of reason to 
a critique of culture by considering that the symbolic form features in every form of 
human thought. Other philosophers for whom the symbol was a significant feature 
include Ricouer and Lefort.16 Ricoeur in his earlier works explored the hermaneutics
11 Searle, J. 1995 61.
12 The logical, legal and constitutional consequences raised by the king possessing two bodies is 
exhaustively explored by Kantorowicz, E.H 1997.
13 The social construction o f  subjectivities is a central theme o f Foucault’s work on power. See for 
example Foucault,M 1980: 98.
14 So for example in the case o f George 111, he had to obtain Parliament’s permission to hold some 
land as a man and not as king. (Kantorowicz, E.H. 3).
15 For example in Goffman, 1969.
16 There are numerous others, for example, various American philosophers including Dewey, James 
and Blanchot from the continental tradition.
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1 7of symbols and subsequently widened his hermeneutical approach in his exploration
1 8of the relationship between discourse and action. Lefort primarily a political 
philosopher has sought to explore the political condition prevailing within modem 
society. This investigation has included an exploration of its metaphysical structure 
with reference (inter alia) to its theocratic foundations and the symbolic order that 
characterised pre-modem order and the way this order was profoundly altered in the 
passage to modernity.19
Cassirer
6. Returning to Cassirer, he anchored his philosophy in the Kantian distinction
90between things- in -  themselves and the appearance of things. He considered that 
the ultimate grounding in knowledge lay not in ontology but in epistemology.21 He 
accepted that the construction of reality involved two modes of intuition posed by 
Kant, namely that of space and time and also the twelve categories of understanding. 
However he did not consider that these on their own adequately explained the 
processes involved in enabling man access to the appearances that confronted him in 
the world he occupied since Kant’s categories were static and did not take account of 
functions other than that of pure cognition, to be found in linguistic communication, 
mythico-religious, artistic and scientific perception. Cassirer therefore expanded 
Kant’s critique of reason to include a critique of culture which he regarded as 
embracing the aforementioned domains of human activity. All such functions, 
although different in character, including that of cognition were expressed for Cassirer 
through the agency of the symbolic form.
7. For Cassirer, the process of making sense of the world, that is to say, the process of 
giving it meaning, involved an original formative power which gives rise to a 
particular ideational content. All mental activity, whether it simply concerns 
cognition, or art or religion or myth gives rise to image worlds which do not merely 
reflect the empirically given but ‘rather produce it in accordance with an independent
17 For example in Ricoeur, P 1960.
18 Ihde, D 1971.
19 For example as explored in Lefort, C 1986.
20 That is to say the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds.
21 Crowell, S.G 1999:185.
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9 9principle.’ For Cassirer, the relationship between the human mind and life’s 
experiences was a dynamic one in which each impacted upon the other, the 
relationship between them being expressed through a functional bond that is inherent 
in the symbol which embraces humanly created universal meanings constructed 
through its experience of life. The centrality of the symbol in the processes, whereby 
man makes sense of the world he inhabits, is reflected in his classification of man as 
animal symbolicum which is a transformation of Aristotle’s description of man as an 
animate rationale,23 Thus unlike other animals, human existence does not simply 
involve the physical world but also a symbolic world. This means that reality is not 
confronted directly but can only be apprehended through the process of symbolisation 
and resultant symbolic forms which take on a variety of structures and constitute for 
Cassirer, the medium of all forms of thought and culture.24 The consequences of this 
for Cassirer is that our understanding of our experiences of the world involves a 
creative process whereby the representational process involves a constitutive one.25 
From the perspective of a person’s experience of the empirical world, language as one 
of these symbolic forms is therefore central to the conceptualisation process itself and 
without it no sense can be made of the chaotic sense data continually received by 
human beings.26 As Habermas suggests, the constitutive role of language means that
22 Cassirer, E 1953: 78.
23 Cassirer, E 1946a: 25.
24 Bayer, T 2001:18. This need for Man to take refuge behind the shelter of symbolic forms is required 
to enable him to tolerate and make sense o f the world and therefore to avoid, what Blumenberg referred 
to, as the absolutism o f reality, that is a situation in which man comes close to not having control o f the 
conditions o f his existence and subjectively senses that he does not have control o f them. See 
Blumenberg, H 1995: ix, 4-5. The indirect relationship between mind and reality is alluded to by 
Habermas in his evaluation o f Cassirer’s symbolic forms when he states that ‘ [m]ind only makes 
contact with its environment in a mediated way’ (Habermas, J 2001:24). A particularly forceful 
account o f the disconnection between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds and the nature o f claims to 
representation and the truth is given by Nietzsche. In his writings, one can see reference to what he 
considers to be the pervasively metaphorical character o f  language. See for example Nietzsche, F 
1873: 87-99.
25 Different symbolic forms contribute to the construction o f meaning in different ways. So for 
example, myth gives rise to the expressive function embedded in meaning where the signifier is taken 
to be the signified. Language gives rise to representational function embedded in meaning where a 
separation between signifier and signified is appreciated so that the signifier is perceived to exist 
independently o f the signified and hence the former is considered to stand for the latter. Lastly there is 
significative function whereby the signified is in effect suspended and the significance o f the signifier 
is determined by its position in a chain o f signifiers. This corresponds to the symbolism associated 
with scientific and theoretical thought (Cassirer, E 1953: 76-78; Cassirer, E 1957:92; Bayer, T.I, 2000: 
18-19; Lofts, S.G 2000: 57-58.
26 The conceptualisation allowed by the function o f the symbol is therefore disclosive in character 
(Habermas, J 2001: 16).
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9 7its structure ‘embraces both the internal and the external.’ The cognitive 
stabilisation of the world is enabled through the adoption of universal meanings which 
are fuelled by the immediate particularity of life. Making sense of life-experiences 
involves the universal being perceived by reference to the particular and the latter
98 •being given meaning by reference to the former. The idea of the universal present 
in the meaning attributed to a particular experience suggests that there is present a 
sense of other possible experiences which could be expressed using the same 
language. So when one identifies particular sense data experienced visually as 
constituting ‘a leaf, implicit in that identification by virtue of the application of a 
universal idea of a leaf is the possibility of other sense data which could be captured 
by the idea conveyed by the word ‘leaf which is not present but could become so. 
This sense of possibility which is not simply triggered by the actual appearance of a 
leaf but which is capable of being present when its actual appearance is no longer, is a 
manifestation of the power of language to allow for the conceptualisation of what 
Habermas terms ‘a world of possible states of affairs.’ Possibilities which may 
amount to potentialities therefore tie into the idea of language as a symbolic form 
whose elements comprise the particular and universal. These possibilities whether or 
not potentialities are characterised by an absence in terms of actuality as measured
29against the requirement of immanence and hence possess a transcendent quality.
The conceptualising of possibilities means that anticipation30 is capable of being 
experienced and hence futuricity. This idea of anticipation is captured by Blumenthal
27 Habermas J 2001: 14. He too refers to the creative power o f symbolic forms by referring to their 
‘form-giving power which transforms sense impressions into meaningful structures (Habermas, J 2001: 
24).
28 Cassirer, E: 1953: 86.
29 The term ‘transcendent quality’ is used as opposed to ‘transcendence’ as it exists within experience 
rather than being unbounded by it and amounting to a ‘pure alterity’. The idea o f transcendence is 
problematic. See for example Schultzer, B 1935 for an exploration o f its difficulties. Kant considered 
that it was possible to think about transcendent objects despite the fact that we have no sensible 
experience o f them because in Kant’s view his categories, necessary for the construction of thought, are 
applicable to them (Gardner, S 1999: 200). Others argue that a transcendent ‘object’ is in fact 
unknowable since its very essence as something knowable suggests a relationship between man and the 
object represented. Hence Derrida for example suggests that knowable transcendence is more 
accurately described as quasi-transcendence. See Ward, G 2004: 129. The transcendent quality 
referred to above, is more modest in character and is posited simply to suggest that the idea of the 
symbol and its universal component suggests a degree o f detachment from the individual particularities 
that may have provoked and fed the universal. The transcendent quality associated with the idea o f the 
universal in the realm o f language will be seen below to be joined by the transcendence o f mythic 
symbolism to provide an important aspect o f  the state o f sovereignty. See below in this chapter.
30 Cassirer, E 1944: 54.
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in his account of the absolutism of reality.31 Hence the development of the symbolic 
form and particularly language is vital to the conceptualisation of time.32
8. The development of language as a symbolic form allows for the overcoming of 
chaos experienced as a result of the unending momentary impressions that emerge in 
man’s experiences. This is achieved through the attribution of meaning which allows 
for the structuring for this chaos and hence its abatement by the introduction of 
stabilised difference and so ensuring the expression of sameness. This is not to say 
that within ‘sameness’ there is no difference and that in ‘difference’ there is no 
‘sameness’. In each there is the presence of the other since in the very construction of 
sameness, differences are suppressed in the act of making sense of the world.34 
Hence the boundary between sameness and difference is capable of shifting so that 
words associated with particular ideas, whether associated with physical objects or 
social phenomena, are capable of changing their meaning and new words are capable 
of emerging to take account of such reconfiguration that may involve changing 
degrees of specification. Paradoxically therefore, it at least appears that the 
fundamental liberation achieved at least in part by language35 is threatened by
31 This idea o f possible states o f  affairs amounting to potentialities is also captured in Blumenberg’s 
account o f the absolutism o f reality which is provoked by the situational leap from enclosed forest to 
open plains which rendered the ‘unoccupied distant horizon into the ongoing expectation o f hitherto 
unknown things (Blumenberg, H 1985: 4). This involved the development o f anticipation and 
preparation o f what is ‘absent, beyond the horizon’ and to negotiate this profound, unsettling and 
unfocussed anxiety, language becomes central to the construction through stories of the familiar and 
identifiable. In this way calculable risks are identified which can provoke routinised ways to ensure 
avoidance (Blumenberg, 1985: 6). This does not quite capture Cassirer’s assertion that the symbolic 
forms including language develop in response to the chaotic character o f reality as actuality present and 
experienced by individuals.
32 Cassirer, E 1953: 286. He alludes to the development o f  anticipation denoted by the development o f  
the cry in response to fear or pain which he considers is not the mere reflex following instantly from a 
sense impression, but is rather the expression o f a definite and conscious intent. For now consciousness 
no longer stands in the sign o f  mere reproduction but enters the sphere of anticipation. ‘Accordingly 
the sound no longer merely accompanies a present state o f feeling and excitement, but itself acts as a 
factor intervening in a process’ (Cassirer, E 1953:286).
33 Cassirer, E 1961: 60. Meaning as Cassirer puts it ‘constitutes something repeatable and recurring, 
something which is not limited to the bare here-and-now but which comes to be meant and understood 
as one-and-the-same in countless life-moments and in the appropriation and use o f countless other 
persons’ (Cassirer, E 1961:60).
34 Interestingly this is starkly captured in Nietzsche’s comment about the nature o f ideas when he 
states that ‘ [e]very word .. .becomes an idea when, rather than serving as a sort o f reminder o f the 
unique, entirely individualised first experience to which it owes its origin, it simultaneously must fit 
innumerable, more or less similar (which really means never equal and, therefore, altogether unequal) 
cases. Every idea originates through equating the unequal’ (Nietzsche, F 1873: 91).
35 From Cassirer’s perspective the other symbolic forms already mentioned also contribute to 
stabilising the world as humanely experienced and reference will be made below to the mythico- 
religious form in particular.
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potentially endless shifts and reorganisations of the conceptual landscape leading to 
the very chaos that it seemed capable of averting.
Myth
9. Although Cassirer was not prepared to give priority to any of his symbolic forms, 
language pervades the other forms including that of myth through which it is 
expressed. Many of the separations of sensory experiences through language were 
initially accompanied by the expression of what Cassirer regarded as mythical life, 
which for early man enabled him to make sense of life experiences. It was the 
initial domain of existential meaning and begins to arise at a point where, while man 
is decreasingly grounded in the world by instinctual behavioural patterns, he has not 
yet managed to compensate for this weakening through the stabilisation achieved 
through the separation of representations from what they represent, a separation which 
is embedded in the differentiation between the particular and universal which 
language ultimately provides. The fusion between image and thing means that every 
appearance is an incarnation in its own right.37 Without the separation between 
representation and the represented, in the early stages of mythic thought, the lines of 
differentiation between phenomena are constantly shifting. Familiar impressions of 
the ‘homelike, familiar and sheltering can shift into their opposite, the inaccessible, 
terrifying, monstrous and gruesome.’38 The development of mythical thought is 
characterised by a process of increasing stabilisation of man’s perception of the 
world. Manifested in this process is a series of separations that occur through the 
vehicle of language. Initially there is no separation between man and the outer world. 
The endless flux of sensory input gives an experience of the world as alive where 
there is no differentiation as yet between man’s interior and external worlds. 
Stabilisation is achieved through a distanciation of man from the immediacy of the 
world. It involves a process of unremitting extemalisation whereby the original
36 This term ‘life’ is used by Cassirer to denote that myth did not comprise simply o f images and 
representations but for Cassirer ‘ consisted much more in actions’ that is to say a form o f social 
practice characterised by rituals and which invested every facet o f life with a system o f taboos 
(Cassirer, E 1944: 79, 104-108). Again, linking this to the observations above o f Blumenberg, one can 
see the role o f  taboos in the formulation o f calculable risks and the strategies to avoid them.
37 Cassirer, E 1957: 88.
38 Cassirer, E 1957: 90.
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expressive character of the outer world takes on an increasingly stable objective 
form.39
Language
10. Myth is intimately linked to the development of language. There are three stages 
in its development, namely the ‘mimetic’, ‘analogical’ and ‘truly symbolic’.40 At the 
mimetic stage, sound is used to attempt to ‘reproduce’ the sensory impression it seeks 
to represent and therefore it is characterised by onomatopoeic expressions. There is 
as yet no universalisation embedded in language as there has not yet been a separation 
between sign and thing. Each utterance is a response to the particularities of the 
particular experience to which it is a response.41 The relation between sign and 
experience undergoes a change in the analogical phase whereby the reduplication of 
sounds develops to reflect the repetition of experiences. 42 Finally, language moves 
from what has been a designatory function to one of universal signification. In this 
mode, any appearance of similarity between it and the world of immediate perception 
has disappeared.43
11. The process of stabilisation and objectification involves an increasing sense that 
the world exists independently of the individual and in this process the concept of ‘I’ 
emerges separated from ‘thou’ and the construction of objects in response to sensory 
experiences now occurs through the agency of symbolisation. ‘Things’ are created by 
bringing together a series of elements whose ‘existence’ is the product of the 
imposition of a series of dividing lines upon the influx of sensory data. As part of this 
process, according to Cassirer, language enables the grasping of the basic intuitions of 
space, time and number and therefore creates ‘the indispensable condition for all 
intellectual mastery of phenomena... .,44
39 Cassirer, E 1955: 204; Cassirer, E 1957: 84.
40 Cassirer, E 1953: 190.
41 This is revealingly referred to by Cassirer as ‘sound painting’ (Cassirer, E 1953: 190).
42 Cassirer, E 1953: 194. ‘The phonetic repetition conforms closely to a repetition given in the 
sensuous reality or impression’ (Cassirer, E 1953: 195).
43 Cassirer, E 1957:451.
44 Cassirer, E 1953: 226.
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12. Part of the stabilisation process accompanying the relationship between man’s 
actions and the world he acts upon, is its mediation via the emergence of gods through 
which action is deified.45 These gods, initially, very transitory in character,46 stabilise 
into more permanent personal gods and in turn out of these images emerges a creator 
god.47 ‘In him all the diversity of action seems, as it were, concentrated in a single 
summit... \ 48 The very emergence of gods which are increasingly anthropomorphic in 
character and the divine ‘I’ feeds into the growth of man’s self. Language remains 
central to this process of differentiation and the increasing and diversely expressed 
process of permanency. For Cassirer, it provides the anchor around which forms 
man’s conceptualisations of his life experiences. 49 Through language religion 
emerges out of myth although always remaining attached to it. In religion there 
comes to be the separation of meaning from existence. In mythic rituals, the imagery 
used in such practices is experienced as the magic reality embodying the sacred itself. 
In ritualistic practice, the expressive behaviour adopted by its participants does not 
simply comprise images of the gods being referred to but are in fact the gods 
themselves. There is no representation as such and there is nothing that is being 
‘thought... [or]. . . ’supposed’ that is not at the same time real and effective.’50 
Separation between image and meaning accompanies the conceptual separation of the 
particular from the universal. Image no longer fuses with determinate meaning but 
can only point to it and remains inadequate to it.51
45 This, using the language of Berger and Luckmann, contributes towards the process o f  socialisation 
whereby human activity is habitualized. This ensures the narrowing o f choice and the production o f  
stability to avoid the ever present threat o f  chaos which arises as a result o f man’s underdeveloped 
instinctual organisation (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 66-71).This underdevelopment is also implied 
by Cassirer who, referring to a remark made by Uexkull, says that Tower animals.. .are so completely 
adapted to their environment that each rests as peacefully and serenely in this environment as an infant 
in its crib. But this undisturbed serenity comes to an end as soon as we enter the human sphere.’ 
(Cassirer, E 1961: 77).
46 Cassirer refers to the transition described by Usener from that o f momentary gods to continuing 
personal gods and cites the transition to the emerging corporeality o f such gods that is crucial to the 
emergence o f  man’s conception o f himself as a continuing ‘I’ (Cassirer, E 1946a:33).
47 Cassirer, E 1955: 206.
48 Cassirer, E 1955: 206. This attribution o f  diverse experiences to one single source will be seen to 
form a very important ingredient of sovereignty.
49 The place o f  language will be returned below as it will be my contention that one o f Cassirer’s 
weaknesses is his underdevelopment o f the social domain within which language occurs and the 
centrality o f  social practice to the anchoring o f  man’s experiences which is not simply limited to the 
role o f language, albeit one that remains very important.
50 Cassirer, E 1955: 238.
51 Cassirer, E 1955: 239.
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Religion
13. Within religion’s fabric there is contained answers to the cosmological question 
of the world and also the anthropological one that concerns the origin of human 
society and the duties and obligations that arise from it. Religion like myth is based 
on the idea that there is a common bond between man and nature. Both are 
expressions of the unity and fundamental identity of life. The mythic perception 
that the whole dwells in each part remains. However as a result of various separations 
that occur, there is now scope for the development of the experience of individuality 
marked by the rise of T  that accompanies the emergence of the Divine-Other. 
Reflecting the inter-relation between the two, the idea of self-responsibility develops 
and the transition from mythos to ethos.54
Science
14. For Cassirer, the most advanced symbolic form was that of science. Science 
which has a wider meaning than that given to it in English refers to any theoretical 
body of knowledge.55 Science is characterised by an intellectual process by which 
empirical observation is explained through a ‘system of well-ordered symbols in order 
to make them coherent and interpretable in terms of scientific concepts.’56 As with 
other symbolic systems that Cassirer developed, it is based on the contention that 
while the drive to understand the world is located in our experiences of it, the 
explanation of the way we make sense of them is located in the domain of 
epistemology and more particularly, for Cassirer, the symbolic forms that pervade that 
domain. Like religion, scientific thought rests on the idea that ‘everything objective’ 
comes to be seen as mere appearance. The perception of things is considered to be an 
expression of a more profound reality. Just as religion is unable to completely detach
52 Cassirer, E 1944: 94.
53 Cassirer, E 1946b: 371.
54 Cassirer, E 1955: 168. The separations referred to, lead to the emergence o f T ,  to primitive 
conceptions of the objective world and to the beyond where the Divine-other is taken to be located.
55 Lofts, S.G2000: 161
56 Lofts, S.G 2000:167.
114/267
itself from myth, just as language is unable to break away from the intuitive givenness 
of perception,57 science is unable to completely detach itself from verbal language. 
Science as with the other symbolic forms enables man to stabilise his experience and 
perception of the world.58 That world’s contours are constructed by man through the 
generation of concepts which make sense of it and in so doing enters into a 
fundamentally different relationship to reality.59 The primary task of science is to set 
up rules which allow prediction to take place in terms of what occurs in the intuitive 
sphere60 and therefore ultimately the validity of scientific concepts are rooted in that 
sphere. While language, in its role of stabilising our experience of the world, begins 
the process of conceptualising the fluctuating input of sensory data through the 
agency of representation, the representation remains in profound contact with the 
sensory input that gives rise to it, thus giving to language a fluidity whereby it adapts 
to lived perception in ways that are primarily determined by the language structure of 
which the representations form part.61 That structure is such that it is constantly 
developing as each linguistic concept ‘establishes a definite centre [sic] and focus in 
which the rays from the various spheres of intuitive being come together and 
permeate one another.’62 It is constantly developing in a chaotic and reactive way, 
which provides it with its dynamism and strength. Yet this strength is also a 
weakness, from the perspective of scientific concept formation, since the latter 
‘demands stability and unambiguousness.’63 Scientific discourse derived from the 
flux of intuitive experience seeks to construct a view of the world in which the 
personal is eliminated as far as possible in its quest to establish a system of inter- 
subjectively and universally valid statements64 whereas the development of language 
is one that is place, time and culture bound where inter-subjective understanding is far 
more tenuous. The free play of meaning, which gives words their power and
57 Lofts, S.G: 2000: 167.
58 Cassirer, E 1957: 407.
59 Cassirer, E 1957: 282.
60 Cassirer, E 1957: 282.
61 The point here is that for Cassirer language emerges from a given speaker and therefore always 
reflects the perception o f a particular speaker who experiences the world as a ‘thing-world and a 
person-world.’ (Cassirer E 1960:93). These two aspects are in constant tension with one another and 
the extent to which each is expressed varies. For example in the mythical view o f the world, it is 
person-world which Cassirer describes as ‘expression-perception’ that dominates while in scientific 
discourse the thing-world dominates.(Cassirer, E 1960: 95)
62 Cassirer, E 1957:336; Cassirer, E 1944: 207.
63 Cassirer, E 1957: 336.
64 Cassirer, E 1960: 96.
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language its strength, in the domain of scientific discourse, must be abolished.65 The 
meaning of concepts needs to be constant and have stable relationships with others.66 
Yet of course language remains central to the pursuit of scientific discovery that 
exploits language in its stage of full maturation which occurs when it becomes ‘purely
f\1symbolic expression.’
The Value of Cassirer’s Writings for the Understanding o f Sovereignty
15. It is worthwhile pausing here to assess the potential value of Cassirer’s 
observations about man’s relation to his environment and the role of symbolic forms 
in enabling him to make sense of that environment, in understanding the nature of 
sovereignty and more specifically the models of sovereignty so far considered. In 
contrast to other animals, man’s subjective experience of his environment is not 
firmly structured by his own instinctual organisation. He is ‘world open’ in the sense 
that he can draw upon and react to what he perceives to be his environment in a
/TO
multitude of ways that are only weakly determined by his biological propensities.
The result of this is man’s potential state of acute ontological insecurity, suggested by 
his exposure to the chaotic flux of life from which he cannot be shielded by innate 
instinctual propensities. For Cassirer, the central mechanism by which this is 
achieved is through the mediation of reality through the agency of the symbolic form 
which cognitively provides for points of unity around which meaning can be 
constructed, hence allowing for the amelioration of the threat of chaos. These points 
of unity or stability come in a variety of forms, the most relevant for our purposes 
being those of mythico-religious and language. The former provides forms of 
explanation through which man can make sense of his life experiences and have a 
sense of control over what is otherwise potentially at least the profound senselessness 
and unpredictability of life. Such explanations predicated around gods provide 
explanations which are structured and flow from the point of unity or unities 
expressed by them. The evocation of the actuality of gods through ritual experience 
either directly within the mythic domain or in a representational sense as religious
65 Cassirer, E 1957: 337.
66 ‘The particular concepts strive towards a community o f concepts’ which must relate to one another in 
accordance with identifiable principles (Cassirer, E 1957: 337).
67 Cassirer, E 1957:451.
68 Berger, P and Luckmann, T 1966: 65-66.
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experience develops provide points of unity to which can be attributed the diverse 
flux of life. That attribution not only occurs through the agency of the imagery 
associated with the mythic but also language. Language of course also supplies the 
cognitive stabilisation required by man through the agency of comparatively fixed 
meaning which is a pervasive symbolic form through which man’s ability to interact 
and make sense of his environment is facilitated. One can immediately see here that 
the institutional manifestation of sovereignty and the language through which it is 
expressed provides a point of unity to which the flux of life can be attributed and 
through which it can be explained and ordered. At the same time, this point of unity 
as constituted by sovereignty, seen as an incident of language, provides a site of 
contestation with regard to its properties, roles and location. These play themselves 
out, inter alia, in the ongoing debate about sovereignty’s character of which the 
models discussed in this thesis are manifestations.
16. However, the value of Cassirer in understanding the nature of sovereignty goes 
beyond the above and points to the process of transcendencing the flux of life which 
leads to the possibility of conceptualising social institutions including that of 
sovereign hence the avoidance of existential chaos which drives the development of 
the symbolic forms. Such transcendence manifests itself in two variants that are 
implicitly suggested by Cassirer’s symbolic forms. These are what can be called 
transcendence inside time or common place transcendence suggested by language, art 
and science on the one hand and metaphysical transcendence on the other suggested 
most obviously by the mythico-religious symbolic forms. These forms of 
transcendence are both relevant to operation of sovereignty and will now be explored.
Transcendence inside time - a commonplace transcendence
17. Despite the difficulties associated with the idea of transcendence, it constitutes an 
important ingredient to understanding sovereignty. The need to avoid chaos, which is 
at the centre of Cassirer’s framework, can also be seen expressed in the writings of 
other philosophers and reference will now be made in particular to those of Deleuze 
and Guattari whose explorations of chaos provide a useful supplement to Cassirer’s 
approach. Chaos for Deleuze and Guattari was present in the physicality of the world 
but potentially also in thought. For them, the problem of philosophy was ‘to acquire a
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consistency without loosing the infinite into which thought plunges.’69 Their 
description of chaos is more explicit than that of Cassirer. It comprises an infinitely 
variable flux manifested by ‘all possible forms which spring up only to disappear 
immediately, without consistency or references’.70 Hence chaos for Deleuze and 
Guattari is the enemy of thought and the activities of philosophy, science, literature 
and arts, echoing Cassirer, are ways of keeping such chaos at bay.71 Immanence itself 
is therefore conceived as a plane through which chaos is filtered and provides the 
fixity that chaos lacks. As a result the idea of immanence possesses the quality of 
transcendence which is unavoidable. It is the product and enabler of everyday human 
activity and in our everyday existence we are unaware of it as it does not present itself 
to us from an embedded perspective as a ‘transcendent’ experience. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, ‘thought cannot stop itself from interpreting immanence as immanence to 
something... [a]nd if this cannot be avoided it is because it seems that each plane of 
immanence can only claim to be unique, to the plane, by reconstituting the chaos it 
had to ward off: the choice is between transcendence and chaos.’72 The 
unavoidability of transcendence however does not suggest that this quality is 
manifested in its absolute pure form as the chaotic constantly impacts upon what is 
separated and identified in its immanent existence. Logically, the purity of such 
transcendence is captured by Derrida’s claim that it can only be defined negatively 
captured by the formulation as being ‘neither x or not x’.73
69 Deleuze, G and Guattari, F 1994: 42.
70 Deleuze, G and Guattari, F 1994: 118.
71 Deleuze, G and Guattari, F 1994: 202. A list which has more than a passing resemblance to 
Cassirer’s symbolic forms. The sense o f transcending such flux is also captured by the Heideggarian 
term ek-stase used for example by Merleau-Ponty. (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 81).
72 Deleuze, G and Guattari, F 1994: 51.
73 Smith, D.W 2003: 54. This approach is displayed in Derrida’s analysis o f  difference when he 
claims that it is ‘neither this or that, neither sensible nor intelligible, neither positive or negative, 
neither superior or inferior, neither active or passive, neither present or absent, not even neutral, not 
even subject to dialectic with a third moment, without any possible sublation (.Aufhebung)' (Derrida, J 
1992:72 as quoted in Smith, D.W 2003: 54). Deleuze did not accept that God was transcendent unlike 
other beings as he adhered to the univocity o f being as originally formulated by Duns Scotus so there 
was no difference ultimately between God’s being and man’s being in that they all existed in a plane o f  
immanence (Smith, D.W 2003: 55). He does not therefore appear to reject the transcendent quality 
captured by Derrida’s formula simply because it existed in a plane o f immanence but considered that 
characterising God in this way lacks ontological credibility. For my purposes I will not be basing my 
comments on his ontological framework in so far as it characterised God as an immanent being. 
However his comments about how immanent qualities themselves involve a synthesis that gives to the 
idea o f immanence a transcendent quality will be used.
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18. Considering sovereignty and more generally government with which law is 
associated, the idea of it also involves a form of transcendence as will be seen in the 
re-examination of the models particularly when considering the question of 
attribution.74 One will be able to see that each involves the presentation of a stream 
of a variety of decisions and activities of a legislative, judicial and executive 
character, embodied in a variety of practices which may be associated with particular 
individuals or collectives of such individuals through whom such activities occur, 
against the setting of normative requirements, which are implicated in the production
n c
and reproduction of the institution. One will see that there is a sense that the
totality of the institution exists in the moments of its manifestations of which the 
embedded individual is aware and evaluations of such moments can occur against the 
context of previous manifestations which in the subjective experience of passed time 
can become sedimented into a general impression which can form property- like 
qualities. As a consequence, fresh decisions are not only capable of providing the 
structural continuity of the institution’s manifestation but also are capable of 
disrupting such continuity.77 That is to say, such decisions have the potential to 
disrupt the embeddedness of some or all of the institutions associated with 
sovereignty within the society over which they claim jurisdiction.78
74 See for example chapter 8 paras 32-40..
75 Giddens, A 1984: 23-25. Such requirements are captured by MacCormick’s institutional rules, 
namely institutive, consequential and terminative rules (MacCormick, N 1986:52-53).
76 The equation o f  a totality to its manifestations which suggests both presences and absences is 
explored by Giddens by reference to Marx and Althusser. (Giddens, A 1979: 160). The idea of  
reification is posed here.
77 The different awarenesses o f individuals contributes towards a diverse range o f impressions o f the 
nature of institutions. The embedded judge is likely to have a markedly different awareness o f the 
nature o f such institutions from the taxi-driver.
78 This could be seen to be playing itself out in Pakistan prior to the recent parliamentary election in the 
early part o f 2008, with the executive branch o f government in the form o f Musharraf declaring a state 
o f emergency in what in effect amounted to an unconstitutional introduction o f marshal law, 
suspending the constitution without lawful authority and suspending the members o f the supreme and 
other courts. He was being increasingly confronted by a section o f the population who were opposed 
to these actions together with his insistence on holding parliamentary elections while the ‘state of 
emergency’ was still in place. Yet at the same time, the population or at least vociferous parts o f it 
including the lawyers continued to hope for judicial resolution o f existing disagreements with 
Musharraf. One can therefore see that from a Schmittian point o f view, Musharraf s position was 
capable o f being that o f commissarial or sovereign dictator, depending on how one assesses the 
constitutionality o f the ‘declaration o f emergency’ as he sought to claim that his suspension o f  civil 
liberties was necessary to preserve the state in the face o f extremist violence. Yet at the same time, this 
was a position that was contested by significant parts o f the population who would have liked him to 
relinquish power and in that sense again, from a Schmittian perspective, they contested his sovereign 
position {The Economist, November 10th 2007).
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Transcendence outside o f time - a metaphysical transcendence
19. In Cassirerian terms, the generality of its existence is fed by the particularities of 
its decisions, which spread across time. Conceptualising the experience of the 
existence of institutions involves transcending these particularities and perceiving the 
institution as existing through time with property-like forms that amounts to a form of 
reification. The properties attributed to such institutions are expressed as thing-like, 
consistent with possessing the same facticity as that presumed in the domain of 
nature. Here one can see, that such reification fits in with the underlying existential 
need to construct points of unity or solidity to provide experience with a sense of 
order, without which the sense of profound chaos would embrace the individual. 
Referring to the institutions associated with sovereignty, for example Hobbes’ 
sovereign, its characteristics associated with its supremacy can be experienced as 
fixed, and fact-like and natural which is bom out of experience and the quality of 
language itself with its capacity, subjectively speaking, to fix and to conceal the
7Qmutability of such qualities by its very function of revealing.
20. The idea of transcendence in the above sense is engaged irrespective of the type 
of institutional expression of sovereignty. Commonplace transcendence is the 
product of existence which to be meaningful has to pull itself out of the chaotic flux 
of which it is part both internally and externally. But moving back to Cassirer’s idea 
about the need for ontological security requiring an overcoming of chaos, this requires 
the positing of fixed sources outside time that can provide seemingly unchanging 
points of fixity and reference that man experiences as ultimately outside his control 
and thus provide what are considered to be fundamentally grounded anchors and
79 One can ‘reveal’ the apparent illusion o f  an institution’s fixity by alleging that social institutions 
including those associated with sovereignty are relational in character. Hence the idea espoused that 
sovereignty is the expression o f the relationship between constituent and constituted power as 
promoted by Agamben and Loughlin for example. This does help to overcome the seeming fixities 
associated with conceptualising sovereignty in terms o f particular institutions whether embodied by an 
individual or otherwise. Yet in so doing and adopting what from a Cassirerian point o f view is an 
expression o f  scientific symbolism that is abstract in character leads to a moving away from the 
embedded experiences o f institutions by institutions as loci o f fixity. Hence one produces an 
impoverished view o f sovereignty.
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sources of explanation for such experiences.80 To repeat, with regard to the creator 
god, ‘in him all the diversity of action seems, as it were, concentrated in a singly 
summit.. . ,81 This is captured by Lefort’s claim that religion is characterised by a 
simultaneous concrete presence existing in time and space and another presence 
whose relationship to time and space is far more tenuous. This is expressed in his 
statement that in the metaphysics of human organisation, ‘human society can only 
open itself to itself by being held in an opening it did not create. Humanity ‘ naively
83invents a time that exists before time [and] organises a space beyond their space.’
21. The manifestation of such transcendence within the context of governance has 
come in the form of the divine and the quasi-divine. The pre-modem and early 
modem era saw the centrality of the idea of God to the explanation and the ultimate 
source of the manifestation of law. In terms of pre-modem models of governance, 
one can see this most clearly in the model of Augustinus Triumphus where there is no 
distinction between spiritual and temporal governance. However even where there is 
such a separation, for example in the model of governance proposed by Dante, it 
remains the case that in the final analysis the requirements of God’s laws trump those 
of the emperor in the event of clash. Moving on to the early modem era, the 
centrality of God continues with Bodin’s sovereignty with the existence of the latter 
explained as the outcome of action by the former;84 with his laws being circumscribed 
and limited by the requirement of higher law and with the sovereign prince being 
conceived as the image of God.85 The hold of the idea of God upon sovereignty had 
not yet been completely detached and indeed one can detect a hierarchy of being 
reminiscent of the Chain of Being demonstrated in Triumphus’ model, stretching 
from God through the sovereign to the population under the latter’s jurisdiction.
80 Cassirer, E 1955: 206.
81 Csssirer, E 1955: 206.
82 Lefort, C 1988: 222-223.
83 Lefort, C 1988: 223. The term ‘invent’ from an embedded perspective does not fully capture the 
complexity of the situation as the power o f the time before time is that it is experienced as an existence 
and not an invention.
84 Bodin, J 1992: 46.
85 Bodin, J 1992:39. The intimate connection between Bodin’s sovereignty and God is captured by 
Bartelson’s observation ‘that sovereignty is necessary in order for the state to fulfil its this worldly 
purpose, but within a divinely ordained universe . . . ’ (Bartelson, J 1995: 141).
86 The idea o f the ‘Great Chain o f Being’ is explored by Lovejoy. See chapter 8 below at para 1. This 
is expressed by Bodin’s reference to God as the ‘great’ sovereign and proclaims that ‘[j]ust as God, the 
great sovereign, cannot make a God equal to Himself because he is infinite and by logical 
necessity...two infinites cannot exist, so we can say that the prince, whom we have taken as the image
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However even with the onset of modernity, even with the increasing relocation of the 
spiritual to the domain of the private, the idea of a transcendent all powerful God or 
gods at least initially remains important to the operation of sovereignty so that in the 
case of Hobbes, his model embraces attempts by him to ensure that it is the sovereign
87himself who will possess such characteristics. And in later models of governance 
the idea of God or gods remain important as supplementary devices with which to 
ensure the acquiescence of populations to the modes of governance which are
increasingly constructed around the idea of a transcendent ‘people’. This can be
88seen for example in the writings of Locke, Rousseau and Kant. The emergence of 
‘the people’ as the central focus of sovereignty embodied in the idea of the ‘nation’ 
and constitutionality which was accompanied by the residualisation of the idea of God 
was reflected in the language of constituent and constituted power associated with the 
writings of Sieyes. The nation as constituent power was ‘prior to everything and the 
source of everything’, its will always being legal, and ‘is the law itself from which 
government arises as the nation’s representatives whose powers are circumscribed by 
laws.89 This provides an example of a transcendent entity existing outside time and 
reflects Lefort’s propositions above mentioned.90
22. As both types of transcendence contribute towards human ontological security, 
they also contribute towards an explanation of the power of the idea of sovereignty 
and its association with a particular governmental arrangement. One can see for
of God, cannot make a subject equal to himself without the annihilation o f his power. (Bodin, J 1992:
5).
87 The quasi-divine quality, associated with the sovereign position, similar to that manifested in 
Hobbes’ sovereign, is reflected in the iconography o f  rulership including the portraiture o f monarchs 
and other heads o f state. Of such portraits, taking the period for example from 1750-1820, the most 
important contribution to a ruler’s imagery was the one created upon the ruler’s assumption of power. 
The task o f the artist was to ensure that the image projected a personification o f  rulership in which the 
figure is perceived as an incarnation o f the country over which rulership was exercised. Reflecting 
this, compositional formula were transferred from one political context to another so that aspects of  
Washington’s image appears in the portrait o f  Napoleon and o f George IV (Lloyd, C 2007:60-61).
88 In the case o f Rousseau ensuring obedience to laws, ‘has in all ages, compelled the fathers of nations 
to have recourse to divine intervention and credit the gods with their own wisdom in order that the 
peoples, submitting to the laws o f the State as to those o f nature, might obey freely and bear with 
docility o f the yoke o f public happiness’ (Rousseau, J 1993: 216). Kant in a similar vein claims that 
‘[a] law which is so sacred.. .that it is practically a crime even to cast doubt upon it and thus to suspend 
its effectiveness for even an instant, cannot be thought as o f coming from human beings, but from some 
infallible supreme legislator. That is what is meant by the saying that “all authority comes from God”.’ 
(Kant, I 1991: 143).
89 Sieyes, E.J, 1963: 124-126. The nation as existing outside law is, in terms o f the models discussed 
clearly in Schmitt’s narrative.
90 See paragraph 17 above.
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example in the model of sovereignty proposed by Augustinus Triumphus, the 
centrality of an entity that crosses the boundary between common place and 
metaphysical transcendence as the holder of the papal office is a material 
manifestation of a metaphysically transcendent and materially absent God. That 
material manifestation is constituted through the existence of the institution of the 
papal office, which in its diachronic manifestation, is the product of the exercise of 
common place transcendence of the stream of decision-making attributed to it. The 
holder of the papal office, as a manifestation of an entity that exists outside time, is 
both fed by and feeds his institutional existence which is the product of common 
place transcendence. In relation to Hobbes, the distanciation of God in his model to 
the original mover and the absorption of the spiritual by the temporal means that the 
quasi-divine quality of his sovereign, from Hobbes’ perspective, rests with the 
presentation of its immanent form, that is to say it is ultimately the outcome of the 
particularities of commonplace transcendence as applied to the construction of the 
sovereign entity.91 From Hobbes’ perspective the loss of quasi-divine status is likely 
to lead to the destruction of the holder’s sovereign status as obedience to him is 
undermined. As a result the institutional presence of Hobbes’ sovereign is centrally 
dependent on the mimicry of metaphysically transcendent attributes that are in his 
model created out of the process of commonplace transcendence.92 Austin’s model 
of sovereignty on the other hand is silent as to the reasons for habitual obedience by 
the bulk of the population and hence does not exclude the possibility of the sovereign 
exhibiting metaphysically transcendent qualities which provide an inducement to such 
obedience. As will be seen with Schmitt’s sovereign, particularly in its more radical 
variant, namely that pertaining to sovereign dictatorship, his position may well be 
dependent upon his capacity to become the sole expressor of the peoples’ will which
Q->
might be achieved through personal charisma or even as the charisma of office.
91 This process is explored further in Chapter 8 below. See in particular paragraph 31. What in essence 
is sought is a simulation o f metaphysical transcendence so that from the perspective of the embedded 
subject the experience o f  the sovereign is as though he is metaphysically transcendent.
92 This ties in with Schmitt’s observation that Hobbes’ Leviathan is variously depicted ‘god, man, 
animal and machine’ (Schmitt, C 1996: 19-20). .See Chapter 8 below and paragraph 33. What one sees 
here are both features o f the purely mythic from a Cassirerian point o f  view in a depiction that is 
unstable in form and ‘mutates’ from one recognisable form to another and the religious in the 
emergence o f the stabilised form o f the god.
93 Weber referred to the routinization o f charisma being expressed in the form o f the charisma o f office 
(Weber, M 1978: 246-254).
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23. In the context of sovereignty, both commonplace and metaphysical transcendence 
point to the necessity to establish causal closure, namely that the cause of society’s 
normative structure derives from the sovereignty entity so preventing infinite 
regress.94 The resort to the idea of God for example by Leibniz leads the way out of 
this general difficulty, which from a Cassirerian point of view, expresses the role of 
the mythico-religious in seeking a ‘final answer’ to the infinite flux of the world. In 
the age of modernity, the rationality of science comes to replace the theological, as the 
primary vehicle to discover ultimate causes, but the problem of infinite regress 
remains and, if anything, is exacerbated through the realisation that there is no 
ultimate foundation for a causal explanation or framework of values which is external 
to itself.95 Reflecting this, Weber refers to the unceasing struggle between ‘the gods’ 
that represent the different explanatory devices through which attempts are made to 
make sense of the world and the consequential necessity to ‘make a decisive 
choice.’96 Schmitt, in this regard, acting consistently with the intractable dilemma, 
thrown up by Weber, makes that choice in relation to sovereignty and rejects the idea 
of sovereignty as located in the highest located independently derived power which is 
present in the models of Triumphus, Bodin, Hobbes and Austin.97 Schmitt’s 
definition of sovereignty’s location is expressed in the more limited and narrower 
formula o f ‘he who decides upon the exception’.98 Here, Schmitt attempts to avoid 
what he sees as the weakness of those definitions of sovereignty that have gone before 
him, with their emphasis on underived power by reference to causation. But that does 
not mean that causation, despite Schmitt’s claim, ceases to be relevant as Schmitt’s 
definition rests on this claim that Tike every other order, the legal order rests on a
94 Chains o f  causation suffer from two obvious and inter-related difficulties. The first is indeterminacy 
of causal pathways particularly as applied to complex events as for example cited by Hegel in the form 
o f the French Revolution whose existence can be said to the product of an ‘endless number o f factors’ 
(Hegel, G.W.F 1967: 79. Weber referred to this as ‘the infinite causal web’ (as cited in Rasch, W 
2004). The second is that even if one could determines a specific chain o f causation, its end point 
would remain a problem because o f the difficulty o f ‘endless regress’. Hence the need for causal 
closure which overcomes the second difficulty and in so doing, while not eliminating the first 
difficulty, ameliorates it and provides for ontological security. Leibniz refers to the infinite regress 
problem and seeks a solution in the metaphysically transcendent God who provides the first cause of 
the world (Leibniz, G.W 1989: 150 as cited in Rasch, W 2004:25). It is o f course the metaphysically 
transcendent solution or mimicry o f  it that are sought in the pre and early modem models of  
sovereignty.
95 Rasch,W 2004: 26.
96 Weber, M 1991: 152.
97 Schmitt himself rejects the idea that there is in terms o f  political some ‘irresistible highest or greatest 
power that operates according to the certainty o f  natural law’ (Schmitt, C 1985: 17).
98 Schmitt, C 1985: 5.
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decision, and not a norm.’99 Tolstoi’s ‘warring gods’,100 to which Weber refers, 
remain and from a Cassirerian point of view this conflict is the outcome of gazing at 
the world’s complexities through different symbolic forms, namely the mythico- 
religious, language and the scientific as ontological security is sought. Mindful of the 
difficulties associated with determining causation, the relationship between social 
institution and the activities and decisions associated with them and which through the 
process of commonplace transcendence feed their existence are described in terms of 
‘attribution’. This reflects the possibility of explanations of causation that may 
range from those that are mythic to those that are scientific in content and which may 
be regarded as expressions of the power of language in making sense of ‘our world’ 
around which Cassirer’s philosophy is substantially based and which points to that 
which lies ‘beyond’.
Cassirer’s Shortcomings
24. Ontological security for Cassirer is driven by the necessity to avoid profound 
existential chaos experienced as the ‘inaccessible, terrifying, monstrous and 
gruesome.’101 The techniques for establishing ontological security are potentially 
diverse. For Cassirer they reside at the level of language and other modes of thought 
and communication he identifies with the symbolic forms. The symbolic medium has 
a structure which embraces both the internal and external, that is to say the world of 
the subject and object and in so doing overcomes the opposition between subject and 
object.102 There is therefore a sense in which Cassirer is moving towards a 
conceptualisation of the human as an embedded agent rather than a detached one but 
he does not draw out the implications of embeddedness. What Cassirer does not 
sufficiently reveal to put it in Heideggerian terms is the sense of ‘the ready at hand’ as 
opposed to ‘the present at hand’ denoting the difference between the idea of practical 
interaction with the world and that of detachment.103
99 Schmitt, C 1985: 10.
100 Weber, M 1991: 153.
101 Cassirer, E 1957: 90.
102 Habermas, J 2001: 14-15.
I03‘ Readiness to hand’ reflects the idea of Being in the World (Mulhall, S 2001: 40). The centrality o f  
the symbol as the point o f departure for the explanation o f existence, reflects Cassirer’s neo-Kantian 
approach rooted as it is in epistemology and Cartesian duality, depicted in Kant’s metaphor of his 
position to the enquiry o f the nature o f human contact with the world as observing a ship moving
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25. This idea of embeddedness suggests, looking at it from the perspective of the 
individual, that there is in the daily contact of humans with the world what Taylor has 
described as foreground and background. For Taylor, these domains are symptomatic 
of a conceptualisation of the object of philosophical enquiry as the embedded agent 
rather than the disengaged one.104 In so doing, he seeks to draw on the works of 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty who in rather different ways reacted to a 
form of ontologizing of rational procedure whereby the processes of rational thought 
are read into the constitution of the mind, an approach which derived from the 
dualities including that of subject/object associated with Cartesian thought.105 Central 
to the idea of the disengaged agent is the idea that reality is captured most 
authentically by the state of objectivity which is within the disengaged agent’s grasp. 
In contrast the idea of the embedded agent suggests finitude, that is to say a world 
whose existence transcends the capacities of human beings to reduce it to the 
categories of their own thought.106 Such an agent is embedded in the experience of 
his own existence and has to be seen in that way. The sense that an individual makes 
of conscious experience is affected by an unarticulated background. This amounts to 
a kind of pre-understanding or, to use the terminology of Wittgenstein, a type of 
stage-setting when considering how the social intelligibility of language is 
achieved.107 The idea of embeddedness will emerge in the further discussions of the 
models of sovereignty with particular emphasis upon Austin’s model, referring it as it 
does to the idea of habit and hence by implication to routine. In discussing Austin’s 
model, further insights will be provided about the idea of routine which will seen as a 
process which helps to satisfy the need for ontological security, lying at the centre of 
Cassirer’s framework. It will be developed in the closing chapter where its
down- river, never seeking to imagine the experience o f it from the perspective o f its occupants 
(Mulhall, S 2001: 39).
104 Taylor, C 1997.
105 Taylor, C 1987: 61. Dillon for example identifies such dualities as being characterised by 
separations between consciousness and thing, being for itself and being in itself and immanence and 
transcendence. (Dillon, M.C 1988).
106 Dillon, M.C 1997 90.
107 Wittgenstein, L (1998): para 257. The idea o f  background is captured by Taylor’s formulation 
influenced by Polanyi whereby ‘it is subsidiary to the focal object o f awareness; it is what we are
“ attending from ” as we attend to the experience’ (Polanyi, M 1964 and 1966 in Taylor, C 1997:69). 
Taylor’s background however is narrower than Wittgenstein’s stage-setting in that it is what the agent 
‘always knew or had a sense o f .  Wittgenstein’s stage-setting on the other hand may include matters of 
which the agent had no sense. Giddens himself refers to the idea o f ‘setting’ for interaction which is 
akin to to Wittgenstein’s stage-setting and provides the contextuality and hence contributes towards the 
meaning o f such interaction. (Giddens, A 1979: 207; Giddens A 1984: 118).
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relationship with rupture will be explored against the continuing need for ontological 
security.
And Searle
26. The experienced ‘solidity’ of social institutions as the outcome of commonplace 
transcendence which has ingredients of the metaphysically transcendent in the case of 
the early models of sovereignty, is consistent with the structural properties referred to 
by Giddens. It can be seen to be the product of the embedded experience of those 
subject to a given sovereign’s jurisdiction. That embeddedness involves a process of 
attribution referred to above whereby the individual instances of particular activities 
are attributed to particular social institutions including that of the sovereign 
institution. It is the two-way process between the stream of such instances and the 
institution to which they are attributed which both gives meaning to such instances 
and fuels the commonplace transcendence through which ‘the structural properties’ of 
the institution are conceptualised. What determines the meaning of ‘event A’ and 
its attribution to ‘institution B’ will inevitably depend on a form of social practice 
which may be complex, and where a complete line of causation is impossible to 
identify. And this leads to the idea of the institutional fact and its link to social 
practice posed by Searle’s constitutive rule, ‘X counts as Y in circumstances C’.108 
One can immediately see here a two-way process in operation, whereby the activities 
associated with a social institution, both feed and are fed by the existence of the latter. 
So for example, by reference to the British parliament, the enactment of statutes are 
attributed to it which in turn contributes towards its existence. The ‘enactment’ 
refers to document ‘X’ which ‘counts as’ statute ‘Y’ in circumstances (C). The latter 
(C) are constituted by the attribution of the instance of enactment of ‘ Y’ to the British 
parliament which both feeds and is fed by such attribution which drives and is driven 
by ‘X’ counting as ‘Y’. And yet this does not fully capture the interlocking processes 
which contribute towards the creation and continued existence of Parliament and the 
statutes associated with it. Parliament’s existence and constitutional position is 
contingent upon a multiplicity of factors including the practices of democratic 
elections to the House of Commons, executive activity in seeking to implement
108 Searle, J 1995: 43.
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policies through the process of legislative enactment by Parliament, the political 
convention of ministerial responsibility to Parliament and a continuing judicial 
commitment to upholding the statutes that emerge from Parliament. There is therefore 
a potentially complex interlocking and interacting set of social practice which is 
associated both with what is ‘produced by’ a social institution and the existence of the 
social institution itself. In so far as circumstances C are identified, this is an exercise 
in what is akin to foregrounding through which the totality of such interlocking 
practices is selectively presented in a way which, inter alia, provides what is 
perceived to be the most immediate and powerful explanation of the creation of the 
institution in question. That immediacy helps to distanciate multiple contingencies 
that are operational in the creation of a given social institution and which are 
submerged into what is akin to the background seemingly becoming peripheral in 
character, thus bringing into relief the institution’s solidity, inevitability and seeming 
naturalness.109 This will be seen to emerge in relation to the forthcoming 
investigation of sovereignty where Searle’s formula is used as a presentational device 
to highlight the circumstances that are central to the creation and continued existence 
of the sovereign but which do not necessarily appear explicitly within the models 
under discussion as central factors upon which the institution is dependent. In using 
Searle’s formula what can be foregrounded and hence highlighted are factors which 
within the language of the models occupy peripheral positions. In the very 
foregrouniding of them not only is the contingency of the location of sovereignty 
highlighted but in certain circumstances alternative sites of sovereignty are posed
109 Searle himself explores the idea o f background in relation to the intelligibility o f  speech for example 
in his exploration o f  the statement that ‘ George Bush intends to run for president’ (Searle, J 2002: 
196.). Searle in fact distinguishes between what he refers to as ‘the network’ that is to say 
understandings that are closely related to the above claim and are needed to make sense o f it such as 
the existence o f regular presidential elections. He distinguishes between these understandings and more 
basic assumptions such as that the elections go on at the surface of the earth. He considers this is not a 
belief but a ‘preproposition’ that is ‘so to speak ‘pre-suppositional’ or ‘pre-intentional. The network 
hence comprises beliefs in contrast to the background. Looking at his formula for the creation o f  
institutional facts, namely X counts as Y in circumstances C, one can see using his approach that 
operating is ‘ a network’ o f understandings and activities, in relation to the creation o f a particular 
institutional fact such as the appointment o f a particular president and behind that a background. The 
difficulty with the separation between network and background is that the dividing line between the 
two domains is uncertain. Differentiating between supposition and pre-supposition with the former 
located in the network and the latter in the background he fails to appreciate that it is the articulation of 
a presupposition such as ‘elections take place on the surface o f the earth” which turns it into a 
supposition. His explanation o f network and background does not adequately capture the possibility of 
the presupposition or pre-belief becoming supposition or belief as it moves to the foreground. A more 
accurate differentiation which does not suggest the kind o f qualitative difference suggested would be 
near and far background which is a modification o f Taylor’s approach.
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which are incompatible with the model’s claims. So for example, it will be seen that 
in relation to the model of Augustinus Triumphus, the individual’s position as the 
sovereign pope is contingent upon the continued acquiescence of the Council of 
Bishops and hence from a Schmittian perspective sovereignty appears to rest with the 
Council of Bishops and not the pope. With regard to Hobbes, Austin and Schmitt, 
an individual or collective will only continue to ‘count as’ a territorially limited 
sovereign upon, inter alia, an international practice of non-interfering processes of 
governance that exist beyond the jurisdiction of the sovereign entities under 
examination.
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PART 3 
Chapter 7: A Re-Examination of the Model of Sovereignty by Augustinus 
Triumphus 
Introduction
1. For the purpose of this Part, my aim is to examine a number of the models that 
were initially described in the first part of the thesis. The character of the examination 
will comprise a set of what can be described as thought experiments whereby I 
endeavour to imagine the models chosen as constituting a set of lived diachronic 
experiences over time. Therefore, at least in part, I will examine these models from 
the inside, endeavouring to imagine the steps required to make the models operate 
effectively. I will assume that the terms of each model examined have been socially 
implemented and that they reflect the constitutional arrangement through which social 
governance is organised. I will not be generally concerned with the extent to which 
the authors’ intentions in constructing their ideas about sovereignty or institutions to 
which sovereignty can be attributed, were aimed at describing governance as it 
actually took place or whether they were aimed at providing a set of prescriptive 
requirements around which government should be organised.
Augustinus Triumphus
2. To briefly recap on what has been mentioned so far about Triumphus’model, here 
sovereignty was ascribed to the pope and at first site it appears to be absolute in terms 
of authority, territorial scope and temporal duration. On the face of it the pope was not 
subject to any higher earthly authority.1 The sovereignty expressed by the pope was a 
manifestation of God’s cosmic supremacy and the pope himself was the earthly 
embodiment of God. Therefore the pope’s will was God’s will and it expressed itself 
in the form of positive law that was the earthly expression of divine law. Papal 
expression was at first sight the only channel through which divine law could become 
known on Earth and required unquestioning obedience of the universal empire over 
which he would rule. The supreme position of the pope was reflected in Triumphus’
1 This will be examined below.
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assertion that ‘the law cannot be greater than the legislator.’ 2 In so far as it is 
described, this amounts to a model of absolute supremacy possessed by the holder of 
the papal office. While the holders of the office would vary over time, the office itself 
was continuous. The papacy embodied a juridical personality- a corporation- 
identified with the Ecclesia which was equated simultaneously with the mystical 
body of Christ and the men and women who were considered to comprise the 
territorially based Christian community so that the Ecclesia existed on both planes, 
the temporal and spiritual, corresponding to the immanent and transcendent.3
3. Looking at the model from the perspective of Cassirer’s symbolic forms, a number 
of observations can be made. From the point of view of the different symbolic 
categories posed by Cassirer, one can immediately see the strong presence of a 
mythico-religious form manifested by the transcendent quality of the occupier of the 
papal office who is regarded as the vicar of Christ ,4 having the attributes of God,5 
occupying the position of head of the Ecclesia as well as personifying it, where the 
absolute good of society is located 6 in respect of which the exercise of his sovereign 
will is equated with the absolute good. The result is that there appears to be a 
complete identification between papal office and Ecclesia so that its occupant is 
infallible and yet human in constitution.7
4. From the point of view of the role of the model more generally, considering the 
relationship between the particular and universal associated with Cassirer’s symbolic 
forms most evidently language, one can discern a number of different perspectives. 
One can look at Triumphus’ model from the outside and consider it to be a particular 
expression of a constellation of possible arrangements to which the assignment of 
sovereignty is given and hence the assertion that it contains a manifestation of 
sovereignty. From Triumphus’ perspective, one can argue that his claims as to the
2 Wilks, M J 1963: 173.
3 Wilks, M J 1963: 48-49, 53,469; Russell, J.B and Lumsden D.W 2000:21. The Ecclesia as a human- 
divine organization reflects Christ the God-man. Its immanent manifestations in the form o f earthly 
society however is simply a reflection o f its transcendent reality with its human elements seeking to be 
incorporated into such reality. See Augustine , 1998: Book X X I1: 18 for an early expression of this.
4 Wilks M J 1963: 157.
5 Wilks M J 1963: 160.
6 Wilks M J 1963: 157.
7 The identification o f pope with absolute good and hence his identification with the Ecclesia will be 
explored below as in fact there is a fissure running through Triumphus’ model.
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position of the papal office in the process of earthly governance is an attempt to 
formulate a universal arrangement. Flowing from this one can also see the model as 
forming the basis of a specific form of governance in which the particularities of how 
it would be constituted are developed in accordance with the generalities of the 
requirements of the model. In the process of exploring the model, various 
incongruities about Triumphus’ model will be exposed and the conditions necessary 
to ensure the continued sovereign position of the occupier of the papal office. To do 
this, Searle’s general formula embodying the conditions necessary to be satisfied for 
the creation of social institutions will be used, namely that the X counts as Y in C
o
circumstances. It will be applied to Triumphus’ model and others that are going to 
be investigated. Its use will be seen to be its role in exposing the difficulties and 
uncertainties associated with each model. It also provides a common vantage point 
from which to view the diversity of arrangements found in the models.
5. In relation to Triumphus’ model, applying Searle’s formula, person X counts as 
pope (Y term) and hence possesses sovereign powers where he is elected to that 
position by the cardinals (C term). Clearly one can imagine the election of a pope as 
part of a social practice where there have been past holders of the papal office and 
they have exercised absolute governmental powers that amount to those associated 
with sovereignty. Each such transaction where a pope is elected derives its validity 
from the perspective of the model’s requirements because it is considered to be a 
particular instance complying with a normative practice laid down in general terms 
in the model. Therefore the validity of the exercise whereby any particular cardinal is 
elected as pope derives at least in part form the fact that it fits into the generality of 
expected practice which has occurred in the past in what can be perceived as a 
historically continuous process.
6. The difficulty that is immediately faced here is the incongruity between the 
occupier of the papal office who is considered by Triumphus to possess the attributes 
of God on earth9 and his election by mortal cardinals. A chain of authorisation which 
in the final analysis involves any entity other than God is potentially problematic. To 
argue that the cardinals are empowered by God to choose the pope sets up the
8 Searle, J 1995: 43.
9 Wilks, M J 1963:473.
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possibility that they rather than the pope rest at the summit of the Ecclesia. The 
temporal arrangement threatens to disrupt the character of the hierocratic order to 
which Triumphus is committed. Hence to avoid this difficulty, Triumphus considers 
that the cardinals in fact only nominate one of their number to be pope and it is only 
by the confirmation of that nomination by the chosen candidate in his apparent 
capacity as pope that the appointment is completed. The difficulty is therefore 
apparently resolved through a circular process which amounts as Derrida has 
described in a different context as a ‘fabulous retroactivity’.10 If one looks at the 
process of papal appointment through its diachronic practice using Searle’s 
formulation one can identify the following stages:11
(1) Ajs (X term) count as cardinals (Cai) (Y term) when appointed by P(ope)i (C 
circumstances);
(2) Cardinal B\ counts as P2 when nominated by cardinals (Cans) 12 and 
confirmed by P2 •;
(3) A 2S count as cardinals (Ca2)when appointed by P2 ;
(4) Cardinal B2 counts as P3 when nominated by cardinals (Cans) and confirmed by 
P 3 ,
(5) Ajs count as cardinals (Ca3 )  when appointed by P 3 ;
7. One can see that within Triumphus’ hierocratic framework, there is an 
indeterminate quality about P2 and P3 when first nominated. He completes his 
transition to become the holder of the papal office when in that indeterminate state he 
endorses himself and by doing so that status is retroactively resolved. In this 
sequence of events, the particularities of each stage in the practice will have to match 
with the general expectations of what is to occur at each stage. That is to say the
10 Derrida, J 1986: 10. Here Derrida was describing the ‘fabulous retroactivity’ involved in the creation 
o f ‘the people’ by their representatives at the time o f the signing o f the US declaration o f  
Independence.
11 In fact, reflecting the seemingly absolute supremacy o f the pope, Augustinus Triumphus did not 
consider that a pre-condition for appointment to the papal position, was that the candidate had to be a 
bishop or that appointment had to be undertaken by the cardinals. However he did not go as far as 
claiming that the normal method o f appointment, namely of a cardinal by a conclave o f cardinals could 
not occur and that this method would likely constitute the normal practice (Wilks, M.J. 1963: 464,
468).
12 The notation n is used in relation to the cardinals who choose a pope as their membership may be 
determined not only by appointments to their number made by the pope immediately preceding the one 
being appointed but may also include those cardinals appointed by preceding popes.
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particularities of each stage of the practice leading to the creation of particular 
institutional facts such as P2 and A2S will have to conform with the general 
requirements denoted by the normative framework associated with the model.
8. The major difficulty for Triumphus however was that he could not deny the 
possibility that a pope could fail to carry out his functions and this of course 
potentially undermines the entire basis upon which the occupant of the papal office’s 
rests. Triumphus endeavoured to minimise the consequences of the possibility by 
claiming that an occupant of the papal office who acted in a manner that was 
incompatible with divine law divorced himself from the papal office in so doing and 
hence was not acting as pope in such circumstances. Triumphus in admitting the 
possibility of a pope not acting in accordance with divine law allowed ideas 
associated with conciliar theory 13 to undermine his hierocratic model. He admitted 
the necessity of a general council of bishops on behalf of the community having the 
authority to override the law made by the pope if it failed to comply with the 
requirements of divine law.14 In the event that the pope had acted heretically, 
although the cardinals could appoint a new pope since the encumbent had dismissed 
himself by his actions, it was only a general council that could confirm a ‘pope’s 
heresy, pass judgment upon him, appoint a replacement and take over government 
during the interregnum.15 The generality of God’s will in Triumphus’ model was 
therefore capable of being expressed through the particularity of papal governance in 
normal circumstances and action by a general council in extraordinary ones. Looked 
at from the perspective of Schmitt’s model of sovereignty, what one can see here is 
that the general council has jurisdiction to decide upon what is akin to the exception
13 Within the conciliar movement, one can identify a number o f different currents but in essence it 
centred around the idea that the supreme authority within the Christian community was not the pope 
but a general council o f bishops o f  which the pope was one amongst equals. The conflict between those 
who considered the papacy had supremacy and those that considered that the general council had 
supremacy was fundamentally a conflict between the location o f sovereignty, namely whether it rested 
with the pope or elsewhere. See Russell, J.B and Lumsden, D.W 2000: 175, Wilks M J 1963 and for a 
general account Black, A 1988: 573-587.
14 Wilks, M J 1963: 507.
15 Poole, R.L 1920 222; Wilks, M J 1963: 512. The implications o f the general council effectively 
deposing a pope despite Triumphus’ claim that the pope did this through his own actions are profound 
since, as a matter o f possibility, this ultimately leads to the centre o f Conciliar theory which claims that 
the council is superior to the papal office as expressed by the Council o f Constance (See Figgis, J.N. 
1915: 31).
134/267
in Schmitt’s model, on the grounds in effect of necessity16 triggered by the inability of
I n
the existing incumbent of the papal office to act consistently with the public good, 
which would occur where he had acted heretically. This immediately gives rise to 
the situation where the potentiality of a general council being convened and the 
replacement of the pope as usurper is ever present. In effect, all the particularities of 
all papal action are capable of being compared to the generality of how a pope ought 
in the final analysis to behave to conform with the requirements of non-heretical 
behaviour, interpreted in the final analysis by the general council.
9. Applying Searle’s formula, looked at from the perspective of each expression of 
papal will, even though there was a presumption that the expression of papal will 
would amount to an expression of divine will and hence to be obeyed, the 
presumption was always rebuttable even if only improbably. Hence, the exercise of 
will by the occupant of the papal office would only count as the exercise of divine 
will and hence to be obeyed, if the general council of bishops had not declared it to be 
heretical.
10. Looking at the position of the pope more generally in times of exception where 
the existing incumbent is regarded by the general council of bishops to be a usurper, 
the consequences following on from this are that:
Cardinal B2 counts as P3 when appointed by GCB\ in circumstances where B\ ceases 
to be P2 by becoming a usurper P 2 ’ as a result o f acting heretically in the opinion o f  
GCBi
Integrating the state of normality with the state of exception where the bold type 
denotes events constituting a state of exception.
16 This results in effect to a transfer o f authority from pope to general council to act in casu necessitates 
against the presumed head, that is the pope where he is considered to have acted heretically.
17 Akin to state necessity triggered by the prospect o f  governance by the existing papal incumbent not 
being able to govern in accordance with the public good as defined by the requirements o f divine law. 
That is to say a new unacceptable normality from the perspective o f the general council beckoned, one 
which was intolerable and had to be prevented by the removal of the offending pope.
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Cardinal B2 counts as P3 when appointed by GCB} in circumstances where 
Cardinal Bj who had been appointed as P2 by Cans no longer counts as P2  by 
becoming usurper 7V  as a result o f acting heretically in the opinion o f GCBj
11. Mirroring the two complimentary locations which the Ecclesia’s intentions are 
expressed in times of normality and exceptionality, Triumphus ultimately accepted 
that taking into account normality and exceptionality, supreme power rested with 
general council and pope, since in the event of the latter being held by a general 
council of bishops to have acted heretically, the Ecclesia would continue to be 
represented albeit temporarily by the former.18 Looked at from a Schmittian 
perspective however, it is clear that sovereignty in effect lay with the general council 
because of its ever present authority to declare what was in effect a state of exception 
when it considered that the holder of the papal office was acting heretically.
12. One can see from the above that the logic of the hierocratically orientated 
discourse that dominated Triumphus’ model, to achieve closure, could not 
accommodate the arrangements involving the role of the general council of bishops in 
the event of the pope acting heretically. The logic of the claim made by Trimphus that 
the supremacy of the pope’s position meant that the legislator came before the law 
and that the pope was free from all legal restraints 19 meant that there was no place for 
what amounted to an adjudicator also possessing executive powers, in this case the 
general council of bishops, operating independently of the pope that had the power in 
effect to remove him from office in the event that it determined that he had acted 
heretically. To allow the incorporation of this provision meant that despite the 
hierocratic emphasis in Triumphus’ model, papal supremacy in the final analysis was 
fundamentally undermined.
13. Augustinus Triumphus produced his model of sovereignty within the context of a 
three-way struggle which occurred between the pope, Holy Roman Empire and the 
emerging territorially based kings. He was considered to be the author of the Unam 
Sanctum issued by Pope Boniface V I1 in his bid to establish papal sovereignty at the
18 Wilks,MJ:505.’...in  Ecclesia et in papa.’
19 Wilks, M J 1963: 175.
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expense of that of the emperor.20 Out of this struggle emerged the idea of 
territorially based inalienable and indivisible sovereignty in which the ruler was 
supreme with his own domain, that supremacy expressing itself in the form of every 
kingdom being independent of the empire and that its ruler exercised supreme power 
in his domain independently of the emperor. The king’s powers hence were the same 
within his territory as the emperor’s outside it. This ideological struggle which 
reflected an emerging practice whereby kings were increasingly assertive in their own 
kingdoms centred around the possession of what might be called the marks of 
sovereignty, namely those rights and powers associated with sovereignty’s condition. 
It was around these that conflict was joined. These included that as with the emperor, 
high treason could be committed against the king and conversely the king, as with the 
emperor, could not be subject himself to such a charge. In the same vein, those 
advocating territorial governance to be independent of the emperor also considered 
that judicially, there could be no appeals from the rulings of the king’s sentences and 
the emperor had no right to appoint key officials within territorially defined 
kingdoms. In the process, the configuration of temporal governance was considered to 
require regionally based units to meet the diverse needs of diverse populations in 
contrast to the uniform approach of the emperor which was more suited to the needs 
of spiritual governance associated with the pope. Justifications for the supremacy of 
kings over emperor in the domain of temporal governance ranged from the 
prescriptive acquisition of kings’ rights, to the greater efficiency of regional 
governance to ensure the enforcement of law, to the rejection of the legitimacy of the 
empire because it was perceived to have been created by force which had no legal 
validity, to interpretations of various biblical passages to support the idea of such 
kingdoms, to Aristotelian arguments resting on the claimed nature of man to want to 
live in communities with elected leaders. Through the struggle between pope, 
emperor and princes, the modem idea of sovereignty emerged, expressing the 
liberation of secular politics from the yoke of theology, the emergence of law as being 
a central vehicle for stately governance, the dominance of secular over cannon law in 
the event of conflict and the idea that the lawmaker was anterior to the law, the latter
20 Catholic Encyclopeadia; Divine Right o f Kings.
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9 1depending on the will of the former and the former not being bound by the latter.
The next re-investigation will concentrate upon Hobbes’ model but before this is 
attempted, it is worthwhile pausing a moment upon Triumphus’ model.
Conclusions
14. Referring to Cassirer’s symbolic forms, the essence of their rise was to enable 
human beings to make sense of the world that was rushing towards them. The rise of 
the most primitive type of symbolic form, namely that of the mythic emerged out of 
this need. The outcome of activity on the immanent place gave rise to the 
transcendent in the form initially of mythic gods of increasing stability which led to
99the development of religion with the separation of meaning from existence. The
9 ^point is that the desire for what might be called ontological security, gives rise to a 
number of mental constructions through which the experiences of existence are 
perceived, explained, developed and tolerated. These within the context of a 
discussion about sovereignty24 include the idea or ideas of gods or God existing in a 
transcendent domain as exemplified in Triumphus’ and Dante’s models; stable origins 
which provide the starting points for explanations of how the present and its nature 
came to be as exemplified in the forthcoming discussion of the Hobbesian model of 
sovereignty and the daily use of repetitive practices through which life is undertaken, 
an example of which will appear in Austin’s model and by way of observation the 
construction of normative reference points as exhibited in law itself. What is 
suggested in the construction of these stable points of unity particularly with regard to 
the idea of gods and origins, both of which suggest that man’s existence occurs by 
reference to something that preceded him and transcends him is that the ‘fabulous 
retrospectivity’ referred to above is a pervasive occurrence in the process of 
governance. This retrospectivity in turn suggests that while the relationship between 
the transcendent and the immanent is perceived to be one whereby the former gives
21 Accounts of the development o f  the idea o f sovereignty within the medieval and early modem period 
can be found in numerous publications including Wilks, M J, 1963;Ullmann, W 1964; Merriam 1968; 
Tierney, B 1979; Hinsley, F H 1986; Canning, J.P 1988; Onuf, N 1991; Buijs G 2003.
22 See the previous chapter for a fuller explanation o f this point.
23 A phrase used by Anthony Giddens. See Giddens, A 1984: 376.
24 Clearly outside this discussion one could broaden the examples to include for example Kantian 
transcendental categories and more broadly generally the points o f departure o f any theoretician 
including Cassirer himself with his symbolic forms.
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rise to the latter, at least from the idea of man as generator of his own symbolic world, 
it is the latter that gives rise to the former. More will be said about these points in due 
course.
139/267
Chapter 8: A Re-Examination of Hobbes
Introduction
1. The model of Augustinus Triumphus reflects a metaphysical concept of being in 
which the immanent is an outcrop of the transcendent which is where reality truly lies. 
His model follows the contours of the ‘Great Chain of Being’ 1 as manifested by the 
structure of the Ecclesia. Hobbes’ model in contrast reflects the nominalist thinking 
that had developed in the later middle ages with the separation of immanent from 
transcendent, with the former being able to be studied within its own context on the 
basis of experience and experiment, and with the residualisation of the idea of God to 
that of the Aristotelian first mover who is withdrawn, inscrutable, transcendent and 
detached from the immanent world which is increasingly perceived to be self- 
propelling. What pervaded nominalist metaphysics was the idea of contingency both 
in respect of the vertical relationship between man, the cosmos and God and also in a 
horizontal sense regarding the relationship between man and his past and future. 
Unlike the model of Triumphus, that of Hobbes is based on the territorially limited 
centralised state.
2. The idea of the social contract which provides the core of the legitimating 
narrative, which is used by Hobbes to justify the existence and authority of a 
centralised and absolute sovereign, can be seen as a point of fixity in an uncertain and 
contingent world. The synchronic and diachronic contingent, fluctuating and diverse 
existence of the multitude is replaced by an expression of unified but episodic 
collective will which produces a further point of unity in the form of a unitary 
sovereign which unlike that of the social contract does not have an episodic existence 
but is continuous in time and is perceived to embody and in effect replace the 
multiplicity of wills that, through momentary agreement, gave rise to it.
1 Lovejoy, A 1964:59.
2 For a discussion o f the impact and contribution of nominalism to the emergence o f modernity see 
Oberman, H.A 1963; H.A Oberman 1986, Dupre, L 1993: 174-177 and usefully synthesised in Buijs, G 
2003. More will be said about in the concluding chapter.
3 Oberman, H.A 1983:27.
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3. This legitimating narrative is central to Hobbes’ justification of governance as it 
seeks to establish that without such governance, man would descend into an 
intolerable state of uncertainty captured by the idea of the state of nature given his 
natural and unchanging anti-social and individualistic propensities. This can be 
regarded as a form of antirrhetic discourse4 in which the prospect of a descent into 
‘chaos’ is used as a form of verbal violence to justify the continuation of governance 
which alone can insure the protection of the community from such an outcome. It is a 
form of world-making as Goodman describes but it is one that, while important to 
Hobbes’ justification of governance, possesses a character of impossibility that is akin 
to Derrida’s ‘fabulous retroactivity’ 5 in that its evocation is the product of a present 
production that is projected into the irretrievable past to serve the needs of the 
present.6
4. The purpose therefore of this chapter is to endeavour to explore the impossibility 
of the bipolar simplicity of Hobbes’ legitimating narrative whereby peace was 
associated with centralised sovereignty and unending turmoil was associated with its 
absence despite what might have been its use in the daily practice of governance to 
help ensure daily compliance given the profound irrationality that Hobbes attributed 
to man. In so doing, I will seek to reveal what might be called the embeddedness of 
his sovereign into an already existing practice of social existence. I will also 
endeavour to establish that in so far as social existence was of a disruptive quality, 
Hobbes’ acceptance of individuals’ rights to resist sovereign commands in certain 
circumstances rather than being marginal to his model of sovereignty is in fact 
significant.
4 In the sense that such discourses are regarded as ones against evil and undesirable threats. They are 
usually posited against the character or characters considered to be the cause o f such perils, for 
example Satan. See Goodrich, P 1995: 49. This idea o f descent in relation to governance is o f course 
not unique to Hobbes and was accepted for example by Hegel although he did not accept that the 
possibility that a war o f all against all would break out in the absence of government itself (Pelczynski, 
Z.A 1971:95).
5 Derrida, J 1995:10.
6 The idea of the past as history rather than myth can also be perceived to be an idealisation as 
suggested for example by Collingwood (Collingwood, R.G 1993).
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Hobbes* State of Nature
5. Hobbes’ model can be seen as part of the process whereby the secular gains 
dominance over the spiritual for the purpose of earthly governance and presents a 
model of sovereignty which, as previously described, is one where the sovereign is 
regarded as supreme and anterior to the existence of positive law. This law, as 
developed by or in the name of the sovereign, is the supreme mechanism through 
which social control is achieved. The spiritual has been absorbed by the temporal and 
the domain of the sovereign is territorially limited. The model presented is one 
where the basic separations associated with the practice of sovereign statehood are 
present, namely the separation between the government and the governed and that 
between the states themselves evoking Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction. With 
Cassirer’s framework in mind, the symbolic nature of sovereignty is again one that is 
heavily infused with a mythico-religious character by for example the iconic 
expression of the sovereign as a god-like creature whose shape, size, attire, majesty 
set him apart and in a phenomenological sense ‘above’ the population which he is 
considered to rule over.7 There is a further element, consistent with a mythic 
narrative, in the form of the proclaimed foundation of the community over which the 
sovereign rules, namely the social contract as a result of which the state of nature is 
replaced by the creation of a community which is personified by the sovereign. It 
emerges out of ‘the wild’ that is characterised by a war tom state of being. This is 
not the shapeless chaos that Cassirer refers to as that which man attempts to overcome 
and expel through the development of symbolic forms, most profoundly the mythic 
form as expressed through language.8 The mythic stories of creation testify to this
7 Onuf, N.G 1991:435.
8 The human dread o f chaos for Cassirer is provoked by the anticipation and fear which gives rise to 
mythical thought which ‘may be interpreted as a constant and obstinate negation o f  the phenomenon of 
death.’ (Cassirer, E 1944: 84). Chaos itself can be seen as an expression o f death in the sense of the 
latter representing nothingness when deprived o f its religious meaning as depicted by Eliade, M (1960: 
237), an unimaginable state which links to the idea o f chaos being indescribable as suggested by 
Cassirer, E (1961: 65). Hobbes himself in explaining the reasons for the state o f  nature refers to the 
desire o f  man to preserve himself, that is ‘to avoid that which is hurtful: but most o f all that terrible 
enemy o f nature, death, from which we expect both the loss of all power, and also the greatest o f bodily 
pains in the losing...’ (Hobbes, T 1994: 79(6)).
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process and frequently involve the creation of the world out of chaos.9 This chaos, 
for Cassirer, is indescribable and hence constitutes an experience dominated by utter 
randomness rather than simple unpredictability. That is to say, its indescribability is 
consistent with a state of being where each moment of its existence is completely 
independent of its past and hence its unpredictability is total.10 This is not the case 
within the state of nature. Here, while the relationships between individuals are 
constantly changing and are therefore unpredictable in terms of their detail, there are 
certain continuities out of which such unpredictability arises. There is the underlying 
desire by each individual to preserve himself which leads him, through the exercise of 
his own individual judgment, to constantly seek to satisfy his own needs and wants in 
circumstances where everybody else is engaged in the same pursuit.11 These 
constancies arise from the assumptions Hobbes makes about the nature of man and 
reality. He considered that reality comprised mechanically linked phenomena. The 
task of understanding it required an application of what has been described as the 
resolutive-compositive method that required that phenomena were analysed by 
reducing them to their simplest components and then investigating their 
interrelationships. Hobbes’ methodological individualism was an application of this 
approach and required that the investigation of man’s psychology was a precondition
9 For example the Pelgasian Creation Myth whose first sentence reads, ‘ In the beginning, Eurynome, 
the Goddess o f All Things, rose naked from Chaos, but found nothing substantial for her feet to rest 
upon, and therefore divided the sea from the sky... ’ . In relation to Greek myths, similar references to 
the creation o f the world out o f Chaos are made for example in the patriarchal myth o f Uranus and 
Hesiod’s Theogany (Graves, R 1960: 27-35). This is also captured by Nietzsche when he observes that 
‘behind every ground, under every grounding’ lurks ‘an abyse’ (Nietzsche quoted from Beyond Good 
and Evil in Wadenfels, B at p. 66).
10 This is a conceptualisation o f  randomness which is adopted by Stewart, I (1997:240). It equates with 
Cassirer’s idea o f chaos. Deleuze and Guattari also captured this idea o f  chaos in their statement that 
‘Chaos makes chaotic and undoes every consistency in the infinite’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994:42). 
Stewart counterposes this state to a chaos where there is a connection between present and past and 
where unpredictability, characterised by chaos, is not total but occurs within limits which are 
determined by underlying continuities. This is the chaos conceptualised in Chaos Theory and might be 
regarded as chaos in a weak sense to differentiate it from Cassirer’s chaos. See also Eve, R.A, Hors fall 
and Lee, M.E 1997: 60-68; 269-274. To capture the dread o f chaos, its depiction in mythic terms is 
diluted so that it becomes describable. So for example, Fitzpatrick describes the creative forces as 
acting on undifferentiated, formless, limitless and nocturnal chaos (Fitzpatrick, P 1992:19). Clearly the 
very use o f language to describe its contents, even in the idea o f randomness, suggests a sense o f  
constancy but here one can see the use of further terms to specify constancies which are capable o f  
evoking dread and the need to avoid it.
11 This process is substantially captured in Hobbes’ assertion that ‘ the Felicity o f this life consisteth 
not in the repose o f mind satisfied. For there is no such...Summum Bonum,. ..Nor can a man any more 
live, whose Desires are at an end, than he whose Senses and Imagination are at a stand’ Hobbes, T 
1968: 160. Elsewhere he says that ‘ I put for a generall inclination o f  all mankind, a perpectuall and 
restless desire o f Power after power ceaseth onely in Death’ (Hobbes T 1968: 161). Moreover, ‘because 
the condition o f Man, (as hath been declared in the precedent Chapter) is a condition o f warre o f every 
one against every one, in which every one is governed by his own Reason...’ (Hobbes, T 1968: 189).
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I 9to the investigation of social processes. Understanding man required
1 ^conceptualising him in a pre-societal context, that is in a state of nature. Man 
therefore constituted the interacting parts of society but in his plurality was likened to 
the component parts of a watch.14 Lastly, returning to Cassirer’s symbolic forms and 
particularly language, it is the very use of language through which the state of nature 
is conceptualised which allows for the undesirable content and constancy of its 
unpredictability to be communicated and hence to provide the basis for the need and 
justification for its replacement by a commonwealth, so that it is characterised as a 
process marked by competition, distrust, hostility, conflict, warfare and short lives.15
6. If one looks at the state of nature in the way that Hobbes’ has described it, one can 
see that the unpredictability is not limitless. While it is not possible for there to be 
stable and peaceful relationships between individuals that are long lasting, it is not 
impossible for there to be such episodic periods, as a result of domination by one 
individual over others or even by agreement. However these periods are ultimately 
doomed to be short lived because of the ever present desire by human beings to 
satisfy their desires within a world characterised by the rough equality of humans who 
are competitive in spirit and who engage in a relentless pursuit of their conflicting 
aim s.16 In so far as such agreements are made, they are unenforceable, as there is no 
central power to ensure compliance.17 There is also the continuing problem of each 
individual insisting on exercising his own judgment as to what the agreement, for
1 ftexample, a defence pact requires. Bearing in mind the hostile context in which 
agreements are made, they can inevitably also function as tactical devices which are
12 This method can be traced back to Aristotle and was introduced to Hobbes by Galileo. See Gordon, 
Scott 1991:72.
13 The resolutive element comprises the analysis o f individual man while the compositive element is 
the resultant exploration o f the origins and requirements of civil society, that is a commonwealth under 
the control o f  a sovereign (Gordon, Scott 1991: 72).
14 Hobbes asserts that ‘ For as in a watch, or some such small engine, the matter, figure, and motion o f  
the wheels cannot be well known, except it be taken insunder and viewed in parts; so as to make a 
more curious search into the rights o f states and duties o f subjects, it is necessary... not to take them 
insunder, b u t.. .that they be so considered as if  they were dissolved... .’(Hobbes, T quoted in Hampton, 
J 1986: 7.). See also Hobbes, T 1968:82.
15 Hobbes, T 1994: 80.
16 Hobbes, T 1994:81.
17 As suggested by Hobbes when he considers that covenants that are enforceable by a central power 
are not considered to be void (Hobbes, T 1968: 196).
18 Hobbes specifically discusses this possibility but considers that such pacts will not endure because 
there will be no agreement amongst the participants as to what measures will be required to ensure that 
defence is effectively realised. See Hobbes, T 1998: 70.
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subordinated to the overall individual strategy of creating and maintaining domination 
over others.19 One can imagine that the inevitable termination of these short periods 
of stability are caused by those who benefit from them, considering that the 
disadvantages they bring outweighing the advantages. They might well be also 
caused by the very complexity of the fluctuating relationships one can imagine 
existing within the state of nature. Periods characterised by harmonious relationships 
experienced between certain individuals do not prevent such individuals from also 
experiencing simultaneously hostile relations with others. Hence, the violence 
experienced with some individuals might well impact upon the character of the 
relationships forged with others facilitating or undermining peaceful co-existence 
with them. What emerges out of conceptualising the state of nature in this way is that 
one can see within its very operation the possibility of sovereignty as depicted by 
Hobbes. If one were to freeze frame the state of nature at any given moment in time, 
a variety of possible worlds are suggested, some of which might be peaceful and 
comparatively harmonious while others might be conflict ridden, hostile and violent. 
The short-lived agreement and the short-lived period of domination by one person 
over another can be extrapolated towards the idea of sovereignty as posed by 
Hobbes.20 Hence chaos, in the weak sense, which is conceptualised in this way, as 
comprising the state of nature, possesses the elements of domination and agreement 
associated with sovereignty. One can see the relationship of dominance which, if 
made permanent, begins to resemble the sovereign subject relationship, based on the 
principle of agreement which is developed to provide the legitimising basis for 
individuals to submit themselves to the sovereign figure they have agreed upon, and 
no longer to exercise their individual judgment as to what is required to survive and
9 iprosper but allow the sovereign to do this on their behalf.
19 Hobbes does not go as far as saying that agreements creating peace might be used in this way but it 
inevitably would be the case and is implied by his acceptance that man in the state of nature is entitled 
to take all steps necessary to protect himself.
20 This domination o f one person by another might have occurred through acquiescence or agreement.
21 There is considerable controversy as to whether the covenant setting up the sovereign involves 
individuals in transferring their natural law rights or simply requires them not to exercise those rights 
and allow the sovereign to exercise them on their behalf. This is in part due to the various formulations 
that Hobbes adopted in his different texts. So for example in Element o f  Law he appears to suggest 
that such rights are transferred whereas in Leviathan he appears to suggest that the sovereign body will 
exercise the rights o f individuals on their behalf, that is to say in a representative capacity. See 
Hobbes, T 1994: 106 (7), 107(10); Hobbes, T 1968: 228. Interestingly Gauthier considers that Hobbes 
changes his position from The Elements o f  Law to Leviathan and is o f the opinion that On the Citizen 
also suggests that rights are transferred. Yet, reading the relevant passage in On the Citizen, at the very
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7. What this suggests is that when one compares existence in the state of nature 
which is dominated by hostility and violence and that of sovereign practice where
9 9peace and stability are far more dominant, there are significant aspects of continuity.
In both, there are individuals with the propensities to seek domination unless 
prevented by an absolute power in the form of a sovereign. In both, individuals 
possess the ultimate fear of death and the desire to preserve themselves and in 
Hobbes’ mind it is this desire that provides an important foundation for the creation of 
the sovereign institution and hence an escape from the state of nature. It is also an 
existence that suggests a manifestation of social practice in the sense that as 
described, the territorial reach of the state of nature has no intrinsic limit. The social 
interaction depicted can potentially be global in character only being separated by 
physical barriers. The idea of this international state of nature is explored by Hobbes 
23 although he accepts that in reality it was unlikely that the world as a whole 
simultaneously experienced such circumstances.24 The point is that conceptualising 
the transition from the state of nature to society through the creation of a sovereign by 
covenant suggests that prior to society’s creation, there was an underlying practice 
whereby there were lines of demarcation, for geographical or other reasons which 
separated off zones of endemic conflict so that the latter habitually did not take place 
across them. The absence as well as the presence of conflict between certain peoples 
along certain lines was central to the giving of shape to the struggles and societies that 
emerged and hence, it will be suggested central to the creation of sovereign 
institutions.25
Returning to Searle’s formulation and applying it to Hobbes’ model:
least it is ambiguous. See Hobbes, T 1998: 72 (5) and (7). For my purpose the dispute is not central as 
either way the exercise o f the substance o f such rights is vested in the sovereign.
221 am using the idea o f ‘practice’ here to denote actions within a social context that are repetitive in 
character.
23 In depicting the global reach o f the state o f nature Hobbes states that in such a situation there is ‘no 
Culture o f  the Earth; no Navigation, nor use o f  commodities that may be imported by Sea; no 
Commodious Building; no Instruments o f moving, and removing such things as require much force; no 
Knowledge o f  the face o f the Earth; no account o f Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society...’ (Hobbes, T 
1968:186).
24 ‘... It may... be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this; and I believe it 
was never generally so: but there are many places where they live so now’ (Hobbes, T 1968:187).
25 Hobbes’ assumption that the state o f nature is a condition that is regionally based emerges for 
example in his description of the meaning o f the term ‘people’ when he states that it means ‘no more, 
but the multitude o f  those particular persons that inhabit those regions, without consideration o f any 
contracts or covenants amongst them (Hobbes, T 1994:124).
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Institution X (person or collective) counts as sovereign (Y) in circumstances (C term) 
where each individual within the state of nature between themselves has authorised 
the actions and judgments of X to be his own for the purpose of living peaceably.26
Territorializing Hobbes
8. By implication, the agreement applies to a specific group of individuals that are 
likely to be located within a specific territory, given that Hobbes accepts that globally 
the world comprises of separate sovereigns who rule over specific territories and who 
compete with one another in an international state of nature. Even if the territory 
which the individuals occupy is expansive, anything less than being globally 
applicable means that it is territorially limited. As a result the above formulation 
which does not express the territorial specificity that many institutions work within 
needs to be slightly modified to read:
Within Territory Tj_ institution X  (person or collective) counts as sovereign (Y) in 
circumstances (C term) where each individual within the state o f nature between 
themselves has authorised the actions and judgments o fX  to be his own for the
27purpose o f living peaceably.
26 Leaving aside the controversy over the exact nature and scope o f the covenant between individuals in 
the state o f nature giving rise to the sovereign, I have for the purpose o f applying Searle’s formula 
adopted a summary o f one description o f the covenant which states, ‘a Commonwealth is said to be 
Instituted when a multitude o f Men do agree and Covenant, every one with every one, that to 
whatsoever Man, or Assembly o f  Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present the Person 
o f  them all, (that is to say, to be their Representative',) every one.. .shall Authorize all the Actions and 
Judgments, o f that Man, or Assembly o f men, in the same manner, as if  he they were his own, to the 
end to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected from other men’ (Hobbes T 1968: 228- 
229). Another version states ‘I authorise and give up my Right o f  Governing my selfe, to this Man, or 
to his assembly o f men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his 
Actions in like manner’ (Hobbes, T 1968: 227). Gaultier suggests that this does not truly represent 
Hobbes’ position regarding the covenant as nowhere else did he equate authorization with the 
renunciation o f rights. It is difficult to reconcile the giving up o f a right when Hobbes accepts that in 
certain circumstances the bond between subjects and sovereign dissolve and the former are perfectly 
entitled to exercise that right without there having been a transfer back o f the right other than perhaps 
arguably by implication. Hence I have not used this version o f the covenant and consider that it is 
more appropriate to say that individuals covenant in effect to transfer the exercise of their right to self 
government. However I do not consider that, even if  I were to adopt this version of the covenant, my 
observations below, in substance, would significantly alter.
27 The territorial specificity o f any institution that operates within a territorial state is something that 
does not explicitly feature within Searle’s formula.
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9. Leaving aside the possibility of conflict for the moment, the territorial specificity 
suggests that in addition the very creation of the sovereign institution is accompanied 
by the absence of any other event that for the individuals gives rise to a sovereign 
institution whose domain of governance covers them. There is a term implied in the 
agreement that gives rise to the institution, that no one else counts as sovereign at the 
time that the sovereign institution is created. In this sense the creation of the 
sovereign involves the simultaneous selection and rejection of individuals who are all 
potentially eligible to fulfil this role. Furthermore, returning to the point made above, 
if  one is to conceptualise sovereignty as operating over a specific piece of territory, 
then the agreement is consistent with an existing practice which precedes it whereby 
all others who are not part of it either exist within a separate state of nature or 
alternatively are part of already existing commonwealths. This idea of existing 
practice preceding the creation of a commonwealth emerges in Hobbes’ claim that 
the emergence of commonwealths is the product of the enlargement of smaller units 
ultimately derived from ‘Familyes’ in response to the constant fear of invasion and 
danger. Here too one can see the possibility of a constantly shifting territorial 
configuration expressing chronic conflict between social groupings in their bid to 
ensure their dominance over others.
10. As with Augustinus Triumphus’ model, within Hobbes’ model one sees 
mechanisms that can come into play in circumstances that have some similarity with 
that of the state of exception explored by Schmitt. Clearly the idea of the state of 
exception is captured by a sovereign’s ability to take whatever measures are necessary 
to preserve his commonwealth against internal or external threat in circumstances 
where no existing normative framework can predict when such decisions should be 
taken or what measures should be taken to deal with the danger. However here in 
relation to each individual who is subordinate to a sovereign, there is also the 
possibility of a decision taken by her or him to resist the sovereign in circumstances
28 Hobbes, T 1968: 224. This does not sit easily with the idea that commonwealths are the product of  
the unification o f roughly equal individuals as it suggests that practice in the state o f nature does not 
simply comprise the actions o f atomised individuals but also temporarily cooperating groups. This is 
also reflected in his observation that in the state o f nature, men are capable o f forming factions 
(Hobbes, T 1998: 22). Existing practice is also as mentioned above expressed by the existence o f  states 
o f nature which are regionally based.
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9 0that are akin to a state of exception. This comes about because of Hobbes’ 
acceptance that in certain circumstances individuals, who are taken to have 
covenanted to obey the sovereign, are released from it and are entitled to resume the 
exercise of their own individual judgments in order to realise their own natural right 
to self preservation. In such circumstances, while from the perspective of the civil 
law of the sovereign, the individual remains bound to obey his commands which are 
incapable of being unjust, from the perspective of his natural right to preserve himself 
which exists independently of the sovereign’s will,30 the individual has the right to 
take all action necessary to preserve himself.31 As an overall proposition, the 
subject’s obligation to the sovereign only lasts as long as he is able to protect him
9^
given that the purpose of obedience is such protection. Hence covenants not to 
defend oneself were considered by Hobbes to be ones that could be justly disobeyed 
and so if a subject was commanded by a sovereign to kill himself, he was entitled to 
resist.33
11. At first sight the scope of the subject to disobey the command of the sovereign 
here appears to be limited and no doubt this was Hobbes’ intention. He was
29 This is captured by his formula that sovereignty rests with he who decides upon the exception. 
Schmitt, C 1985:3. This formula will be discussed in more detail below in the chapter on Schmitt. It 
will be seen that ultimately it comprises a decision to invoke measures to protect a people from an 
internal or external danger which constitutes a grave threat to their continued existence. Schmitt
considered that at the centre o f Hobbes’ model o f sovereignty was his capacity to undertake 
exceptional measures free o f any normative constraints for the purposes o f insuring the continued 
existence o f the commonwealth (See Schmitt, C 1996). I use the phrase here in a way not intended by 
Schmitt since it concerns circumstances where individuals seek to resist the commands o f a sovereign 
on the ground that their preservation is threatened. Hence the phrase captures at an individual level 
what Schmitt sought to capture at the level o f a people, namely that there can be circumstances which 
constitute an existential threat to either, the nature and circumstances o f  which cannot be catered for by 
any existing normative framework.
30 ‘For the right o f men have by Nature to protect them, when none else can protect them, can by no 
Covenant be relinquished.’ (Hobbes T: 1968: 172.
31 In such circumstances the morally obligatory nature of the first part o f  the first law o f nature which
states that "every man, ought to endeavour peace as farr as he has hope o f  obtaining it... ’ falls away
leaving the second part which states ‘. ..and when he cannot obtain i t , that he may seek, and use, all 
helps and advantages o f warre’ (Hobbes, T 1968:190). This power is matched by a natural right to ‘by 
all means we can, to defend ourselves ’ (Hobbes, T 1968: 194). There is some controversy over the 
meaning o f this term. Does it mean that he is entitled to anything or only anything necessary to ensure 
self- preservation? Malcolm, for example, argues in favour o f the narrower version and this would 
appear fit with the implicit meaning o f  the term. However, even if  one accepts the narrower meaning, 
it is still open textured in content and at the end o f the day, it is the individual exercising it who is the 
final judge o f its appropriateness. See Malcolm, N 2002:445.
32 Hobbes, T 1968: 272.
33 Hobbes, T 1968: 199; Hobbes, T 1968: 269. Hobbes in fact appears to extend this right to 
circumstances where an individual is threatened with ‘Wounds, Chayns, and Imprisonment; both 
because there is no benefit consequent consequent to such patience’ (Hobbes, T: 1968: 192.
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attempting here to limit the consequences arising out of the disjuncture that exists in 
his model between what the sovereign may do which has no legal limits and what a 
subject may do in defiance of such action in pursuance of his independently existing 
natural right to preserve his life which would be unlawful with regard to the civil law 
in respect of which the sovereign was supreme legislator, executor and judge. The 
difficulty is however that in practice given the indeterminate idea of resistance, that it 
was for each individual to judge as to what that required in circumstances where there 
was no adjudicatory mechanism to determine what was acceptable that did not 
involve the sovereign, the way was open for the whole edifice constituted by the 
commonwealth to be undermined.34 This acceptability of resistance for Hobbes also 
extended to individuals forming a defence pact where each of them had been accused,
■j c
whether justifiably or not, of a crime for which the expected sentence is death. In 
forming such a pact, Hobbes was in effect recognising that individuals faced with 
what they would perceive as the unequal power of the sovereign, would seek to 
negate that imbalance and hence to produce a situation where there was a nearer 
approximation to the equality that pervaded the state of nature without the chronic 
disorder associated with it. This scenario clearly suggests that collective resistance 
was possible by reference to Hobbes’ model although not explored and given its 
indeterminate scope, it was potentially capable of constituting an act that amounted in 
effect to an ousting of the sovereign’s jurisdiction, the partial abolition of the 
commonwealth at least in the territory occupied by those resisting his will, and the 
creation of another.
34 The lack of certainty about when a subject’s life was put in danger by the sovereign was highlighted 
by Hobbes in his observation that ‘a man cannot te ll , when he seeth men proceed against him by 
violence, whether they intend his death or not’ (Hobbes, T 1968: 192.
35 Hobbes, T 1968: 270(113) (Leviathan). ‘But in case a great many men together, have already 
resisted the Sovereign Power unjustly, or committed some Capitall crime, for which everyone one of  
them expecteth death, whether have they not the Liberty then to joyn together, and assist, and defend 
one another? Certainly they have... ’ The subversive implication of the individual’s right to defend 
himself was highlighted by Filmer who stated that such doctrines are ‘destructive to all such 
governments whatsoever, and even to Leviathan itself. Hereby any rogue or villain may murder his 
sovereign, if  the sovereign but offer by force to whip or lay him in the stocks, since whipping may be 
said to be a wounding and putting in stocks an imprisonment’ (Filmer, 1991: 195).
36 It is difficult to see what other outcome there could be in the absence of the sovereign withdrawing 
his threat of death since there would be no incentive for the resistors to cease their resistance which 
could well escalate as the sovereign became more determined to overcome them. On the other hand if  
the sovereign did lift the death sentence, this might have been to his short-term advantage at the 
expense o f long term instability. The concession could have acted as a precedent possibly encouraging 
others to engage in activity contrary to sovereign command as they perceived the sovereign as being 
incapable o f suppressing the exercise o f their liberty, hence leading to further social disruption and 
ultimately the dissolution o f the commonwealth.
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12. A restriction in the scope of opposition to one of resistance was however removed 
for Hobbes in circumstances where stability broke down as manifested by the 
proliferation of murders and robberies which for Hobbes would be caused by the 
corruption of the judiciary giving rise to the expectation amongst potential wrong 
doers that they would not be punished. In such circumstances Hobbes considered that 
there would be a reversion to the state of nature and the commonwealth would be 
dissolved. Here of course the fundamental difference to the previous scenario was 
that there was disorder which was created by subjects who had covenanted to obey the 
sovereign in circumstances where the sovereign’s agents, namely the judges were 
incapable of countering it. However if one imagines Hobbes’ model as a living one, 
in practice, these distinctions could well count for little and the defence pact played 
out to its logic points to the possibility of a collective voice, existing independently of 
the existing sovereign, that gives rise to a new sovereign to replace the existing one.
[PLEASE TURN OVER].
37 Hobbes, T 1998: 152.
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13. At its most disruptive, the possibility existed for repeated creations and 
destructions of successive sovereign or sovereign lines. Diagrammatically the 
operation of Hobbes” model can be depicted as follows:
Fig. 1
s s s
S >3n
SON] —► CWi ----- ► SON2  ►CWz  ► SON3  ► CW3
14. Here is depicted what might be regarded as a series of cycles looked at 
diachronically, where there are successive states of nature leading to the creation of
o
successive sovereigns or successive sovereign dynasties, if one is contemplating 
kingship as the prevalent form of governance, at the head of successive 
commonwealths. The diagram points to the logical outcome of Hobbes’ model 
despite his own belief that the creation of a sovereign through covenant between 
individuals in the state of nature would provide a permanent escape to the endemic 
conflict that he generally maintains would otherwise result. Its cyclical nature is 
underpinned by Hobbes’ acceptance that ultimately the obligation of subjects to
■7Q
sovereign only lasted as long as the sovereign was able to protect them. This sets
38 So that in relation to S|„ if  regarded as a dynasty would comprise S)n, S |n+i, Sin+2 etc and S2n would 
comprise S2n, S2n+1, S2n+2 etc.
39 Hobbes, T: 1968: 272.
152/267
up a situation where in fact in the final analyses, each individual becomes an 
independent arbiter of whether he continues to be obliged to obey the sovereign’s 
commands.40
15. Added to the cyclical character of social existence is the possibility of conquest 
which Hobbes accepted would give rise to the ousting of one sovereign by another. In 
these circumstances, the legitimacy of the conqueror’s position as sovereign is 
founded on a contract directly between him and those defeated whereby the latter 
submit themselves to the former in exchange for the commitment by the former to 
spare their lives.41 It is the covenant rather than the defeat that for Hobbes provides 
the legitimacy for the conqueror’s entitlement to the obedience of the vanquished. 
Again however the agreement is distinctly conditional as it will last only ‘so for as 
long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him’.42 If anything, the 
entitlement to resist the sovereign is wider here since it extends to circumstances 
where his liberty is under threat. Territorially, Hobbes considered that there would be 
a dynamic towards larger units of governance given that larger units could utilise 
larger human resources to defend themselves, but clearly an acquisition event could 
actually lead to the break-up of an existing unit as part of it was absorbed into that of 
the victor’s existing territory. Furthermore when considering the possibility of a 
dissolution of commonwealths or part of them arising out of the circumstances 
described above, one can see the potential for complex changes in boundaries where 
conflict that is initially internal to a given commonwealth develops into conflict 
between commonwealths as parts of existing commonwealths split off or are absorbed 
by other commonwealths.43
16. Hence the diagram above does not explicitly portray the potential complexity that 
will potentially be associated with a world in which the two primary forms of social 
existence are those characterised by the state of nature and commonwealth. 
Irrespective of how each commonwealth came into being, in essence the existence of
40 The subversive implication of the individual’s right to defend himself.
41 Hobbes, T 1968: 255.
42 Hobbes, T 1968:255.
43 One can imagine for example a situation where the individuals in part o f  a commonwealth that 
reverts to a state of nature because o f an uncontrolled increase in the level o f crime as referred to by 
Hobbes creates a new commonwealth which then enters into conflict with its neighbour o f which 
formerly it was part.
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each will be conditional on the extent to which each individual within each 
commonwealth considers that the sovereign relating to each such unit is protecting his 
or her life. Referring back to back to Searle’s model, bearing this conditionality in 
m ind:
X  (whether individual or assembly) counted as sovereign (Y) only for as long as X  is 
able to protect his subjects (C circumstances).
17. Clearly one can see here a great deal of scope for dispute about the conditions 
referred to in the above formulation. The fundamental difficulty is that the way is set 
for the existence of an irresolvable disagreement over whether X is able to protect his 
subjects. The dilemma posed at the centre of Hobbes’ model generates a multi- 
perspectival response to this conundrum. To explore this, a return is made to 
Cassirer’s observation that the making sense of human experience involves symbolic 
forms particularly language whose structure provides an interactive interface between 
the general and particular and which enables circumstances which are considered to 
constitute an undermining of personal security to be asserted as well as denied in 
response to the experiencing of diverse events occurring over time and across space.
18. Different individuals’ assessment of the extent to which the sovereign is able to 
protect them are likely to vary depending upon a number of factors. These might well 
include: evaluations of the events that each individual experiences, both as to their 
existence, nature and significance as set against what they perceive to be necessary to 
ensure their self preservation; the extent, if any, to which such events are regarded as 
manifestations of sovereign failure to ensure their preservation; and the extent if any 
to which action will need to be taken in defiance of the sovereign with a view to 
ensuring their self preservation. The particularities of each experience of each 
subject will be assessed by that subject against a number of unfolding generalities 
including what each individual considers necessary to ensure self-preservation and the 
impression gained by that individual of the extent to which the sovereign is capable of 
ensuring his protection. This process will not simply concern the experiences of 
events to which they are subject but also their unfolding evaluations of events they 
perceive have occurred to others.
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19. The result could be that each individual might have differing views on the state of 
the commonwealth precisely because their experiences or their evaluations of them 
could well be different and the generality against which they are measured could 
different. Hobbes’ comment that disorder in these circumstances leads to the 
dissolution of commonwealth is premised or at least consistent with his dominant idea 
that ultimately there are only two modes of existence, namely that in the state of 
nature and that under a sovereign within a commonwealth.44 His comment therefore 
that the commonwealth in such circumstances would be dissolved assumes that each 
subject would adopt the same evaluation of the circumstances despite their differing 
experiences and limit points beyond which each might consider that he was freed of 
his obligation to obey the sovereign. Yet the likelihood is that an indeterminate 
situation might exist where it is neither the case that all continued to obey the 
sovereign nor that they all disobeyed him. Looked at in a slightly different way there 
would be a plethora of interpretive ‘communities’ comprising individuals in their 
own right and the sovereign himself who might disagree over whether the 
commonwealth continued to exist. There would be no obvious way of resolving the 
difference, that is to say there would be no institution whose interpretation45 of 
whether or not the commonwealth continued to exist would be binding upon the 
alleged sovereign and subjects. There would be no sovereign behind the sovereign. 
Hence one justification for the need for a sovereign, namely the need for an institution 
with absolute power to provide order and stability resulted in a model that was one 
sovereign short and a rectification of this apparent insufficiency would only reveal 
that it would always be so in circumstances where each individual had the inalienable 
right to take measures independently of the sovereign to preserve themselves in the 
event that the sovereign failed to do so 46
44 Hobbes does not reject the possibility o f  intermediate formations but claims that they will not be 
stable and will dissolve into a state o f nature in the absence of the creation o f  a commonwealth. So for 
example he refers to the creation o f a defence pact as mentioned above and also elsewhere accepts that 
in the state o f nature men are capable o f forming ‘factions’ (Hobbes, T 1998: 22).
45 The term interpretation is used to denote that the judgement as to whether the commonwealth existed 
would take the form o f claiming that it did or did not exist and hence it, that is the interpretation has the 
quality o f a performative utterance.
46 The need for an institution with absolute power as justifying a sovereign has been described by 
Hampton (Hampton, J 1986: 97-103) as the regress argument and the above dilemma shows that 
ultimately within the framework o f Hobbes’ model there is no escaping the intractable dilemma of the 
infinite regress whereby given human nature as perceived by Hobbes, there is the need for a supreme 
authority to resolve conflict.
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20. In so far as individuals increasingly resist the commands of a sovereign because 
they no longer consider that he is able to preserve their lives, in accordance with 
Hobbes’ legitimation narrative, namely that the sovereign’s authority is based on a 
social contract between individuals comprising the multitude at the time of its signing, 
he that is the sovereign is under no obligation to concede to them. Their actions may 
well be regarded from his perspective as being ‘unjust’ in so far as they are in conflict 
with his positive laws from his point of view.47 From the perspective of the 
individual, given the sovereign’s failure in his view to take the necessary actions to 
preserve him, the latter will be faced with acts or omissions which are in breach of his 
natural right to preserve himself and hence will be regarded as evil or iniquitous.
21. If one imagines that the existing sovereign (SI) is the outcome of a social 
contract between the members of the multitude at a particular moment in time (ml), 
the legitimacy of that sovereign is fed by that event which can be designated as SC 1. 
If SI begins to act towards the subjects of his commonwealth (CW1) in ways that 
they increasingly consider are incompatible with their continued preservation, 
increasingly they will act in ways that are consistent with the emergence of a state of 
nature and the dissolution of the commonwealth. As this tendency develops, in 
response to the emergence of a state of nature, those finding themselves within it may 
through a second social contract SC2 occurring at moment m2 create a second 
sovereign S2 and CW2 given that they no longer regard themselves as having any 
obligations to SI. SI on the other hand will have no obligation towards S2 and the 
legitimacy of his position will continue to be fed by the SCI. Practically speaking, 
there is no possibility for the simultaneous existence of CW1 and CW2 where the 
populations occupy the same territory in the absence of agreement between S1 and S2 
whereby they agree in some way to divide such territory and the population which
47 The term ‘unjust’ in used rather inconsistently by Hobbes. Sometimes he uses it to mean acting in a 
manner which is contrary to positive civil law contrasting with iniquitous actions that are those that are 
incompatible with natural law. At other times, he uses the term to include actions which are in breach 
o f natural law. The apparent inconsistency is usefully explored by Burgess. See Burgess, 1994:65 
ftn.15. However he omits to say that the breach o f positive law is at the same time a breach o f natural 
law in the sense that it amounts to a failure to keep his covenants, save where to do so is incompatible 
with the individual’s natural right to preservation (Hobbes, T 1968: 201). It is at least arguable 
therefore that this point o f intersection between obligations o f natural and civil law provides the source 
o f ‘leakage’ whereby at times Hobbes suggests that actions which are incompatible with natural law are 
unjust. A clear demarcation between ‘unjust’ actions and ‘evil’ ones, referred to by Burgess is to be 
found in Hobbes , T 1994: 88, 98-99. What is important to appreciate is that whatever label is attached 
to any particular action or inaction whether by sovereign or subject, it will be the outcome o f subjective 
evaluation by one or both.
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occupies it between them. Hence the state of nature which the creation of a 
commonwealth was designed to exclude so that it would reside between rather than 
within states can be seen from the above to be capable of reasserting itself in the form 
of strife within territories over which commonwealths exist adding to the complexity 
of the conflicts existing between individuals and states undermining the boundaries 
between states.
22. What one can see occurring here referring back to Searle, is that each subject is 
capable of making his own judgement as to whether sovereign S1 has protected him 
so that:
X  no longer counts as SI since he is no longer considered by the particular subject to 
be protecting him as a result o f which by virtue o f a new social contract (SC2) to 
which he was a party Y counts as S2 fo r  as long as he protects him.
In making this judgement, the subject will inevitably not simply look at what has 
actually occurred to himself or others but also is likely to evaluate what is likely to 
occur in the future.
Sovereign Practice and Territorialisation
23. The suggestion that sovereignty emerges within the context of an existing 
practice involving states indicates that the multitude out of which sovereignty 
emerges is already identifiable. The territorialization of the multitude from which 
sovereignty apparently emerges, suggests that the identity of that multitude is 
profoundly influenced by the existence of other states or communities, the 
configuration of their territories, and hence their populations from which the 
multitude in the case where sovereignty is being considered has been excluded.
Hence the existence of the multitude can be regarded as the product of sovereign 
practices involving adjacent sovereignties and not simply the events applicable to the 
emergence of the sovereign under study. One has to add that such exclusion as 
mentioned above might contribute to a given multitude having some sense of 
collectivity, linguistically, religiously and culturally expressed and a sense of its 
history all of which suggest some existing degree of governance. This reading which
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accords more with historical reality, begins to break down the bipolarity of possible 
states of existence between those situations defined by an atomised state of being in a 
state of nature and those where there is sovereign-based governance.48
24. The claim that the sovereign was bom out of a social contract by a multitude 
living ‘in the wild’ potentially has the effect of burying the above explanation with its 
greater degree of nuance as to the multitude’s existence prior to the advent of a 
sovereign. The pre-existence of a territorially based multitude that exhibits some 
degree of social coherence suggests the possibility of other forms of governance, 
including that associated with feudalism and theocratic governance, the very types of 
governance against which Hobbes was opposed. It weakens the claim that the current 
sovereign’s continuing existence is absolutely indispensable to the continuing 
preservation of his subjects and might even pose the sovereign as not being so much 
the solution to civil strife but its potential cause.49 As a result the fear-factor could be 
reduced and the likelihood of resistance to the sovereign could be increased. The 
claimed existence of the social contract, in reality likely to be a founding myth,50 also 
helps to overcome a reality where the likelihood was that sovereignty was established 
by forcible domination and that way of course again strengthens the sovereign’s
48 It has been argued for example that the state of nature was a construct that provided a depersonalised 
account of the English civil war that ensured that its memory would remain in individuals’ minds 
without casting blame or any particular side or party. With that kind o f reading, although involving the 
centrality o f violence, it takes place within the context o f an already existing territorially limited 
society with its own culture and hence potentially poses the possibility o f  modes of existence that do 
not divide simply into those where there is endemic violence and those where there is complete peace 
with nothing in between.
49 This is o f course the point that Locke makes in his model o f sovereignty where its location moves 
from an executive sovereign to ‘the people’ expressed through a legislative body with the former 
possessing the residual right to overthrow the latter. In the process the state o f nature is recast as a 
more benign place with an already existing society.
50 This ushers in a wide literature including Cassirer (1946b) who proclaims that the social contract is a 
means by which man, having been exiled from a stable order by virtue o f the loss o f the fixity o f the 
religious and ethical worlds, refounds such stability in the realm o f the community agreement (Cassirer 
1946b: 169). One can see from this explanation again the idea o f the transcendent in that the agreement 
lies beyond the immediacy and contingency o f existing immanent practices o f governance allowing 
their discontinuities to be ‘overcome’ by reference to the constancy o f an ever present moment of 
foundation. Fitzpatrick on the other hand locates the social contract in the Freudian explanation that it 
mirrors the totemic ritual o f worship whose significance lies in its representation o f the covenant o f  
obedience to the father (Fitzpatrick P, 2001: 24). This too, from a Cassirerian perspective, accords 
with the need to rebut the threat o f  chaos by an involvement in the fixity o f a relationship around which 
irresolvable conflict occurs a relationship whose character fundamentally involves an exclusion o f  
others who do not occupy the position o f father.
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legitimacy. Both the claimed existential need for a sovereign and the choice as to the 
location of sovereignty are therefore protected more effectively.51
25. The emergence and continuation of a sovereign therefore may well be the product 
of an already separating or separated population which enters into a subordinate 
relationship with him. This process may well be intertwined with those in 
surrounding territories whereby governance occurs on the basis that the regional 
territorial configuration is accepted willingly or otherwise. Stability might therefore 
be the product of practices which depart from the founding mythology. There is a 
sense therefore in which the prevailing practice of the population to the sovereign 
both generates its own founding and its own explanations which in turn are seen to 
‘produce’ actually existing arrangements. There is complex movement in play which 
is generated by the actually existing operation of co-ordinated behaviour between 
subjects and between them and sovereign which can be claimed to be consistent with 
the legitimating narrative through which governance is justified. Looking at this 
process from the perspective of adjacent populations one sees the following:
[Please turn over]
51 It is interesting to note that in the concluding chapter o f Leviathan, Hobbes opines that one o f the 
most effective causes o f a state’s disintegration is the ‘approbation’ o f a Conqueror’s past actions as 
justifying the state given that there is ‘scarce a Common-wealth in the world, whose beginnings can in 
conscience be justified’ (Hobbes, T 1968: 721).
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26. Here one sees a stable relationship between three territorially limited and 
adjacent states A, B, and C. One can see that the integrity of state B is in part 
contributed by the existence of the surrounding states which contribute towards the 
creation of the territorially limited multitude b, that is (M))b. The contribution of 
surrounding states to the integrity and stability of state B is the product of a sovereign 
practice which involves non-interference by states A and C upon state B. That is to 
say that the sovereign practices of ASn and CSn must centrally involve an 
exclusionary dynamic in relation to the territory and population of state B which is in 
turn reciprocated.
27. Looked at from the perspective of BSln, assuming that his position is the product 
of forcible domination, the claim that it is the product of a voluntaristic social contract 
may be problematic not least because the population or at least much of it will have 
directly experienced the conquest. However, as one moves beyond this point to 
subsequent members of the dynasty, namely BSln+i, B Sln+ 2 etc., the creation of a
52 Clearly to classify government as being simply the product o f forcible domination is itself to 
simplify matters in that it may well be the case that there may be sections o f  the population that were 
not averse to the conquest and may not regard it in the same way as other parts o f the population. This 
suggests the possibility that, within a given population there may be different histories, some being 
more dominant than others, whose diversity may allow for the establishment, at least potentially, o f a 
variety o f foundation stories.
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multitude existing in a state of nature which gave rise to its own sovereign as a means 
of escaping its own intolerable dilemma becomes possible, being reinforced by the 
current reality of governance. As each new rupture occurs so that sovereignty is 
taken by BS2n from BSln for example, a similar process will occur in which at least 
initially the legitimacy deficit is not likely to be overcome by the claim that the new 
sovereign arrangement is based on consent. As the continuity of each new dynasty 
increases, the claim as to a founding based on consent will be strengthened and will 
support and be supported by a growth of authority based on longevity and continuity 
itself.
Some Observations on the Place o f Resistance in Hobbes* Model o f Governance
28. In discussing the practices associated with sovereignty which, although not 
explicitly referred to by Hobbes, can be seen by way of extrapolation as the logical 
consequences of Hobbes’ model of governance, the issue of resistance clearly comes 
into focus. Instances where resistance appears to be justified emerge in Hobbes’ 
writings at various points. In essence, at their core is the proposition which is never 
abandoned by Hobbes that a commonwealth and the concomitant obligations of 
subjects to obey a sovereign can only last as long, ‘and no longer’, as the latter has 
power to protect them, given that natural right of men ‘to protect themselves when 
none else can protect them’.53 Furthermore such a right cannot be trumped by any pre­
existing covenant to obey the sovereign and is therefore inalienable.54 This natural 
right is supported by a natural law which imposes upon the individual in a state of 
nature the obligation not ‘to do that which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the 
means of preserving the same: and to omit that, by which.. .it may be preserved.’55 
While the natural right of self- preservation is not handed over to the sovereign, as 
previously explained in covenanting to create the sovereign each individual hands 
over his judgment, as to the means needed to ensure such survival to the sovereign, 
whose single will replaces that of the many and whose commands the individual 
covenants to obey.56 This inalienable right of self-preservation however continues to 
lie at the centre of Hobbes’ sovereign- subject relation even though from a
53 Hobbes, T 1968:272.
54 Hobbes, T 1968:272.
55 Hobbes, T 1968: 79; Hobbes, T 1968: 201.
56 Hobbes T 1998: 72.
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jurisprudential point of view by definition nothing the sovereign does can be held to 
be unjust even though it can be regarded as iniquitous. Hobbes endeavours to 
minimise the consequences of the presence of this right by seeking to specify the 
circumstances in which it can be invoked which have been alluded to above. However 
the difficulty is that once the ‘genie’ in the form of the natural right to self 
preservation is ‘out of the bottle’, its implications inevitably become potentially far- 
reaching and contested. Lying behind these scenarios is Hobbes’ assessment of man’s 
natural propensities and by what amounts to an unenforceable normative code 
comprising Hobbes’ conceptions of natural law whose overwhelming purpose is to 
avoid that ‘which is hurtful; but most of all that terrible enemy of nature, death, from 
whom we expect the loss of all power, and also the greatest of bodily pains in the 
losing’.57 Hobbes considered that within civil society, the sovereign was the ultimate
CO
interpreter of what was publicly to count as natural law. His actions could be 
measured by reference to such law and hence it was capable of providing a 
legitimating framework. Hobbes, reflecting this, claims to ground ‘the Civill Right of 
Sovereign both the Duty and Liberty of Subjects upon the known naturall Inclinations 
of Mankind, and upon the Articles of Law of Nature; of which no man, that pretends 
but reason enough to govern his private family, ought to be ignorant.’59 As has 
already been mentioned, Hobbes accepted that a sovereign’s breach of natural law 
might in certain circumstances result in the dissolution of the commonwealth.60 What 
is interesting here is that by implication given that the content of natural right and law 
are constructs of reason derived from man’s inclinations, whether or not sovereign’s 
subjects were aware of the content of natural law as developed by Hobbes, such 
inclinations themselves could lead to resistance and possibly rebellion.61
57 Hobbes, T 1994: 79. The character o f natural law was such that its normative qualities were always 
binding internally upon individuals’ consciences in a state of nature and hence constituted a system o f  
standards by which each individual could measure his actions, subject to the overriding limitation that 
any commitment to obey them fell away in so far as such obedience was inconsistent with the 
continuing ‘safety’ o f the individual (Hobbes, T 1998:54).
58 Hobbes, T 1968:322. In effect natural law at least potentially occupies the position o f what would 
now be termed the rule o f law in providing a set o f standards against which the contents of positive law 
are judged.
59 Hobbes, T 1968: 725. It is interesting here to speculate whether Hobbes would have been in favour 
o f the outright banning or the restricted availability o f his own writings to the population of a 
Hobbesian commonwealth given that their contents as regards natural law could undermine the 
sovereign’s claim to be entitled to possess monopoly powers to claim the contents o f such laws.
60 Hobbes, T 1998: 152.
61 Hobbes in fact at one point equates resistance with rebellion in the context o f the sovereign-subject 
relationship (Hobbes, T 1968: 377).
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29. It is therefore difficult to see how the constant possibility of resistance does not 
play a profoundly important role in determining a sovereign’s actions and commands 
to his subjects and it is not surprising, bearing this in mind, that Hobbes devotes 
considerable space to how sovereigns ought to govern to ensure what he terms ‘the 
safety of the people’, an interesting term, because Hobbes make it clear that by that 
phrase he does not mean ‘bare preservation’, casting a generous interpretation upon 
the duty of the sovereign to protect his subjects.62 The question then arises as to 
whether in the articulation of the sovereign with his subjects, the collectivity of the 
latter as a separate entity comes into play as part of that relationship. From a 
juridical point of view the answer is in the negative as the individuals who handed 
over power to a sovereign are taken to only express their collectivity through his 
actions and commands which are taken to be theirs through a process of 
authorization. As a result, he is incapable of injuring his subjects or being unjust to 
them as they are incapable of injuring or being unjust to themselves.64 However, the 
possibility of collective action remains and a prudent sovereign needs to take it into 
account when governing. It is captured in Hobbes’ acceptance that obedience to a 
sovereign only lasts as long as he has the power to protect his subjects.65 By 
extrapolation, this poses the possibility that every subject of the sovereign might come 
to the conclusion simultaneously that such conditions pertain and hence obedience to 
the sovereign ceases.66 Even if one does not wish to concede the possibility of 
collective action in opposition to an existing sovereign, the effect of such a 
development is consistent with that of such action even if it is the product of isolated 
individuals coming to their conclusions simultaneously. But the possibility of some 
kind of collective action is not discounted by Hobbes as has already been shown 
above in an analysis which seeks to show that the character of the state of nature is 
not as atomised as might first be suggested. Not only is it predicated on the existence 
of geographically discrete social formations but also as previously mentioned there is
62 Hobbes, T 1968: 376. Chapter 30 o f Leviathan most particularly outlines the measures to be taken to 
ensure a successful commonwealth.
63 Hobbes, T 1968: 227.
64 Hobbes, T 1968: 232.
65 Hobbes, T 1968: 272 and paragraph 12 above.
66 This returns us to the impossibility in Hobbes’ model o f resolving such a clash, other than through 
violence or possibly agreement because there is no sovereign behind the sovereign. From the 
sovereign’s perspective, such resistance is unjustified. However from the those that are regarded by 
him as his subjects, a lack o f protection means that the commonwealth is dissolved and there is no 
sovereign. The sovereign has in effect become a usurper and in so doing echoes the position o f the 
heretical pope in the model o f Augustus Triumphus. See above.
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the suggestion that in the state of nature there is the possibility of small social units 
where the domination associated with the sovereign-subject relationship is prefigured
/  \  f \ lultimately in familyes. He also accepts as previously mentioned the possibility of 
joint action against the sovereignty within the commonwealth in the form of defence
Z 'o
pacts. The idea of action which has a collective quality is also however posed in the 
very appointment of a sovereign where individuals agree with each other to hand over 
their rights of self-government to a third party a moment before that individual or 
assembly becomes sovereign.69 This momentary expression of collectivity combined 
to the proposition that subjects only have to obey a sovereign for as long as the latter 
has the power to protect them, admits of the possibility that the move to create a 
sovereign can occur in the context of disaffection from a previous sovereign precisely 
because the latter is regarded by his subjects as unable to protect them pointing 
towards the possibility of the successive creation and destruction of commonwealths
70diagrammatically illustrated above.
30. The point here is not that the legal relationship of sovereign and subject ever 
admits of the justification of resistance or rebellion but that Hobbes never abandons 
the right of self-preservation and all that flows from it in terms of natural law. The 
right of self-preservation both justifies the creation of a sovereign and potentially 
undermines its continued existence as resistance derived from this right can in 
practice undermine its continuing existence. It is true that within Hobbes’ writings, a 
people can only exist following the organisation of a commonwealth within the body 
of the sovereign and hence as a separate entity its existence is denied. Despite this, 
the possibility of resistance, whether or not through collective action, remains a 
central concern in Hobbes’ writings with regard to the way that a sovereign ought to 
behave.71 Resistance and even rebellion against a sovereign might be illegal but in
67 Hobbes, T 1968:
68 Hobbes, T 1968: 270.
69 Hobbes, T 1968: 227.
70 See paragraph 14 above. The root towards the creation o f a new sovereign might have embraced at 
least initially the setting up o f defence pacts in relation to the ousted sovereign or the break down of 
law and order as a result o f corrupt judges referred to above.
71 The denial o f the existence o f a people as a separate entity holds for the creation o f a sovereign by 
agreement within a population. However where a sovereign emerges through conquest, as mentioned 
in paragraph 16, the possibility arises that in such circumstances ‘a people’ is capable o f existing 
separately from the sovereign. The reason is that the justification for conquest is not based on an 
agreement between each individual to submit themselves to a third party who is not part o f the contract, 
but directly to the conqueror. In such circumstances, it is at least arguable that in the event the
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certain circumstances will be legitimate. That legitimacy is to be found in the tenets 
of natural law from which Hobbes does not disconnect his model of governance, 
given that the very justification of sovereignty and the sovereign- subject relation is 
predicated upon the need for self-preservation and the natural requirement that 
covenants are to be obeyed. The sovereign’s relationship with his subjects is 
designed to overcome the claimed existence of chronic resistance by individuals 
against each other in the state of nature. Furthermore the very construction of the 
sovereign’s power and presence is deeply informed by the continuing possibility of 
resistance against him within the commonwealth itself.
The Problem o f Attribution
31. At the heart of Hobbes’ model of sovereignty is the requirement of obedience to 
the sovereign of his subjects. Hobbes appreciated that there was a profound difficulty 
that he had to overcome, namely how to ensure that individuals would honour the 
covenant they had entered into to obey the sovereign given their tendencies towards 
irrationality and their propensity to engage in conflict which might include resistance 
against the sovereign. He envisioned that the sovereign’s primary instrument to 
ensure obedience was fear. Most frequently, alluded to is the fear of death, as having 
an essential role in motivating men to form a commonwealth and he also saw it as the 
glue holding society together as reflected in his assertion that ‘the origin of large and 
lasting societies lay not in mutual human benevolence but in men’s mutual fear.’
The task is to ensure that fear coalesced around the person of the sovereign so that it 
appeared to emanate from him sufficiently forcefully to compel his subjects to adhere 
to a practice of obedience.73 To do this would require a multi-layered approach 
since Hobbes considered that no sovereign could possess sufficient coercive power to 
generate sufficient fear on its own. Hence the creation of fear of the ruler required a 
social process whereby subjects were exposed to the teachings of the elite layers that
sovereign is no longer able to protect his subjects, the former is in breach o f contract with his subjects 
and the latter can then seek to enforce the contract by taking steps to replace what is in effect, from 
their perspective, a former sovereign. This gives rise to a clash o f perspectives in respect o f which 
there is no sovereign behind the sovereign to resolve it. See paragraph 20 above.
72 Hobbes, T 1998: 24.
73 The centrality o f fear in Hobbes’ model also reflected his view that ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in the world 
were not intrinsic properties but were the outcome o f individual’s personal preferences. See Robin, C 
2004: 31-50 for an exploration o f the place o f fear in Hobbes’ model.
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impressed upon them in a multitude of ways that the sovereign is all powerful74 and 
the consequences of disobedience namely certain punishment and, if necessary, lying 
behind that the threat of the return of the state of nature with its profound 
uncertainties.75 Hobbes’ position, namely that the only public access to God’s 
commands and teaching was through the words of the sovereign was also clearly 
central to this project.76 These strategies would occur against the backdrop of 
sovereign action that ensured in the eyes of his subjects who, living in the 
commonwealth, would be better for him than living in the state of nature. The 
sovereign’s apparently pervasive presence is crucial to the project of ensuring 
obedience.
32. It is necessary that the generation of meaning through the symbolic forms and 
particularly that of language are not simply associated with and limited by the 
meanings which denote objects but that they also become infused with significance 
when associated with the idea of supreme rulership.77 These selfsame particularities 
also have to be fed by and feed the presence of the all-powerful idea of the 
immanently transcendent sovereign.78 The end product needs to be a situation where 
both physical appearances of the sovereign and his non appearance provoke a sense of 
all powerfulness in the minds of his subjects. Looking at Geertz’s study of three
70rulerships, he lists the different ways in which this all powerful position is 
constructed. These include the maximisation of the sovereign’s physical appearances 
through maintaining a high degree of visibility across his territory enhanced by 
display, ceremonies and formalities.80 The difficulty is however that the physical
74 Robin, C 2004:39. Hobbes recognised the centrality o f such elites, for example, in his comment that 
‘Men may be brought to the love o f obedience by preachers and gentlemen that imbibe good principles 
in their youth in the universities (Behemoth 59 in Robin, C: 2004: 39). Clearly the transmission o f the 
ideology o f  fear would potentially render each subject to be a messenger o f the certainties that would 
follow disobedience, leading to a mutual and continual reinforcement o f the obedience.
75 The purpose o f punishment in Hobbes’ view was not revenge but ‘terrour’ (Hobbes, T 1968: 355) 
Further the power o f fear lay in the uncertainty o f  the consequences o f disobedience. See Hobbes T 
1968: 120.
76 Hobbes o f course as has previously been mentioned, did not consider that the sovereign could 
command his subjects internal beliefs( Hobbes, T 1968: 504-5 (Leviathan)). This point for Schmitt 
provided the origin o f the modem liberal ‘ “neutral” ‘ state which was incapable o f ensuring political 
stability and o f dealing effectively with crisis. See Schmitt, C 1996: 56.
77 This concerns the iconography used to develop the majesty historically associated with rulership.
78See chapter 6 above for a discussion o f the place o f transcendence in the construction o f sovereignty.
79 Geertz, C 1983: 121-146.
80 Geertz does not explicitly contemplate the central task o f constructing and securing the meaning of  
non-appearance in the overall project o f projecting an all-powerful sovereign.
166/267
limitations inherent in the bodily presence of the sovereign had to be overcome not 
only via the spectacle of his physical appearance but by the marshalling of his 
physical absences. Constructing the meaning of these absences is therefore crucial to 
the construction of an idea of an all powerful sovereign and involves the interlocking 
use of the enhanced appearances by his representatives and by the use of imagery 
depicting the sovereign which as Wagner-Pacifici has suggested needs to be
o t
exchanged and reproduced. Through such mechanisms and associated discursive 
practices, the dangers are reduced of what amounts to double non-appearances 
defined by places and times in which he is neither present physically nor are his 
representatives and the imagery associated with him.
33. Hence the idea of the transcendent unity of the sovereign is fed by a series of 
diverse particularities whether or not these involve the body of the sovereign himself. 
However this process does not simply concern the sovereign and the images and 
discursive practices directly associated with him, including the production of law by 
way of the sovereign’s commands. It also potentially includes a multitude of other 
practices, each with its own particularities, which go towards the feeding of the idea 
of the sovereign’s simultaneous diversity and unity. Hence to cite one practice, that 
of the judiciary who are regarded by Hobbes as agents of the sovereign. Clearly in 
relation to such practices the particularities that are associated with it go towards the 
feeding of the practice as a whole. So for example, the appointment of each judge is a 
particular instance of the general process of judicial appointment and each judicial 
ruling is a particular instance of the general practice of applying the law and so on. 
One might say the same thing concerning the collection of taxes, the operation of the 
armies and so on. From the perspective of Searle’s formula -X counts as Y in
81 Wagner-Pacifici, R 2005:100.
82 As for example indicated by Hobbes’ view that the source o f judicial authority is located in the 
sovereign on whose behalf the judge adjudicates. See Hobbes, T 1968: 323. Furthermore Hobbes 
considered that as words were capable o f endless meanings which could only be fixed by the sovereign, 
certainty and justice required that a judge’s decision was final, subject to direct interference by the 
sovereign. Judicial decision could not be constrained by nor contribute towards precedent since to do 
so could result in unjust rulings being followed in other cases. At one level, Hobbes here ‘throws the 
baby out with the bathwater’ since a system of precedent involving a hierarchy o f courts negates the 
potential for endless discussion without a final ruling. See Hobbes, T 1968: 326. However this 
approach is consistent with the requirement for the sovereign’s presence to be dominant, pervasive and 
decisive and yet at the same time enigmatic in that rulings cannot easily be predicted and yet can 
always open to the possibility o f direct sovereign intervention in the event o f being unacceptable. 
Certainty is pervaded by uncertainty as the sovereign’s centrality possesses the former quality while 
what the sovereign may do in relation to specific situations contains the pervasive threat and at times 
actuality of the latter.
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circumstances C- one can see therefore that its application to the creation and 
maintenance of the idea of a particular sovereign in the way attempted above does not 
on its own fully capture the processes that would be needed to maximise the 
possibility of the sovereign’s survival which is ultimately predicated upon a 
population’s submission. Most obviously the ‘filling out’ o f ‘circumstances C’ would 
require an inclusion of practices having the effect of enhancing or designed 
specifically to enhance the idea of the sovereign’s presence through the mechanisms 
of ceremony, display, representation and imagery with each such activity itself 
potentially constituting an instance of a practice to which Searle’s formula could 
apply.83
34. The idea of the transcendent unity which is perceived to be immanently 
manifested in a diversity of form can be seen itself to be a particular example of a 
generality. That is to say the acceptance of the idea of the existence of a transcendent 
unity which possesses the qualities of sovereignty can from a Cassirerian point of 
view be seen as a particular example of a transcendent unity which might be capable 
of existing in several forms, so that for example Hobbes accepted that sovereignty 
was capable of exhibiting itself in the form of an assembly. Here however the 
possibility is increased of the idea of the sovereign’s unity being ruptured by the
QA
perceived discordance between members of the assembly. The assembly therefore is 
an expression of sovereignty that fits less stably with the idea of a transcendent unity 
than that of the idea of a solitary sovereign. It is also possible to perceive sovereignty 
in a very different way bearing in mind those activities that are perceived to clearly 
not personally involve the sovereign, in an immanent sense, such as that of judicial
o r
practice which are attributed to the sovereign unity. Here one can see the possibility 
of the authority which legitimates the exercise of power attributed to the sovereign 
being separated off from those bodies that actually exercise it. The sovereign in such
83 This is not to mention the negative view that the creation and existence of a sovereign is predicated 
upon the existing sovereigns in neighbouring territories in so far as they as a matter o f practice do not 
impose obedience upon the population o f sovereign under consideration as suggested in the previous 
section o f  this chapter.
84 Hobbes favoured the solitary sovereign as opposed to the assembly because o f the propensity o f the 
latter to split into factions. See Hobbes, 1968: 286.
85 The attribution o f  a diverse range o f activities associated with governance was also noted in 
governance associated with Augustinus Triumphus’ model o f sovereignty given that the sovereign 
there embodied the entire community (Ecclesia) including those that exercised government, practically 
speaking on his behalf ( Wilks, M.J 1963: 38).
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circumstances is perceived as embodying the authority and unity of the instruments of 
governance that are associated with it. Hence, the exercise of power by such 
instruments, are perceived to be sourced by such authority and to be incapable of 
existence without such authority. The idea of the transcendence therefore of the 
sovereign unity both continues to feed and be fed by the idea of the immanent 
activities of such instruments and involves common place transcendence whose 
specific character points towards the metaphysically transcendent in which the 
sovereign is posed as god-like overcoming the limitation of time and place.
35. The split is graphically demonstrated in the traditional forms of rule located in 
the Polynesian Islands such as the island of Tonga. In terms of practice, sovereignty 
was in essence divided between a monarch called the Tuitonga who was revered and 
before whom all prostrated themselves. His life was lived apart in meditation, prayer 
and ritual. Government was actually in the hands of another person, namely the 
Tuihaatakatana. The former reached his position through the principle of inheritance 
while the latter was the chief who was the winner of a contest, such as one of combat 
in Mangala, one of the Hervey Islands.86 The victor of such a combat would have to 
be invested by the Tuitonga and to do this he would have to approach him on all fours 
and listen to the instructions the Tuitonga gave him as to how to rule. If the Tuitonga 
was not satisfied that the chief would carry out his instructions he would refuse to 
have the sacred drum beaten and undertake the customary sacrifice. Without these, the 
state of war between the chiefs that gave rise to the victor would not end and fertility 
to the soil would not be restored. So the victorious chief had to promise to govern 
correctly in the eyes of the Tuitonga, under threat of constant insecurity, in the
07
absence of such a promise, because of the continuation of war and famine.
36. There are several interlocking features of this arrangement which can be noted.
At one level, the existence of government is the product of a social contract between 
Tuitonga and the victorious chief although in contrast to Hobbes’ social contract this 
does not involve the population at large. The chiefs ability to rule is contingent on the 
authority he gains from approval by the Tuitonga and it is as though the authority and
86 This account was originally located in De Jouvenel, B 1997: 116-121 who obtained it from 
Williamson, R.W (1934) The Social and Political Systems o f  Central Polynesia (Cambridge University 
Press).
87 De Jouvenel, B 1997:117.
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power associated with governance has been partially split between two individuals
Q O
with each strengthening the other. De Jouvenel attempts to describe this 
arrangement as one where there is both a passive and active king. This is clearly a 
description that does partially accord with the arrangement in a functional sense.89 
However it appears to be the case that the Tuitonga’s role, in effect, of being ‘the 
sovereign behind the sovereign’, does not create simply a partnership of opposites but 
a hierarchy which paradoxically is reinforced by his central position as the appointer 
of the governor and at the same his reclusive existence and disconnection from the 
daily business of governance. In this way, his immanent manifestations come to feed 
the idea of his transcendence which provides a unifying framework and reference 
point against which government is legitimated, gathers its meaning and is tolerated by 
the population. The impact of the Tuitonga’s role in this regard is highlighted by the 
fact that in Samoa where the authority of the equivalent of the Tuitonga has vanished, 
civil war was endemic, government was unstable and uprisings frequent.90
37. Looking at Hobbes’ model in the context of this arrangement, one can construct a 
different reading whereby the site of power and authority is effectively split with the 
idea that the sovereign’s role as an individual becomes the authority for the 
government’s power and the point of unity and continuity which provides the point of 
reference and explanatory framework for the diverse manifestations of government 
activity. The sovereign’s disconnection from the day to day activity of government, if 
anything, reinforces the idea of his transcendent position as it suggests the potential 
manifestation of immense power which is capable of manifesting itself in a diversity 
of forms and events which overcome the physical limitations of the monarch’s body, 
and as a result appear capable of threatening the existent normality. With this 
reading of Hobbes’ sovereign, one sees the possibility of the idea of a sovereign unity 
providing the explanatory frame of reference for the diverse activity of governance, 
little of which actually in a direct causal sense directly involves the sovereign. In this 
sense therefore one can see very clearly a conceptualisation of sovereignty whereby 
the sovereign possesses a mythico-religious role which provides meaning and stability
881 say ‘partially’ because the act o f appointing the governor or active king represents a point at which 
power and authority fuse.
89 I say ‘partially’ here too for a similar reason. He is not completely passive and indeed his action in 
the appointment o f  the governor or active king is an act upon which the entire system o f  governance is 
predicated.
90 De Jouvenel, B 1997:118.
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to what would otherwise be perceived as the uncertainty, unpredictability and 
alienating quality of government impositions.
38. The question of the attribution of the activities and presence of the diverse forms 
of government attributed to the transcendent unity of the sovereign institution 
therefore involves a series of diverse and multiple practices within the context of a 
powerful legitimation narrative which provides such practices with meaning. From 
Hobbes’ perspective at the heart of this legitimating narrative are essentially two 
features. Firstly there is the foundation myth which explains and justifies the 
existence of the sovereign. Secondly there is the continuing threat that without such a 
central institution, society would disintegrate to the uncertainty and disruption 
associated with the state of nature which the sovereign is perceived to ward off by, 
inter alia, controlling wayward subjects.
39. By seeking to tease out aspects of Hobbes’ explanatory narrative for the creation 
of a sovereign, we have sought to show that in fact there is a different Hobbes lurking 
in the background which at least implicitly accepts the impossibility of the state of 
nature as posed by him in the foreground, and that the existence of his sovereign, 
despite his claim that it alone is responsible for the creation of meaningful society, is 
in fact embedded in a wider practice that spatially and temporarily transcends the 
existence of the sovereign in question. This was done by reference to units of 
governance pre-existing the commonwealths subsequently created, the existence of 
common linguistic practices and territorial specificities which while making the state 
of nature meaningful as the territorially limited pre-cursor to the creation of social 
contracts giving rise to territorially limited commonwealths, also undermines its 
claimed chaotic content. Moving back to Cassirer’s model and the idea of mythic 
symbolization, one can see that the existing practice of government and the needs 
generated by existing legitimating narratives based for Hobbes around the fear of 
death or damnation themselves provide for the construction of historical pasts. These 
can be experienced as constituting the irretrievable past which appear to provide 
points of causation of the present governmental practice and the needs for them. In 
this sense the move towards the uncertain and contingent future contributes towards 
the construction of a stable past which provides a reference point and a ‘guiding hand’ 
for the facing of that uncertainty through the agency of the sovereign. The
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elimination of the existential uncertainty captured by the idea of the state of nature 
driven by the need for self-preservation both justifies the creation of Hobbes’ 
sovereign and potentially points to the latter’s destruction given Hobbes’ refusal to 
abandon the right associated with that need.
Chapter 9: A Re-Examination of Austin
1. From the previous chapter on Austin’s model of sovereignty, it can be seen that 
there are three key elements of the model. Firstly that sovereignty is located in a 
supreme determinate body that is not subordinate to any other determinate body, 
secondly that its position as a sovereign institution is conditional upon habitual 
obedience by the bulk of the population within its jurisdiction and thirdly that the 
population in question is not habitually obedient to any other sovereign body.
2. Absent from Austin’s model is any explicit claims as to the existence of a social 
contract as providing a reason or justification for the creation of the sovereign and as 
to the fundamental purpose of the sovereign as for example indicated by Hobbes as
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the preservation of his subjects. It does not preclude government preceding consent 
by the population.91 Lying at the heart of his model is the fact of habitual obedience 
by the bulk of the population rather than its causes. No definition was supplied for 
the term ‘habitual’ or ‘obedience’ or ‘bulk’ for that matter and even if it were there 
would still remain the difficulty of determining who would be the final interpreter and
Q9arbiter of whether the condition was met. There is an implicit acceptance that 
sovereignty emerges out of an existing practice whereby societies can be demarcated 
prior to the imposition or emergence of a sovereign.93 Hence for example in his 
exploration of the occupation of France by allied armies in 1815, he explores the 
question of whether or not the sovereign of the French nation as a result were the 
‘allied sovereigns’.94 In so doing he accepts the possibility that the French might have 
been an ‘independent society in a state of nature’ prior to the invasion. Unlike 
Hobbes however, he appears to accept that while such a society is not a ‘society 
political’ since that only comes about through having a sovereign, it does not need to 
be anarchical and hence he accepts that the ingredients of a civil society can exist in 
such circumstances. He does not explain how this might be but one can infer such 
an existence from the typology of rules he adopts whereby social organisation can 
also involve the adoption of rules of positive morality and the laws of God. These 
laws unlike the commands of positive law are enforced not by sanctions imposed by a 
sovereign or his delegates but by approbation.95 Such rules might therefore form the 
basis for a self-regulating society.
91 In the sense that sovereignty’s creation does not have to be preceded by the expression o f consent by 
the population over which the former comes to have jurisdiction, it is has a similarity with the models 
o f Triumphus and natural law models including that o f Aquinas, Dante and early modem models such 
as that o f  Bodin and Machiavelli, not to mention the vast majority o f political practice until the modem 
era and the advent of democracy. It also fits in with Hobbes’ reflection at the end o f Leviathan that 213 
commonwealths are rarely created through prior consent by the affected population( Hobbes, T 
1968:721-722)..
92 See chapter 4 paragraph 15 above.
93 Austin does not discount the possibility o f  sovereignty emerging in an institution which defines the 
territorial extent o f the population, the bulk o f which is considered to be habitually obedient to it. This 
possibility emerges from Austin’s non-reliance on social contract theory involving a pre-existing 
population as a justification for the creation o f a sovereign, and has some similarity with Hobbes’ 
explicit approach to the imposition o f a sovereign following conquest o f  territory that would also result 
in the definition o f a population that goes on to form the subjects o f that sovereign.
94 Austin, J 1832: 168-170. Austin differentiates between societies in a state o f nature ‘or anarchy’, 
political societies that are not independent and those that are political and independent. The latter were 
characterised by the sovereign-subject relationship.
95 Austin, J 1832: 19-21.
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3. The purpose of this chapter will be in particular to explore further the nature of 
habit and rules and suggest that reasons for undertaking behaviour that appears to be 
consistent with the commands of a sovereign are complex and dynamic and may or 
may not embrace a commitment to follow such commands particularly in the light of 
the diversity and episodic nature of the commands or their application that emanate 
directly or indirectly from the sovereign. This exploration both provides a more 
illuminating explanation of the Austinian sovereign-subject relationship and also 
points to the potentiality for rupture which will be explored in Chapters 11 and 12 
below.
Habits and Rules
4. One of the central features of Austin’s model of sovereignty is that the relationship 
between sovereign and subject is based on habit. Could one say that obedience is 
ultimately rule-governed, thus profoundly contradicting Austin’s assertion that the 
hall mark of a sovereign relation the domain of governance is habit-based?96 
Ultimately not, since one then moves into the problem of the infinite regress since 
where is there a pre-existing rule that the constitution ought to be obeyed and if that 
existed, where is the rule behind that one? This is not to say that individuals 
particularly may not consider that they are bound by the terms of the constitution.
But that is moving into, as Hart would put it, the internal aspect of rules whereby 
individuals may have reasons for obedience which subjectively they consider 
motivates them to obey the rule. From this perspective, individuals may consider 
their behaviour is rule-governed and one can say using Hart’s phrase that there is a
Q7social practice that ‘constitutes the ‘acceptance of a rule’. However as a matter of 
logic, given that rules are not self implementing, explaining behaviour as the outcome 
of obedience to a rule does not fully explain it. Why is there such a social practice? 
Of course Hart in his critique of Austin rightly considers that Austin cannot explain 
why a population in the habit of obedience to one monarch will upon his demise, obey 
his successors. This for Hart is explained by the existence of rules that enable the right 
of the first king to legislate to transfer to his successor through the vesting in the latter
96 Let us assume for these purposes the Austin’s sovereign has ‘enacted’ a constitution which might 
simply have one clause which declares that all the commands o f the sovereign must be obeyed by all 
members o f the population within the sovereign’s jurisdiction.
97 Hart, H.L.A, 1961: 58.
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of a continuously existing title which had previously vested in his predecessor. This 
idea of the continuing title, referring back to the symbolic forms of Cassirer, points to
QO
an explanation for the continuation of the social practice of obedience to the 
prevailing monarch to be explained by conduct which is orientated, amongst other 
things," towards a unity with a transcendent quality associated with the title with its 
continuing quality and history vested in the former monarch’s successor. The office 
of monarchy that accompanies the title therefore contributes toward its inhabitant 
possessing a transcendent quality which is fed by the immanent manifestations of its 
inhabitant and associated imagery already mentioned.100 That is not to say that 
individuals might not have differing attitudes towards obedience to what or who they 
perceive to be the sovereign. The criminal will selectively obey the commands of the 
sovereign but it is suggested that even then, it will not be every command that she or 
he disobeys but only certain ones and indeed his criminal strategy will be reliant upon 
predictable patterns of social behaviour which may well be considered to be rule- 
bound by others for its formulation and implementation.101 Even the rebel who might 
not consider that she or he is obliged to obey the sovereign’s commands will develop 
his strategy of opposition in the expectation that others currently obey them and the 
purpose of his opposition may well be aimed at the obedience to a sovereign unity but 
not the one currently in situ.
5. Yet the idea of social practice constituting ‘acceptance of a rule’ suggests the 
possibility of its behavioural manifestations being consistent with the rule that the 
commands of the sovereign will be obeyed and yet are not motivated by it. It is 
possible, despite Hart’s essential thrust to the contrary, that the habitual obedience 
required by Austin’s model will involve rule-governed behaviour from an external 
perspective and that therefore from that point of view the term ‘habitual’ is not
98 This is a point I go on to qualify below by raising the possibility that in fact individuals may conduct 
themselves in manners which are consistent with the commands o f the sovereign but who are at the 
same time not particularly conscious or conscious at all o f the sovereign’s existence.
99 The attraction o f the transcendent unity expressed by the monarch who possesses the title will also be 
fed by the expectation based on past experience that obedience to the monarch results in predictable 
patterns o f social behaviour -  a point made by MacCormick, N in his exploration o f Hart’s internal 
aspect o f rules. See MacCormick, N 1978: 289.
100 The point here is that the immanent continuity o f the institution o f monarchy which is ‘occupied ‘ 
by successive monarchs helps feed the relative transcendence o f each occupant.
101 So for example, the burglar or thief takes advantage of the exclusionary qualities o f property 
contractual law by physically obtaining property and then endeavours to take advantage of such laws 
by behaving as if  he was vested with ownership o f the property he has stolen.
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necessarily misplaced.102 The idea of habitual behaviour as Hart indicates suggests
1 HTnon-reflective conduct that exhibits regularity and predictability of conduct. The 
way that Hart poses the idea of habit is that it can be differentiated from that of the 
following of rules in that the individual in the latter circumstances has an internal state 
of mind in which he or she consciously follows the rule as opposed to the non- 
reflective state of mind associated with habitual behaviour. There is of course a lot 
that has been written about Hart’s differentiation between habitual and rule-following 
behaviour. One recent commentary is that of MacCormick who along with others 
makes the claim that habitual behaviour can also amount to behaviour which is 
consistent with the following of legal rules and that in fact much rule-compliant 
behaviour is habitual in quality.104 In reaching this conclusion he refers to the works 
of various commentators who point in that direction including that of Krygier,105 
Tamanaha,106 Bourdieu107 and Luhmann.108 MacCormick makes the point that 
individuals frequently engage in conduct that is consistent with legal rules even 
though they may not be aware of them or at least their detail.109 While this may be 
true, where his ideas are underdeveloped is in an exploration of the relationship 
between the two different types of behaviour. There is a sense in his writings in which 
individuals engage in behaviour in an either/or state. That is to say, they either are 
reflective in the way they undertake their behaviour or they are not and they either 
know the rules that indicate the necessity of their behaviour or they do not and that 
looked at diachronically, an individual’s behaviour either falls into the realm of 
habitual behaviour or it does not. It is as though the basic framework of Hart namely 
that there are two kinds of behaviour, continues to manifest itself, but these are
102 Hart does accept that the individuals can acquire the habit o f complying with particular laws such a 
driving on the left hand side o f the road although they will not acquire the habit o f paying taxes . See 
Hart, H.L.R 1961: 51.
103 The idea o f regularity o f  conduct is captured by dictionary definitions so that for example the 
Concise Oxford Dictionary defines habitual behaviour as something done ‘constantly’ or as something 
that is ‘regular’ or ‘usual’. The idea o f ‘habit’ also suggests a ‘practice that is hard to give up’ (Concise 
Oxford Dictionary 1995: 609). The non-reflectivity emerges in the analysis by Barnet, H o f the 
difference between habits and constitutional practice. See Barnett, H 2006:27-28. The idea o f ‘habit’ 
does not suggest that the repetitive quality o f conduct associated with it is the product of a normative 
order.
104 MacCormick, N 2007: 61-74.
105 Krygier, M 1982: 155-180 cited at MacCormick, N 2007: 62.
106 Tamanaha, B.Z. 1997: 180-181 cited at MacCormick, N 2007: 61; Tamanaha, B.Z. 2001: 145-6 
cited at MacCormick, N  2007: 69.
107 Bourdieu, P 1977: 2 cited at MacCormick, N 2007: 68.
108 Luhmann, N 2004: 60-62 cited at MacCormick, N 2007: 68.
109 MacCormick, N  2007: 69.
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separated diachronically. At one point he refers to the findings of cognitive scientists 
and how the brain habituates itself to new skills and that therefore the initial conscious 
learning of such skills ultimately leads to the position where the rules associated with 
such skills and which have hitherto been used as props are discarded It is as though 
Wittgenstein’s ladder once climbed up is thrown away so that the skills come to 
transcend the rules.110 While clearly in the application of mastered skills, the rules 
that are associated with it no longer have the importance they once had, to say that the 
ladder is simply thrown away suggests an irreversible separation of skill from rule and 
that somehow in the process of mastery of the skill the rule is utterly eliminated from 
the minds of the applicator. This is an overstatement and it is suggested that rather 
than the ladder being thrown away it is put down. That is to say, the awareness of the 
rules which provide the explanatory and justificatory framework for the development 
of the skill is residualised but not eliminated, at least not completely.111 This too 
substantially applies to behaviour which appears to be consistent with rule-governed 
requirements.
6. Before proceeding further, it is worthwhile stepping back to develop a number of 
matters not considered by Hart or McCormack. Firstly it is worthwhile considering 
the kind of consciousness that does accompany behaviour. Adopting Giddens’s 
model, consciousness can be divided into a number of different categories that include 
practical and discursive consciousness. The former is engaged while an individual is 
undertaking activity in the sense that one is aware of what one is doing and one 
reflexively responds to the unfolding situation without necessarily ‘thinking’ about it. 
Discursive consciousness on the other hand involves the individual being able to
i i
explain the reasons for her or his actions that might well involve justification.
Using these two variants one can immediately see that all-conscious behaviour 
whether or not it might coincide with certain rules is capable of being seen in this 
way. Furthermore, looked at diachronically, it poses the possibility of a given 
individual constantly moving into and out of the different states of consciousness and 
indeed potentially possessing a state of consciousness that embraces both ingredients
110 MacCormick, N 2007: 66.
111 The point o f  symbolic reference by which the person who has mastered the skills will continue to be 
located in the rules which are conceived to be fixed points o f certainty contributing towards ontological 
security.
112Giddens, A 1984: 49.
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to varying extents, that are in flux. What is suggested here therefore is that rule- 
consistent behaviour is no different from any other form of behaviour when it comes 
to the kinds of conscious states involved. Closely associated with these different
I 1 ^forms of consciousness are varying degrees of reflection. Practical consciousness 
does not involve reflection while discursive consciousness does. Added to these and 
returning to idea of chaos as depicted by Cassirer, the need to avoid it and indeed its 
weaker varieties stems from a desire for ontological security.114 Within the domain of 
the social this desire can be seen to be reflected in the idea posed by Giddens of 
routinization. Much of individual behaviour in a social context is routinized 115so 
that certain behaviour is taken for granted- it is what one does.116 The idea of 
routinization does embrace the notion of habit but what it also suggests is a dynamic 
process involving a social setting in which ‘taken for granted’ behaviour occurs. 
Clearly there are some forms of behaviour that are more easily explained in this way 
than others. One routinely drives on the left hand side of the road in what is a form of 
social practice involving many other vehicle users. One routinely, even if one is 
hungry, avoids going into a shop and taking some food, that is to say that it might 
well not occur to such a person that there is that option available. Even in relation to 
the payment of tax, one routinely does so without necessarily thinking that it is one’s 
legal obligation to do so. The idea of routinization in which it is most likely that a 
practical form of consciousness is engaged suggests as with habit a lack of reflection 
and at the time one is undertaking it, a lack of need for explanation associated with 
discursive consciousness. Taking the idea of reflection and that of routinization, one 
can see that existence involves states of being which involves travel along both axes.
113 By reflection is meant here the process of actively
involve thinking through the different options that are
See chapter 8 above for a discussion o f the differer114
115 Giddens defines routinization as ‘the habitual, takeh-for granted character o f the vast bulk of  
activities o f day-to-day social life; the prevalence o f f imiliar styles and forms of conduct, both 
supporting and supported by a sense o f ontological security’ (Giddens, A 1984:376).
116 Giddens, A 1984: 64.
:hinking about ones situation which might 
posed by one’s position, 
t forms o f chaos..
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N o w  f v
Routine Non-routine
Reflection
7. It is difficult to think of any domain of human social existence where routine and
non-routine are completely disconnected from one another. Returning to the payment
of taxes, the general activity of payment might involve the filling out of tax forms
which involves a considerable amount of routinized behaviour with regard to the
mechanical way one fills out a form. Responses to the questions will involve varying
degrees of reflection from those that require one’s identification details to those
which involve careful reflection and non-routinised action, for example the
identification and location of particular documents from which relevant information
can be gleaned in the light of the information requested. Even here however it is not
necessarily the case that the critical reflection associated with considering what ought
to be done in the light of what is understood by the individual to be the legal
requirement is undertaken.117 It is even the case that what is critically reflected upon
in the sense of what the individual considers ought to be undertaken does not
constitute a normative requirement found in the relevant legal regulation so that it is
perhaps the imagined existence of a rule that the individual considers he ought to
followed but this does not coincide with common standards associated with such
activities or the legal regulations that are expected to be followed. Come what may
however, it is the very routinization that provides the security and sense of fixity that
provides for the channels along which non-routinized action and reflection, which
1 1 £may be associated with it, can proceed.
8. It is therefore quite possible that the individual undertaking behaviour is not 
conscious of the rules that require that behaviour at the time he undertakes it
117 If undertaken this would amount to the reflection associated with the internal aspect o f  the rule
developed by Hart (Hart, H.L.A 1962: 56).
118 The routine clearly as a matter of outcome narrows down the endless possibilities o f action and 
reaction to a few and in the process foregrounds what remains so that social co-ordination is enhanced 
through non-reflective routine and a concentration on activity, the non-routine scope o f which is 
effectively agreed between involved parties. The narrowing effect o f routinized or habitual behaviour 
is also alluded to by Berger and Luckmann. See chapter 6 above.
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particularly if such behaviour is carried out in a non-reflective way. Even where 
reflection is involved, it might not happen to revolve around the relevant legal rules 
that might be associated with the need for such behaviour. So for example as 
mentioned by MacCormick, the use of credit cards is likely to be undertaken by 
individuals without the knowledge or awareness of the existence of some or all the 
technical legal rules associated with their use and capacity to trigger the transfer of 
capital from one place to another. In relation to each transaction undertaken with the 
credit card, the particularities will be unique in terms of the details of the transaction 
even if for no other reason than its timing will not be repeated and the specific object 
or service will not be purchased again.119 In relation to each transaction there will 
both routinised and non-routinised elements associated with it. The basic structure of 
the transaction in terms of the way the credit card is used to effect the transfer of
capital will be a repeated one but the object or service bought may only be done once
1 00or a few times in that person’s life.
9. Reflection may well be undertaken but not necessarily about the legal rules that are 
considered to underpin the action’s social acceptability. On the other hand it may be 
that the individual might, at the point of transaction, be conscious of certain but not 
necessarily all the rules comprising legal obligations that underpin it. Furthermore, it 
may be that, from transaction to transaction, the extent to which the individual is 
aware of the rules varies and finally that even if aware of the rules, it is not that which 
actually motivates her or him bur rather the desire to purchase the object in question. 
In all these varying states, the external behaviour may well be regarded as consistent 
with the ‘following o f  a rule and yet from an internal perspective, there are a variety 
of shifting states of mind which may or may not embrace the obligatory nature of the 
rule as a motivational and standard- setting ingredient. Even if a rule constitutes a 
conscious reason for the individuals’ behaviour, there may or may not be a non- 
reflective aspect to the thought in that while the individual is thinking that rule 
requires him to obey it, there is no reflection on whether there is a requirement that 
rules must be obeyed Hence even if the individual has consciously deliberated over
119 Rather than type o f object or service.
120 This points to a difficulty with Giddens’ positing o f routine behaviour. It is as though behaviour 
falls into one category or another. In fact not only might different elements o f given behaviour separate 
out into routine and non-routine particulars, it is also the case that there may be elements which could 
be placed into either suggesting that the boundary between routine and non-routine behaviour is blurred 
and potentially shifting.
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whether or not to obey the rule, this may well take place against the non-reflective 
tacit assumption that rules generally ought to be obeyed matched by routinized 
behaviour which reflects this state of mind.
10. Returning to the two states of consciousness posed by Giddens, the individual 
might when moving from practical to discursive consciousness, explain what he or 
she is doing with or without reference to the legal rules that are involved and the 
explanation may vary from credit card transaction to credit card transaction. The 
extent to which the rules are mentioned, if any, may alter as might their description, 
so much so, that it might be that the descriptions provided might bear varying 
resemblances to the rules that are actually engaged in such transactions. The 
fundamental point here is that routinized behaviour is intertwined with non-routine 
behaviour and reflection will co-exist with non reflection. The claim therefore that 
there exists a rule obeying habit on its own says very little about the variety of 
circumstances which may exist within an individual who is behaving consistently 
with the requirements of a rule.
11. Moving back to Austin’s model, the idea of habit is not explored by him in any 
depth. When perceived in terms of routinized behaviour which is non-reflective. It 
provides a potential state of being between population and sovereign which is highly 
desirous since the less reflection on whether the sovereign’s commands are to be 
obeyed, the less likely the possibility of fundamental disruption leading to the demise 
of the existing sovereign institution, whatever form it might take. This is a point that 
Austin appreciates in his view that it is desirous that individuals have a habit of 
obedience to the law.121 This may, as previously mentioned, express itself for example 
in relation to the payment of taxes. However even when the individual questions 
whether tax needs to be paid, it may be that the answer is supplied by the idea that, 
using the language of Austin, the command by the sovereign to pay tax has to be 
obeyed. There is regular behaviour which might be considered to be day-to-day 
conduct associated with routine but now it is subjectively considered to be motivated
121 A point noted by MacCormick, 2007 at p. 64 derived from Austin’s A Plea fo r  the Constitution 
(London 1859). Austin is by no means unique in his appreciation o f this. Kant for example considered 
that citizens should be actually discouraged from reflecting on the need to obey laws which he 
considered, not surprisingly to be a pre-condition for an effectively functioning state (Kant, I 1991: 
85,143).
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by a different certainty, namely the continuing existence of a rule.122 Pressed upon 
this point the individual might then resort to the justification that the reason why this 
particular commandment is obeyed is the general requirement that all the commands 
of the sovereign have to be obeyed- that is to say the command that taxes have to be 
obeyed is considered to be a particular instant of the general command contained in 
the constitution that all the commands of the sovereign must be obeyed. Clearly there 
one is still in the domain of social practice that is expressed by a regularity of 
behaviour or routine. This time it is being motivated by another certainty, namely the 
general requirement that the commands of the sovereign must be obeyed. Therefore 
one can see that moving back to Cassirer’s proposition that social practice is 
constructed around perceived certainties, again one remains under the ‘gaze’ of one, 
that is in this case the general rule.123 One could say that coming to the ‘end’ of the 
chain of explanation reflects an unreflective practice of assuming that the ‘end’ 
chosen is the only end or indeed the end at all.
12. What is suggested therefore is that the commitment to behave in a manner that is 
consistent with the sovereign’s commands, can take place at a multitude of levels that 
may or may not, from a conscious perspective, directly implicate the commands 
themselves. These are varying states into and out of which individuals can move. In 
any social group, it is possible that there will be varying motivations between 
individuals when the group is looked at synchronically and the motivation of each 
individual may vary when the same group is looked at over time. To this is added the 
possibility, as described above, that the motivation while subjectively derived from 
the existence of a command or rule may not be considered to be that of the sovereign 
institution but may in fact be subjectively perceived to emanate from other executive
122 Referring to Wittgenstein, there is nothing inherent in a statement purporting to be a rule such as 
acommand that requires obedience in a particular way and that both the obedience and the form it takes 
are in effect the outcome o f a social practice. ‘ “[OJbeying a rule is a practice’” (Wittgenstein, 
1998:para 202) There is no inevitability that a particular course o f conduct accords with obeying o f a 
command issued by the sovereign more than any other course o f conduct as suggested by Wittgenstein 
(para 201). This reflects what Williams has characterised as the Regress argument, namely the 
possibility that a given command could be given a multiplicity o f interpretations and the Paradox of  
Interpretation argument whereby a given action could be made out to accord or conflict with the 
interpretation that is applied. See Williams, M 2005: 185.
1231 have not here attempted to look ‘above’ the explicit detail o f Austin’s model to ascertain whether 
there might be any justification outside the rule which might subjectively justify obedience but this is 
something that considered when the relatively transcendent concept o f ‘the people’ is introduced.
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organs of state for example, those that exist locally or from the judicial branches of 
government.
Unity and Diversity
13. One can see in his model as with Augustinus Triumphus and Hobbes, the idea of 
a unity characterising the locus of sovereign whether it be an individual or a multi- 
membered ‘determinate body’124 as he described it which is consistent with a 
mythico-religious idea of unity which Cassirer posits as being existentially necessary 
for man’s well-being or as Giddens suggests his ontological security. The essence of 
this body as possessing a unity which is fed by a diversity of activity and decision­
making is accepted in the process of describing a particular body as sovereign. By 
doing so, one immediately attributes to it a continuity of activity in the form of 
decision-making, even though each decision is unique in its particular way. The idea 
of unity expressed by diversity, as with Hobbes’ model, will inevitably manifest itself 
in what is perceived to be the enforcement of the will of the sovereign locally through 
delegation of his powers. The idea of such delegation is central to Austin’s model125 
and is a reflection of his top-down model of a centralised state which would be 
managed according to the principles of utility. Hence, for example, judges were 
regarded as delegates, whose authority rested on the authority of the sovereign 
whether expressly conferred or by acquiescence.126 As with Hobbes however, the 
indirect relationship perceived to exist between subject and sovereign which is now 
more extensive and more explicitly developed leads, at the very least, to an ambiguity 
of attribution. The particular manifestation of a judge is capable of being perceived as 
either simply a manifestation of the sovereign body in the form of a delegated activity 
or alternatively a particular manifestation of the seemingly independent activity of the 
judiciary. Clearly Austin’s approach is to highlight the former and to explain the 
independent activity of the judiciary in the development of customary law as being an
124 As for example in his description o f determinate body as exemplified by the British Parliament at 
Austin, 1832: 127.
125 ‘ .. .by every actual sovereign (whether the sovereign be one individual, or a number or aggregate of  
individuals) some o f  those powers are exercised through political subordinates or delegates 
representing the sovereign author.’ The exercise o f sovereign powers through political subordinates or 
delegates, is rendered absolutely necessary, in every actual society, by innumerable causes’ (Austin, J 
1832: 191).
126 Austin, J 1832: 35.
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expression of the sovereign’s will characterised by acquiescence.127 However the 
absence of a positive expression of the sovereign’s will allows for the importation of a 
conceptualisation of the judiciary’s activities as being independent of the directly 
expressed sovereign will. The potential disconnection of attribution of activities of 
what might broadly be regarded as state officials with the sovereign body directly 
clearly goes beyond the domain of the judiciary and also will involve diverse 
executive activity at a national and local level.128 The paradox therefore as with 
Hobbes’ model is that the extent to which there is a diversity of imminent 
manifestations to feed and be fed by the perceived unity of the sovereign institution 
and to therefore ‘empower’ its transcendent quality makes the suggestion that 
sovereignty is manifested by the habitual obedience by the bulk of the population as 
potentially problematic. One cannot say that such obedience is to the sovereign from 
the shifting perspectives of each individual, but rather, if at all, to the institution or 
institutions that Austin considers are delegates of it.129 There is therefore the potential 
for disruption if for any reason the bulk of the population within a particular area 
regard the activities of the ‘local state’ or parts thereof as having greater acceptability 
than that of the state itself.130 In Austin’s model unlike Hobbes, even taking into 
account his idea of the motivation for obedience being the fear of sanctions imposed, 
there are more numerous possibilities for the disruption of the state’s coherence. 
Rather than simple preservation being the fundamental driving force for the creation 
of a Hobbesian commonwealth, in Austin’s case, the much more indeterminate 
category of utility is in play, whose satisfaction is not an explicit precondition for the
127 Austin, J 1832: 35-36.
128 For example activity at county and borough level. This does not o f course render the local leader as 
being sovereign since the region is subservient to the centre. This is a point made by Austin when he 
poses the example of the viceroy that has the habitual obedience o f the population o f a region but is not 
sovereign as through the viceroy, the population has habitual obedience to the viceroy’s superior to 
whom the latter is beholden. Here one can see the assumption operating that the habituation to one 
superior means that the population o f that region habitually obeys the sovereign. However outward 
behaviour which can be regarded as consistent with Austin’s assertion actually may be motivated by 
obedience to a regional leader, namely the Viceroy and not the sovereign body and hence the bulk o f  
the population is not in fact habitually obedient to the sovereign, although its behaviour is consistent 
with such as inference. Here is an example o f  what was alluded to in the chapter o f Austin regarding 
his method whereby his interpretation o f  the empirical evidence is determined by his existing model o f  
sovereignty and simply reinforces it in a tautological process.
129 This is a further manifestation o f  Austin interpreting the empirical through an a priori framework 
regarding sovereignty which was explored in the earlier chapter on Austin.
130 For example, where there is a schism between centre and part of the periphery which is caused by 
the alienation o f the population o f the latter to the activities o f the former on the basis o f regional, 
ethnic or religious differences. Such schisms can also occur where a local population identifies the 
local state with the national state and rejects both.
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existence of a legal system constructed around what is perceived to be the presence of 
a sovereign institution.131
The Illumination o f Austin’s Sovereign Practice Using Searle
14. Returning to his formula, Xcounts as Y in C circumstances, regarding the creation 
of sovereignty, one can see here that X counts as sovereign in circumstances where
1 37the bulk of the population habitually obeys X, a determinate and common superior 
who or which does not habitually obey any determinate or common superior. 
Conversely, X ceases to count as sovereign in circumstances where he ceases to be 
obeyed habitually by the bulk of the population. This denotes a practice that may be 
motivated by a desire to follow certain rules but cannot be explained by the rules 
alone. However this practice that concerns territorially limited sovereignty is the 
product of a network of practices whereby in surrounding territories, governing 
practices do not encompass that of the territory where the sovereign is located.
Looked at in this way, to simply summarise a specific sovereignty, as though it is an 
isolated domain of practice using Searle’s formula is inadequate. As with Hobbes’ 
model, to endeavour to capture it more completely requires the application of his 
formula to the governmental practices that surround the territory of X. Hence along 
with the above formulation one would have to apply Searle’s formula to other 
governmental practices so that one develops a picture whereby the circumstances are 
consistent with sovereignty appearing to amount to an ordering principle that governs 
both what is interior and what is exterior to states.
Hence capturing this practice using Searle’s formula in a way that attempts to capture 
this practice one can state th a t:
131 In the sense that there is no such contractual condition which provides the justification for the 
sovereign’s existence although desires to obtain benefits considered to be deliverable by the sovereign 
might provide the motivation for habitually obeying which would include the desire to be protected 
from conquest, etc. This is o f course formulating motivation as having a positive character and does 
not discount a simultaneous motivation being one o f fear o f  sanctions being imposed in the event o f  
breach o f the sovereign’s commands
132 Austin, J 1832: 166.
133 The idea o f sovereignty as an ordering principle, as for example emerging from a sociological 
perspective out o f the writings o f Giddens (1996:281-282) is manifested in the materials associated 
with international law.
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X counts as sovereign 
in circumstances where:
(a) the bulk of the population (P) locatable within a particular territory (T) habitually 
obeys the commands of X ; AND
(b) X is a determinate and common superior who or which does not habitually obey 
any determinate or common superior; AND
(c) The bulk of the population (P) in territory (T) does not habitually obey any other 
determinate or common superior who or which does not habitually obey any 
determinate or common superior.
15. One can see looking at sovereignty in this way that its disruption whereby X is no 
longer habitually obeyed by the bulk of the population, can occur in a number of ways 
by reference to the requirements stipulated in (a) to (c) and give rise to the demise of 
X or the persistence of X but within a reconfigured territory. So one example might be 
that X may after disruption only have the habitual obedience of the bulk of the 
population (Pi) within Ti. Y may now have the habitual obedience of the population 
(P2) within T2 which as with T] was formerly part of T.
[Please turn over]
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16. Hence the shift in sovereignty in this way might be described in the following 
way:
Fig 1
X no longer counts as sovereign S over population P in territory T 
as circumstances (a) to (c) no longer apply, AND
(1). X counts now counts as sovereign Si over population Pj in territory Ti 
in circumstances where:
(a) the bulk of the population (Pi) locatable within a particular territory (Ti) habitually obeys 
X; AND
(b) X is a determinate and common superior who or which does not habitually obey any 
determinate or common superior AND
(c) The bulk of the population P|in territory Ti does not habitually obey any other determinate 
or common superior who or which does not habitually obey any determinate or common 
superior; AND
(2). Y counts as sovereign S2 over population P2 in territory T2 
in circumstances where:
(a) the bulk of the population P2 (P-Pi) locatable in territory T2 (T-Ti) habitually obeys Y; 
AND
(b) Y is a determinate and common superior who or which does not habitually obey any 
determinate or common superior; AND
(c) The bulk of the population P2 in territory T2 does not habitually obey any other 
determinate or common superior who or which does not habitually obey any determinate or 
common superior.
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17. The legitimating narrative that is used to justify this rupture might take several 
forms. At one level, X and the population that he is left with might consider that Y’s 
regime is illegitimate and amounts to an unlawful breakaway in breach of X’s 
commands prior to the split. X therefore might continue to consider that he is 
sovereign over the entire population P and territory T. X might therefore not 
‘recognise’ Y and his or its new regime even though from Austin’s perspective, it 
clearly is now a separate one. Y and its population on the other hand might consider 
the new regime is perfectly legitimate claiming for example that it is an expression of 
a just claim by a people for independence from X’s regime. Clearly one could 
develop variations where for example two (or more) regimes are created out of one by 
agreement as for example occurred in the division of the Czechoslovakia into the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Diagrammatically one can depict Austin’s model in the following manner 
Fig 2
Pi " s.
P2 * s2
18. Here in terms of the elapse of time, one can see the reconfiguring of territorial 
sovereignty so that one state fractures with the possible reconfiguration of borders and 
populations. As with Hobbes, viewing sovereignty as a practice in which there is an 
interdependence between states in the sense that the positive expression of 
sovereignty as depicted above is accompanied by a correlative negative expression in 
the sense that sovereign institutions whose domains are constituted by the obedience
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of the bulk of other populations do not receive the obedience of the populations 
referred to above.134
Looked at in this way the above diagram can be amended in the following way: 
Fig 3
Si/-S,
S/-S,
As with the Hobbesian model, one can see from this the large potentiality for 
disruption whereby existing sovereign entities secure the obedience of the bulk of 
populations not formerly exhibiting such conduct. This does not take into account the 
possibility of other power centres emerging within a given population and ultimately 
displacing the existing determinate body as the sovereign entity.
134 Austin recognises that ‘political and independent societies’, characterised by the sovereign-subject 
relation are in part dependent upon a condition of non-interference being satisfied. See Austin, J 1832: 
171.
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Chapter 10: A Re-Examination of Schmitt
1. The positivist model of sovereignty developed by Austin, unshackled by any 
higher system of law, points as does Hobbes’ model to the possibility of the existing 
legal order being suspended by the sovereign in the face of crises in order to protect it, 
leaving what Schmitt referred to as a juridical state. Austin’s model hence at least 
implicitly contains a decisionist idea of sovereignty developed by Schmitt whereby 
ultimately the decision to suspend a legal order cannot be subsumed under any 
existing system of already existing norms. The idea of overriding the existing 
positive legal order or elements of it in the face of crisis was also seen to potentially 
operate in the case of the model of Augustinus Triumphus. Here as the pope was 
regarded as above the law, he could override it and in that sense therefore was capable 
of operating what might be called a state of exception. This ties in with the basic 
doctrine of necessity developed for example by Aquinas who stated that in the face of 
crisis a ruler could override existing law on the grounds of necessity ‘ because 
necessity is not subject to the law.’135 In this model also, however, as we have seen 
there were circumstances where the location of rulership could be temporarily 
transferred to pre-determined institutions, these being the Council of Bishops in the
1 3Acase of Augustinus Triumphus. These were also circumstances of crisis but the
triggers were determined by what was considered to be heretical action. With regard 
to Dante, the position is complex. The thrust of Monarchia is against the idea of the 
exception as for example revealed by his comment that those who seek the purpose of
1 ^ 7right must seek it with right.’ An underlying doctrine of necessity is recognised in 
the writings of Aquinas although it is not explored by Dante in Monarchia. There is, 
despite the overwhelming claim of Monarchia that spiritual jurisdiction stands 
independently from temporal jurisdiction, an unresolved quality about the relationship 
between the two. He states towards the end of the work, when affirming that the 
authority of the emperor does not come from the pope but from God directly, that that 
conclusion should not ‘ be taken so literally as to mean that the Roman Prince is not
135 Aquinas, T 1988: qu. 96 a.6. It is important to note however that unlike the positivist models o f  
sovereignty, in the case o f Aquinas, natural law could not be overridden. And hence unlike the modem 
state o f exception the application o f the doctrine o f necessity only allowed the ruler to free himself 
from the requirements o f positive law to the extent that this did not contravene the requirements of 
natural law (Aquinas, T qu. 97 a.4).
136 Wilks, M.J 1963: 507. See chapter 7 above.
137 Dante, 1996: 45.
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in some sense subject to the Roman Pontiff, since his earthly happiness in some sense 
is ordered towards his immortal happiness.’138 The implications of this comment are 
unexplored. Does this mean that where the pope considered laws produced by the 
emperor to be a spiritual threat, he, that is the pope could override such laws? This is 
not explored but the comment can be said to raise the possibility of the holder of the 
papal office declaring what is in effect a state of exception where he considers the 
emperor’s laws amount to an unacceptable spiritual threat.
2. In Hobbes’ model, the sovereign was empowered to suspend the existing legal
order in the face of crisis as solely determined by the sovereign institution. In
addition, the possibility of a shift in the location of sovereign power in the face of
crisis was also posed where the existing sovereign could no longer ensure
preservation of his subjects in the face of such crisis. However here the shift, if it
occurs, is to each individual who from the sovereign’s perspective is under his
jurisdiction as the state of nature which the sovereign’s role was designed to exclude,
reasserted itself. This in turn might provoke the creation of a new sovereign whose
location is not predetermined within Hobbes’ model and is not intended to be
temporary. Such shifts can be explained by reference to the pre-existing right to self
preservation which constitutes a point of connection between Hobbes’ model and the
domain of natural law and rights, which is either actively pursued by each individual
within the state of nature or in terms of its application is transferred to the sovereign
110whose location is not pre-determined. Again in the case of Austin, one can see a 
similar scenario unfolding in that the demise of one sovereign as a result of the bulk 
of the population no longer habitually obeying his commands could be the outcome of 
crisis as perceived by the population and result in the emergence of an alternative site 
of sovereignty. Here like Hobbes, the potential transfer of the location of sovereignty 
was not required to be temporary and its location was not pre-determined. Unlike the 
circumstances in Hobbes, the trigger for such a rupture could not be explained by 
reference to an existing natural right but justification might involve resorting to the 
secular and more elastic domain of utility. These observations are consistent with the
138 Dante, 1996: 94.
139 Hobbes’ attitude towards the right to self-defence does not expressly go as far as Aquinas. In 
relation to dealing with the problem o f tyranny, Aquinas argues that one is allowed to defend oneself 
meeting force with force which if  required can be lethal in its effects and hence suggests a right o f  
defence which extends to tyrannicide (Aquinas, TII-II qu 69. a 4c. referred to in Finnis, J 1998: 289). 
See chapter 8 above for an exploration o f the place o f resistance in Hobbes’ model of sovereignty.
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idea that Schmitt’s proposition that the sovereign is he who decides upon the 
exception objectively possesses a duality of meaning whereby it is possible that the 
point of rupture associated with the decision to suspend the existing legal order can 
either be accompanied by a continuity or a disruption as to the location of
140sovereignty.
3. If one conceptualises sovereignty as a practice with a diachronic existence, one can 
see that rupture is capable of playing a part in each of the models so far discussed. 
Discontinuity and continuity co-exist so that even where there is rupture, it occurs 
within a wider ongoing practice of sovereignty. At first sight, the idea of rupture, in 
so far as it is expressed within the explanatory framework of the model at all, in these 
models is expressed in a marginal manner. What the above accounts have sought to 
do is to de-marginalise such ruptures, which flow from the relational character of 
sovereignty, to suggest that viewed in a diachronic sense, these models are 
constructed with the possibility of rupture present within narratives that tend to 
emphasise continuity. In contrast to the above models, the place of rupture in 
Schmitt’s model is at its centre. The purpose therefore of this section will be to 
further explore the nature of his model from this perspective. In the process, an 
exploration of the relationship between norm and exception will be undertaken. 
Following this, the models already covered will be briefly re-examined in order to 
locate the nature of the rupture present in them within Schmitt’s model.
4. For the purpose of this exploration, the definition of sovereignty used will be that 
formulated in Political Theology, that is to say that it is is possessed by he who 
decides on the exception.141 The idea of sovereignty posed in Political Theology is
140 This emerges below in the differentiation between commissarial dictator and sovereign dictator.
141 Schmitt, C 1985: 3 .1 am mindful in so doing that in later writings, for example in Verfassungslehre, 
he locates formal sovereignty with constituent power in the form o f the German people who expressed 
their sovereign power through the agency o f the Constituent National Assembly which produced a 
constitution through which the content and the exercise o f the people’s political decision was 
formulated. The promulgation of the constitution ended the sovereign dictatorship o f the assembly. 
However given the elusive nature o f the political which cannot ultimately be predicted or defined by 
any normative structure, Schmitt’s model even with this modification does not break from the 
possibility o f a sovereign dictator emerging in the form o f a dominant individual who engages in 
dictatorial rule to preserve the essence o f the people’s interests proclaimed by that dictator in its name.. 
That is to say, that although in later works he rhetorically relocated sovereignty to ‘the people’ from the 
monarch, because o f the formless nature o f ‘the people’, the sovereign dictator emerges as a concrete 
institution, the qualities o f which had historically been possessed by the sovereign monarch. See Cristi, 
R 1999: 188-192.
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consistent with the concrete manifestations of dictatorship which Schmitt explores in 
Die Diktatur whereby the commissarial dictator is classified as someone who 
endeavours to restore order so that the existing constitution can be implemented 
normally. A sovereign dictatorship on the other hand brings about the abrogation of 
the existing constitution so that a ‘condition whereby a constitution [that the sovereign 
dictator ] considers to be a true constitution will become possible.’142 The decision 
made by both is an absolute decision not itself determined by any legal norm and of 
course in relation to the latter type is made by someone who is outside the existing 
system of such norms altogether.143 The term ‘sovereign’ will be ascribed to both 
types of individuals unless otherwise stated although it is appreciated that one could 
argue that the commissarial dictator, in so far as he is accounted for by the 
constitution, has a quasi-sovereign quality about him in the sense that he can be seen 
to be the product of a constitution rather than its originator. In both cases the nature 
of exceptional circumstances are impossible to predict as are the steps that need to be 
taken by the sovereign to resolve the crisis. 144 In relation to the decision of a 
commissarial dictator, the rule of law, if it exists prior to the decision in its thick 
sense, at the moment of the sovereign decision is superseded by a rule of law in its 
thinnest to vanishing sense, namely rule by law. The legitimacy of the decision is 
primarily located for Schmitt in the claim that the sovereign expresses the 
fundamental interests of the people by reference to requirements that flow from 
existential friend/ enemy distinction which he alone has the capacity to define in 
response to the concrete circumstances that confront him.
Norm v Exception
5. Schmitt’s ideas of the decision and the exception form a central place in his 
explanation of juridical systems, as for him any legal system rests on a concrete 
decision and the rules of a system prove nothing and the exception proves 
everything.145 The idea of the exception provoked by exceptional or emergency 
circumstances, however cannot be divorced from and indeed is intimately intertwined
142 This quote is obtained from Schwab’s introduction to Political Theology. See Schmitt, C 1985: xix.
143 Although as will be seen, the judgment as to whether a sovereign dictator as opposed to a 
commissarial dictator is operating, can be unclear and contested.
144 Schwab, G in Schmitt, C 1985:xx.
145 Schmitt, C 1985: 10,15.
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with normality. It is the sovereign’s perception of that normality in its diachronic 
existence, namely both with regard to the past and future, that will lead to an 
evaluation of what kind of circumstances will amount to exceptional ones which 
require exceptional measures to quell them. Schmitt does not explore the specifics of 
this process but the centrality of the political and the evaluation of friend/enemy 
inevitably for him must lead to an identification of social qualities within and around 
a given society that constitute that normality associated with that society.
6. In aid of his analysis of the exception’s relationship to the norm, he cites 
Kierkegaard’s observations on the relationship of the exception to the ‘general’.146 
What Schmitt quotes however is not so much about ontological priority but about the 
epistemological relationship between exception and norm and that the exception is a 
gateway to understanding the norm. Kierkegaard is quoted by Schmitt as saying that 
‘the exception explains the general and itself... If they [exceptions] cannot be 
explained then the general also cannot be explained.’ 147 This suggests that the way to 
understand the general or norm is through appreciating the nature of the exception. It 
is also consistent with the privileging of the exception at the expense of the norm and 
the suppression of the dialectical relationship between them, a relationship 
highlighted by Kierkegaard in which the exception springs out of the general and the
1 AQ
interaction between the two impacts upon the character of both. This dialectical 
relationship may at first sight not be considered something of notable importance but 
it is suggested that this can have a profound impact upon a conceptualisation of a 
sovereign’s role regarding responses to perceived crises.
7. How can the circumstances amounting to an emergency situation be assessed other 
than against the qualities associated with normality? If one takes the qualities that 
might comprise an emergency suggested by Rossiter for example, external attack, 
rebellion and economic depression, each one of these is predicated in crude terms
146 This is the term used by Schmitt in his quote from Kierkegaard. In the publication translated by 
Walter Lowrie the term used is the ‘universal’. For the sake o f  consistency I will use the term ‘general’.
147 Schmitt, C 1985: 15.
148 Kierkegaard S 1941: 132-133. The idea o f the exception emerging from the general is captured by 
Kierkegaard stating that ‘[t]he earnest and resolute exception (which though in conflict with the 
[general] is nevertheless a scion from its root’ (Kierkegaard, S 1941: 133). He characterises the 
relationship between the general and the exception as o f  one strife which is ‘exceedingly 
dialectical’(Kierkegaard, S 1941: 132).
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upon a conception of normality that, inter alia, embraces peace from external and 
internal attack and a tolerable economic performance.149 The extent to which 
toleration and reluctance to move from a normal mode of government to an 
emergency mode will also depend in part upon perceptions about the impact of the 
use of emergency powers upon the prospects of returning to normality. This is 
perhaps brought out by Abraham Lincoln who had been forced to take emergency 
powers at the beginning of the American civil war and asked whether a government 
must ‘of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its people or too weak to maintain 
its own existence?’ 150 At a certain level therefore the exception is clearly structured 
by the norm and not vica-versa. Ulmen in line with this suggests that ‘a constitution 
without gaps necessarily presupposes a normative utopia wherein there is no 
exception. By definition the norm precludes the exception whereas the exception 
presupposes the norm and is bound by its definition. The exception cannot decide for 
the exception, it can only decide for the norm.’151 This is also supported by the idea 
that the sovereign entity existentially is not going to have had experience of 
circumstances constituting an exceptional state of affairs other than against the 
context of what it perceives to be normality as it exists and possibly an alternative 
normality as the sovereign desires it. If he is a commissarial dictator his very 
existence is a product of the norm which only meaningfully operates within an 
operational normality. If he is in Schmittian terms a sovereign dictator whose 
existence is not the product of any constitutional arrangement, his creation will be as a 
result of a reaction to what is perceived by him to be an unacceptable threat to his 
perception of normality. There is therefore an intimate relationship between what is 
perceived to be normality and crisis, between what is required to protect such 
normality and hence between normality and what is likely to constitute a state of 
exception requiring measures to overcome the crisis. Crisis, preparations for it, and 
consequent declaration of a state of exception or emergency hence contributes 
towards the crystallisation of perceptions about what comprises normality and
i
towards its unfolding in a diachronic sense.
149 Rossiter, C 1948: 6.
150 Rossiter, C 1948:3.
151 Ulmen, 1991: 244 as quoted in McCormick, J.P 1997: 226-7.
152 This impact of crisis upon the development o f a state’s normality, as captured by its constitutional 
configuration, is for example explored by Bobbitt in his investigation o f  the role o f war amongst other 
features which contribute towards the development o f states and their constitutional forms ( Bobitt, P 
2002). Locke poses the role o f war quite explicitly as the expression o f  conflict over the location o f
195/267
8. However, at a deeper level the relationship between the two is more complex. To 
appreciate this requires an investigation of normality. For these purposes certain 
assumptions will be made about the nature of man and his relationship to the process 
of social organisation. It is arguable that man has no specific environment, that is to 
say that the operation of his instincts is not dependent upon any particular kind of 
physical environment. The result is that in contrast to animals, man’s relationship with 
his environment is characterised by world-openness. His instinctual organisation 
may be described as under-developed compared to that of higher animals. Biological 
world openness is transformed by social order into world closeness.154 The idea of 
normality, therefore, is typically characterised by order and stability arising out of 
social relationships which are considered to be predictable in content. It is this state 
of affairs which is characterised by a hierarchy of enforceable norms with associated 
institutions. However the reality is that a mode of normality and the norms around 
which it is structured represent one of many possible ways of social organisation.
Each mode of normality represents not only a continuing decision to adhere to a 
certain kind of social organisation and set of values but also gives rise to the 
continuing exclusion of other kinds of (ab)normalities. Thus, for example, the 
practice of liberal democracy represents a commitment to that mode of governance 
and also amounts to a continuing exclusion of other kinds of governance for example 
monarchical dictatorship.155 Therefore a given normality and set of norms is the 
product of one or many positive decisions leading to the existing mode of governance 
with the result that other incompatible normalities are excluded possibly by positive 
decisions but at any rate by incompatible practices being consistent with such a 
decision.
sovereignty when he states that ‘[t]he great question which in all ages has disturbed mankind, and 
brought on them the greatest part o f those mischiefs which have ruined cities, depopulated countries, 
and disordered the peace o f the world, has been not whether there be power in the world, but who 
should have it’ (Locke, J 1993: 73).
153 Berger, P and Luckmann, T 1991: 65.
154 Berger, P and Luckmann, T 1991: 69.
155 The precise features o f  the liberal democracy which are regarded as contributing towards a 
particular normality will be historically and culturally specific but will embrace a cluster o f values as 
for example claimed by Freeden to include liberty, individualism, progress and democracy. See 
Freeden, 997:140-177.
196/267
9. The adoption in substance of one kind of normality to the exclusion of others may 
well be a complex cumulative process which reflects choices connected with national, 
social, economic, religious, cultural and moral priorities. However society is 
structured, participants will consider other methods of social organisation as being 
unacceptable. The society exhibiting a laissez faire economy might regard a 
communist method of economic organisation as being completely unacceptable. A 
secular liberal democratic society might regard a proposal to change to a 
fundamentalist religious society as out of the question. The alternative normality to 
the members of that society thus may not be regarded as such at all but as an 
abnormality to be avoided. The point is that what in a substantive sense will be 
regarded as “normal” will be determined by the prevailing preferences motivated and 
reinforced by particular legitimation or ideological narratives .156
10. The idea of the exception is most easily fed by the idea of chaos or disruption 
whose threat entitles a state to invoke exceptional measures. In positing the need for 
exceptional measures in this way, Schmitt provides an example of an antirrhetic form 
of discourse l57whereby what is highlighted is an expression of evil, which is most 
threatening including to ontological security. From a Cassirerian point of view this is 
captured by the idea of chaos158 perhaps behind which lies proclaimed features of 
what amounts to an alternative normality whose claimed characteristics are most 
likely to be constituted by what are considered to be its most repugnant features that 
can comparatively easily be focussed upon, identified and imagined and united 
against. In so doing, in effect the claimed features associated with ‘our’ normality 
are prioritised, are clearly differentiated from the prospect of chaos and the alternative 
normality and in so doing are given an added grounding by being posed as the 
antithesis to these alternatives. By positing ‘chaos’ against claimed attributes that 
amount to ‘our’ normality against a background where the claimed features of the 
‘other’ normality or normalities are distorted, simplified or suppressed, the 
relativising of our own normality by the invasion of our imaginations by the possibly
156 Clearly what the members o f a community consider on these points is likely to be marginalized 
where dictatorial powers are in play.
157 This is a form o f discourse characterised by negation and rejection. See Goodrich, P 1995.
158 Here I refer to chaos in its weak sense, for example in idea o f unpredictable and devastating 
violence which is said to emanate from a continuing source, for example al Quaeda.
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complex features of other normalities is obstructed.159 The perception of alternative 
normalities can be infected by the idea of chaos and the brutalities that might be 
associated with them, which in turn allows for the idealisation of the claims 
concerning our normality and a sense of its fixity and legitimacy so that it can be 
differentiated and contrasted from the formers’ unpredictability and repugnance. It 
also allows for the imagining of the continuities of our normality, whereby the 
uncertainties that pervade it are marginalised in favour of its apparent certainties 
which can be set against the perceived uncertainties of what it is perceived to be 
threatened by.160 These variables are ‘revealed’ in the Schmittian model by the 
sovereign decision-maker The claimed features associated with the normality under 
protection strengthens the legitimacy of the decision to declare the state of exception 
and the measures to be posed which emanate from the identity of the sovereign 
decision-maker. The identity of the decision-maker together with the reasons for the 
decision contribute towards the security of the population faced with the 
fundamentally disrupting character associated with events that threaten or constitute 
what is perceived to be unacceptable disruption.
11. Schmitt’s assertion that norms require a pre-existing normality and that the 
decision to declare a state of exception cannot be subsumed in any given framework 
of legal norms can be seen in this light. While it can be said to be a logical inference, 
what it constructs, namely a normality without any norms is an oxymoron if one uses 
the term ‘norm’ in its wider sense, that is to say constituted by social norms. Even if 
used in its narrower sense as simply referable to law, one has to ask how it is that a 
society that does possess non-legal norms cannot also possess legal ones. While the 
idea of the political does not necessarily alight on any particular feature of society as 
has been previously described it is predicated around the idea of a homogeneous 
people and while Schmitt does not explicitly commit himself to any particular set of 
features which provide the basis of such a quality, inevitably they will be predicated 
on some from of identity that involves a combination to varying degrees of language,
159 The suppression o f alternative normalities is reflected in the discourses in which threats to the 
existing normality are posed. So for example the depiction o f the conflict in Northern Ireland as ‘the 
troubles’ undertaken by ‘terrorists’ rather than as a war o f liberation undertaken by republicans in 
response to the illegitimate occupation o f part o f Ireland by the British state.
160 The perceived uncertainties provide a point o f unity around which action can be formulated and 
justified and hence possess a symbolic quality.
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culture, religion, race and economics.161 Imagining a society that has such 
commonalities means imagining one with norms of some description including legal 
rules. So one returns, as with Hobbes, where the idea for the justification for 
sovereignty was the aversion of a state of nature, to the idea that the power of these 
ideas do not lie primarily in their historico-empirical accuracy but in their points of 
unity in response to which decisions by the sovereign institution can be justified. In 
both of their foundational discourses, the antirrhetic lies in the idea of disruption 
potentially amounting to chaos which one way or another is to be excluded. Schmitt, 
concentrates on the features associated with the existing normality and the 
requirement to protect it from other potential normalities. He perceives the world as 
comprising a pluriverse of states each expressing the requirements of the political as
1 ff)apparently generated by their specific populations.
A Grammar o f Normalities
12. Augustine observed that war is waged to create a peace of one’s own choosing.163 
This is capable of casting a revealing light on the relationship between the exception 
and normality.164 Firstly, the idea of conflict between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ can be 
conceptualised as a clash between competing normalities and the idea of exception, as 
constituted for example, by the prevalence of conflict and ultimately violence which 
must be seen in relation to such a clash. Secondly, it is possible to consider normality 
in two different ways which will be designated Ni and N2 . The idea of peace namely 
the absence of violent conflict and the existence of repetitive social practices is 
designated as Ni. In Augustine’s mind peace is associated with order and the idea of 
order at its most abstract has been conceptualised as a regulated connection between
161 See Chapter 5 above.
162 Schmitt, C 1996c: 53. It should be observed that the idea o f a pluriverse o f states where apparently 
there are no a priori criteria to determine each state’s existence appears as a liberal theory o f group 
autonomy. However this is more apparent that real. Particularly, when bearing in mind Schmitt’s 
allegiance in the 1930s to the National Socialists, what groups were accorded community status with 
the entitlement to statehood was anything but liberal, as for example demonstrated in Hitler’s attitude 
towards the Poles and the effective obliteration o f the country with the absorption o f  about half o f it 
into the Third Reich.
163 ‘Indeed even those who wish to disrupt an existing state o f peace do so not because they hate peace 
but because they desire the present peace for one o f their own choosing’ (Book XIX: 12:934.). ‘.. .the 
peace o f a city is an ordered accord, with respect o f command and obedience o f its citizens’ (Book 
XIX: 13: 938 (Augustine, 1998).
164 Augustine’s observation is echoed by others. For example, Clausewitz states that war ‘is an act of  
force to compel our enemy to our will’ (Clausewitz, C. von, 2007: 13). Foucault considered that ‘war is 
the cipher o f peace’ (Foucault, M 2003: 269).
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one thing and another, suggesting repetition.165 This suggests predictability most 
clearly captured by the existence of a series of identifiable social practices regulated 
by a normative framework which itself is applied and developed in an orderly way 
and it is against such background that the norm/exception division is posed. Peace 
however can be the outcome of different forms of governance and hence can be 
different in character between one society and another. Hence the substantive social 
characteristics associated with the idea of peace can vary from one society to another. 
N2 therefore captures these social characteristics and includes norms, both legal and 
non-legal and the social institutions which produce such peace and give it its specific 
characteristics and in turn which are generally dependent upon it for their 
functioning.166 The democratic secular republic or the fundamentalist theocratic state 
are both capable of being perceived as exhibiting peace and hence of exhibiting N|. 
However they are likely to differ fundamentally in certain substantive senses for 
example in connection with the different perceptions and emphasis based on 
individual liberal freedoms, the place of religion in the structure and organisation of 
society and the role, substance and operation of law in the process of social 
regulation. These differences are captured by N2 which can be specifically allocated 
to different societies by use of the designation (a), (b), (c)...etc So in relation to the 
above societal examples by way of illustration they could be designated respectively 
as N2(a) and N2(b). Returning to Augustine’s above-mentioned quote the idea of ‘a 
peace of ones own choosing’ captures both Nj and N2 in that generic idea of peace is 
present as well as its specificity.
13. An undermining of N2 will constitute an undermining of N]. Activity regarded as 
violently terroristic for example will disrupt aspects of N2 and hence will weaken the 
existence of N], that is to say the undermining of the prevailing peace. Such attacks 
will require the effective mobilisation of the state to protect N2 and in the process 
ensure Ni. Violent attack itself, by reference to normalities can be perceived as a form 
of anti-normality in that, if  allowed to become established, it will destroy existing 
peaceful relations without necessarily replacing them with another normality, albeit 
one that from the perspective of those committed to the existing normality is
165 Waldenfels, B 1996: 85.
166 I use the term ‘generally’, as there are certain institutions most obviously the military and to a lesser 
extent the police which are constructed to operate in the absence o f peace and obviously can come to 
the fore in times o f exception.
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unacceptable. Hence the disruption itself can be characterised as giving rise to the 
threat of -Nj/-N 2(a), that is to say constant violence and the undermining of any
I zin
peaceful recognisable normality. By conceptualising normality in this way, its 
relationship with the exception can be developed. Hence if  one takes the 
circumstances of the Weimar Republic in 1920, it had experienced a number of
I ARcommunist uprisings, which attacked institutions severely undermining N2 and 
hence Ni posing an alternative N2 , namely the imposition of communism to replace 
the existing social democracy and hence restoring Ni. The Reich President declared 
states of exception and instigated the introduction by the government of various 
means such as the suspension of civil liberties and widespread arrest and detention 
169 with a view to protecting N2 and restoring Ni. In these circumstances there were a 
number of normalities pertinent to N2 which might be relevant. For the sake of 
completeness there is the normality that the Weimar republic overrode namely the
1 7(1constitutional monarchy, the present normality that was being protected by the 
institution of emergency measures which can be designated as N2 and the potential 
normality, if any,171 that the emergency measures are designed to prevent, for 
example a communist republic which can be designated as N2 (b). However there is a 
further potential normality N2 (C) that could emerge as a result of the permanent 
institution of the state of exception itself and thus the permanent prevention of the
I 79resumption of the normality N2 (a) it was designed to protect.
14. What can be gathered from the above, is that the very decision to declare a state 
of emergency and to impose measures to resolve the crisis at hand can be 
conceptualised as intimately connected with the existence of the normality being 
protected N2(a), the potential normality being opposed N2 (b) and the extent of 
disruption to the existing normality N2 (a) by those perceived to be agents of N2(b) by
167 One can see such circumstances prevailing currently in Iraq and also since the early 1990s in 
Somalia and in terms o f the degree and chronic character o f the violence expressed in Hobbes’ state of 
nature.
168 Rossiter, C 1948: 38.
169 Rossiter, C 1948: 38.
170 For the purpose o f this exercise, the normality that has ceased will not be designated as it is not 
necessary to what will now be developed.
171 In the case o f potential disruption by what might be perceived to be terrorists organisations the 
emphasis may well be on the disruption on the existing normality rather than its replacement by an 
alterative one.
172 Generally, the differences between N2(a) and N2(b) are likely to exist in the domains o f  one or a 
combination o f matters pertaining to nationality, ethnic identity, culture, religion and economic 
organisation.
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the actual imposition of emergency measures associated with the state of exception. 
The idea of the exception suggests that whatever measures are imposed will be for as 
long as they are needed. Their purpose is to overcome the crisis that triggered the state 
of exception and allow a continuation of the normality protected by such measures
1 n'l
namely N2(a). Hence the idea of the exception raises the expectation that the 
potentiality of such measures being imposed permanently and as a result creating a 
new normality (N2(C)) will not be realised. This occurred in effect following the 
accession of Hitler to the chancellorship under the Weimar constitution. A series of 
emergency decrees were issued under the authority of Article 48 of the Weimar 
Constitution which contributed towards the process of decline of the normative state 
and left the Weimar constitution as nothing more than a shell. The most important 
were a presidential decree suspending a large number of fundamental rights ostensibly 
made to defend the state against ‘Communistic, state-endangering acts of violence.’174
1 75Following this, an ‘Enabling Act’ was enacted by the Reichstag which vested the 
cabinet in effect with unlimited power to legislate with the power to depart from the 
constitution with the agreement of the Reichstag and Reichsrat.176 While the measure
173 The term ‘continuation’ rather than ‘return’ can be used as the existing normality has the capacity 
through having a normative framework that allows for its own temporary suspension through the 
declaration o f a state o f exception.
174 This was declared in the introductory paragraph o f the decree entitled ‘Decree o f the President of 
the Reich for the Protection o f the People and the State (Fraenkel, E 2006: 241).
175 A decree entitled ‘The Law Concerning the Solving of the Emergency o f the People and the Reich’ 
(hppp://web.csustan.edu/Flistory/Faculty/Weikart/enabling.htm accessed on 3rd September 2007.)
176 Article 2 of the decree. Whether this article breached the terms o f the constitution depended on the 
interpretation given to article 48. Section 2 o f Article 48 stipulated that the ‘[i]f, in the German Reich, 
public security is considerably disturbed or endangered, the Reichpresident may undertake necessary 
measures in order to restore public security and order, and if necessary intervene with the aid o f armed 
forces. For this purpose he may suspend, temporarily, in part or entirely, the basic rights as provided in 
Articles 114,115,117,118,123,124 and 153 ( Schwab, G 1989: 37). Schmitt argued that this provision 
did not prevent the Reichpresident from introducing measures under the authority o f Article 48 which 
extended beyond the abrogation o f the specific rights stipulated in that article. Even here, however, 
Schmitt considered that there were limits to what could be legislated under Article 48. For example he 
considered that Article 48 could not be used by the Reichpresident to turn a republic into a monarchy 
and given that the operation o f  Article 48 required a basic institutional minimum. Hence according to 
Schmitt, Article 48 assumed the continued existence o f the Reichpresident, the government and the 
Reichstag. One could argue that while Article 2 of the ‘Enabling Act’ allowed for the overriding of 
provisions o f the constitution and appeared to have no limit and hence went beyond a strict 
interpretation of Article 48 which only allowed for certain rights to be suspended, it too implicitly did 
not allow for measures which removed those institutions which were required to implement it. These 
would have included the cabinet and both legislatures. In any event, Schmitt was o f the view that 
Article 48 only allowed for the introduction o f measures temporarily and this was clearly not the case 
with regard to the ‘Enabling Act’. While Schmitt’s ‘latitudinarian’ approach to Article 48 was rejected 
by other jurists such as Hugo Preuss and Richard Grau, it accorded more with the way that Article 48 
had been used in the 1920s and early 1930s prior to Hitler’s rise to power. A number of provisions 
other than those stipulated in Article 48 were contravened by presidential decree including for example 
the imposition o f special courts despite Article 105 which explicitly stated that special courts were
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stated that it would only remain in force for the duration of the then government. 
Article 5 was ignored and the measure remained in force until the destruction of the 
regime. With this breach in mind, the measure enabled the cabinet to permanently 
override the constitution, and it was turned into a statute that marked the end of the 
Weimar constitution and marked the founding measure of the national socialist
1 77system. In effect here the substance of a new normality but without a meaningful 
normative structure was imposed initially using the language of the exception.178
15. This idea of competing normalities can also be applied in reverse. That is to say 
taking the example of the Weimar Republic and looking at the situation from the 
perspective of the insurgents in the 1920s who were engaged in attempting to 
introduce communism 179 by using violent means. Here the communists’ agenda was 
to gain power so as to initiate an economic transformation, that is to say to transform 
N2(a) into N2(b). In order to achieve that they had to gain control of the repressive 
apparatus of the state, a process which would undermine Ni.and facilitate the 
replacement of N2(a) by N2 (b) whereupon N i would be re-established. As it happens 
they were unsuccessful and therefore they were never able to gain continuing control 
of the state instruments of repression. Hence they were never able to overcome the 
imposition by the state of emergency measures designed to protect N2 (aj and hence
1 RO 1 o 1could not progress to establishing N2(b). ’
illegal and totally forbidden. ( Rossiter, C 1948:69; Schwab, G 1989:37-43; Neumann, F 1966: 41-61; 
Noakes J and Pridham, G 1998 ).
177 Neumann, F 1966: 53.
178 In 1941 Hitler issued an edict empowering the Reich Marshall independently to enact any 
legislation or administrative decrees that he considered necessary for air-raid protection (Neumann, F 
1966: 58). In 1942 a decree was passed by the Reichstag giving to Hitler’s word the force o f law, 
(Stone, N 1980).
179 The Spartacists led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg was the most prominent 
revolutionary left-wing organisation (Finn, J.E 1991:152).
180 The government’s ability to suppress communist insurrection was not just dependent on the use of  
Article 48. To be able to impose order, Ebert the Reichpresident had to ensure that the army was on 
side and so, he managed, notwithstanding his socialist past, to secure an alliance with the Reichswehr 
which was a profoundly conservative organisation (Finn, J.E 1991:152-3).
181 One can say that the relationship between norm and exception has become more complex and 
contested because o f  the growth of asymmetrical conflict and the globalisation o f normalities by the 
emergence o f environmental, economic and religious conflicts that transcend state boundaries. This 
has increased scope for dispute over the nature o f  conflict where the priorities o f nation states which 
are essentially based on defined territories and units o f governance are not necessarily matched by their 
antagonists who are not necessarily confined to given territories or are committed to territorial control 
in a way associated with states. For example ‘al Quaeda’, an organisation claimed to exist by many 
western states but whose political agenda is not necessarily agreed upon. There is a growth in 
emphasis upon the idea that such ‘terrorist’ organisations are not interested in territorial gain but are far 
more interested in ensuring a chronic state o f insecurity in certain western states which undermines
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16, All these normalities are imagined by reference to constructing the generality of 
each one through the particularities of their manifestations which may be experienced 
directly or indirectly or speculated upon.182 Added to that is an assessment about the 
extent to which events have occurred which create an emergency necessitating the use 
o f ‘measures to restore public security and order’ that might include the suspension of 
basic rights. In the terms of this one can see a focus by reference to public security 
which directly relates to the requirements of peace represented by N] as seen through 
the prism of N2. On both levels such judgments are always capable of being contested 
and the idea of Schmitt’s sovereign as depicted in Political Theology whereby the 
decision to declare a state of exception and the measures needed to deal with it are
1 R^merged in the same individual, is to foreclose on that debate. The sovereign’s 
judgment on what is under threat, the nature of the threat and the kinds of steps that 
need to be taken to avert it is final. It too will be based on a set of estimations based 
upon the particularities that the sovereign takes into account and from which the 
existing normality and those that might be threatening it are inferred.
The Relationship between Commissariat and Sovereign Dictatorship
17. However, to protect the existing constitutional settlement is in fact not the last 
word. As previously explored, as the political lies at the heart of Schmitt’s model, 
ultimately the decision to declare an exceptional situation may in fact pass out of the 
hands of the existing institution which is exercising the functions of a commissarial 
dictatorship by means that may or may not be constitutional, into the hands of an 
institution, whether individual or aggregate, that is committed to changes that are 
associated with sovereign dictatorship, namely the creation of an altered normality
their socio-economic and political systems leading to their withdrawal from what are considered to be 
illegitimate occupations in the middle-east and, among some elements associated with al Quaeda o f  
establishing global Islamic supremacy (Burke, J 2004).
182 We return here to the idea posed by Cassirer that meaning involves a synthesis o f the particular and 
general. An alternative normality may not be experienced directly from the perspective of those 
determining governmental action including the Schmittian sovereign but indirectly in the sense o f it 
being perceived perhaps via the media and intelligence etc. through the prism o f  the normality under 
threat.
183 In Schmitt’s earlier writings in Die Diktatur, he adheres to the classical definition of dictatorship 
wherein there is separation between the institution that declares the state o f exception and the dictator 
who is appointed directly or indirectly to make decisions on the measures that need to be taken to 
resolve the crisis and who remains accountable to that institution. See McCormick, J.P 1999: 217-251.
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that is characterised by a new constitution that more fully in its view reflects the true 
essence of the people.184 Alternatively the same shift between ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
constitution can in effect be undertaken by the same institution which shifts from a 
commissarial to sovereign dictatorship role. For Schmitt both forms of dictatorship 
are capable of being legitimate, even if acting unconstitionally, as they seek to protect 
the people from its enemies in circumstances where existing constitutional 
arrangements are considered to be inadequate. 185 It is also the case that the move 
from restoring the existing constitution to one where it is in effect abrogated does not 
involve a clear break between decisions associated with the functions of a 
commissarial dictators and those associated with the functions of a sovereign dictator 
particularly where there is no change of personnel. What starts out as a claim to 
restore the effective operation of the existing constitution might develop into a 
process of decision-making by the same individual that in effect gives rise to the 
imposition of a new constitutional settlement.
18. Working through the relationship between the two types of dictatorship, the 
distinction between the two types of dictatorship may be problematic but it is not 
inevitable. Where a dictator emerges by unconstitutional means who is committed to 
the taking of steps which result in the replacement of existing constitutional 
arrangements by new ones, this would accord with Schmitt’s idea of the sovereign 
dictator. However, the dictator might initially appear as a commissarial one, 
polemically committed to the restoration of the constitution rather than the creation of 
another but may take measures which in effect dispose of the former and give rise to 
the creation of the latter or nothing that would amount to a constitution in the
1 8Ademocratic-liberal sense as for example in the case of Hitler. In such
184 Schwab, G in Schmitt, C 1985::xix.
185 The possibility for governmental action being legitimate and justified despite being unconstitutional 
flows from a number o f themes or positions in his writings. These include his understanding o f the 
political and the existence o f the pre-constitutional essence o f  a people, his exploitation o f  Weber’s 
hesitancy over legality constituting a thick rather than a thin form o f legitimacy, his claim that legality 
was subservient to legitimacy, his commitment to the administrative state over that o f the legislative 
state, his idea that legitimacy primarily derived from the authority o f the decision-maker and his idea 
of the consent o f the population to the authority o f the decision-maker being expressed through its 
passive acquiescence. The relationship between legitimacy and law is particularly explored in Legality 
and Legitimacy and is commented upon for example by Schwab and particularly by McCormick 
(McCormick, J 1997 and 2004; Schwab, G 1989: 125 and Schmitt, C 2004).
186 This gives rise to the issue as to whether an amendment clause in a constitution, assuming it has no 
explicit restrictions, can be used to amend the existing constitution out of existence. Schmitt himself 
rejected this contention and claimed, reflecting his idea about the centrality o f the friend/enemy
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circum stances, one would not necessarily  be clear as to which type o f  dictator one 
w as confronted with other than retrospectively. Even then, there could well be room 
for contention over w hether or not the original constitution had been restored, 
assum ing that was the claim , depending on what one identified as the term s o f the 
original constitu tion .Is' The m ovem ent from com m issarial d ictator to sovereign 
d icta tor can be diagram m atically represented in the follow ing way:
Fig. 1
F/En
CD SD
N,/N2(a) v N-j/N-2(a)
n/ex
distinction, that amendment provisions did not provide unlimited authority to ‘recast the structure o f 
the constitution fundam entally’ (Schm itt, C 2004: 96). This also conforms to his attitude towards 
A rticle 48 described above.
187 In this analysis, one sees once again the ’fabulous retroactivity’ posed by Derrida in the creation o f  a 
‘n ew ’ constitutional arrangement.
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19. Looking at this diagram, one can see that the emergence of the sovereign dictator 
is not dependent on the prior existence of the commissarial dictator although the 
action or inaction of the former might provoke the creation of the latter.188 In the 
case of the commissarial dictator, the nature and interests of the people, the nature of 
the events considered to constitute or threaten a crisis in the light of their perceived or 
threatened impact upon the people and its institutions, the extent to which exceptional 
measures are needed and their nature are capable of becoming pivotal points of 
reference around which each sovereign judges whether a state of normality or
I OQ
exception exists and the measures required in the event of the latter. The existence 
of the model is predicated upon a practice that is captured in the Schmittian idea of 
the pluriverse, that is the idea of a multitude of states, each with its own population 
whose perception of the world, upon what is acceptable and unacceptable, upon what 
might arouse it to engage in conflict and ultimately violence cannot be reduced to a 
statement of universal reason but is particular to that population and ultimately as 
with any other state is expressed in the idea of the decision that is underivable from 
any universally accepted normative condition. At the point of the exception, the 
stability of a particular state, in the opinion of that state’s sovereign, is threatened in a 
way that is unacceptable to that sovereign. A condition of crisis, as declared by the 
commissarial dictator, calls forth the need for exceptional measures while the absence 
of crisis results in him withdrawing from the daily political process depending on the 
constitutional arrangements in play. And yet, assuming for the moment that the daily 
process of governance does not actively involve the commissarial dictator, the very
188 The notation o f the diagram above comprises the following: CD and SD are commissarial and 
sovereign dictator respectively; P denotes the people as the symbolic pole o f unity, on whose behalf the 
sovereign claims he is undertaking the decision to declare the exception; F/En denotes the 
friend/enemy distinction in the light o f the fundamental qualities attributed to the people by the 
sovereign decision-maker and the threats being experienced. D denotes disruptive events that have 
occurred which threaten or undermine the existing order and institutions; -Ni/-N2(a) denotes the threat 
that such events pose to the existing order Ni/N2(a) which the CD seeks to protect. Their significance 
and seriousness will be inferred from their nature and their implications for the existing order and the 
extent to which they pose another undesirable normality Nj/N2(b); n/ex denotes a state o f normality 
where norms n are applicable and the potential to declare measures under the authority o f  a state of  
exception ex, where such norms are no longer considered to be applicable, which the dictator has sole, 
and from Schmitt’s point o f view, unchallengeable authority to decide upon.
189 The categories by which the justification o f the need to declare a state o f exception might disguise 
the articulation o f other interests such as the class, race or other divisions o f society which are not 
explicitly regarded as the points of unity that are proclaimed by the sovereign to define ‘the people’. - 
N_i suggests a state o f affairs which lacks social stability and embraces the idea of chaos captured for 
example by Hobbes’ state o f nature.
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maintenance of what is perceived by the government in normal times to be necessary 
for the production of that normality can fundamentally determine his perception of the 
boundary between normality and exception. It is therefore the case, bearing in mind 
the dialectical relationship between normality and exception, that sovereign practice 
centrally involves the activities of governmental institutions in times of normality 
which are concerned with both social peace and disruption.
20. Breaking down Ni/N2(a) v -Ni/-N2(a) one can see the following normalities:
Fig 2
N i/N2(c)
Ni/N2(a) *-------------► n/ex -N1/-N2(a).................. N,/N:2(b)
CD SD
Here one can see that the objective of the sovereign in declaring a state of exception is 
to introduce measures so as to return to the state of normality (Ni/N2(a)) under attack 
or to protect it so that it is not fundamentally undermined. In evaluating the 
circumstances confronting him, the commissarial dictator will evaluate disruptive 
events as they present themselves to him and from these infer the extent to which 
N i/N2(3) is undermined as constituted by N-i/N.2(a). In evaluating that, it may well be 
that an evaluation of the disruptive events will not only involve the extent to which, in 
his view, they undermine the normality he aims to protect but also the nature of the 
forces that are considered to be the cause of such events and the normality for which 
they stand.190 In all this, while normalities can be described as having specific 
features that provide the impression of finished entities, they are in reality constantly
190 For example a theocratic or communist society.
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unfolding through the agency of events, many of which will be chronologically 
separated. A process of continual interpretation by the commissarial dictator 
therefore takes place whereby individual events are fitted into an overall conception 
of such normalities, particularly that which he is engaged in defending. That process 
of interpretation will develop around his normative prescriptions of how society ought 
to develop, through which events are given meaning and prioritised in terms of 
significance, and as a consequence the character of the crisis and the steps that need to 
be taken. The particularities of individual events feed into and are seen in the light of 
the generalities of the normality under protection and its needs. In the idea of 
normality rests the idea of exclusion of other normalities. The norms, whether legal or 
not, which contribute towards structuring a particular normality in the form of 
institutions, customs, rights and obligations suggest the exclusion of other norms 
which go towards the construction of other normalities. In order to return to that 
normality, the measures taken by the commissarial dictator are clearly a response to 
the crisis as he perceives it. 191
21. For Schmitt, however, the distinction between commissarial dictator committed
to restoring the existing constitution and sovereign dictator committed to abrogating
it, is deeply problematic. The scope of the measures that the commissarial dictator can
take to restore normality by reference to the constitution are uncertain not least
because Schmitt’s position was not a consistent one. In his examination of Article 48,
he considered, as we have seen, that it allowed the taking of virtually any measure to
cure a crisis, subject to the requirement of the institutional minimum associated with
the constitution, namely the maintenance of the Reichpresident, the government and
the Reichstag.192 Furthermore, he considered that the role of the Reichpresident
under Article 48 allowed him to operate both as lawmaker and law applicator, as
1legislator and executive in his role of overcoming crisis. However more ominously
191 The relation o f commissarial dictatorship to law is captured by Schmitt’s description o f its role:
‘A dictatorship therefore does not have the purpose o f making itself superfluous is a random despotism. 
Achieving a concrete success however means intervening in the causal path o f events with means 
whose correctness lies solely in their purposefulness and is exclusively dependent on a factual 
connection to the causal event itself. Dictatorship hence suspends that by which it is justified , the state 
of law and imposes instead a rule o f procedure interested exclusively in bringing about a concrete 
success ...[a return to ] a state o f law.(Schmitt, C 1989: xvi).
192 Schwab, G 1989: 40. This is reinforced by his assertion that the ‘President is free to intervene in the
entire system o f existing statutory norms and use it for his own purposes (Schmitt, C 2004: :71).
193 Schmitt, C 2004:71.
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in later writings, he claims that the decree making powers of the Reichpresident was 
superior to the law making powers of parliament hence pointing to the possibility and 
desirability of a permanent decree state.194 This was reinforced by suggestions that 
constitutionality was ultimately linked not so much to the constitution itself but to the 
pre-constitutional will of the people, a point of transcendent symbolic reference, 
expressed through the decisions of the Reichpresident who was not infected with what 
Schmitt considered to be the bargaining, compromise and factionalism present in 
parliament characterised by endless party conflict.195 The disunity manifested in 
parliament because of the absence of a unified politics expressing a unified people 
pointed logically to the possibility of itself becoming the cause of crisis. For Schmitt, 
this constituted a kind of Trojan horse displaying a chaotic lack of resolve that echoes 
the idea of the ever threatening state of nature which for Hobbes could be glimpsed 
even inside a commonwealth in the phenomenon of criminality. Hence the idea of the 
commissarial dictator having the role of dealing with episodic crisis becomes 
absorbed by the idea of a permanent crisis which could only be catered for by a 
sovereign dictator. Part of his function was to abrogate the existing constitution which 
itself had become an obstacle to the process of acceptable governance based around 
the people’s unity of will as expressed by the dictator through the agency of 
plebiscitory democracy. Therefore from the dictator’s viewpoint, normality could be 
‘restored’ by the exclusion of the existing constitution and associated institutions.
N2(a) within such a framework is likely to require abrogation of the existing 
constitution, thus in effect turning the idea of the commissarial dictator into a 
rhetorical device through which the actions of sovereign dictatorship are realised. 
Looked at in this way, the normalities referred to above need to be modified to 
include the ‘creation’ of a new normality. This normality reflects an anti-liberal 
authoritarian perspective and is considered to be under threat not simply because of 
hostile events but because of what is perceived to be the incapacity of existing liberal 
constitutional arrangements to counter them. It emerges out of N 2(a) and hence
194 Schmitt, C 2004:74.
195 Behind the marginalisation o f parliament and the identification of the Reichprasidenf s positions 
with those o f ‘the people’ is the assertion that ‘every democracy rests on the presupposition o f the 
indivisibly similar, entire, unified people...’ (Schmitt, C 2004: 28). Schmitt’s reliance upon a pre­
constitutional will allowed him to beat a path towards protecting bourgeois privileges, including 
property rights to which he was committed, in circumstances where he considered that at the heart of 
liberalism there lay a contradiction in that such demands could not be protected by bourgeois liberal 
institutions most particularly parliament (See Maus, I 1998:196-216).
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looking at N2(a) from both an authoritarian and liberal perspective , with the former 
constructed around the idea of the pre-constitutional will, (although it may 
rhetorically be claimed to be associated with the normality of the constitution,) and 
the latter constructed around the constitution, one can in fact discern two normalities 
namely N1^  and N22(a):
Fig. 3
N 12(a):that is to say normality from an authoritarian perspective
N22(a): that is to say normality from a liberal perspective which 
includes the existing liberal constitution
This leads to a modification of the above diagram concerning the relationship of 
normalities (Fig. 2) when drawing out the logic of Schmitt’s authoritarian perspective: 
Fig. 4
> n/ex
SD
22. One can see here that -N|/-N‘ 2(a) now absorbs Ni/N22(a) into its embrace since the 
latter, standing for the liberal institutions such as parliament, contribute from the 
perspective of the authoritarian dictator towards the destruction of the idea of the
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people’s unity of will which lies at the centre of Nj/N^a). Ni/N2(b), the alleged 
unwanted normality that exceptional measures are designed to avoid is now capable 
of being seen at the very least to be assisted by the normality denoted by Ni/N22(a) 
associated with the constitution and particularly the rights protected under it that a 
commissarial dictator would be expected to restore.. Given the sovereign dictator’s 
position as being the sole determinant of the people’s will, with the liberal law­
making processes centred around a multi-party parliament being seen as an obstacle to 
the expression of that will, the possibility is increased of the exceptional measures 
temporarily introduced under the guise of an orthodox commissarial function 
becoming permanent in order to ensure the protection and continuation of the 
normality rhetorically associated with the people’s will, namely Ni/N'2(a). Hence the 
requirement for recasting the relationship between the potential normality that might 
occur if the exceptional measures become permanent, namely N]/N2 (C), (a situation to 
be avoided from the perspective of liberal democracy), and the normality desired by 
the sovereign dictator, namely Nj/N12(a)- In the light of Schmitt’s authoritarian 
approach, the normality, Ni/Nt2(C), can be justifiably equated with the one that the 
sovereign dictator seeks to protect, namely Ni/N^a) in the name of protecting the 
peoples’ existence and unity. With these alterations in mind, the relationship of 
normalities now appears as follows:
[Please turn over]
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Fig. 5
N j/N V 96 (=N,/N2(c))
l
N /ex  -N i /-N12(a)  N i /N2(b) (which includes N i /N22(a))
SD
23. What one sees here from the dictator’s perspective is in effect the fusion of 
normal and exceptional circumstances. The former now comes to be permanently 
absorbed into the latter and in effect a new normality is created bom out of the need 
by the dictator to permanently exclude all or key aspects of the democratic liberal 
form of governance associated with the normality which he now seeks to suspend. 
These features including the protection of civil rights and the primacy of parliament in 
the legislative process, which he opposes as being incapable of expressing the 
people’s will that he alone proclaims to understand, give expression to and protect. In 
doing so, he may justify his actions as being appropriate to his alleged commissarial 
function but in fact in substance they will be those of a sovereign dictator. The 
condition of the permanent exception is established and this describes the nature of 
Hitler’s Third Reich whose coup d’etat was initiated by the Decree of 28 February 
1933. If one traces through the various measures that were introduced by the National 
Socialists, one can see clearly the systematic destruction of the liberal constitutional 
order at play. This became most apparent with the ‘Enabling Law’ referred to above 
and the discarding in practice of Article 5 which rendered the measure permanent. 
Other measures taken were also in breach of the ‘Enabling Law’ and had the effect of 
permanently concentrating power in the hands of the government and ultimately in
196 Peace as associated with Ni/N^a) historically manifested itself most starkly in what Agamben 
refers to as the sovereign space, that is a space where individuals are completely abandoned to the 
unfettered actions o f the state as most starkly expressed by the concentration camp (Agamben, G 
1998).
197 Article 5 of ‘the Enabling Law’ declared the validity of the law would cease on 1st April 1937 or if  
the Reich Cabinet in office on the date that the law came into effect was replaced by another.
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Hitler’s. These included the abolition of the federal council by statute on 14th 
February 1934 and the merging of the posts of Chancellor and President.198 To echo 
Marx, while Hitler rhetorically identified himself with the cause of the German 
people, in effect the latter became identified with the cause of the former.199
198 The ‘Enabling Law’ ostensibly preserved the position o f  parliamentary institutions and the federal 
council See Neumann, F 1966.
199 Marx, K 1891.
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PART 4
Chapter 11: Routine and Rupture
1. The creation of a model of sovereignty is inevitably the outcome of a hermeneutical 
exercise that seeks to generalise in two senses. It may seek to express in generalised terms a 
description of the process of governance as observed by the creator of the model.1 It may 
also be the outcome of a construction of normative frameworks of how governance ought to 
occur propelled by moral, social and instrumental considerations. The latter concern can be 
said to be prominent for the principal creators of models of sovereignty including the ones 
covered in this thesis. The former concern appears perhaps more prominently in Austin’s 
model than the others covered but even here as suggested in the first reading of his model, his 
normative concerns cannot be divorced from what at times appears to be an observational 
tract. Schmitt’s model taken in the context of his other writings also is presented at least in 
part as a description of existing and past practice although once again there is a normative 
theme running through it linked to his authoritarian prescriptions for the maintenance of 
national unity. In the construction of the models the symbolic character of the term 
‘sovereignty’ or ‘sovereign’ manifests itself in constant competition between variants as to its 
meaning and nature. The foregrounding of the elements associated with sovereignty as 
depicted in a given model is inevitably constructed against the context of a background which 
comprises a range of considerations including metaphysical assumptions about the way 
knowledge and humans exist, the nature of the human condition both individually and 
collectively in terms of their propensities, the assumed character of human society and its 
organisation in terms of its perceived actuality or assumptions about the way it ought to exist 
and the underlying moral and ethical consideration around which the process of governance 
needs to be constructed.2 The range of considerations, the character being given to each one, 
the relationship between them and the weighting given to each one will clearly vary. 
Triumphus’ model is dominated by a metaphysical assumption predicated upon the 
supremacy of the spiritual world over the temporal. Hobbes on the other hand is committed to 
a very different metaphysical construct. Dante, in the shadow of Aquinas perceives the 
human condition as essentially cooperative. Hobbes believes in the opposite. Sovereignty
1 This is captured by the idea o f theory as defined for example by Harre who describes it as ‘ a representation o f  
the structure o f the enduring system in which those events occur which as phenomena are its subject matter and 
by which they are generated’ (Harre, R, 1970 14 quoted in Manicas, P.T 2006: 27).
2 For example putting it simplistically whether humans are essentially solitary or cooperative beings , the former 
being exemplified most clearly by Hobbes.
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located in the idea of the people has as its background the centrality of democracy in marked 
contrast to the early models of sovereignty as depicted in Triumphus and Hobbes for 
example. Austin’s attitude to democracy is less than wholehearted and is consistent with an 
idea of sovereignty which does not locate it squarely with the people but with the supreme 
institutions of governance whose position does not need to be the outcome of some 
democratic process. Similarly Schmitt’s route to sovereignty does not require as a pre­
condition, sovereignty’s location being the outcome of democratic procedures. In so far as 
democracy is admitted, ultimately his move is to hollow it out in the form of the plebiscite. 
Order and freedom constantly interact with one another in the considerations used to 
construct and justify the idea of sovereignty which is derived historically from a commitment 
to a centralised form of governance that is territorially based.
2. The process of the production of models of sovereignty, suggested above, leads to the 
conclusion not surprisingly that the idea of sovereignty is deeply connected to a series of 
other ideas that have the capacities to assert, shape and justify its existence.3 However the 
concept of embeddedness immediately raises the query as to within what does such 
embeddedness occur? Here the idea of practice emerges as applicable to an explanation of 
activities within the social domain. The idea of practice is captured at least in part by its 
dictionary definition which includes ‘ habitual action or performance’, a ‘habit or practice.’4 
This suggests the possibility of action which is repeated and undertaken without thinking so 
that in so far as it is artificial and leamt, the proceeds of such learning having possibly been 
forgotten or possibly even repressed. Another explanation of practice is to be found in 
Foucault’s writings where he describes them as ‘ places where what is said and what is done, 
rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and taken for granted meet and interconnect.’5 
He therefore highlights that practices consist of both things said and done, that is to say 
action and discourse. Foucault of course engages in an extensive analysis of such practices 
based on the proposition that such practices constitute the social order that has a degree of 
coherence although not for the reasons necessarily given by those that engaged in it.6 In his 
exploration of social practices he seeks to reveal how social power operates and how truth
3 This idea o f the embedding o f  ideas amidst others with which they are interconnected in the political domain is 
usefully explored by Freeden, M 1998.
4 The Concise Oxford Dictionary (9th edition): 1995: 1072.
5 Foucault, M 1991:75.
6 Barron, A 202: 959.
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and power are mutually reinforcing.7 His notion of power does not equate with institutions 
that might be associated with it and more generally he de-centres the subject as agent in his
Q
explanation of it. Yet of course neither does he reject the role of such institutions in the 
transmission of such power. What he rejected was the claim that the sovereign institution 
was the primary source of a social order’s intelligibility and that it was the primary source of 
such power.9 Furthermore it is through the operation of power that the subject is constituted. 
Power then manifesting itself through a series of practices which are also manifested in the 
governmental process gathers its expression through the constitution of the ‘subject’ and the 
institutions associated with governance.10 The idea of government is hence in Foucault’s 
mind constituted by a series of practices through which power circulates. In conceptualising 
power in this way however, he does not explicitly capture the experience of participants 
within such practices, who will inevitably conceive of governmental power emanating from 
the institutions associated with it and such institutions will be experienced as having a 
‘solidity’ derived from repeated instances of their decision making and activities.11 This 
brings us back to Giddens who as stated in the first part of this thesis considered that social 
systems are reproduced social practices that exhibit ‘structural properties’ captured by the 
idea of ‘commonplace transcendence’ previously explored above in chapter 6 and that this 
links in to Berger and Luckmann’s point that institutions take on an objectified point when 
they are transmitted beyond those that created them and hence appear to participants as
t 9unchallengeable realities beyond the possibility of change by human action.
7 Quoted in Faubion, J.D 1994: xvi from 1973 interview , “ Interview on the prison: the book and its methods” 
collected in volume 1 o f Dits et ecrits p. 752.
8 Foucault states that by power he does not ‘mean “Power” as a group o f institutions and mechanisms that 
ensure the subservience o f the citizens o f a given state.’ (Foucault, M 1979: 92)
9 Foucault, M 1979: 92-93. He considered that power ‘comes from everywhere ...[and]...in so far as it is 
permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing, is simply the overall effect that emerges from all these 
mobilities.. .no doubt power is not an institution and not a structure: neither is it a certain strength we are 
endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society’ 
(Foucault, F 1979: 92-93).
10 For example Foucault states that the form o f power that applies itself to immediate everyday life categorises 
the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law o f  truth on 
him that he must recognise and others have to recognise him. It is a form o f power that makes individuals 
subjects’ (Foucault, M 1983: 212).
11 The reason for this is that individuals will not experience themselves or the practices with which they are 
engaged as being the outcome of the circulation o f  power.
12 See Giddens, A 1984: 17-24; Berger P and Luckmann T 1966: 76. See also chapter 2 paras 6 and 7 above 
and chapter 6, para 8 above.
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Routine
3. What will now be suggested is that the idea of the embedded agent whose experience of 
the world is enabled through the operation of a background, within the context of social 
practice, can be used to bring together a variety of themes explored in this thesis. At the 
centre of this exploration will be an endeavour to link within the context of sovereignty, the 
symbolic with the idea of practice and that of habit.
4. The idea of the symbol providing the possibility of endless meanings and contested sites 
of meaning, together with the existence of social practice in which the meaning of language is 
inter-subjectively fixed and the operation of emdeddedness, as previously explored with its 
association of foreground and background, will be used in a form of synthesis to explore how 
sovereignty should be conceived.13 Before doing so, however, one more ingredient needs to 
be briefly developed and that is the idea of practical and discursive consciousness posed by 
Giddens and initially raised in the second reading of Austin when considering the idea of 
habitual obedience.14 This needs to be placed in the context of foreground and background 
posed above. From the perspective of a given action, the idea of foreground can clearly 
include Giddens’ ideas of practical and discursive consciousness.15 They suggest a degree of 
focal awareness of what one is doing but that does not always necessarily involve reflection 
in the sense of being able to express what one knows about the deed in words at the time of 
its undertaking or even if it does, it does not necessarily involve critical reflection.16 It can 
therefore be seen that the foreground associated with conduct being undertaken can involve 
non-reflective or reflective thinking and that the latter category can involve uncritical and 
critical thought. However from the perspective of a consideration which from an external 
point of view might be associated with a given action, for example the need to follow a 
particular law, the idea of practical consciousness suggests that at most, from an internal
13 See chapter 6 above.
14 Chapter 9 para 4 above.
15 Giddens, A 1984: 49. Practical consciousness suggests recall while an action is undertaken without the 
person benig able ‘to express what he “knows’ while discursive consciousness involves recall where the person 
can give expression verbally.
16 Here the suggestion is that what Giddens describes as discursive consciousness can be sub-divided into two 
forms o f reflective thinking, namely uncritical reflection which will be primarily descriptive in nature and 
critical reflection that involves analysis and evaluation. The use o f  Giddens’s classification o f practical and 
discursive consciousness helps to enrich Taylor’s idea o f foreground.
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individual perspective, the law will not be in the individual’s foreground but in his 
background, or possibly not even part of his background at all.17 Even the possession of 
discursive consciousness in relation to a particular action does not mean that the law that 
relates to such action will inevitably be part of the foreground. The individual will probably 
be uncritically aware of his conduct or at least aspects of it, in the sense of being able to 
express its contents or critically aware of it in the sense of being able to analyse it or part of 
it. However even though the law may not be included in the foreground of such awareness, it 
might be in the background although not inevitably. If in the background, in the sense that 
the individual is not conscious of it at the time of the conduct, it may come to the foreground 
upon further reflection of the reasons for his conduct, in that the individual may allude to the 
law which therefore travels at that point from background to foreground.
5. Looking at Austin’s idea of sovereignty necessitating habitual obedience by the bulk of 
the population to the commands of a determinate superior, one can clearly see that such 
obedience may involve, from the perspective of the individual and legal requirements, a 
number of different states of m ind.18 Within the time period surrounding the action, these 
range from practical consciousness where law may be in the background or possibly outside 
the individual’s consciousness altogether to discursive consciousness where law may, 
although not inevitably, be in the foreground and if it is, either being thought about 
uncritically or critically both of which may involve a range of detail as to the law’s nature 
and implications.19 Even when thought about critically, it is still possible that the individual 
may uncritically follow that law because he considers himself (uncritically) bound to do so.
6. The sense of routine suggested by Austin’s claim of individuals’ habitual obedience to the 
law with its association of uncritical compliance, without excluding the possibility of critical 
compliance at times, fits overall into a behaviour of repetitive obedience that characterises his
17 This does not mean that the existence o f the law in such circumstances is no longer part o f the stage setting in 
the sense that the effects o f the operation o f the law, namely broad compliance by others provides the 
background for the individual.
18 Austin, J 1832: 117.
19 The same individual may ‘transit’ from one o f  these states to the others or either o f them over a period o f time 
in relation to the particular action or group o f actions o f a similar nature. On the face o f  it, someone who is 
‘unconscious’ o f the law at the time of the action associated with it from an external point o f view, cannot 
incorporate it into his background or foreground unless he is subject to an input, whereby for example he is told 
about the law, whereupon it may well move straight into his foreground and then possibly as time goes by 
recede into the background to become part o f Wittgenstein’s stage setting (Wittgenstein, L 1998: para 257).
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9ficonception of the sovereign-subject relationship. However this has to be cast wider 
reflecting the fact that territorially based sovereignty is embedded in international practice 
characterising the existence of and relationships between territorially based states as
9 1associated with international law. This sense of territorially limited sovereignty being 
inextricably inter-dependent with international social practice was suggested in the second 
readings of Hobbes and Austin. Such routine also can be seen to operate within Schmitt’s 
model since the decision to declare a state of exception, at least in its commissarial variant, is 
predicated upon an existing social practice that, inter alia, includes the terms of any 
constitutional settlement and the configuration of the sovereign borders of the state under 
examination. The idea as Schmitt proclaims that the sovereign is both inside and outside the 
domestic political order, derives from his authority to suspend much of the very 
constitutional order through which his institutional presence is seemingly structured.
Schmitt claims that this way of looking at sovereignty means that the definition of
99sovereignty ‘must therefore be ‘associated with a borderline case and not with routine.’
Yet is this really the case? Has routine behaviour no part to play in the decision of a 
particular governmental office holder to decide that there is a state of exception and upon the 
measures needed to counter it. The fact that such an office holder makes the decision as 
opposed to others might well be consistent with taken-for-granted behaviour, that is 
routinised compliance with the prevailing constitutional requirements that, inter alia, identify 
that particular office holder as the decision-maker and the procedures that must be satisfied 
for such decisions to be made validly made. The measures decided upon to counter the threat 
constituted by the state of exception might also be consistent, for example, with routinised 
compliance with existing international borders. Both adherence to existing constitutional 
requirements and international borders might also constitute part of the background against
20 The idea of routine suggests habitual taken-for granted- activity. See Giddens, A 1984: 376 and Chapter 9, 
para. 6. Habitual behaviour in the sense o f behaviour that is regular and hard to give up (as defined by the 
Concise Oxford Dictionary -  see Chapter 9, para 5). may therefore not be taken for granted and so by reference 
to these definitions, it could be argued that all routine behaviour is habitual but not all habitual behaviour is 
necessarily routine. For the purpose o f this chapter I will equate them save where the difference becomes 
significant.
21 The inter-relationship between the domestic and international is the subject o f controversy, with varying 
emphasis placed on the former and latter as primary drivers for the development o f the system in its totality and 
its elements. While there are a variety o f emphases within each school o f international relations, neo-realists 
and institutionalist liberals for example tend to place primary emphasis on the international domain as defining 
the characteristics o f individual units while others in the liberal tradition emphasise developments in domestic 
units as being the primary drivers in the system as a whole. These differences interlink with differences over 
conceptions of how the relationships between domestic and international domains are structured with the most 
obvious but not the only factor being the juridical construct o f state or sovereign borders and legal regulation 
more generally but also involving cross-border political, economic and social processes (Sorenson, 2001: 5-23).
22 Schmitt, C 1988:4.
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which the decision to declare a state of exception is made in the sense that those concerned 
with the decision may not consciously, even in an uncritical way, reflect upon them as part of 
the decision-making process. That is not to say that these matters might not come to the 
foreground in the form of non-critically or critically reflective thought involving analysis, 
evaluation and judgment so that the elements of the decisions concerned with these matters
9^might no longer be said to be routine. In such circumstances, elements of the decision 
concerned with these matters will supplement other key non-routine elements that are 
concerned with the nature of the threat and the steps needed to counter it.24
Routine and Rupture
7. Implicit within the above discussion about practice is the idea of habit, most obviously 
captured by the process of routine associated with practical consciousness, and uncritical 
thinking associated with discursive consciousness. The idea of habit as initially suggested by 
Austin and expanded in the above manner points to a potentiality that provides for a rather 
paradoxical conclusion. It is that routine can play a significant part in the rupture of the very 
sovereign subject relationship which Austin proclaims is constituted through it. To explore 
this further requires an appreciation if the interconnectedness of social practices through 
which activities occur. This is graphically exposed by the character of the bus queue which
9 ^Sartre uses in his exploration of groupings.
To begin with, it should be noted here that we are dealing with a plurality 
of isolations: these people do not care about or speak to each other and, in 
general they do not look at one another; they exist side by side alongside a
bus stop This man is isolated not only by his body.. .but also by the
fact that he turns his back on his neighbour, who moreover has not even
23 This would be the case where the thoughts associated with the behaviour is critically reflective in character.
24 A territorial threat by one state against another reflecting a territorial dispute will inevitably mean that the 
location o f the borders will come to the foreground and provide a focus o f reflection and contested assertion 
leading to a number o f possible decisions by the government o f the threatened state including, but not 
necessarily limited to the seeking o f mediation through international adjudication potentially based on 
competing notions o f  external sovereignty. This has been explored for example by Koskenniemi who he seeks to 
show, partly by exploring the way territorial disputes have been approached, that the pure fact and legal 
approach to assessing the existence o f state sovereignty dissolve into one another (Koskenniemi, M 2005: 224- 
302). The complexity o f  how sovereignty is ascertained internationally is captured by Brownlie’s observation 
that the issue o f territorial sovereignty or title is often complex and involves applications o f various principles o f  
the material facts. The results o f this process cannot always be ascribed to any rule or ‘mode of acquisition’ 
(Brownlie, I 2003: 127).
25 Sartre, J-P 2004.
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noticed him...The practical conditions of this attitude of semi-
9 f\unawareness are, first his real membership of other groups ( it is 
morning, he has just got up and left home; he is still thinking of his 
children who are ill etc., he is going to his office; he has an oral report to 
make to his superior; he is worrying about its phrasing, rehearsing it under 
his breadth etc.).. . ,27
8. One can see here immediately the interlocking of activities, whereby the waiting at the 
bus-stop not only relates to the practice of travelling to and from work and potentially a 
variety of other activities for which the bus is needed such as those relating to educational, 
consumer and leisure-orientated pursuits but also the practice of waiting for buses. It is 
juxtaposed in the case of the above individual to activities associated with being a father and 
perhaps, in the case of other individuals, waiting-in-line to travel in order to undertake other 
family roles. In this queue as in any other queue, the terrorist, bank robber, priest, accountant, 
school-child, judge and civil servant could have all lined up together. All of them to cite 
Giddens, require their ontological security. All engage in routines. Even the terrorist, who in 
the development of his plans of destruction, may have developed them around certain 
routines of actions and thought relating to his way of life which may involve conscious 
obedience or compliance with certain law. The judge, who may have tried suspected 
terrorists, will have engaged in routines with regard to the procedures through which such 
trials are undertaken. The civil servant, a member of the executive branch of government, 
who might be involved in the drafting of legislation to counter terrorism, is likely to engage 
in certain routines that do not involve critical thought. These might include engagement with 
certain internal organisational procedures constituting the stages by which legislation is 
developed. These legislative activities will operate in the context, in the case of the United 
Kingdom for example, of the operation of parliamentary sovereignty which provides the civil 
servant with part of his background and certainly stage-setting against which his foreground 
concerns derive meaning and are acted upon. Routines hence pervade the activities of the 
individuals mentioned and while they wait at the bus-stop for the same bus, or for that matter 
different ones, they all engage in the activity of queuing for a bus which also has a routine
26 The idea o f ‘unawareness’ at first approximation chimes in with the idea o f Taylor’s background but more 
poignantly points to the difficulty o f  clearly describing the latter and points to the zone o f indistinction that 
exists at the imagined boundary between foreground and background since it can be seen to have ingredients of 
both.
27 Sartre, J-P 2004: 256-257.
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element. These individuals also belong at least potentially to a variety of groupings in the 
sense that they engage in collective behaviour in a variety of circumstances including that of 
the bus queue itself which might be defined for example by reference to work, profession, 
organisations such as trade unions, pressure groups, leisure and sports activities. Clearly 
here by reference to common activity, some groupings may be episodic in character, while 
others such as that related to professional associations, may have considerably more 
permanency and may well be organisationally structured through a series of rules which may 
or may not be expressed legally. Routine therefore co-exists within different activities that 
may interlock and which may be associated simultaneously with a variety of groupings, the 
combinations of which are likely to differ for each individual and may change over time.
9. Considering permanent organisations to which individuals belong, for instance trade 
unions or political parties, the idea of agreed social practices, expressed for example in 
Wittgensteinian terms in a variety of language games, is likely to mean that reflexive 
cooperation is achieved both from an internal point of view with regard to the perception of 
each individual in the collective and externally from the perspective of the detached onlooker. 
However there always remains the possibility that disruption and breakdown of the collective 
may occur. The reasons for this include that ultimately the idea of collective activity 
manifesting collective intentionality occurs through individuals with all their potential 
differences as regards personal histories, capacities, circumstances, belief structures and 
priorities.29 There always remains the possibility that in the face of new and perhaps 
unexpected developments that impact upon the collective, the latter in extremis will break 
down. Referring back to Schmitt, the potentiality for this is at least in part caught by the 
observation that in relation to any normative structure, concrete decisions cannot be fully 
determined by it.30 The exercise of the relevant language game through which such decisions
28 By way o f observation, such groupings might exhibit features Sartre associates with ‘collectivities’ and 
groups. The former are characterised by passivity and lack o f  reciprocity while the latter are characterised by 
reciprocity in contrast to a bus queue which he refers to as a ‘series’ (Sartre, J-P 827-828). I have not adopted 
Sartre’s schema o f meaning for terms such as ‘collective’.
29 It is recognised that collective and individual identity are affected by each other and can be said to be co­
constituted and capable o f being mutually reinforcing and hence reproduced. Druckman for example in a survey 
of the literature on in-group biases observed that membership ‘in a clan, religious group or ethnic group 
becomes part o f the individual’s self identity and is crucial to a sense o f self worth’ (Druckman, D 1994: 49-50). 
This leads to loyalties to the group which in turn leads to differentiation between who to support and who to 
avoid leading to the group reproducing itself and continual inclusion and exclusion. However there always 
remains the possibility for rupture for a variety o f  reasons related to the individual’s particularities, interests and 
history within the collective and relationship to other groupings o f which he is part. See Kratochwil, F 1989; 
Bloom. W 1990.
30 See chapter 5 above at para 7.
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are arrived now may become the site for conflict and ultimately the disruption of the 
organisation. Specific features of the organisation perhaps relating to finances, representative 
structures, regulatory procedures might becomes pivotal points around which such conflict is 
engaged. Uncritical thought and taken-for-granted activity for example might operate to 
reflect the assumption that compliance with the regulatory structure of the organisation and 
the possession of viable finances might well determine and structure the conflict around 
them. Within the context of such conflict not only might there be taken-for-granted 
agreement between the protagonsists as to the importance of such matters but there will have 
to be what might be called ‘pre-contractual’ agreement in the form of inter-subjective 
language games that make meaningful communication possible and hence provide the 
possibility of disagreement. Even in the splitting apart of the organisation, a language 
game between antagonists will continue to operate and unreflective assumptions and 
consequential actions will continue to operate regarding the need to maintain the existing 
organisation or the desirability to create a new one. The creation of a new one, although not 
necessarily a frequent occurrence, might well involve routine behaviour as to the mechanisms 
of doing so, based on non-reflective or uncritical reflective thought. This analysis will 
provide an interesting insight with regard to sovereignty which will be explored below.
10. However to limit the above analysis to the domain of practice inter-subjectively driven is 
on its own inadequate to capture the subjective experiences of those participating in such an 
event. The embeddedness of each individual in the practice of a collective carries with it the 
operation in the minds of such individuals of conscious processes that will embrace both 
uncritical and critical thinking pivoted around justifications for the practices that are 
undertaken. If for example certain practices are undertaken in order to ‘follow’ a series of 
rules, one can argue as Wittgenstein does that such behaviour cannot be explained as being a 
product of the interpretation of the rule and that such a manifestation is the product of a
31 Taken-for -granted activity is routine activity. See above.
32 The language game can be seen to be a manifestation o f routine in the sense that it is taken-for -granted 
behaviour. From a detached perspective, it can be said to be part o f an individual’s background. However 
looking at background and foregrounds from Taylor’s embedded perspective, it is very likely that individuals 
engaging in language games will be completely unaware as to their existence and hence they exist ‘beyond’ the 
background and are incapable o f  becoming part o f the foreground from that domain. Seen in this light, the 
behaviour manifested in a language game is consistent with the idea o f taking-for- granted behaviour associated 
with routine. However from an embedded perspective, the individuals concerned will probably not be aware that 
they are engaged in routine behaviour which separates it from other routines, for example that o f obedience to 
the law in respect o f which he may well be aware as a foreground or background matter.
33 For example, the founding conference, involving the choice o f officials based on accepted electoral 
procedures reflecting underlying democratic principles.
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technique.34 One can argue as Tully does that a general rule cannot ‘account for precisely the 
phenomenon we associated with understanding the meaning of the general term: the ability to 
use a general term as well as to question its accepted use, in various circumstances without
1  c
recursive doubts.’ The implications of the infinite regress helps to lead to this conclusion. 
Yet from the individual’s experience, this is not how it seems. Wittgenstein’s approach 
looking at it from Taylor’s structuring of the experience of existence into the foreground and 
background rears up its head and swallows Wittgenstein’s point in the sense that the idea of 
an inter-subjectively generated technique that explains communication and social action is 
very unlikely to be part of an individual’s foreground as he engages in such activity, nor 
likely even to be part of his background and is far more likely to be completely outside the 
consciousness of the individual although remaining as part of Wittgenstein’s stage-setting. 
The experience of the embedded agent may be explainable in such terms but is unlikely to be 
experienced in such terms.
34 Wittgenstein, L 1967.
35 Tully, J 1995: 105-106
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Chapter 12: Symbols, Transcendence, Embeddedness and Routine
1. In this chapter I will bring together a series of pervasive qualities previously revealed and 
applied to varying degrees in the second readings of the models under examination in this 
thesis. These comprise the symbolic, transcendence, embeddednesss and routine that can be 
seen as the metaphysical fabric of sovereignty’s articulation and out which, with particular 
reference to the symbolic form of language and transcendence, emerges a framework, namely 
the secularised chain of being, within which such articulation occurs. In so doing, I will 
initially refer to Lindahl’s model of sovereignty which is significantly influenced by 
Cassirer’s symbolic forms in order to point out its strengths and weaknesses. I will suggest 
that the latter results from his failure to overcome the shortcomings of Cassirer’s model of 
symbolic forms. I will then identify the secularised chain of being as central to an 
understanding of the metaphysical domain in which ideas of sovereignty exist. I will then 
seek to use it together with the ideas of the symbolic, the transcendent, embeddedness and 
routine to illuminate the dynamics of political and military conflict through which the 
location of sovereignty is determined.
2. Within the process of democratic governance with which Lindahl is particularly 
concerned, sovereignty is located in ‘the people’ as a transcendent absent unity in contrast to 
the particular, present and diverse features of the individuals that make up society in its 
immanent actuality.1 A political order is achieved through the exercise of political power by 
government representing the sovereign in whose name such exercise is undertaken. In so 
doing resolving the conflicting interests of society is achieved by government by reference to 
the overall interests of the transcendent absent sovereign entity which are constantly 
unfolding. Hence, the sovereign provides the ultimate point of unity and reference for 
governmental action and by these means government endeavours to legitimate its actions. 
Lindahl’s characterisation of sovereignty is persuasive and reflects what I will later refer to as 
a secularised chain of being. More immediately however, it will be argued that the 
complexity of the triadic relationship between sovereign, government and individuals of 
society posed by Lindahl’s model is not fully captured.
1 Lindahl, H 1997: 347-371.
2 Lindahl, H 1997: 366-367.
3 Lindahl, H 1997: 358.
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3. The exploration of the inadequacies of this model will take place from two perspectives, 
namely that of the disembedded and the embedded. From the first perspective, it will occur 
through investigating the transcendent nature of the people. It will in the process draw on 
the proposition that the division between transcendence and immanence posed by Lindahl is 
miscast in that transcendence and immanence cannot be completely separated from one 
another. From the second perspective, it will be argued that reducing the characterisation of 
sovereignty to the Cassirerian symbolic form is helpful but inadequate in that this does not 
bring out the centrality of routinization for the operation of sovereignty. In so doing, a 
synthesis of the symbolic form and routinization will occur to provide a model of sovereignty 
which better explains its complexities.
Perspectives
4. If one takes the idea of transcendence as presented in Lindahl’s formula as one in which 
the separation of the general and particular are marked by the differentiation between the 
transcendent and the immanent, it is the case that, as used by him, neither completely escapes 
from qualities associated with the other. Looking at transcendence attributed to God and ‘the 
people’ a number of comments can be made. The conceptualisation of the idea of God in 
Derridian terms denotes the qualities of pure transcendence. However in religious terms the 
idea of God attributes properties to Him such as goodness associated with Man, and even 
though in their imagined perfection they are not immanently experienced, the result is the 
movement away of the idea of God from the realm of pure transcendence. The point is that in 
describing what is considered to be transcendent, one cannot in the absence of completely 
negativing all categories associated with immanent presence, completely escape from the 
immanent and immanence itself embodies commonplace transcendence.
5. When it comes to the idea of ‘the people’ the position becomes more complex which a 
simple substitution of ‘God’ by ‘the people’ does not reflect. The idea of ‘the people’ is a 
problematic one from a variety of perspectives.4 From an external perspective, that is to say
4 Hegel for example reflected on the difficulty o f conceptualising the people when he claimed that 
‘opposed to the sovereignty o f  the monarch, the sovereignty o f the people is one o f the most confused based on 
the wild idea o f the “people”.’ However he also captures the necessity for it to be represented when he then 
went on to say that ‘[t]aken without a monarch...the people is a formless mass and no longer a state’( Hegel, 
GWF 1967: 279). At the centre o f this need for representation is the impossibility o f the people or constituent or 
sovereign power to express itself unconditionally (Lindahl, H 1997; Christodoulides, E 2007: 191). It can only 
express itself in a conditioned manner, that it is to say in emergent or settled constitutional form. However even
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from one that is located at a point outside a specific people in question, one is already 
removed from its pure expression as displayed by Derrida since this is an idea provoked by a 
physical presence of human beings rather than nothing. As with the model of Hobbes, with 
regard to the multitude in the state of nature, there is an operating but implicit assumption 
reflecting an acceptance of an ongoing practice that the extent of the multitude and in this 
case the people is finite and territorially limited. Since if one regards ‘the people’ as 
potentially embracing the population of the world in what would be a global conception of 
sovereignty, in contrast there is a specificity attached which reflects a practice involving a 
division into peoples who are geographically located and separated from one another which 
are each likely to have attributed to them specific histories, cultures and socio-political 
organisations. To cite Anderson, at the very least, a nation, which for these purposes is to be 
regarded as synonymous with a people, possesses the generic qualities of geographical 
limitation, sovereignty and the idea that it constitutes a community.5 The idea of a particular 
people in this sense therefore involves the foregrounding of one people at the expense of 
others, in what amounts to a double movement of inclusion and exclusion, whereby in 
relation to a given people a separate sovereignty is attributed, namely (P|) which clearly 
implies that in so far as other sovereign peoples exist, they are excluded (-Pn).6 This double 
movement of sovereignty we saw in particular when considering the models of Hobbes and 
Austin but could clearly also be applied to Schmitt. The idea of a people hence from a 
perspective that is external to any particular people, potentially posits all peoples as co­
existing in what can be regarded as a plane of immanence with no particular people 
occupying a transcendent position in relation to any other people. However such immanence 
is not divorced from transcendence since the very classification of populations in this way 
involves a synthesis which involves a category of collective being, namely that o f ‘peoples’ 
which transcend the individuals that constitute them, a reflection of a political metaphysic
its representation is problematic not least because those summoned in the ‘w e’ that denotes a collective such as 
the people are summoned despite themselves (Christodoulides, E 2007: 202). I seek above not to engage in these 
difficulties which have been done elsewhere but to explore the transcendent nature o f ‘the people’.
5 Anderson, B 1991: 7. The relationship between people and nation is a complex one and at times the terms are 
used synonymously and at times differently. Yack for example distinguishes between ‘a people’ and ‘a nation’ 
by claiming that the ‘a people’ are a community that exists in space and ‘ a nation’ is a community that exists in 
time (Yack, 2001: 520-521). While a nation may be specially dispersed as for example the German people and a 
given people by reference to statehood such as the Spanish people comprise a political unit o f a number of 
nationalities, the separation o f space-time into its components in this way can lead to the erroneous conclusion 
that a ‘people’ has no history and a ‘nation’ has no spatial presence. For my purposes the term people is used to 
denote a political unity which may comprise o f a single nationality or a number.
6 There is no inevitability that those excluded from a particular people’s sovereignty are in fact recognised by 
that people and its government as possessing sovereignty and this is historically captured by the process of  
colonization.
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that embodies the idea of sovereign equality. The above analysis, in contrast to Lindahl’s 
model, leads to the foregrounding of international practice, in which the seeming 
transcendence of a given people, from the perspective of the state through which they realise 
themselves through domestic governance, is replaced by what amounts to the immanent 
practice which characterises the relationship between a multitude of peoples expressed 
through a multitude of states and governments.
6. The question that has to be asked however is the perspective from which Lindahl’s model 
is constructed. Its conceptualisation of ‘the people’ is detached in character and is unlikely to 
accord with the perspective of individual participants. It is true looking at Lefort’s 
observation that democracy is predicated on the idea that ultimately the power of the people 
belongs to no one in the sense that while a government’s actions can be attributed to the will 
of the people, that will is perceived to transcend any particular expression of it, unfolds 
diachronically and can never be fully appropriated. Its numerous and at times contradictory 
divisions point to a perceived existence that as a transcendent unity overcomes such 
divisions. The idea of the people’s transcendence cannot be equated particularly from a 
diachronic point of view with any particular attributions as they constantly mutate. Flowing 
from this is the idea that attributed to that transcendence is the idea of the people as a 
common space and as its power appears to emanate from no one, popular sovereignty can be 
likened to an empty place.7 But this description also amounts to a disembedded view, from 
the perspective of individual participants through which an endeavour is being made to 
capture the situation they experience. From a particular individual’s or government’s point 
of view, qualities will be attributed to a people, which may well be regarded as possessing 
varying degrees of permanence and in so far as mutation occurs, such changes are perceived 
to be expressions of a set of constancies with regard to language, culture, political priorities 
and other matters. Such attributions may well be a projection of the individual’s or 
government’s unfolding conclusions from his or its own experiences of how society operates 
which will be constructed though an operating set of assumptions relating, inter alia, to the 
moral, economic and cultural domains as to how a society ought to operate. There is 
therefore subjectively, an experience of degrees of fixity about society which, from a 
disembedded and diachronic perspective, can be seen to amount to a process of change of
7 Lefort, C 1986: 279; 1988: 225.
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which the individual might become aware by comparing past with present and even then may 
well relate past to present through a set of constancies.
7. However even from a detached point of view, the people as a common space and power 
being akin to an empty place, needs to be viewed with care. Both space and place suggest 
limits, most obviously those associated with the existing geographical configuration of a state 
which links into the international practice concerning the articulation of stable borders. But 
the common space and empty place are also predicated upon the continuing unity of the 
political community whose realisation is through government. That unity inevitably has its 
limits, determined by a variety of factors including socio-economic, cultural, religious, 
historical and political ones. Where such limits lie is likely to be a matter of ongoing 
controversy and dispute. Although they may not easily be determinable does not mean they 
do not exist. In reality they are only likely to be revealed, after the event, that is to say after 
the fracture of a political community into two or more and/or where democracy has been 
replaced by an authoritarian regime 8
A Secularised Chain o f Being
8. The character of transcendence however needs to be unpicked further. As we have already 
seen, transcendence can be thought about in two inter-related senses: firstly in the 
metaphysical sense associated with the need to attribute life’s causation and character to that 
which lies beyond it, most obviously exemplified by religion, and secondly in the 
commonplace sense attributable to the need to make sense of daily experience including that 
which involves social structure. Concentrating on the first sense, it is captured by the chain 
of being which developed in Christian theology prior to the rise of the nominalistic approach 
to conceptualisng the relation of God and nature, in which the world is perceived as being an 
outflow of God. So that in the conception of sovereignty present in Triumphus’ model, God 
remains tied to the immanent order and so is not freely transcendent.9 Nominalistic thought 
provoked a re-conceptualisation of the relationship between God and the cosmos whereby the 
former became completely detached from the latter and the latter emerges as an independent 
entity. As a consequence of the nominalist ‘break’ with the previous conception, a number of 
consequences flowed, including the release of the law-giver from the requirements of divine
8 More will be said about conflict below.
9 Buijs, G 2003: 250.
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reason so that the holder of sovereignty comes to be perceived as free from the law.10 This 
approach emerges in Bodin’s model and is clearly present in Hobbesian thought, as portrayed 
in the first chapter on Hobbes earlier in this thesis both in his eschatology and in his 
conceptualisation of sovereignty. Law comes to be seen as essentially arbitrary and for 
Hobbes, becomes a product of will, the existence of which can no longer be made attributable 
to a higher transcendent order.11 Austin’s model follows in this tradition as does Schmitt’s
1 9decisionism. Nominalism provides the conceptual space for the legitimation of the 
geographically limited supreme ruler existing independently from the pope and Emperor as 
depicted in all the models of sovereignty discussed in this thesis with the exception of those 
o f Augustinus Triumphus and Dante. It also allows for the emergence of the national 
community, that is to say ‘the people’ as a corpus republicae mysticism in its own right.13 
The emergence of the national community at first sight appears to be completely 
incompatible with the symbolism of the universal chain of being. However it is suggested 
that in fact what occurred was not so much the abolition of the chain of being altogether but 
the demise of it in its universal and explicitly theological form and the continuation of it in a 
secularised form.14
9. Its continuation is most clearly manifested in the metaphysical arrangement between 
people, government and population most powerfully expressed in arrangements of 
democratic governance. As with the universal chain of being where God as the creator of the 
cosmos could not be completely cut off from it, so with ‘the people’ who cannot be 
completely disconnected from its concrete manifestation giving rise to the infection of its 
transcendent absence with the qualities of its immanent presence. Hierarchy also, with
10 Or at the very least consists o f  a model in which higher law is largely residualised.
11 Buijs, G 2003: 251.
12 Schmitt’s decisionism in its repudiation o f rationality as providing an exhaustive explanation o f sovereign 
decision-making most explicitly reflects the idea o f the inscrutable God.
13 Kantorowicz, E.H: 207-232 also referred to in Buijs, G 2003:254 and Lefort, C 1988: 251.
14 Buijs considers that modernity ushers in the destruction o f the universal chain o f being but does not consider 
the possibility o f its manifestation in secularised and localised form. Lefort, on the other hand, does recognise 
the emergence o f the corpus republicae mysticism. However in the publications referred to at ftn 7 above he 
does not explicitly relate it to models o f sovereignty and does not appear to specifically explore the influence o f  
nominalistic thought upon the development o f secular governance and democracy. The idea o f God associated 
with such thought constitutes Him as an inscrutable being unbound by any normative framework. The idea o f  
emptiness associated with power referred to by Lefort in relation to democracy suggests a place o f unfettered 
potentiality, the realisation o f which is also unconstrained by any pre-existing normative limits in a substantive 
sense. (Note however the comments above about the actuality o f  limits). One can therefore see a significant 
connection between the two, that is to say the idea of an inscrutable God as constructed through a nominalist 
framework and the idea o f emptiness associated by Lefort with the conceptualisation of power within 
democracy.
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potential for enlargement, appears between the people, government and population. This is 
much like, referring to Cassirer’s symbolic forms, the mythic gods which were projections of 
primitive man to fasten his immanent interactions to certainties in a perplexingly uncertain 
world. The discourse of democracy proclaims that government owes its existence to the 
people to whom it is accountable.15 The attribution of the people’s will to government action 
is reinforced by attributing that revealed will to ‘the word’ embodied in the constitution.16
10. This is accompanied by the growth of prescriptions for governance which explicitly 
embody functional separation of governance as a reaction against the emergence of 
centralisation as mirrored in writings of Locke and Montesquieu and in practical terms 
realised most obviously in the governmental arrangements of France and the United States. 
However in so far as the chain of being continues to exist, it does so under the influence of a 
nominalist metaphysic which provides the conceptual springboard for the growth of the 
secular and postivism and chimes in with the decentralisation of governance from its pre­
modem hierarchical form. The finality of the sovereign decision is constructed around the 
foregrounding of the national community as the basic self-sufficient unity of governance.17 
Furthermore the unfolding of secularised ‘higher’ law embodied in the idea of the codified 
constitution occurs within a positivist framework which involves the expulsion of an ultimate 
theological rationale for the justification of law and the foregrounding of it as an instrument 
for change rather than the expression of custom. 18
15 The rather paradoxical position ‘the people’ finds itself in is that it is considered to be both the foundation of  
government and also to be ‘above’ government in that government serves the people. This can be explained by 
the foundation comprising concrete episodic manifestations o f the people in the form for example o f  elections 
giving rise to government while the people’s supremacy relates to its transcendent continuity, which is located at 
the head o f the secularised chain of being and which provides the point o f reference by which governmental 
action is evaluated and justified.
16The sacred character o f this revealed will is captured by Justice Hugo Black who states ‘[The] Constitution is 
my legal Bible: its plan o f government is my plan and its destiny is my destiny. I cherish every word of it from 
the first to the last and I personally deplore even the slightest deviation from its least important commands’ 
(Black, H 1969: 66). The idea of the chain o f being as applying to governance is not simply applicable to 
democracy but is also potentially revealed in dictatorship. For example God is replaced by the iron laws o f  
history as exemplified by Marxist writings through which the people develop as revealed by a leader whose will 
embodies that o f the people as made possibly by the operation o f such laws with government seeming to 
emanate and be dependent upon such a leader for its continued existence, legitimacy and effectiveness.
17 There are clearly departures form this exclusivity with the arrangements associated with the European Union 
and the European Convention on Human Rights but these are partial exceptions to prevailing practice described 
above and do not re-introduce higher law in a pre-modem sense. In so far as the finality o f decision-making is 
re-located in institutions whose jurisdictions are international, it is limited and voluntary in character.
18 Freeman, M.D.A 2001:199.
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11. Lindahl’s model reflects the idea of a secularised chain of being and is not simply 
applicable to democratic governance. The chain exists within and is penetrated by a 
nominalist metaphysic which is embodied in the relationship between government and the 
governed. If the symbolic pole of ‘the people’ is residualised by, for example, the negation 
of the availability and undertaking of genuinely democratic means of government choice with 
its voice coming to be permanently attributed to one individual or group then one can see 
coming to the fore out of the chain of being a single relationship, denoted by fixed 
government and subject to what amounts ultimately to the emergence of dictatorship. A 
modem variant of the inscmtable and transcendent God might be expressed through the 
charismatic dictator whose decisions are final and infallible and whose claim to quasi divine 
status is attempted through a multitude of devices.19 The infallibility of the decision, 
furthermore in the final analysis, need not be based on reason or justification but can be 
‘created out of nothing.’20
12. Hence the arrangement of governance, as depicted by the secularised and diachronically 
existing chain of being, appears to operate as an all-encompassing arrangement from which 
the ‘outside’ is comprised of the potentially threatening ‘Other’ whose characterisation is the 
subject of international relations and which can be seen to comprise in the main, of parallel
9 Iunits of governance, in what to use Schmitt’s term, amounts to a pluriverse of states. 
Relationships with the outside are conducted by halting references to the practice of 
international law, where the conflicting principles of sovereign equality and hierarchy
99interact. As Hobsbawn has pointed out, in the international arena where the process of
19 Thus in relation to Hitler, the construction o f his myth resulted from ‘a mixture of autosuggestion, deliberate 
fabrication and quasi-universal acceptance... The failed artist was transmutted into the architect o f the universe, 
the deranged ascetic into a saint on a stained glass window, and his entire spasmodic biography into the architect 
o f  the universe’ (Aycoberry, P 1999: 68). Apart from his live performances, emphasis was placed on visual 
propaganda in the form o f the cinema, photography and artistic representation. Mythic generation in the case o f  
Hitler had at its centre the claim that he had a unique affinity with the German People. In effect through a 
continuous and infallible contract with the people, the ‘ “[p]eople were personified in the Fuhrer’” (Overy, R 
2004: 113). In so far as the ruler embodied the ruled one can see a similarity with Hobbes’ model o f  
sovereignty.
20 As Schmitt describes when alluding to the writings o f De Maistre, an anti-liberal thinker o f the 19th century 
who in effect precedes Schmitt in reducing the state to the moment o f  the decision and who considered that 
every government was absolute and that authority was good once it existed (Schmitt, C 1988:55, 66).
21 Given the fundamentally arbitrary quality o f any existing configuration o f  states, embodied within the idea o f  
the pluriverse of states is the potentiality o f  rupture, the demise o f existing ones and the emergence o f new ones 
and the reconfiguration o f borders. Hence the role played by most states through international law to strictly 
limit the realisation of this potentiality.
22 Simpson, G 2004.
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globalisation has unfolded in a multitude of arenas, to date no effective expression has 
emerged in the political domain of an adequate supplement or alternative to the nation state.23
Conflict
13. However, the seeming completeness of a governmental arrangement existing within a 
seemingly complete and self-generating world characterised by a secularised chain of being, 
confronts elements, that in terms of potentiality, continuously pose a threat to its integrity, 
even if  such a threat is remote. These threats are capable of emanating from both the 
‘outside’ and the ‘inside’ and a combination of the two to the integrity of the chain of being.24 
Leaving aside the general issue of the disempowerment of the state through globalisation and 
the hegemonic practices of the more powerful of their number, from the outside comes the 
possibility of destabilisation and ultimately ‘cold’ or ‘hot’ war and conquest. From the 
inside, ultimately rupture is continuously posed albeit frequently only as a remote possibility 
in what can be conceptualised as the triadic relationship between people, government and 
population. To explore this a little further, a return will be made to Sartre’s bus queue and the 
existence of a set of groupings that interlock through the persons of the members of the 
queues ‘through’ whom a series of grouping also intersect.25 One can picture from this, in 
relation to the process of governance, the unfolding political configuration of the population 
as attributed to it by the activities of its representatives.
14. Within the population which can be perceived as being formed into a collective through 
the activity of representation, there is a continuing possibility that individuals operating as 
individuals or within a group context, in so far as they contemplate their identity and needs, 
might consider that existing governmental priorities and policies do not suit them. Within the
23 Hobsbawn, E 2007: 23. Turning the ‘outside’ into a domain that more resembles the ‘inside’ is the function 
o f bilateral and multilateral treaty making and international law. The European Union itself can be seen as the 
most advanced project for the turning the outside into an extension of the ‘inside’ with the construction o f a 
series o f interlocking arrangements between governments o f existing European states expressed through 
centralised regional institutions with growing jurisdictions regarding regional governance. This arrangement 
poses a move beyond the nation state as the fundamental unit o f equality towards their individual citizens. Such 
movement operates in an international context wherein the arrangement o f states is characterised by the 
principles o f equality and hierarchy interacting. The sense o f inside is revealingly explored by Conquest, R in 
his exploration o f order and chaos in the international domain (Cooper, R 2003).
24 Dangers posed by both ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ developments in combination are raised for example by the 
current governmental claim in the United Kingdom as to the threat o f international terrorism.
25 On the basis o f Sartre’s classification some o f these may have the features associated with what he classified 
as the ‘ group’ namely ‘an ensemble each o f whose members is determined by the others in reciprocity’ (in 
contrast to a series as manifested in the bus queue) (Sartre, J-P 2004: 828).
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domain of the democratic process, this is captured in the daily activity and routine of politics. 
The assumption is that the democratic process provides the possibility of satisfying the 
priorities of the population through representation as it unfolds. Yet what occurs where, 
within an existing population that is attributed in a transcendent sense to ‘the people’, there is 
another which is potentially disruptive to existing arrangements? A useful example here is a 
population, perhaps a sub-state nationality or even majority population that does not consider 
that it can obtain the necessary autonomy or representation under existing constitutional
97arrangements. One can see that from the perspective of such a grouping, its perceived 
emergence as a people separate from the majority or dominant population might have been 
forged in counter-position to it with regard to a variety of factors including language, race, 
religion and economic position. Its own perceived religious, economic and cultural qualities 
together with its ideals and political aims might well have been developed in reaction to the 
actions, propensities, ideals and policies it attributes to what it perceives as the dominant 
population. Hence its sense of collective identity might be inextricably linked to the way that 
it considers it has been historically treated and excluded by what it perceives to be the 
dominant population, whose identity seen from its particular perspective possesses certain 
permanent characteristics.28 In so far as there has been a routine of engagement in the 
existing mode of governance and within the existing chain of being, it might become 
disrupted.29 The uncritical acceptance of the existing status-quo becomes replaced with an 
increasingly critical attitude based around an increasingly coherent alternative narrative, 
expressed through an emerging leadership in what Sartre would call a fused group that poses 
a rupture from existing arrangement in order to create a new chain of being, given expression
26 The way in which oppositional movements develop has attracted a substantial literature. See for example 
McAdam D, Tarrow, S and Tilly, C 2001, Tarrow S, 1998 and Tilly, C 2004. What emerges, clearly 
exemplified by Tarrow for example, is that the collectivity o f such movements is achieved, inter alia through 
the attribution o f grievances that identify injustices whereby responsibility is ascribed to identifiable others and 
solutions are formulated that form pivotal points around which mobilisation is organised (Tarrow, S 1998: 111).
27 The obvious example o f the majority population in this position historically is the South African non-white 
population. An example o f a sub-state nationality is the Tamil people o f Sri Lanka or the Kurdish people 
concentrated in South-East Turkey.
28 For example, the emergence o f the Palestinian people and their claim expressed through their leadership to 
nation and statehood can be seen to be inextricably linked to the emergence o f the Zionist challenge and the 
emergence and continuation o f the Israeli state. That is to say there can be a relationship operating in which, to 
use the language o f normalities, one desired normality which is perceived to be currently denied, is developed in 
reaction to another normality as perceived by the subjugated people characterised by exclusion by a ‘hostile’ 
people. See for example Shlaim, A 2000; Gregory, D 2004: 76-106; Pappe, I 2006.
29 One sees this for example in relation to the Kurdish population in South East Turkey. The Palestinian 
example does not fit into that o f the Kurdish, Tamil or South African examples in that their physical exclusion 
was central to the creation of the Israeli state (Shlaim A 2000).
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through the creation of a new state. The secularised chain of being is therefore not simply 
applicable in case of resistance to existing governmental arrangements, made in the name of 
the existing sovereign people, but is also applicable to a grouping that considers itself to be a 
people whose sovereignty in effect only exists in the domain of subjective entitlement and 
expectation.
15. Civic routine, involving engagement in existing political and legal processes through 
existing representation, hence can become increasingly pervaded with a sense of generalised 
unsatisfied aspirations which become, to reflect Cassirer’s terminology, symbolic poles
through which political debate and contest is constructed and emerges as, to put it in
1Wittgensteinian terms, the new language game of liberation. The routine of engagement 
may become infused by language which points to the possibility of disengagement perhaps 
signified by contestation over sovereignty. The routine of constitutional engagement 
expressed, for example, through the use of law to advance a grouping’s cause might be 
replaced or joined by the routine of disengagement from such mechanisms and the routine of 
the pursuance of unconstitutional means.
16. This process can be seen for example in relation to the Anglo-Irish conflict which has 
only recently been settled with any realistic possibility of success.32 Here in what was a 
conflict that lasted some eight hundred years, it is worthwhile focusing upon the events 
sparked by the general election in the United Kingdom in 1918 which at that time included 
the entirety of the island of Ireland. A majority of Irish representatives, elected to the British 
parliament, were committed to withdrawal from Britain, an independent Irish republic and
30 Sartre, J.P 2004: 254, Clearly this is not inevitable in the sense that it may well be that lack o f identification 
with the existing mode o f governance might resolve itself for example in the formation o f sub-state 
arrangements o f governance that are constitutionally reached in what can be described as a pluri-national state. 
Tierney provides an important account o f the constitutional dynamics o f this process by reference to Western 
states and their minority nationalities including the Quebecois in Canada, the Catalans in Spain and the Scots in 
the United Kingdom. In all these cases constitutional adjustments are made to provide such nationalities with 
greater autonomy in the form o f limited representative government See Tiemay, S 2004. See also Hopkins, J 
2002 which explores the regionalisation o f European governments from a constitutional perspective. The 
possibility o f a separation and the creation o f a new state through which a new chain o f being would have been 
constituted was posed by elements o f  the nationalist movement in Ireland as represented by Sinn Fein before the 
current settlement.
31 This may well express itself in debate over the character o f the existing arrangements o f sovereignty which 
may feed into the attitudes towards the existing constitutional arrangements including the interpretation o f the 
constitution itself. This emerged in particular in the conflict between Canadian state and those seeking the 
independence o f Quebec (Tierney, S 2004:100-109).
32 The historical and factual detail that follows is based on a variety of sources which include the texts o f the 
agreements referred to and Beckett, J.C 1966; Fitzpatrick, D 1977; Kelley, K.J 1988; Foster, R.F 1988 and 
Coogan, T.P 2003.
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resistance to what it perceived as continuing illegitimate occupation by the British of Ireland. 
These representatives proceeded to adopt a provisional constitution and set up a separate all- 
Ireland legislature in Dublin. They also reaffirmed the declaration of independence of 1916
'j
made in the name of the Irish people. Significant parts of the country started to be 
administered by or on behalf of the newly formed government. The British, supported mainly 
by the Protestants of the North-East of Ireland, refused to recognise the proclamation. Two 
chains of being faced each other, the existing British one and a newly forming Irish one.
Irish resistance to existing arrangements of governance was made through what was a double 
claim. Firstly it was made in the name of the Irish people and secondly by those who claimed 
to be its representatives. Both these claims were opposed not only by the British but by 
mainly protestant sections of Irish population, who identified with the British chain of being. 
The Anglo-Irish War from 1919 to 1921 was fought over the question of sovereignty and the 
Irish republican initiative was effectively crushed.34 What emerged was a constitutional 
settlement which allowed for the creation of an Irish state on part of the island of Ireland with 
dominion status providing less than complete independence.35 Initially, reflecting the 
character of the settlement, which was effectively imposed following military defeat, no 
reference was made to the Irish nation in the first constitution of the Irish Free State. The 
Irish chain of being, expressed through the language of popular sovereignty was substantially 
suppressed through the rather ambiguous claim that governmental authority was derived from 
‘the people of Ireland’ with no mention of the Irish nation, its sovereignty and its claim to 
the entire island. It re-emerged more forcefully in the 1937 constitution in a number of 
ways. Firstly this later constitution was created in the name of the Irish nation whose
7^sovereignty was expressed, inter alia, by its right to form a government. Secondly, the 
territorial expression of nationhood was expressly and unconditionally proclaimed to be the 
entire island of Ireland rather than the part occupied by the Irish state.38 Thirdly, the 
legislature and executive of the new state in the constitution unconditionally reserved their
33 Beckett, J.C 1969: 445.
34 The declaration o f independence hence was never followed by the institutionalisation o f all Irish governance 
through the creation of an independently existing and effective normative system that would allow for the 
presupposition o f a newly created basic norm. Hence the declaration’s potentiality to become the ever-present 
moment o f  founding o f a created state was never realised. These observations reflect the more general point that 
the pre-supposition o f a new basic norm can only take place retroactively (Kelsen, H 1999: 115; Lindahl, H 
2007: 19).
35 Most obviously, through the continuing right o f  the British military forces to undertake the defence o f Irish 
coastal waters, to use Irish harbour facilities and the restricted right o f the Irish government to establish and 
maintain its own defence forces ( Second Schedule to the Irish Free State Act 1922).
36 Article 2 of the Constitution o f the Irish Free State Act 1922.
37 The preamble to the constitution and Article 1.
38 Article 2 o f the 1937 constitution.
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rights to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of the island.39 As part of the process leading 
to the current settlement in Northern Ireland, interestingly, amendments to the 1937 
constitution have been undertaken so the Irish nation’s claim to the entire territory of the 
island of Ireland is now made conditional upon the consent of a majority of the population 
and the reserved powers referred to above are removed.40
States o f Exception and competing normalities
17. Violent conflict that episodically has characterised relations between Britain and Ireland.. 
Such conflict need to be seen not simply from the perspective of the state’s prerogative but 
also from that of those that engage in resistance and which is pointed to as an embryonic 
possibility in Hobbes’ model and more fully in Locke’s and implicitly in Austin’s through the 
cessation of the habit of obedience.41 The language of sovereignty has primarily perceived 
the state from the perspective of the ruler and not the ruled reflecting its origins in seeking a 
justification for centralised governance.42 To stretch the meaning of the exception, employed 
by Schmitt in his exploration of the idea of sovereignty, against what was an authoritarian 
context, so as to include the decision by a population to resist a state’s unwarranted 
encroachments, reflects more consistently the idea of sovereignty as having a relational 
dimension between ruler and the ruled, particularly bearing in mind the implications of 
democracy that are reflected in the idea of sovereignty residing with ‘the people’. The 
ultimate conclusion to such a struggle might be the emergence of a new political order out of 
the old that has the ingredients of statehood. Hence the spectrum of crisis measures 
associated with this broadened idea of the state of exception can range from the suspension of 
existing constitutional arrangements by existing government to quell acts of resistance to 
revolutionary overthrow by its population.43
39 Article 3 of the 1937 constitution.
40 These were removed by way o f amendments made to the 1937 constitution in 1999, reflecting the terms o f  
Article 1 o f the Agreement between the governments o f the United Kingdom and Ireland and Article 2 o f the 
Good Friday Agreement both made on 10th April 1998. The current settlement provides for newly structured 
devolved government for the people o f Northern Ireland within existing borders.
41 One can also see the state o f exception used in this way by reference to natural law. For example, both 
Aquinas and Suarez considered it justifiable for example to kill a tyrant in self defence ( Finnis, J 1998: 288- 
290; Tiemay, B 1997: 313-315). See chapter 10 para 1 above.
42 The sense o f seeing the state from the perspective o f the ruler as opposed to the ruled is usefully commented
upon by Bobbio N 1989: 54-57.
43 The range o f crisis is captured by Christodoulides, E 2001: 122.
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18. In the idea of war, as for example experienced in Ireland, looked at from a British 
perspective, a state of exception in effect existed as manifested by the introduction of martial 
law in large parts of Ireland, the draconian use of powers of search and arrest accompanied 
by the use of the ’Black and Tans’, auxiliaries who behaved like independent mercenaries 
and who engaged in the sacking of towns and villages.44 From the Irish republican point of 
view, it could be said that the British occupation of territory in defiance of the Irish’s 
entitlement to sovereignty also amounted to exceptional circumstances requiring a state of 
exception which was initially expressed in the formation of an Irish parliament and 
declaration of independence in defiance of the British in a bid to create a new normality and 
was subsequently accompanied by military initiatives to protect the bid for independence.
The potential was therefore open for configurations of sovereignty to profoundly change and 
referring back to the grammar of normalities explored in relation to Schmitt, one can see 
posed two incompatible normalities, namely a re-establishment of order by existing sovereign 
arrangements associated with British governmental institutions or its establishment through 
the successful realization of Irish sovereignty expressed in Irish statehood manifested through 
Irish governance.45
19. More generally, moving away from the specifics of the Irish conflict, the temptation here 
is of course to highlight the rupture that will be undertaken to create such a formation, 
primarily one in which the new form of government emerges in contravention of existing 
constitutional arrangements and hence is detached from them. However, in terms of the 
principles over which the conflict leading to separation might be fought, they are likely to be 
profoundly connected with those associated with the state from which separation is sought. 
The constitutional structure of the new formation might well reflect those of the arrangement 
applicable prior to separation, either mirroring or reacting to them or a combination of both 
and the terms of conflict are likely to reflect international practice in the sense of existing 
border configurations even where a new state emerges out of an existing one. Neither is there 
detachment in the sense of the continuing need to refer to transcendent entities, whether they 
be ‘the people’ or ‘nation’ or God or a combination thereof, as the reference points by which 
the formation is justified and against which, through its governmental expression, it seeks to 
justify its continuing existence. Hence Derrida’s point about foundations involving
44 Foster, R.F 1988:498.
451 do not seek here to engage in the issues o f  international state recognition.
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references to God and natural law at such moments.46 The point however is that the major 
significance of these references is not their enunciation at the time of their making whether it 
be in a constitution or otherwise and the resultant expectations that these create. It is in the 
fact that their existence forms a constant background to society’s operational foreground as it 
moves into the future. It is that very movement that helps to invest what otherwise might 
have been an insignificant historical event with its significance as an ever present moment of 
founding that provides a reference point that ultimately helps to justify and legitimate 
governmental activity.47 As part of the background, that event contributes towards the 
ontological security that is achieved through the routinization of governance. In such 
circumstances and in so far as it comes to the foreground in the process perhaps of 
constitutional controversy, moments of foundation achieve a double presence. That is to say 
they constitute a double moment.48 One exists historically in real time and another which is 
transcendent and exists outside time and so is experienced as an ever present foundational 
reference point49
46 Derrida, J 1986: 11.
47 This sense o f the past operating as a reference point for the future is captured by Lindahl 2007: 19.
48 Being akin to the King’s two bodies as per Kantorowicz, E.H: 1957.
49 This is akin to the creation myth which takes place in sacred time as for example developed by Eliade, M 
1975: 36-37. A slightly different way o f capturing the transcendent quality o f the transcendent moment is to say 
that ‘it spreads over continuous time’ (Christodoulides, E.A 2001:115).
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Chapter 13: Concluding Remarks
1. Augustinus Triumphus’ model of sovereignty, although distinctly pre-modem in 
character provides an important clue to the nature of sovereignty. From that model 
one can see the chain of being in operation with the idea of God at its head. The 
location of sovereignty ostensibly with the pope, although dependent upon the 
acquiescence of the Council of Bishops, denotes the relational quality of sovereignty 
and hence its embedded character. However as importantly from the perspective of 
this thesis, the configuration of his model is captured by the idea of the chain of being. 
It is the idea of this chain of being, albeit in secularised form, which remains a 
constant point of reference within this thesis. The models of sovereignty alluded to 
and indeed other models not specifically explored in some way or other are orientated 
towards the chain of being, even if only in attempt to depart from it. One can see in 
the variety of ways that domestic sovereignty has been described. Whether by 
reference to a particular institution as in the case of Bodin, Hobbes, Austin and 
Schmitt, or whether by reference to ‘the people’, as for example in the case of Locke, 
or Kant and Lindahl, or whether by reference to sovereign power, as for example by 
Loughlin with specific reference to the relationship between government and citizenry 
and Agamben with specific reference to the relationship between constituting and 
constituted power, all such models reflect in one way or another a persistent theme, 
that is the chain of being, which for all of them, save for Bodin’s, has a secularised 
form.1 To put it in relational terms, the triadic relationship between people, 
government and the governed persists, even where the model suggests an attempt to 
suppress or residualise.
2. For example, Hobbes’ model is a reaction against the pre-modem chain of being 
which posed God at its head and hence constantly posed the danger that religious 
institutions would trump secular ones concerning governance. However he attempts 
to replace God with sovereign and in so doing to reduce a triadic chain of being to a 
dyadic one, with the sovereign occupying both the position of government and 
transcendent being. This duality of being is fed by a legitimating narrative which 
culminates in the story of the sovereign’s creation. This narrative’s suppressive
1 Loughlin, M 2003: 70; Agamben, G 1998: 41.
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quality is characterised by the construction of the public requirement of a residualised 
God by the sovereign himself and the denial of a diachronically existing people by its 
presence being confined to one ever present moment of the sovereign’s creation. That 
momentary existence witnesses the almost simultaneous birth and absorption of ‘the 
people’ into the body of the sovereign fuelling his quasi-divine status. But to tell it 
like this is to miss the most important suppression. It is that the power of such a 
narrative is fed by the actuality of the sovereign’s domination over his subjects rather 
than the other way round, as their present existence is infused with the uncertainties of 
the future captured by the ever-present threat of chaos denoted by the idea of the state 
of nature.
3. Austin’s model does not refer to the third element but simply concentrates on the 
sovereign and subject. However the very lack of presence of a legitimating narrative 
and the pivotal position of habit leaves open the possibility of the sovereign institution 
being associated with the third transcendent element most obviously expressed in the
'y
idea of ‘the people*. Austin does not deny this possibility. Schmitt’s model, even in 
its concentration on the moment of the exception and its authoritarian character, does 
not negate the position of ‘the people’ as a transcendent pole whose will in the final 
analysis is determined by sovereign decision at the moment of exception. Lindahl’s 
model reflects the chain of being, without explicitly drawing out connections with 
other models of sovereignty, apart from Bodin’s. Yet leaving aside the difficulties in 
his conceptualisation of transcendence and immanence, his endeavour to locate 
sovereignty simply with ‘the people’ by an interpretation of Bodin’s model is 
unconvincing. More importantly however, in foregrounding ‘the people’ as the 
exclusive location of sovereignty, Lindahl provides a model which illustrates rather 
than clarifies the fundamental point about sovereignty. That is, to use Cassirer’s idea 
of the symbol as Lindahl endeavoured, sovereignty constitutes a symbol whose 
meaning is contested. It is within the domain of the secularised chain of being that 
the various models of sovereignty studied in this thesis can be located and so the 
chain is capable of acting as a common reference point. This extends to locating 
sovereignty within a particular institution and as a relationship between entities.
2 In effect, he does briefly contemplate the existence o f the third element when he briefly ponders the 
causes o f obedience to sovereigns and consigns the answers to this problem to the domain of 
‘statistics’ and ‘particular histories’, that is to say to arenas outside the domain of his positivist 
jurisprudence. (Austin, J 1832: 247).
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4. It is furthermore the case that to gather a full understanding of the models 
discussed, an exploration of their operation in a diachronic sense reveals that routine 
plays a profound role in their operation, whether it is within times of normality or 
times of exception and such routine suggests an embedded existence of sovereignty 
manifested through its practice. Such embeddedness, if anything is suppressed by the 
discourse associated with sovereignty which points frequently to the founding 
moment which is detached from history with its supremacy seemingly existing 
outside the prevailing practice of governance nationally or internationally. This 
moment of founding as for example exemplified in the loop of foundation where ‘the 
people’ in effect appear to found themselves as referred to above, points to the chain 
of being not simply being conceptualised in a two dimensional sense as denoting a 
hierarchy, but in a three dimension entity as it exists in time. It is government in its 
constant activity that energises the chain of being in its unfolding and at the same time 
energises the transcendent moment of founding and in so doing casts into the shadow 
the exclusionary consequences that any founding involved,3
5. The relationship between the insights of Cassirer and Wittgenstein has been 
explored above in the context of the sovereignty. Neither one can do without the 
other. The endless meanings that can be attributed to terms is consistent with the 
symbolic character of language. It is therefore the language game that provides one 
strategy to enable inter-subjective communication. This in turn provides the bedrock 
of routine which exists beyond the subjective background of the individual upon 
which the contestation of meaning over terms is resolved including that of sovereignty 
and its applications. Lying behind such contests, inevitably for the individuals 
engaged, views of sovereignty within the particularities of the debates and 
circumstances within which such terms are used, will be fed by generalised 
conceptions of sovereignty which in turn will be affected by such particular meanings.
3 One founding moment, fitting into both an inclusionary and exclusionary narrative can feed and be 
fed by the continuing existence o f one territorially based people expressed in particular through its 
actual governance and the continuing denial o f  another people’s claim to statehood. Hence the 
declaration o f the foundation of the Israeli state with its recitation o f the proclaimed history o f the 
Jewish people and consequential victory in what is described as ‘the War o f Independence’ is fed by 
the continuing existence of the Israeli state. At the same time, the very same events within the 
Palestinian narrative is described as al-Nakba (‘the disaster’) which feeds and is fed by what is 
perceived as continuing Palestinian dispossession. This example also highlights in a stark way the 
conditionality attached to the common space and empty place referred to by Lefort, C. See above.
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In considering the language game of sovereign creation, as for example expressed in 
Searle’s formula, the circumstances C which allude to Wittgenstein’s stage setting or 
form of life includes the secularised chain of being.
6. To return to Cassirer, from the models of sovereignty explored or touched upon in 
this thesis, sovereignty is a symbol upon which a variety of meanings are attributed. 
Those meanings reflect wider assumptions by the modellers of the character of the 
human condition, his sociability, the ends around which society should be organised, 
and the models of governance best equipped to meet such ends. Each model in its 
own way constitutes an empire of social being in which there is a point of unity 
around which social interaction is perceived to operate. That point of unity is where 
sovereignty resides. These models, despite their apparent variations, reflect the 
configuration of the chain of being whose existence has deep theological roots and 
whose operation expresses a deep political metaphysic which in turn contributes 
towards the realisation of human ontological security. The achievement of such 
security involves containment of human potentiality in a variety of ways which in turn 
facilitates its enablement.4 Operating within a political chain of being which is 
captured, for example, by the process of democracy contributes towards the 
contemplation of such potentiality which covers both the immensely creative and 
destructive and we are assisted in participating and holding ourselves open to it and its 
conflictual possibilities. The chain of being casts light upon the articulation of 
sovereignty, as discussed in the models explored above, by its reference to the 
relationship between government, the point of transcendent unity, which government 
by its operation claims to represent as a pre-existing entity and the population under 
its jurisdiction. In so doing, however looking at the process of governance simply 
from the perspective of government within the chain of being is inadequate. The 
contingency of governance, associated with the operation of the models of 
sovereignty explored above, finds itself reflected in the operation of the chain of being 
particularly when viewed from perspectives external to it and from those of the 
diversity of embedded individuals who comprise the population that is subject to 
government. The chain of being, particularly when viewed from these additional 
positions, takes sovereignty beyond the confines of the positivist features of the
4 Both language and law are inter-related mechanisms that are part o f this process and embrace both 
containment and enablement o f human potentiality.
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models explored above, revealing their richer implications through exposing their 
contingent and reflexive nature.
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